

**MAJOR GENERAL LEW WALLACE AT SHILOH.**

GENERAL U. S. GRANT'S VINDICATION OF GENERAL WALLACE.—THE WALLACE AND GRANT LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS WITH INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

BY GENERAL HENRY B. CARRINGTON.

[Author of "Battles of the American Revolution."]

It seems common to all great wars that the true version of leading actions is rarely assured by the immediate reports of commanders. Many causes secure to such reports substantial accuracy, but the development of details seldom fails to show that justice to subordinates cannot be done by the simple statement of general plans and general results. There are historians who still claim that Arnold had no part in the battle of Freeman's Farm, September 19, 1777; and many other battles of the Revolutionary war lacked clear definition until nearly a century had passed and the records were supplemented by careful examination of the battle-fields and a more thorough scrutiny of British, French, and Hessian archives, thereby to correct topographical data and harmonize conflicting statements.

The case of General Fitz John Porter forcibly illustrates the difficulty of changing public opinion, once formed, even when supplemental data enforce military recognition of their value. The Battle of Franklin, which secured to General Thomas the opportunity to fortify Nashville and ultimately defeat Hood, and the battles of Stone River, Gettysburg, Chicamauga and Monocacy, are among the actions of the late war in which differences of statement as to positions and movements have greatly qualified first estimates of the relations which various officers sustained to those actions.

The battle of Shiloh, or Pittsburg Landing, has been the latest under scrutiny. It is not the purpose to consider whether the action of the day was influenced by the arrival of Buel's army, or by the non-arrival of General Lew Wallace's division; nor whether General Wallace did, or did not, march by scientific methods, when he moved for the nearest firing. Among voluminous papers touching the civil war are the copies of original papers received from General Wallace himself, and of present interest. These papers received notice from the Western press at one time, but seem to demand a more formal record, as essential factors in the better understanding of the Battle of Shiloh.

The following outline is suggested by these documents:

1st. That the Federal line of battle, early in the morning, stretched out from Pittsburg Landing nearly to the Purdy Road, with General Sherman's division on the right, within about a mile of that road.

2nd. That General Wallace's division was at Crump's Landing, not more than five miles from Pittsburg Landing; it being then uncertain which of the two would be the objective of attack.

3d. That General Grant visited General Wallace at Crump's Landing and ordered him to hold his command subject to orders, and then steamed onward to Pittsburg Landing.

4th. That before 6 o'clock, A. M., the

sound of firing had led General Wallace to put his command under arms ; and he was prepared to move wherever active work should demand, even before he was ordered to be thus ready.

5th. That he concentrated his brigades, then in three camps, into one mass, at the forks of the Purdy Road and the road to Pittsburg Landing, so that he might take either road, as orders should decide.

6th. That he understood the original line of battle and the disposition of its divisions, and knew that General Sherman held the right.

7th. That the order received by him, before 12 o'clock, M., from Captain Baxter, staff officer of General Grant, was in writing ; and while pronounced verbally, at first, the form it assumed, when reduced to writing and subsequently delivered to General Wallace, was a direct order to "unite with the right," and that involved the march on the Purdy Road.

If the verbal order of General Grant to Captain Baxter, to hasten General Wallace's Division to Pittsburg Landing, was reduced to writing by that officer, after he noticed the early success of the Union Line, he would have shaped the approach of the fresh division to the best possible advantage, to join the *army*, not the precise *Landing*, if the army was not there ; since General Grant, still being on crutches from a sprained ankle when his horse fell under and upon him, on the fourth, was compelled to depend largely upon staff-officers for judicious action, in exigencies which fell under their eyes, and where his riding was greatly limited. There is full harmony of events, by giving full credit to all the data which seem, at first, to work conflict.

8th. That the Staff Officer who delivered the order assured General Wallace

and his staff that the Federal line was successful and driving the enemy at every point.

9th. That a movement at that time, toward Pittsburg Landing, would have taken General Wallaces' Division out of possible contact with the enemy, instead of supporting, and perfecting victory.

10th. That when the Division of General Wallace moved, as it did, within ten minutes after receipt of the orders, "impatiently waited for," it could see the distant smoke and hear the roar of battle, and moved directly toward the point of danger by the shortest route, with the greatest celerity and in harmony with the order received.

11th. That the defeat of the main army, the enforced retirement of Sherman's Division, and, in fact, the withdrawal of the entire original line, were new conditions, to be considered, when other Staff Officers notified General Wallace of the same ; and then, the addition of his division to the rallying army, at Pittsburg Landing, seemed to be an important element to the very safety of that army, except as it could lean upon the divisions of Buel, already within supporting distance.

12th. That the original advance of General Wallace's Division on the Purdy Road, while thoroughly suited to the original conditions as they existed when the order was delivered to him, was, of necessity, useless and dangerous, when he found himself alone and unsupported, and that the enemy had already swept over the position which he expected to occupy.

13th. That there was no alternative, then, but to pass around the left of the enemy, and rejoin the army, at such expense of time or labor as the new conditions imposed ; and that this was done, at great pains and with great celerity, without straggling or loss.

14th. That the prominent idea of withdrawing General Wallace's Division from Crump's Landing, to support the main army in its advance, is to be kept in mind;—whereby, confusion ceases as to the hour of the day when the order to report at Pittsburg Landing was delivered or became operative;—thereby, also, reconciling memories with the incidents of the day, with no discredit to any.

15th. That every theory of supporting an advanced line, from reserves sent forward from the base, must so bend to facts, that it may be the best thing possible, to strengthen the right of a successful line, even to overlapping and turning the enemy; and that such a movement has the emphatic endorsement of standard critics, and marked experience; while a formal movement to the rear, in order to move to the front and the right, as if on parade, would, under conditions such as presented to General Wallace, have been, simply, to wear out his men in marching, with small chance for taking any part in the assumed pursuit of a defeated enemy.

16th. That it is an unsound way of dealing with the facts of history, to gauge the responsibilities of officers and men, of small experience, by the rules which apply to the same officers and men after their experience has matured; and that, when the battle of Shiloh took place, and citizen regiments took part, with very slight knowledge of arms, it was equally true, that the officers themselves, both regular and volunteer, were porportionately unfamiliar with battle action on a large scale, and that, as a matter of fact, the Generals and Colonels, for the most part, had never seen a batallion drill, unless at West Point, much less drilled more than a company; and their con-

duct and opinions, in 1861-2, are not to be measured by the ripened experience of the years succeeding and succeeding years of reflection.

And finally, that the orders, movements, and results of the sixth day of April, 1862, must be judged by their relations to the passing hours and issues of that day, as practical men would act under changing conditions, and not by any formal order, which, however appropriate at one time, would, at any other time, defeat the work in hand. The Rules of Evidence, recognized by Civil and Military Courts alike, are but expressions of sound judgment of past experience; and Military Science, so called, has no other basis than that which belongs to the wise use of means to ends in all applied science and in all human endeavor. Whenever, therefore, the conduct of a battle is consistent with the conditions, as at the time understood, it is not exactly just to measure it by the terms of any instructions inconsistent with those conditions;—so that while an order to march to Pittsburg Landing became necessary upon the retirement of the original line, it ought not to be technically applied back to a time when that line was supposed to be sweeping on to victory and only sought fresh strength to mature that victory.

That a general action was precipitated by the Confederate forces under General Albert Sidney Johnson and was in the nature of a successful surprise of the Union Army, is the fact which harmonizes the reports of officers of both armies with the incidents of the day, and fairly distributes responsibility, without reflecting the narrow escape of the Union Army from destruction upon any single officer or command; especially, where all did so well, and so much is to be credited to the fall of General John-

son and the interruption of his deliberate plan, first to surprise, and then sweep on to victory, at whatever cost.

The Documents are as follows :

1st. Letter of Major General Lew Wallace to General U. S. Grant, February 26, 1869.

2nd. Letter of Lieutenant Colonel Ross, A. D. C. to General Wallace, January 25, 1868.

3rd. Letter of General J. A. Strickland to General Wallace, January 24, 1868.

4th. Letter of General G. F. McGin-


nis to General Wallace, February 20, 1868.

5th. Letter of General Fred. Knefler to General Wallace, February 19, 1868.

6th. Letter of Captain Ad Ware, A. D. C., to General Wallace (without date).

7th. Letter of General John M. Thayer to General Wallace, March 4, 1868.

8th. Letter of General U. S. Grant to General Wallace, March 10, 1868, commenting upon the letters cited and suggesting their publication, in justice to General Wallace.



The map of the *Compte de Paris* has been utilized. 1, 2 and 3 give location of Wallace's Brigades in line, perpendicular to the river, with right at Adamsville (3), 2. Concentration of Division. 4. Crossing at Snake Creek to take the right of General Sherman. 4-5. Countermarch to lower crossing after retirement of the right. 6. Lower crossing which had for several days previously been under water. Wallace's division, on the 7th, held the right of Sherman, as indicated for the 6th, when he moved to take part in the general action.

General Wallace to General Grant :

WASHINGTON CITY, Feb. 29, 1868.

GENERAL :

About a year after the battle of Pittsburg Landing, it came to my knowledge, that I was suffering, in your opinion, from erroneous information upon the subject of my conduct and movements as commander of the Third Division of your army during the first day of the battle named. To place myself right in your estimation and in that of the army gen-

erally, I asked a Court of Inquiry, by letter to the Secretary of War (Mr. Stanton) July 17, 1863. After several months, during which the application received no attention from the Secretary, I withdrew it, by advice of friends, General Sherman amongst others. The course I then resolved upon, that counselled by General Sherman, was to carry my explanation directly to you; and such continued my intention until the battle of Monocacy, after which your treatment of me became so uniformly

kind and considerate that I was led to believe the disagreement, connected with Pittsburg Landing, forgotten; a result, to which I tacitly assented, notwithstanding the record of that battle as you had made it, in the form of an endorsement on my official report, was grievously against me.

A recent circumstance, however, has made it essential to my good name, which I cannot bring myself to believe you wish to see destroyed, to go back to my former purpose; in pursuance of which, the object of this letter is simply to introduce certain statements of gentlemen lately in the army, your friends as much as mine, in hopes that the explanations to be found therein will be sufficient to authorize you to give me a note of acquittal from blame, plainly enough, to allay the suspicions and charges to which I have been so painfully subjected. The statements are in the form of extracts pertinent to the subject from letters now in my possession, from General Fred Knefler, General George McGinnis, Colonel James R. Ross, General Daniel MacCaulay, Captain Ad Ware, General John A. Strickland, General John M. Thayer, now United States Senator from Nebraska—all, of my command, on the day in question, present with me, well known to you, and of unimpeachable honor. I could have obtained many others, of like import, but selected these because their authors had peculiar opportunities for information upon points considered of chief importance. It is possible that my explanations of the matter would be sufficient for the purpose in view. However that may be, it is my judgment now, that the charges against me have gone so far, and been put in such grave form, that public opinion may require an exoneration, though it come from your hand, to be based upon the testimony of others.

Permit me to say, further, that as to the order you started to me by Captain Baxter, I do not understand there is any question of veracity between us. You tell me, that from the battle-field you dispatched a verbal order by the officer named, to be delivered to me, at

Crump's Landing, directing me to march my division to Pittsburg Landing by the road, parallel with the river; and, supposing, as you did, that the order would reach me by 11 o'clock, A. M., you reasonably concluded my command would be on the field by 1 o'clock, P. M.

Now in all candor, if you have been, as I am informed, of opinion that I received that order as it was given, and at the time stated (11 o'clock, A. M.), and that for any reason, such as personal feeling against you, or that I lost my way, or took the wrong road, or lingered on the march, making but five miles in seven hours, it must be admitted that you were justifiable in any, even the most extreme judgment against me; and I must confess that your moderation was greater than mine would likely have been, had our positions been reversed. I do not flinch from that conclusion, at all; but what I do say in my defence is that the opinion and the conclusion, which is its corollary, are both wrong, because the order admitted to have been dispatched was not delivered to me, in form or substance, as dispatched. On the contrary, the order I received from your messenger was in writing, unsigned, and contained substantially the following instructions:

"You will leave a force at Crump's Landing, sufficient to guard the public property there; then march the rest of your division, and *effect a junction with the right of the army*; after which you will form your line of battle at right angles with the river, and act as circumstances dictate."

This order was read by Colonel Ross, under circumstances well calculated to impress it upon his memory. It was also given to Colonel Knefler, then my Adjutant General, and by him read and unfortunately lost. Finally, its purport, as stated by me above, is vouched for by Captain Ware as the aide de camp. To refuse credit to my version of its contents will be very hard, indeed, corroborated as it is by so many gentlemen of unquestionable veracity, and such excellent opportunity for information on the point.

I think myself warranted now in as-

serting upon the credit of the three officers just named, as well as my own, that by the terms of the order, as it was delivered to me, the object of my march was not Pittsburg Landing, as you intended, but the right of the army, resting, when the battle opened in the morning, at a point quite three miles out from the landing, on the road to Purdy.

As a general principle it must be admitted that when you entrusted the order to a proper messenger for delivery to me, your responsibility ceased; but, I turn and ask you, appealing to your experience and justice, how am I held responsible for the execution of an order if it never reached me; or, if it reached me, conveying an idea radically different from that originally given? Of necessity, I was accountable for the execution of the order, only as it was received, and if it was not received in a form to convey your true design, but was promptly executed, neither of us are responsible for the result. It was not your mistake, nor was it mine.

Having established the purport, at least, of the order as it came to my hand, the next inquiry is: "Did I proceed to execute it, and how?"

On these heads all the letters on file are applicable. They show, as I think, that I took measures anticipatory to the order you gave me, personally, in your passage up the river to the battle-field, viz: to hold myself in readiness to march in any direction; that my brigades were ordered to concentrate at the place most proper and convenient for a prompt execution of the orders, whatever they might be, because it was at the junction of two roads, one leading to Pittsburg Landing, the other to the right of the army. To one of these points, it may be added, I was sure of being ultimately sent, if the exigencies of the battle required the presence of my command. They show, that after you parted from me, going up the river, I took measures to forward your messenger to me instantly upon his arrival (see Colonel Ross' letters), then rode to the place of concentration, and

waited impatiently and anxiously the expected instructions; that they came to hand about 12 o'clock (my own remembrance is 11:30 A. M.), and that the officer who brought them, also brought the news that you were driving the enemy all along the line. (See letters of General Knefler and Colonel Ross.) Up to that time, therefore, I was certainly blameless.

But let me ask you to stop here, and consider the effect on my mind and subsequent movements, of the information, thus reliably obtained, that the battle was won. What inducement could I have had to march away from or linger on the road to a victory? Upon the hypothesis that the good news was true, how could I have imagined, (had there been so much as a doubt as to the intent of the order received,) a necessity for my command at Pittsburg Landing?

But, proceeding. The letters further establish, that, immediately upon receiving the order, I put my column *en route*, to execute it.

Now comes the questions. Did I take the right road to effect the junction with the right of the army, or one leading to Purdy, away from the battle? Pertinent to these inquiries, General Knefler says, that the road chosen for the movement had been patrolled and picketed by my cavalry. By their report, if by nothing else, I must have been posted as to its terminus. In corroboration of this assertion please notice that General Macaulay, General Strickland, General Thayer and General Knefler, all allude to the fact that the head of the column was approaching, not going away from the firing, when the countermarch took place. Consider, further, that the most imperative necessities of my situation, isolated as I had been from the main army, were, to know all the communications with that army, and to keep them clear, and in order for rapid movement. *Not only did I know the road, but every step my division took from the initial point of the march up to the moment of the change of direction, was, as is well known to every soldier in the column, a*

*step nearer to the firing, and therefore a step nearer to the battle.* While on this inquiry, let me add that the report of my being set right after marching upon the wrong road has in it this much truth, and no more. When about a mile from the position which had been occupied by the right of the army (General Sherman's division), Captain Rowley overtook me and told me that you had sent him to hurry me up, and that our lines had been carried by the enemy and the army driven back almost to the river, a very different story from the one brought me by Captain Baxter. Captain Rowley set me right as to the conditions of the battle, not as to the road I was following. Colonel McPherson and Major Rawlins, the other members of your staff, mentioned as having been sent to me, met me after the countermarch, when my command was on the river road moving to Pittsburg Landing.

Concerning the countermarch, I would remark that the condition of the battle, as reported by Captain Rowley, made it prudent, if not necessary. My column was only five thousand men, of all arms. Reflecting upon it now, I am still of the opinion that it did better service the next day in your new line of battle, than it could have done, operating alone and unsupported in the rear of the whole rebel army, where I was certainly taking it, when "set right" by the captain.

Instead of making the change of direction, when it was resolved on, by a countermarch, the result proved that it should have been effected by a general right about. The former manœuvre was chosen, however, because I was confident of finding a cross road to the river road long before the head of the column doubled upon its foot. [See Colonel Ross' statement of the effort made to accomplish that idea.]

One of the results I confidently anticipated from a reading of the letter submitted, is, that you will be satisfied of the wrong done me (unintentional, I believe), by Colonel Badeau, when, in his book, he describes me as consuming seven hours in marching five miles

in the direction of the battle. The march actually performed in that time was not less than fifteen miles, over an execrable dirt road.

Your opinion, as advanced in your letter to the War Office, July, 13, 1863, that General Morgan L. Smith, had he been put in command, could have had the division in the battle by 1 o'clock P. M., is in direct terms, based upon the condition that General Smith received your orders as you supposed them communicated to me. But, suppose he had not received the order as originally given; suppose, on the contrary, the order actually received by him had the effect to send him in another direction from Pittsburg Landing; and suppose that, on approaching his objective, he had found himself in the rear of the whole rebel army, and in his judgment compelled, by that circumstance, together with the bad fortune of our own army, to a further movement of quite ten miles—all of which were terrible realities in my case—I am sure you are too just a man to have held him accountable for the hours, however precious, thus necessarily lost.

With these remarks I place the letters of the officers named in your hands. They will satisfy you, I think, that the exoneration I seek will be a simple act of justice. The many misconceptions which have been attached to my movements on that bloody Sunday, have, it must be confessed, made me extremely sensitive upon the subject. You can imagine, therefore, with what anxiety your reply will be waited.

Very respectfully your friend,

LEW WALLACE.

TO GENERAL U. S. GRANT, WASHINGTON CITY.

Colonel Ross to General Wallace :

CHICAGO, January, 25, 1868.

General: Having read the extract from "Badeau's Life of General Grant," as published in the Chicago Tribune, of the twenty-fifth of December, 1867, wherein he refers particularly to the battle of Shiloh, and seeing the gross injustice done you, and the false light in which you are placed before the country and the world, I deem it my duty to make a brief state-

ment of what I know to be the facts in reference to your failure to reach the field of battle in time to take part in the action of Sunday, April 6, 1862.

I will first state the position of your command on that morning. The First Brigade, Colonel M. L. Smith commanding, at Crump's Landing; Second Brigade, Colonel John M. Thayer commanding, two and one-half miles out on the Adamsville road; Third Brigade, Colonel Charles R. Wood commanding, at Adamsville, five miles out from the river. The first intimation you or any of your staff had of the battle was between five and six o'clock, A. M., when my attention was called by one of the men on the boat on which were your headquarters, to the heavy and continued firing in the direction of the camp at Pittsburg Landing. You were at once notified of this, and being satisfied that there was a battle going on, directed me to go at once and order this division to get ready to move at a moment's warning, and to instruct Colonel Wood to move his baggage and camp equipage to the river with the least possible delay, and march his command to the camp of the Second Brigade, midway between his (then) camp and that of the First Brigade, at the river.

After executing your order, as above, I returned to the Landing. Soon after, you, together with your staff, went out to the camp of the second Brigade, when the division had been ordered to concentrate in order to be in position to take either one of two roads, intersecting the Adamsville road from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing; one leading to Pittsburg Landing, the other to the Purdy road from Pittsburg Landing, intersecting it at a point not far from the right of our army under General Sherman, as it was encamped when the battle began.

Before starting for Colonel Thayer's camp, orders were given by you to Captain Lyman, A. Q. M., on your staff, for a horse to be saddled and kept in readiness, in case a messenger should come down the river with orders from General Grant to you.

Now for the order. Badeau says that a staff officer was dispatched to General Wallace with verbal orders for him to march by the nearest road parallel with the river. The order may have been given verbally by General Grant to his staff officer, but was not so delivered to you, nor did it direct you to march by the nearest road parallel with the river. At about 11 o'clock, A. M., while at the camp of Colonel Thayer, I was directed by you to go to Colonel

M. L. Smith. I met Captain Baxter, A. Q. M., who stopped me and handed me a paper saying, "I wish you would take this to General Wallace." I took the paper, read it and returned it to him, saying, I could not do so, as I was on my way under orders from General Wallace. At the same time I turned in my saddle, and pointed out a group of horsemen, telling the Captain that you were among them. I went to Colonel Smith, delivered my orders, and returning, met the Captain again. I very distinctly remember that this order directed you to move forward and join General Sherman's right on the Purdy road and form your line of battle at right angles with the river; and then act as circumstances would dictate. Now the shortest possible route by which you could reach the point designated in the order was the one taken, viz: that one leading from Colonel Thayer's camp (on the Adamsville road from Crump's Landing), to the Purdy road (from Pittsburg Landing), a distance of about five miles; whereas the distance to the point to which you was to march as designated in the order, *via* Pittsburg Landing, would have been at least twelve miles. Perhaps I should here state that this order was not signed by any one, but coming as it did through one of the Staff Officers of the Commanding General, could not be questioned. I would also state in this connection, that when I met Captain Baxter first, I asked him how things were going. He replied that Grant was driving the enemy at all points. Had this been the case, the order as delivered by Captain Baxter would have been all right, as we could then have joined General Sherman as directed therein. Within ten minutes after the receipt of the order, the troops were on the road.

When we were about one mile from where we expected to join General Sherman, we were overtaken by a messenger from General Grant, Captain (since Colonel) Rowley, I believe, who informed you that our troops had been defeated all along the line, and driven back, till the right was within half a mile of the river, and that the road we were on, would, if followed up, lead us into the rear of the enemy. This being the case, it became necessary to find some other way to form a junction with the army. In order to do so, every mounted man attached to your Headquarters was dispatched to find, if possible, some way to get round the enemys' left without going back to the starting point, or to find some resident to guide us by the nearest possible route. Finally a man was found who was compelled to

act as guide. Nevertheless the march was continued as rapidly as possible, until we joined the right of the army, just after dark, in the position in which it lay when the battle closed for the day. Badeau also says: "General Wallace was set right by Captain (afterwards Colonel) Rowley, and Colonel (afterwards Major General) McPherson, both at the time upon General Grant's staff; that they set him right at 1 o'clock, and it took him till seven to march five miles." It was near 1 o'clock when we were overtaken by Rowley, but instead of having but five miles to march, the distance could not have been less than eleven or twelve miles. The first seen of General McPherson was when we were met by him and General Rawlins, just as the head of the column had reached the river road (from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing) who had come out to urge you to greater haste. We had to march over the worst road I ever remember to have seen. In many places it was almost impossible to get artillery through. In my judgment the entire distance marched by your command could not have been less than sixteen or seventeen miles.

The above, General, are the facts relative to the movements of your command on the day referred to, which fell under my personal observation. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES R. ROSS,

Late Brev. Lieut. Col. Major. A. D. C.  
To MAJOR GENERAL LEW WALLACE  
CRAWFORDSVILLE, Indiana.

General Strickland to General Wallace :

HEADQUARTERS FIFTIETH REGIMENT, O.V.I. }  
BIG RUN TRESTLE, Ky., June 24, 1863. }  
CAPTAIN J. R. ROSS, for MAJOR GENERAL LEW WALLACE:

DEAR SIR: In answer to your question as to my recollection of the circumstances and time of the moving of Major General Lew Wallace's command to the battle of Shiloh on the sixth of April, 1862, I will submit the following statement:

I was Acting Adjutant General for Colonel John M. Thayer (now Brigadier General Thayer), he (Colonel Thayer) being in command of the Second Brigade, General Lew Wallace's Division. On the morning of the sixth of April (Sunday), 1862, the Brigade commanded by Colonel Thayer, stationed at "Stony Lonesome," was in readiness to march at daylight, or before. We were waiting for

orders to move, when Major General Lew Wallace and staff rode to the headquarters of the brigade, I think between the hours of 8 and 9 o'clock; it may have been earlier. General Wallace ordered everything in readiness to move at a moment's notice. I received the orders directly from General Wallace. I assured him that the brigade, upon previous orders from himself and Colonel Thayer, was ready to move, but went again, in person, by order of Colonel Thayer, and notified Commanders of Regiments, Batteries, etc., to be ready at the call from Colonel Thayer's headquarters, to move. I heard General Wallace addressing himself to Lieutenant Colonel McCord, commanding the First Nebraska Regiment, to say, that he had received no orders to move and that he was waiting for orders from General Grant's headquarters to move. I heard General Wallace request one of his staff to watch the road to Crump's Landing for a messenger with orders.

At half past 11 A. M. (it might have been fifteen minutes to 12) a person rode up to General Wallace with orders to move. I was standing by General Wallace at the time. *The Brigade commanded by Colonel Thayer was in motion in just ten minutes after the order was received.* I am particular about this, because Colonel Sanbourn, of the Twenty-first Indiana Regiment, and other officers of the Brigade, talked over the matter in the morning. After the order was received we moved off rapidly.

After we had marched some distance, *and were getting nearer to the sound of musketry continually*, we were met, I think, by Major Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant General of General Grant, and our direction changed. From my knowledge of the country, after the battle of Monday, I am satisfied that, if we had not changed our direction when we did, we would have gone in behind the left of the rebel army. After the direction of the column was changed, I was ordered by Colonel Thayer to go to the foot of the column, for what purpose I cannot now recollect. I think it was at the instance of General Wallace, to change direction on a shorter route of Wood's brigade, and when going from the foot of the column to the head, to report to my commanding officer, Colonel Thayer. I remember noticing all *three of the Brigades in close column, marching rapidly forward.* Just at dusk we arrived at the valley of a small stream, where the mud was very deep. We met an orderly, there, from the battle-field,

who said we could reach General Grant's forces by making great haste, as Berdan's Sharpshooters were holding the road by which we were to enter. *The column was hurried forward as fast as it was possible for it to move.* We arrived a little after dark, on the right of General Grant's forces, but a few yards in front of the enemy.

Not knowing for what particular purpose you wish this communication, I have been precise in details as to time, etc., as it will be remembered by most of the officers of the Second Brigade.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

J. A. STRICKLAND,

Colonel Commanding Fiftieth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.

General McGinnis to General Wallace :

INDIANAPOLIS, Indiana, February 21, 1868.

GENERAL: In reply to your note of this date, I would say, that being in command of the Eleventh Indiana Infantry, I was attached to the First Brigade, Third Division, Army of the Tennessee, commanded by you, and encamped at Crump's Landing, on the morning of the first day of the battle of Pittsburg Landing.

At daylight of said day, our command was aroused by heavy and continuous firing from the direction of Pittsburg Landing, which led us to believe that a general battle was being fought. I do not think more than twenty minutes had elapsed from the time that the battle commenced until our whole brigade had received orders to hold ourselves in readiness, (with three days' rations) to march to any point required; and that point all understood from indications would be Pittsburg Landing.

For the purpose of concentrating the division, our Brigade marched to Winn's Farm, two and a half miles from Crump's Landing, where the Second Brigade of the Third Division was then encamped. The road taken by our division, after concentrating, intersected the Purdy road (from Pittsburg Landing) at a point near Snake Creek, and not far from the ground occupied by General Sherman's division on the morning of the battle, being the right of the army. *This, in my opinion, was the shortest and most direct route to the point at which the right of the army was resting, when the battle began.*

Orders were not received for the division to march to the field of battle, until about 12 o'clock, A. M. and no time was lost during

the march, as we moved with the utmost rapidity.

In the history of that battle, written by (Badeau) who was not there and who could not have had personal knowledge of the facts in relation thereto, serious and gross injustice has been done you.

Very respectfully,

G. F. McGinnis,

Late Brigadier General U. S., A.

[General Fred Knefler's letter to General Lew Wallace corroborating the statements made by the other members of the staff will be found on page 367—ED.]

Captain Ware to General Wallace :

GENERAL: I submit the following statement in regard to the movement of your division, on Sunday, April 6, 1862, as far as came under my observation.

The first intimation I had that an engagement was progressing was about 6 o'clock, A. M. I heard firing in the direction of the camps at Pittsburg Landing. Soon after I was ordered by you to proceed to Adamsville, where the Third Brigade, under Colonel Wood was encamped, with orders to have his tents, and baggage train sent immediately to the river, and his command to march back to the Second Brigade, which was then stationed two and a half miles from Crump's Landing. I also ordered the First Brigade, under Colonel Morgan L. Smith, to move out to the same point. The Second Brigade, under Colonel John M. Thayer, was also ordered to be ready to move at a moment's notice. I returned to your headquarters and with you proceeded to the above-mentioned point. At twenty minutes of 12 an order was to you delivered, by Captain Baxter, A. Q. M., directing "you to move your division up and join General Sherman's right," on the road leading from Pittsburg Landing to Purdy, that being the extreme right of General Grant's position.

Two Regiments of Infantry and one piece of artillery were left at the camp of the Second Brigade, to protect the camp equipage and baggage. I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

AD WARE, JR., A. D. C.

To MAJOR GENERAL LEW WALLACE.

General John M. Thayer to General Wallace :

UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,

WASHINGTON, March 4, 1868.

At the time of the battle of Pittsburg Land-

ing I was in command of the Second Brigade of the division commanded by General Lew Wallace, and, with the Brigade, was in camp two and a half miles out from Crump's Landing, at a place called Stony Lonesome. At dawn of the morning of April 6, 1862, I heard cannonading in the direction of Pittsburg Landing. At an early hour I received orders from General Wallace, through a Staff Officer, to "hold my command in readiness to march at a moment's notice." General Wallace came to my camp, soon afterwards, and informed me that he was awaiting orders from General Grant to move to the battle-field. I knew he was very impatient to receive such orders. The Division was kept in readiness to move without delay. At about half past 11 o'clock an officer rode up to General Wallace with the expected order from General Grant, and, in a few minutes, the command was on the march towards the field of action. As we advanced the cannonading became more distinct. As we were moving on I recollect a Staff Officer passing up the column seeking General Wallace. Very soon we countermarched, with the view, as I understood, of crossing to the river road leading to Pittsburg Landing, and there reaching the right of our army, which we reached about dark. According to my recollection there was no halting while on the march, except to close up the column.

"While waiting in my camp for the order of General Grant to move to the scene of action General Wallace manifested great anxiety to move forward, and did move immediately on receipt of the order. Very respectfully,

JOHN M. THAYER,

Late Brig. Gen'l and B'v't Maj Gen'l of Vols.

General Grant to General Wallace :

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES.

WASHINGTON, D. C., MARCH, 10, 1868.

MY DEAR GENERAL :

Enclosed herewith, I return your

letters from officers of the Army who served with you at the battle of Shiloh, Tennessee, giving their statement of your action on that occasion. I can only state that my orders to you were given verbally to a Staff Officer to communicate, and that they were substantially as given by General Badeau in his book. I always understood that the Staff Officer referred to, Captain Baxter, made a memorandum of the order he received and left it with you. That memorandum I never saw.

The statements which I now return seem to exonerate you from this great point of blame, your taking the wrong road, or different road from the one directed from Crump's Landing to Pittsburg Landing. All your subsequent military career showed you active and ready in the execution of every order you received. Your promptness in moving from Baltimore to Monocacy, Maryland, in 1864, and meeting the enemy in force far superior to your own, when Washington was threatened, is a case particularly in point, where you could scarcely have hoped for a victory ; but you delayed the enemy, and enabled me to get troops from City Point, Virginia, in time to save the city. That act I regarded as most praiseworthy. I refer you to my report of 1865, touching your course there.

In view of the assaults made upon you now, I think it due to you, that you should publish what your own Staff and other subordinate officers have to say in exoneration of your course.

Yours Truly,

U. S. GRANT, GENERAL.

To MAJOR GENERAL L. WALLACE,

CRAWFORDSVILLE, Indiana.

General Knefler to General Wallace :

INDIANAPOLIS, February 19, 1868.

GENERAL. Upon reading the "Life of Grant," by Colonel Badeau, I was much surprised to see his version of your conduct on the first day of the battle of Shiloh. As I was present with your command on that day, as Assistant Adjutant General of Division, I desire to make the following statement of facts, as I can remember them at this time :

The position of your division, on the morning of the sixth of April, 1862, was as follows : Headquarters of the division and camp of the First Brigade at Crump's Landing; Second Brigade, two and a half miles from Crump's Landing, on the Purdy road, at a place, if I remember right, called Stony Lonesome; Third Brigade, two and a half miles from the camp of the Second Brigade, at Adamsville, on the Purdy road, and five miles from Headquarters of division at Crump's Landing.

When the cannonading was first heard on Sunday morning 'you issued orders' at once, for the concentration of the division at camp of the Second Brigade, at Stony Lonesome. The baggage, camp and garrison equipage was ordered to Crump's Landing, and detachments were made for its protection. "*These orders were given before you heard from Headquarters.*"

About 9 o'clock General Grant passed up on the Tigris and in passing the boat upon which were your Headquarters, had a conversation with you. I did not hear what was said, but you immediately mounted, and accompanied by your staff rode rapidly to the camp of the Second Brigade. It was, perhaps, two hours before any order arrived. I know you were anxiously looking for orders, and finally despatched one of your aids to ride to the landing to ascertain if any one had arrived with orders, and conduct him to you. Shortly after that,— it must have been 12 o'clock, M., Captain Baxter, A. Q. M., arrived with orders, and brought the very cheering intelligence that our army was successful. I cannot tell at this time what the particular language was. The order was placed in my hands as Assistant Adjutant General, but where it is now, or what became of it, I am unable to say; very likely, having been written on a scrap of paper, it was lost after coming into my hands; a matter which I much regret, as I feel confident that its production now would conclusively demonstrate that you obeyed the command contained in it. I remember, however, distinctly, that it was a written order to march and form a junction with the right of the army, which was understood to be the right of the army as it rested on the morning when the battle began. Suffice it to say, that the

division marched at once, and took the road which had been previously ascertained as leading to the right of the army, in the position it occupied on the morning of the sixth, and previous to that time. The road was then patrolled and picketed by cavalry detachments of your command. By your permission, I was marching with the advance guard, comprised of several companies of the Twenty-fourth Indiana Volunteers, Lieutenant Colonel Berber, commanding. We marched very rapidly, and to judge from the sound of the battle, we were approaching it fast. The advanced guard had reached the crossing of Snake Creek, near a mill, or some large building, where a bridge had been constructed, and from that point we could see the smoke overhanging the battlefield and distinctly hear the musketry, when an order was received, to retrace our steps, and work our way to the head of the column. We marched back at once, almost to our starting place, where we found the column was marching through the woods where there was no road (not even a trail appeared) to save time and distance. The troops were marching very fast, and I did not come up with you for perhaps two hours after the advance guard received orders to countermarch.

When the column was put in motion on the river road, which must have been after 4 o'clock, we were met by some staff officers of General Grant, Major Rawlins and Colonel McPherson, and another officer whom I did not know. They had some conversation with you, and then, for the first time I learned that our troops had been repulsed, and that we were then marching to join the right of the army, in its new position, at Pittsburg Landing. After some hard marching over execrable roads we reached our position about dusk.

The road the division first marched on led directly to the right of the army in its position, as stated above, and we would have joined it, had it not been repulsed, before 3 o'clock P. M.

Having conversed with many of the division who were present on that day, it is the general impression that we marched between fifteen and eighteen miles. Now, considering that we had troops not inured to hard marching, some of them on their first march, the condition of the roads, almost impassible, and part of that distance through woods, without any road, at all, it certainly ought not to be intimated that you did not do your whole duty in endeavoring to reach the field.

I am General, very respectfully, Your obedient servant,

FRED KNEFLER.

Late Colonel Seventy-ninth Regiment Indiana Volunteers.