



# The Decline of America's Soft Power in the United Nations<sup>1</sup>

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To what extent does anti-Americanism precipitate a decline in America's soft power? Nye postulates a negative relationship, presenting substantial implications for the U.S. national interest. In this paper, I test Nye's hypothesis through an examination of America's political influence within the United Nations. Using a fixed effects model, I regress voting alignment within the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on cross-national, aggregate public opinion toward the United States from 1985 to 2007. Controlling for foreign aid received and alliances with the United States, I find a statistically significant, positive relationship between favorable attitudes toward the United States and voting alignment within the UNGA on overall plenary votes and those votes for which the U.S. lobbies other UN-member states extensively. At the same time, controlling for temporal effects, states are far less supportive of U.S. interests in the UN throughout the tenure of President George W. Bush, capturing the effect of "anti-Bushism" in addition to anti-Americanism. The results of this study shed light on an emerging area of the literature that not only studies the sources of anti-Americanism, but also its consequences.

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What are the consequences of anti-Americanism? According to Joseph Nye, "Anti-Americanism has increased in recent years, and the United States' soft power—its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.S. policies and the values that underlie them—is in decline as a result" (Nye 2004:16). Nye, a champion of soft power as an effective yet underutilized complement to hard (military) power, cautions, "when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs" (2004:16).

To what extent are Nye's claims valid? What evidence is there that anti-Americanism has impaired the U.S. government's ability to pursue key interests?

Although a growing number of scholars have explored the sources of anti-Americanism, and its obverse, pro-Americanism (Berman 2004; Brooks 2006; Everts 2006; Sweig 2006; Chiozza 2007, 2009; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007a, 2007b; Markovits 2007), only a nascent body of work addresses its consequences

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(Keohane and Katzenstein 2007; Ray and Johnston 2007). A test of Nye's thesis may remedy this lacuna within the literature. On the one hand, if anti-Americanism has little to no impact on America's core interests, U.S. policy makers may reckon public opinion to be (borrowing from Shakespeare's *Macbeth*) "full of sound and fury" but "signifying nothing."

On the other hand, if anti-Americanism significantly diminishes United States' soft power, Washington will have an additional incentive to scrutinize and heed global opinion of the United States. A study of anti-Americanism's consequences also provides a critical test to an ongoing debate between political realists and liberals over the importance of public opinion in foreign policy making. Whereas realists assume public opinion is a relatively ineffectual variable in predicting how states engage in foreign affairs (Lippmann 1922; Kennan 1957; Acheson 1965; Morgenthau 1985), liberals consider public opinion rational and a crucial barometer in forecasting states' foreign policy (Nincic 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Holsti 1996).

In a novel study, Katzenstein and Keohane (2007a, 2007b) assessed the decline of American soft power and found null results along three distinct venues: (1) the United States' ability to leverage members of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to sign bilateral immunity agreements, shielding U.S. citizens from ICC jurisdiction; (2) the United States' ability to recruit states to join its "Coalition of the Willing" in Iraq in 2003; and (3) foreign political elites' use of anti-American rhetoric in their electoral campaigns, such as Gerhard Schröder's campaign for reelection in Germany, and Roh Mun-hyun's bid for the presidency in South Korea in 2002. Moreover, Isernia (2007) examined the impact of anti-Americanism on West European attitudes on the war in Iraq from 2002–2004 and found American leadership in world affairs and the assessment of the first President George W. Bush's handling of foreign policy—not anti-American sentiment per se—to be the two most important determinants of attitudes towards the war before and after the 2003 attack in Iraq.

On the other hand, in an analysis of European public support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Ray and Johnston (2007:85) stated, "Anti-Americanism clearly affects the policy preference of Europeans, with greater anti-Americanism associated with more support for EU-led defense rather than NATO policy making." This suggests that within the context of a multinational institution, anti-Americanism may predict how European states leverage their influence against the United States. Moreover, Moreau and Hussain (2002) observe that the United Action Council in Pakistan campaigned on an anti-American platform and won 48 additional seats in Parliament in 2002, suggesting anti-Americanism had a decisive electoral impact.

Given mixed results, we require additional research to understand whether anti-Americanism may weaken America's soft power. Taking a cue from Ray and Johnston's (2007) work on NATO, in which anti-Americanism appears to play a role within a broader multilateral institutional context, I test for a relationship by exploring the impact of anti-Americanism within the United Nations, the General Assembly of which serves as the collective voice of its nearly 200 member-states. Using data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project and an original data set collected from the U.S. National Archives, this paper tests for a relationship between cross-national variation in global attitudes toward the United States over time and voting alignment with the United States within the United Nations General Assembly, not only on overall plenary votes but also on those votes which the United States lobbies other UN member-states extensively. The analysis shows support for the hypothesis. Other things being equal, cross-national favorable opinion toward the United States predicts how states will vote in alignment with the U.S. material interest. At the same time, states were far less supportive of U.S. interests in the UN throughout the tenure of President

Bush, capturing the effect of “anti-Bushism” (Everts 2006) in addition to anti-Americanism.

### Anti-Americanism in the United Nations

In their report for the Center of Strategic and International Studies, *A Smarter, More Secure America*, Joseph Nye and former U.S. Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage, stated, “Many nations have begun to look to the United Nations as a venue to constrain America’s unbounded power since the Cold War, adding to America’s estrangement” (Armitage and Nye 2007:20). Recent scholarship suggests anti-Americanism may be at work within the UN. Analyzing the relationship between American unilateralism and plenary session roll-call votes within the UN General Assembly (UNGA), Voeten (2004:747) found the “preference gap between the United States and the rest of the world widened considerably and at a constant rate between 1991 and 2001.” Cautioning that such a large shift in voting alignment is due to structural (neorealist) forces, Voeten observed, “It may be that the more important consequence of [American] unilateralist policies is that it turns world public opinion against the United States.” This would imply anti-Americanism is part of a larger causal dynamic at work, in which American unilateralism gives rise to anti-Americanism, which then translates into votes against the United States within the context of multilateral bodies such as the UN or NATO.

The idea of “resisting the lonely superpower” (Voeten 2004) touches upon Pape’s (2005) notion that states seek to balance against the unipolar might of the United States—not in the traditional sense of using military buildups, war-fighting alliances, or transfers to military opponents—but through “soft-balancing,” in which states leverage international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. Even though a state may be politically or militarily aligned with the U.S., it may seek to balance the U.S. in more subtle ways. In contrast to Pape (2005), who argues soft-balancing is due to structural forces, I argue soft-balancing is an artifact of political elites seeking to placate their publics and consolidate their domestic political power. All things being equal, when anti-Americanism in a given country is apparent, political elites enact different policies to balance against the U.S. national interest. This would stand in sharp relief to Joffe’s (2001:43) assertion that the world is not “ganging up” on the “last remaining superpower” and “America’s soft power. . . rules over an empire on which the sun never sets.” On the contrary, as *The New York Times* printed, “The fracturing of the Western alliance over Iraq and the huge antiwar demonstrations around the world this weekend are reminders that there may still be two superpowers on the planet: the United States and world public opinion” (Tyler 2003).

### *Does the UN Matter for the United States?*

Realists may contend the United States has little if anything to fear from other states (anti-American though they may be) within multilateral institutions such as the UN, since the United States need not worry about any impact within an international organization that lacks a substantial enforcement mechanism. Yet, upon closer examination, one can see how the UN is important, and perhaps even vital, to U.S. interests.

As the most prestigious and extensive international organization, the UN lends legitimacy to actions it supports. Case in point: the United States clearly stands to benefit from any UN-led support it can muster for the ongoing war in Iraq. Without additional financial and political support from key UN member-states (not to mention administrative and logistical coordination of such support

within the UN), the United States stands to lose more time, money, and resources to secure and rebuild Iraq. Thus far, the war in Iraq has mounted substantial costs for the American economy and the value of the dollar. The Congressional Budget Office estimates the United States has already spent \$368 billion on the war in Iraq, which, projected out to 2017, would top \$1 trillion with \$705 billion in interest payments.<sup>2</sup> Whereas the United States benefitted substantially from multinational support after the UN Security Council supported the use of force in Iraq in 1991, far less can be said of the United States' most recent venture into Iraq, which the UN did not condone. Without such institutional legitimacy, the United States has borne a far greater burden, compared to the first Gulf War. Militarily, compared to the 1991 Gulf War, in which many of America's most prominent allies (e.g., France, Germany) joined the coalition and contributed troops, since the start of the 2003 Gulf War, many such states have hesitated to contribute troops without the sanction of a UN resolution or UN-authorized command structure (Tharoor 2003). Whereas the United States received the support of 160,000 non-U.S. coalition troops in 1991, it gathered only 45,000 such troops in 2003. Economically, a similar portrait emerges. Whereas Germany contributed \$6.4 billion to the first Gulf War, it has thusfar only committed \$10 million to the 2003 Gulf War, via assurances from the Madrid Donor Conference. Even America's bilateral relationship with Japan has produced less than optimal results: whereas Japan contributed \$10 billion in 1991, it has pledged only half of that since 2003.

To this extent, even though the United States may be the most powerful nation in the world, the thick web of international institutions that it forged after the Second World War has created an international environment from which it cannot extract itself entirely (Ikenberry 2001). The United States has an incentive to comply or face a collective backlash. Fear of such a backlash could explain, at least in part, why in late 2002 a very hawkish White House dispatched Colin Powell to the UN Security Council to justify the invasion of Iraq. If the UN had not mattered to U.S. national interests, the Bush administration would not have bothered. This also explains, at least in part, why the U.S. Congress has mandated the State Department each year to tally and present a list of voting practices in the United Nations, not only on those overall votes in plenary session but also those votes of strategic importance to the United States.<sup>3</sup> As powerful as the United States may be, the UN matters.

### **Defining and Measuring Anti-Americanism**

Some scholars define anti-Americanism in terms of actions or statements that involve sanctions or attacks against the policy, society, culture, and values of the United States (Tai, Peterson, and Gurr 1973; Rubinstein and Smith 1985). Yet such definitions say nothing about the sources of such actions and statements. Other scholars take a more complex view of anti-Americanism and conceptualize it as a form of prejudice, in which views toward the United States are immutable, irrational, and even obsessive (Haseler 1986; Minogue 1986; Hollander 1992; Berman 2004). Yet such definitions do not explain how individuals are able to change their attitudes toward the United States over time.

Other scholars define anti-Americanism as an attitude, based on feelings within the context of fluid, intersubjective social relationships and the ongoing

<sup>2</sup>Congressional Budget Office. 2007. [http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8690/10-24-CostOfWar\\_Testimony.pdf](http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/86xx/doc8690/10-24-CostOfWar_Testimony.pdf). (Accessed August 20, 2008).

<sup>3</sup>Voting Practices in the United Nations. 2008. <http://state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprc>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

updating of information about what the United States is and what it does (Chiozza 2007; Isernia 2007; Katzenstein and Keohane 2007a, 2007b). An affective definition of anti-Americanism provides greater theoretical leverage than those that treat it as immutable or that do not explain how anti-Americanism originates and changes over time.

Yet a complex characterization of anti-Americanism remains difficult to operationalize. Most of the data on anti-Americanism come in the form of packaged survey research from polling organizations (e.g., The Pew Research Center and the highly underutilized records of the United States Information Agency housed at the National Archives), in which there are standard questions, such as “Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?” Although such scaled responses allow for a broad range of variation in the extent to which a respondent evaluates his or her pro- or anti-American sentiment, such measures fail to address those underlying components (e.g., cognitive, emotional, and normative elements) that form the totality of an individual’s opinion. At the same time, survey questions can create additional “noise” if respondents answer questions in a manner they believe the surveyor wants to hear (Berinsky 2004; Chiozza 2007).

As a baseline, however, the wealth of data available in the form of cross-national public opinion surveys is formidable. The use of aggregate-level public opinion data reaches far back to the beginnings of modern survey research (e.g., the American National Election Study); continues with major, current longitudinal studies (e.g., the World Values Survey); and has provided a wellspring of data for many major contributions to political science (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998).

What do these data tell us? Taking a snapshot of topline results from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project,<sup>4</sup> Figure 1 depicts a substantial decline in cross-national favorable opinion toward the United States since the start of the new millennium.




FIG. 1. Pew Topline Results  
Source: Pew Research Center

<sup>4</sup>Pew Global Attitudes Project. 2008. <http://pewglobal.org/reports/>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

Favorable opinion toward the United States in France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and Turkey in 2008 declined dramatically since 2000. In Great Britain, favorable attitudes toward the United States plummeted from 83% in 2000 to 53% in 2008. In France and Germany, public sentiment toward the United States nosedived along similar trajectories, with 62% of French and 78% of German respondents reporting a favorable impression of the United States in 2000, but then only 42% and 31% in 2008, respectively. Russia and Turkey also witnessed a steady erosion of popular support for the United States, along similar gradients. Russian attitudes toward the United States were at a high in 2002 with 61% approval but slipped to 46% by 2008. Turkish attitudes staggered from 52% in 2000 to 12% in 2008. Even in Pakistan, where the U.S. government expended more than \$10 billion in unmarked aid, popular opinion toward the United States fluctuated between 10% and 27% between 2000 and 2008.

### **American Soft Power in the United Nations**

If global attitudes toward the United States have deteriorated precipitously, how, if at all, has this affected America's soft power? It is useful here to look at recent major events within the UN. On February 15, 2003, the United States faced a barrage of global resistance as it mounted an invasion to rid Iraq of its suspected weapons of mass destruction and supplant Saddam Hussein's dictatorship with a facsimile of Western-style democracy. Hundreds of thousands of protestors thronged the streets of London, Glasgow, Dublin, Rome, Paris, Berlin, Madrid, Oslo, Vancouver, Buenos Aires, Tokyo, and elsewhere, rallying for the United States to withhold from the invasion. In the United Nations, French Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin became a staple of nightly news clips, publicly rebuffing U.S. intentions to use force.

In the eyes of the international community, at the heart of the matter lay the legitimacy with which the United States sought to spearhead the invasion. On the one hand, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush invoked what has now become the "Bush Doctrine," in which the United States possesses the right to strike preemptively against enemies of the state. Using this logic, Secretary of State Colin Powell argued before the United Nations Security Council in February 2003 that Saddam Hussein posed a clear and present danger, such that an invasion was the only choice to protect the U.S. national interest, lest Iraq lay siege to the United States and its allies. On the other hand, Minister de Villepin and other high-profile emissaries questioned the credibility of Powell's claims, countering that UN weapons inspectors did not have enough time in Iraq to verify whether any weapons of mass destruction even existed. In the UN Security Council, both France and Russia threatened to veto any U.S. proposal to invade Iraq. In turn, the United States left these proceedings without the international legitimacy that comes with UN authorization.

Votes are at the heart of the UN and provide a powerful signal of states' intentions. As early as 1985, former U.S. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick acknowledged, "to an extent greater than often realized, what occurs at the United Nations involves central issues of world politics and frequently touches upon vital U.S. national goals and interests. ...Relations inside the United Nations constitute a significant dimension of our relations with other countries and deserve to be considered with seriousness. Decisions of the General Assembly, for example, are not legally binding, but they frequently have real significance for the conduct of our foreign affairs both inside and outside the United Nations" (Kirkpatrick 1985). Votes within the UNGA represent social discourse among the member-states of the United Nations and can forecast state behavior, the knowledge of which is instrumental to U.S. interests.



Given that the United Nations represents the voice of global public opinion, it is worthwhile to explore not just one isolated incident, such as recent opposition to the war in Iraq, but also more generally to consider the relationship between world public opinion and opposition or support for U.S. policies.

Let us assume that when the public in a given country feels antipathy toward the United States, that country's government has an incentive to distance itself from the United States within international political institutions, such as the United Nations, by voting against the United States on those key issues that the United States deems important to its national interests. This seems to be what the world witnessed when the United States faced a barrage of resistance in February 2003.

This argument rests on the assumption that public opinion matters, particularly in democracies: that political elites generally consider and enact the will of the public. A large body of literature substantiates this claim. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) found statistical evidence that public opinion has a significant driving impact on elite decision making within the United States. Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2004) demonstrated that political elites in any given polity (democracy or nondemocracy) will be mindful at least to the preferences of their "winning coalition," that is, those individuals who, at an aggregate level, can help sustain their ability to remain in power. If such elites are not mindful of what others think and believe, then their political survival may be in jeopardy.

Because of the growing consensus among U.S. policy makers that UN votes matter—even votes that are not legally binding within the General Assembly—since 1982 the United States Congress has mandated that the Department of State maintain and present an annual tally of voting behavior within the United Nations. Each year, the State Department publishes its annual *Report to the Congress on Voting Patterns in the United Nations*, which provides data, not only on overall votes cast in the UNGA plenary session but also for those "votes on issues which directly affected United States interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively."<sup>5</sup> That is, there is a certain subset of overall UNGA votes that the U.S. State Department targets each year and lobbies for within the United Nations. Among these lobbied votes (and overall plenary votes) are several types of issues that the UNGA typically considers: those pertaining to the economic embargo of Cuba, arms control, the Middle East, human rights, and free trade.<sup>6</sup> Illustrating this, Table 1 provides a breakdown of issues that the United States lobbied other UN member-states extensively in 2006.

As Table 1 indicates, in 2006 there were 13 key issues that the State Department deemed important enough to lobby other UNGA members to vote in alignment with America's preferences. This relatively small number is characteristic of lobbied votes in most years for which data are available. Of particular note in Table 1 is the United Nations' annual resolution to condemn the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, which the United States has lobbied against over several decades. The embargo against Cuba recurs the most frequently among U.S.-lobbied votes followed by those resolutions which the U.S. sponsors in addressing human rights grievances across the globe (e.g., in North Korea, Belarus, Iran, Uzbekistan, Burma). Topping off the annual list are typically a handful of issues dealing with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which the United States consistently takes a pro-Israeli position. Clearly, these are substantive issues for U.S. material interests.

<sup>5</sup>U.S. State Department. 2007. <http://state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprc>. (Accessed August 21, 2008).

<sup>6</sup>Given that most votes within the UN Security Council are unanimous, providing little to no variation in voting alignment, the strength of analyzing UNGA votes comes to fore, in which dozens of issues each year are decided on a nonconsensus basis, providing a rich body of cross-national variation to examine.

TABLE 1. Example of U.S.-Lobbied Votes in the UNGA in 2006 ( $N = 13$ )*The U.S. Embargo of Cuba*

The United States lobbied other UN member-states to vote against any resolutions condemning the embargo.

*Human Rights*

The United States sponsored or cosponsored resolutions to address and alleviate human rights grievances in Belarus, Burma, Iran, North Korea, and Uzbekistan.

*The Middle East*

The United States lobbied other UN member-states to abolish the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the Division of Palestinian Rights of the Secretariat, and the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.

*Arms Control*

The United States refused to commit to another review conference following the 2001 UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.

*Free Trade*

The United States lobbied to vote against a resolution for the establishment of rules and regulations that would conclude the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations.

*Source:* Voting Practices in the United Nations, <http://state.gov/p/io/conrpt/vtgprc>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

The United States expends diplomatic resources when lobbying UN member-states to vote its way on issues it deems of strategic importance, making it worthwhile to explore the relationship between anti-American sentiment and voting alignment with lobbied votes in the UNGA. Could variation in pro- and anti-American sentiment predict how nations vote in the UN, particularly on issues that the United States deems of “special importance”? This brings us to the first hypothesis:

**H1:** *There is a positive relationship between public approval of the United States within a given country and the level of voting coincidence that country shares with the United States on UNGA lobbied votes.*<sup>7</sup>

In contrast to the dozen or so lobbied votes each year, overall plenary votes comprise a much larger percentage of total votes within the UNGA. For example, in 2006, the UNGA adopted 258 resolutions in plenary session, 37% of which it did not adopt by consensus, comparable to previous years. By shifting from lobbied votes to overall (nonconsensus) votes, I view soft power and anti-Americanism in a somewhat different light. Perhaps countries that are relatively pro- or anti-American tend to vote apart from the United States not only on those issues for which the United States lobbies but also on issues for which the United States does not lobby, but that may be important to these other states. This leads to the second hypothesis:

**H2:** *There is a positive relationship between public approval of the United States within a given country and the level of voting coincidence that country shares with the United States on UNGA nonconsensus overall votes.*

The U.S. State Department also identifies overall plenary votes along three issue-types: those dealing with arms control, human rights, and the Middle East,

<sup>7</sup>One could argue that the United States selects the countries it lobbies, based on how pro- or anti-American these countries are. For instance, if the French public is relatively anti-American, will that influence the United States' selection of France as a country to lobby? In practice, this endogeneity effect does not apply, as the State Department lobbies every UN member-state, based on the issue at hand.



which we can easily test to assess variation in types of issues of importance to the United States. This leads to the following:

**H3:** *There is a positive relationship between public approval of the United States within a given country and the level of voting coincidence that country shares with the United States on UNGA nonconsensus votes according to issue type (i.e., arms control, human rights, and the Middle East).*

Finally, I consider a multiplicative impact of regime-type and favorable opinion toward the United States, such that public opinion matters more in mature democracies. To this extent, there is an interaction term between regime-type and favorable opinion toward the United States:

**H4:** *If a given country has a strong democratic form of government, public opinion should have a greater impact on its UN votes.*

Even if we observe a positive correlation between global attitudes toward the United States and voting behavior within the UNGA, other factors may do a better job of predicting voting alignment with the United States. One competing explanation is U.S. foreign aid received as a proportion of a country's total gross domestic product. Because the United States has been a frequent donor to many UN member-states, some of which may fear retribution should they side against the United States, there may be a correlation between foreign aid received from the United States and voting alignment, independent of pro- or anti-American sentiment. If, for instance, the United States is a generous foreign-aid donor to a state that happens to exhibit relatively strong anti-American tendencies, but tends to vote in alignment with the United States within the UNGA, then the importance of receiving such aid may trump any impact of global public opinion.

Another competing explanation rests with the extent to which a country shares one or more security alliances with the United States. Perhaps UN member-states vote in accordance with their security links, exclusive of pro- or anti-American sentiment. For instance, in the United Kingdom, Tony Blair staunchly supported President Bush's policies in Iraq from the outset, despite public unrest. Public antipathy toward the United States may matter less than the impact of mutual security commitments.

Moreover, because the data set I examine is a cross-sectional time series, there may be temporally significant effects for which to control. Given that the data range from 1985 to 2007, I note the presence of the Cold War, which is significant because voting blocks were often divided along United States and Soviet lines during this bipolar era. Moreover, given that some scholars (e.g., Everts 2006) hypothesize anti-Americanism may actually be "anti-Bushism," it is prudent to include a binary independent variable to control for the presidency of George W. Bush. At the same time, as a robustness check for these temporal control variables, it is useful to control for linear or polynomial time trends.

## Data and Methods

### *Dependent Variables*

I obtain data on voting alignment with the United States from the U.S. State Department's *Voting Practices within the United Nations*. In calculating voting alignment, the State Department observes, "The percent coincidence is calculated on the basis of Yes/No votes only; abstentions and absences are excluded from the tally. Despite the limitations of this method, it provides less distortion than any alternative" (Kirkpatrick 1985). What an abstention signifies for one nation may

differ for another, making it difficult to rank-order abstentions over time. However, we can achieve more robust results if we compare this method with coding abstentions as no-votes (Voeten 2000).

From these data, I extract several measures of a dependent variable, the first of which I call *Lobby*, a percent derived by dividing the number of identical votes by the total number of identical and opposite votes for which the United States and a given country have voted "Yes" or "No" for a given year, pertaining specifically to those issues for which the United States has lobbied other UN member-states extensively. The second dependent variable is *Overall*, which, like *Lobby*, is a percent derived by dividing the number of identical votes by the total number of identical and opposite votes on which the United States and a given country have voted "Yes" or "No." *Overall* includes not only votes from *Lobby* but also all nonconsensus votes in plenary session. I also include *LobbyAbs* and *OverallAbs* for measures of lobbied votes and overall votes with vote abstentions coded as no-votes (Voeten 2000) as a robustness check. The other dependent variables are *Arms*, *Rights*, and *MidEast*, which break down votes in plenary session on issues pertaining to arms control, human rights, and the Middle East, respectively. I code these in the same way as with *Lobby* and *Overall*. Note that, unlike *Overall* and *Lobby*, the data available from the State Department for *Arms*, *Rights*, and *MidEast*, are not available in a disaggregated manner, making it difficult to recode these vote tallies by including vote abstentions as no-votes. The data range from 1985 to 2007, which allowed me to capture cross-national variation in attitudes toward America well before 9/11, when anti-Americanism became more prevalent.

#### *Independent Variables*

I estimate cross-national variation in pro- and anti-American sentiment through the key explanatory variable *Fav*, which measures the percent of respondents in a country who have a "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" opinion of the United States. I obtained data for *Fav* from Record Group 306 of the United States Information Agency (USIA), collected at the National Archives,<sup>8</sup> and online from the Pew Global Attitudes Project (Pew).<sup>9</sup>

Yet exactly how similar are these different survey questions and to what extent do they measure the same thing, that is, cross-national variation in attitudes toward the United States? Given that Pew combines USIA data from 1999 and 2000 with its own survey results, one could infer the results must be similar, if not identical. To provide reassurance that Pew and USIA are measuring the same time, it is important to provide the precise wording of all the questions used in their respective surveys on global attitudes toward the United States. Table A1 in the Appendix lists such a detailed comparison, with the name of the country, source of the survey (USIA or Pew), along with the precise wording of the question the surveyor asked the respondent. Longitudinally, surveyors used the same questions for each country. Moreover, although the sample size varies for each country, every survey polled at least 500 respondents. In each instance, door-to-door interviews were conducted.

The first control variable is *Usaid*, which measures annual U.S. foreign aid as a percentage of that country's total gross domestic product. Because the United

<sup>8</sup>The National Archives, 2008. <http://www.archives.gov/dc-metro/college-park>. I conducted several field trips to the Archives to collect data from Record Group 306 of the United States Information Agency on global attitudes toward the United States.

<sup>9</sup>The Pew Global Attitudes Project, 2008. <http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=165>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

States has been a frequent donor to many states—some of which may fear retribution should they side against the United States—there may be a correlation between foreign aid received from the United States and how that state votes in the UNGA, independent of pro- or anti-American sentiment. If, for instance, the United States is a generous foreign-aid donor to a state that happens to exhibit relatively strong anti-American tendencies but tends to vote in alignment with the United States within the UNGA, then the importance of receiving such aid may trump any impact of global public opinion. I obtained data for *Usaid* from the U.S. Agency for International Development's *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations*<sup>10</sup> and the World Bank's *World Development Indicators*.<sup>11</sup>

The second control variable is *Alliance*, a dichotomous variable that measures whether a given country shares an alliance with the United States. Perhaps UN member-states vote in accordance with their security links, exclusive of pro- or anti-American sentiment. I obtained data for *Alliance* from the from the Correlates of War (COW) dataset.<sup>12</sup> Countries that share an alliance with the United States, I code as "1," otherwise "0."

I also include an interaction term *Regime\*Fav*, which multiplies *Fav* by *Regime*. I obtained data for *Regime* from Freedom House scores.<sup>13</sup> These scores have two key dimensions: those that assess political rights (PR), and those that assess civil liberties (CL). Both scores range along a scale of one as the "most free" to seven as the "least free." For *Regime*, I combine both PR and CL scores for a scale ranging from 2 to 14. If the combined *Regime* score is five or less, then I code *Regime* as "1," otherwise "0."

I examine a cross-sectional time series of 21 countries from 1985 to 2007; it is therefore appropriate to employ a least-squares dummy variable (fixed-effects) model (Beck 2001; Wooldridge 2002; Gujarati 2003). In using a fixed-effects model, I let the  $\gamma$ -intercept for each nation-state vary (e.g., France's  $\gamma$ -intercept will be different from Poland's  $\gamma$ -intercept), but assume that the slope coefficients are constant across each country (from which I can draw statistical inference). Although no empirical model can firmly establish causality between the explanatory and outcome variables, I have lagged *Fav* by 1 year. Thus, I regress values of voting alignment in year  $t$  on values of favorable opinion toward the United States in year  $t-1$ .

Given that these data are a cross-sectional time series, it is also important to control for temporal effects. For instance, regressing *Fav* by year, the relationship is positive but not significant from 1985 to 2000, but then negative and highly significant from 2000 to 2007. This speaks to a competing explanation within the literature that "anti-Bushism" may be salient (Everts 2006) and prompts the need for a dichotomous variable which I call *Bush*. It is also useful to include a dichotomous variable that captures the presence of the Cold War: *Coldwar*. As a robustness check, I also run separate models controlling for linear and nonlinear time trends. Although a common method is to include time dummies or splines (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998), I follow Carter and Signorino (2007), who show that the inclusion of a cubic polynomial ( $t$ ,  $t^2$ , and  $t^3$ ) is a superior specification. (But given these data are not about time, that is, how long it has been since some process occurred, but about international trends

<sup>10</sup>I employ an aggregate measure of U.S. foreign aid, including all foreign aid from the U.S. Agency for International Development, food aid from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and humanitarian (e.g., HIV/AIDS) assistance from the U.S. State Department. <http://qesdb.cdie.org/gbk/index.html>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

<sup>11</sup>World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2008. <http://www.worldbank.org>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

<sup>12</sup>Correlates of War. 2008 <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

<sup>13</sup>Freedom House. 2008. <http://www.freedomhouse.org>. (Accessed August 20, 2008).

that occur across countries, it is arguably more appropriate to interpret the coefficients of *Coldwar* and *Bush*.)

Table 2 provides summary statistics of the variables. Among the dependent variables, the mean for *Lobby* is 70.07; within the UNGA from 1985 to 2007, of those countries I examined, the average voting alignment with U.S.-lobbied votes was 70.07%. This contrasts with *LobbyAbs*, which has a mean of 55.74%, and suggests that the inclusion of vote abstentions as no-votes shifts the distribution. The means for *Overall* and *OverallAbs* are 55.24% and 43.71%, respectively. Thus, the inclusion of vote abstentions has a marked effect on the perception of voting alignment within the UN. The next three variables in Table 2 show the distributions for overall plenary votes broken down according to issues pertaining to arms control, human rights, and the Middle East. Compared to the percent voting alignment on human rights (74.57%) and arms control votes (68.13%), countries on average cast far fewer votes in alignment with U.S. on matters pertaining to the Middle East (29.70%). Among the independent variables, the mean of *Fav* is 65.60; on average, respondents in the 21 countries in our sample held approximately 65% favorable views toward the United States, from 1985 to 2007. The mean for *USAID* is .28, which represents total U.S. foreign aid a given country receives divided by that country's total gross domestic product, which I multiply by 1,000 for ease of interpretation. *Alliance*, a dichotomous variable, has a mean of .75, indicating that more countries in the sample are allies of the United States than those that are not.

Table 3 specifies summary statistics for *Fav*, from 1985 to 2007, for the 21 countries in the analysis. There are missing observations within the data set, due to the limited nature of data available for *Fav*. Following Beck (2001), I include only those countries that have at least a minimum of 10 country-year observations. The country with the highest favorable opinion toward the United States over time is Hungary, with an average favorability rating of 80.69%. The country with the lowest opinion of the United States is Turkey, with an average of only 37% favorable opinion toward the United States over time.

Table 4 reveals several intriguing results. There is robust support for the first hypothesis: cross-national variation in pro- and anti-American sentiment over time is predictive of voting alignment on U.S.-lobbied votes. In Model 1, coding vote abstentions as missing values, a 1% increase in favorable opinion toward the United States predicts a .49% increase in voting coincidence with the United States on lobbied votes, other things being equal. Thus, a 10% increase in

TABLE 2. Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
<i>Lobby</i> : Lobbied Votes w/U.S. (%)	276	70.07	19.99	0	100
<i>LobbyAbs</i> : Lobbied Votes w/U.S. including abstentions (%)	276	55.74	17.51	0	100
<i>Overall</i> : Overall Votes w/U.S. (%)	276	55.24	18.18	11.8	86.6
<i>OverallAbs</i> : Overall Votes w/U.S. including abstentions (%)	257	43.71	13.10	9.88	70.13
<i>Arms</i> : Votes on Arms Control w/U.S. (%)	215	68.13	23.44	6.7	100
<i>Rights</i> : Votes on Human Rights (%)	215	74.57	25.39	0	100
<i>MidEast</i> : Votes on the Middle East w/U.S. (%)	215	29.70	14.95	0	87.5
<i>Fav</i> : Favorable Opinion toward the U.S. (%)	276	65.60	15.72	12	93
<i>Usaid</i> : U.S. Foreign Aid Received/GDP per capita*1000	276	.28	.69	0	4.24
<i>Alliance</i> : Military Alliance with the U.S. (1 = yes; 0 = no)	276	.75	.43	0	1
<i>Regime</i> : Freedom House Scores (1 = free; 0 = not free)	276	.81	.39	0	1
<i>Regime</i> * <i>Fav</i>	276	54.36	29.55	0	93
<i>Coldwar</i> : Cold War (1 = yes; 0 = no)	276	.10	.30	0	1
<i>Bush</i> : George W. Bush Presidency (1 = yes; 0 = no)	276	.35	.48	0	1

TABLE 3. Key Explanatory Variable: Summary Statistics (by Country)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Min.</i>	<i>Max.</i>	<i>N</i>
Argentina	44.63	12.75	25	63	11
Australia	71.50	5.27	60	76	12
Brazil	59	9.32	40	71	14
Bulgaria	75.25	3.72	69	81	12
Canada	72.60	7.35	59	83	10
Czech Republic	79.25	5.28	71	88	12
France	57.89	12.07	37	71	18
Germany	64.72	16.00	35	82	18
Hungary	80.69	4.09	72	87	13
Italy	71.62	8.81	47	80	13
Japan	66.47	7.30	57	77	15
Mexico	62.5	6.96	48	74	12
Poland	79.5	10.59	50	87	14
Romania	84.73	5.97	74	93	11
Russia	55.2	12.67	38	74	10
Slovakia	75.3	7.93	60	83	10
South Korea	60.46	7.64	46	73	13
Spain	41.36	9.34	23	52	14
Thailand	74.77	7.79	65	90	13
Turkey	37	16.36	12	61	13
United Kingdom	69.33	9.30	55	83	18
Total	65.60	15.72	12	93	276

approval of the United States predicts roughly a 5% increase in voting alignment with the United States. Moreover, this is significant at the 0.001 level. Similarly, in Model 2, replacing the independent variables *Coldwar* and *Bush* with variables capturing linear and nonlinear time trends, we observe a comparably significant relationship between favorable opinion toward the United States and voting alignment on U.S.-lobbied votes. However, both Models 1 and 2 treat vote abstentions as missing values, so it is important to compare these results with Models 3 and 4, in which I treat vote abstentions as no-votes (Voeten 2004). In Model 3, the size of the coefficient for *Fav* is smaller (0.273) but still positive and significant at the .05 level. A 10% increase in favorable opinion toward the United States predicts roughly a 3% increase in voting alignment. (The results are similar in Model 4, in which I replace measures for temporally significant events with measures for linear and nonlinear time trends.)

I find support for the second hypothesis in Models 5 and 7. Among overall plenary votes in the UNGA, favorable attitudes toward the United States predict voting alignment with the United States—at least with those models in which we include the control variables *Coldwar* and *Bush* for temporally substantive events. In Model 5, coding abstentions as missing values, a 1% increase in *Fav* predicts a 0.25% increase in voting alignment with the United States, other things being equal. Thus, a 10-point increase in favorable opinion would signal roughly a 3-point increase in voting alignment on overall plenary votes. This is significant at the .01 level. In Model 7, coding vote abstentions as no-votes, I noted a 0.15% increase in voting alignment with the United States for every percent increase in favorable attitudes toward the United States, significant at the .05 level. However, because Models 6 and 8 do not survive the inclusion of the time trend variables, the results for my second hypothesis are less robust, which I interpret with moderate caution.

At the same time, seven of the eight models suggest the first competing explanation, that foreign aid may be predictive of voting alignment, is statistically

TABLE 4. Results: Lobbied and Overall Votes in the UNGA, 1985–2007 (Fixed Effects)

	U.S.-Lobbied Votes			Overall Plenary Votes				
	Abstentions Coded as Missing Values		Abstentions Coded as No-votes	Abstentions Coded as Missing Values			Abstentions Coded as No-votes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
<i>Fav</i>	0.498*** (0.134)	0.507*** (0.140)	0.273* (0.118)	0.267* (0.123)	0.249** (0.0906)	0.140 (0.0949)	0.152* (0.0762)	0.0880 (0.0735)
<i>Usaid</i>	1.971 (1.877)	2.466 (1.925)	1.406 (1.651)	1.739 (1.691)	0.889 (1.270)	0.255 (1.300)	2.892*** (1.077)	1.651 (1.012)
<i>Alliance</i>	-4.321 (3.561)	-3.771 (3.690)	2.596 (3.132)	3.386 (3.242)	-8.244*** (2.410)	-7.942*** (2.493)	-1.693 (2.018)	0.0850 (1.958)
<i>Regime</i>	33.57*** (9.675)	29.79** (9.910)	9.318 (8.509)	6.438 (8.707)	5.732 (6.547)	9.333 (6.695)	-0.357 (5.507)	3.743 (5.168)
<i>Regime*Fav</i>	-0.540*** (0.137)	-0.493*** (0.141)	-0.139 (0.121)	-0.103 (0.124)	-0.109 (0.0930)	-0.168 (0.0954)	0.0153 (0.0781)	-0.0302 (0.0738)
<i>Coldwar</i>	5.383* (2.421)		-1.122 (2.129)		-5.479*** (1.638)		-0.697 (2.309)	
<i>Bush</i>	-18.45*** (1.704)		-17.15*** (1.499)		-18.29*** (1.153)		-12.49*** (0.970)	
<i>t</i>		0.393 (1.285)		1.770 (1.129)		3.135*** (0.868)		11.88*** (1.583)
<i>t</i> <sup>2</sup>		-0.185 (0.129)		-0.268* (0.113)		-0.172* (0.0870)		-0.810*** (0.132)
<i>t</i> <sup>3</sup>		0.00486 (0.00379)		0.00650 (0.00333)		-0.000643 (0.00256)		0.0150*** (0.00338)
Constant	48.30*** (9.371)	56.86*** (10.74)	41.68*** (8.242)	43.96*** (9.439)	53.09*** (6.342)	48.63*** (7.258)	38.37*** (5.332)	-8.825 (8.094)
N	276	276	276	276	276	276	257	257
R <sup>2</sup>	0.495	0.479	0.485	0.470	0.654	0.644	0.585	0.641

Standard errors in parentheses; \**p* < .05, \*\**p* < .01, \*\*\**p* < .001.



insignificant. This is a curious finding, as the power of the purse can in many cases yield substantial leverage (e.g., America's reasonably successful efforts to enlist Pakistan in its war on terror via a generous \$10 billion stream of nondiscretionary funds). Perhaps the reason why the receipt of U.S. foreign assistance has little if anything to do with voting alignment lay in the relatively inelastic supply of such aid. If the United States were to pull the humanitarian plug, as it were, perhaps this would not only disrupt any perceived moral authority the United States cultivates as a provider of such aid but would also tamper with deeply ingrained political institutions, such as the long-standing U.S. Agency for International Development, the curtailment of which may present significant domestic and bureaucratic challenges. Secure in its prior experience and ongoing understanding that the abatement of such aid would be morally and bureaucratically unthinkable for the United States, nations cast their votes in the UN independently of funds received.

The second competing explanation, that sharing an alliance with the United States is predictive of voting alignment, is unsubstantial for lobbied votes but statistically significant for overall votes (at least in Models 5 and 6), suggesting roughly an 8-point decrease along the  $y$ -intercept among those nations that are allies of the United States. This is a curious finding, yet one that should be interpreted with caution, as it only applies to those models in which one codes vote abstentions as missing values and not as no-votes. Moreover, because the sample of states I employ (21 nations) is not representative of the nearly 200 member-states of the UN, it would somewhat presumptuous to make any generalizations about the role of alliances in voting behavior.

One should likewise use caution in interpreting the coefficients for *Regime* and *Regime\*Fav*, as the signs of these variables display statistical significance only for those votes in which one codes vote abstentions as missing values. In Models 1 and 2, among lobbied votes, there is roughly a 30-point increase along the  $y$ -intercept among those nations coded as mature democracies. Moreover, in the interaction of regime type and favorable opinion toward the United States, there is a drop in the slope that cancels the coefficient for *Fav*. Yet, given that these results do not survive in inclusion of vote abstentions as no-votes, it is not appropriate to make any generalizations.

Perhaps most intriguing, Table 4 points to a robust and significant relationship for the dichotomous variable *Bush* in Models 1, 3, 5, and 7. Independent of pro- or anti-American sentiment, there is a 12- to 18-point decrease along the  $y$ -intercept among countries between the years 2000 to 2007, lending credence to the argument that "anti-Bushism" may be a factor in explaining how countries behave toward the United States (Everts 2006). Moreover, the magnitude of *Bush* dwarfs the impact of *Fav*, significant and robust though it may be.

Finally, let us observe the relationship between global attitudes toward the United States and overall plenary votes broken down according to three different issue types (arms control, human rights, and the Middle East), as Table 5 illustrates.

Table 5 reveals additional support for the anti-Bushism hypothesis as well as the anti-American hypothesis. (Yet, given that the data available only code vote abstentions as missing values, results should be interpreted with some caution.) As the case with U.S.-lobbied votes and overall votes, there is a positive and statistically significant relationship between cross-national variation in pro- and anti-American sentiment over time and voting alignment on overall plenary votes broken down by issues pertaining to arms control and the Middle East (but not so on issues pertaining to human rights). With regard to arms control, a 1% increase in favorable attitudes toward the United States predicts a .49% increase in voting alignment. The largest voting increase occurs on issues regarding the Middle East: for every 1% increase in favorable attitudes toward the United

TABLE 5. Results: Overall Plenary Votes by Issue Type in the UNGA, 1994–2007 (Fixed Effects)

	Arms Control			Human Rights		The Middle East	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	
<i>Fav</i>	0.485*** (0.123)	0.212 (0.113)	0.0950 (0.139)	0.0276 (0.157)	0.611*** (0.158)	0.400** (0.140)	
<i>Usaid</i>	1.761 (1.935)	0.392 (1.701)	1.410 (2.182)	0.597 (2.379)	2.121 (2.495)	2.025 (2.120)	
<i>Alliance</i>	-2.956 (3.722)	-4.874 (3.458)	-3.036 (4.196)	2.308 (4.836)	-12.43* (4.800)	-0.474 (4.309)	
<i>Regime</i>	-9.783 (8.751)	3.180 (7.785)	9.996 (9.866)	14.80 (10.89)	8.956 (11.28)	6.274 (9.700)	
<i>Regime*Fav</i>	0.165 (0.126)	-0.0228 (0.113)	-0.161 (0.142)	-0.185 (0.158)	-0.192 (0.163)	-0.0791 (0.141)	
<i>Bush</i>	-24.64*** (1.578)		-29.90*** (1.779)		-3.923 (2.035)		
<i>t</i>		63.28*** (8.621)		57.46*** (12.06)		-29.56*** (10.74)	
<i>t</i> <sup>2</sup>		-4.117*** (0.580)		-4.196*** (0.811)		1.659* (0.722)	
<i>t</i> <sup>3</sup>		0.0805*** (0.0126)		0.0919*** (0.0176)		-0.0313* (0.0157)	
Constant	48.60*** (8.605)	-231.7*** (41.44)	84.32*** (9.701)	-158.9** (57.95)	3.523 (11.10)	175.1*** (51.64)	
<i>N</i>	215	215	215	215	215	215	
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.763	0.820	0.682	0.627	0.257	0.471	

Standard errors in parentheses; \**p* < .05, \*\**p* < .01, \*\*\**p* < .001.

States, there is a .61% increase in voting alignment. These results are significant at the .001 level. Regarding anti-Bushism, in the presence of the George W. Bush administration, there is roughly a 24 to 30-point drop along the y-intercept on issues pertaining to arms control and human rights.

These results provide robust evidence confirming the hypothesis that anti-Americanism has serious, deleterious consequences for UNGA votes. Whether broken down according to lobbied votes or overall votes in plenary session—with or without abstentions included as no-votes—the story is similar: global opinion toward the United States is a robust, predictive indicator of how states administer their foreign policies. These findings suggest that there are tangible, political consequences of anti-Americanism, when examining about 24 countries from 1985 to 2007. Anti-Americanism does appear to predict a decline in American soft power, as Nye (2004) suggests. At the same time, the results of this study suggest anti-Bushism predicts a great deal of voting behavior in the UNGA.

### Discussion

There is a statistically significant relationship between global attitudes toward the United States and political outcomes contrary to the U.S. national interest. Nye (2004) and Nye and Armitage (2007) argue that despite the apparent weakness of the UN, it remains the one multilateral institution which can bestow legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, without which, that nation can suffer if it chooses to act alone. Without UN approval, the argument goes, other states may seek to constrain the United States, perhaps somewhat in a manner which Pape (2005) describes as soft balancing. Disgruntled United States allies express their displeasure with the United States—perhaps due to American unilateralism, as Voeten (2005) suggests—through institutionally limiting U.S. influence.

A decline in American soft power provides an effective institutional strait-jacket, curtailing America's capabilities. In contrast to allied support for the first Gulf War (in which the United States enjoyed the full backing of the United Nations), support for the current war in Iraq has been dismally low, such that the United States has shouldered the brunt of the burden, politically, economically, and militarily. Without the legitimacy of the UN, the United States appears to have a rock in its proverbial shoe, thus inhibiting its ability to achieve its national interest. In this regard, it may well matter if France or Germany votes in alignment with U.S. preferences within the UN, as vote support is indicative of approval for U.S. policies and the values that undergird those policies. By voting against the United States, countries are casting a collective shadow of disapproval on U.S. policies. To the extent that the United States is a country founded upon ideas—as a “city upon a hill,” which casts a beacon of moral authority for the rest of the world to admire and consider—votes against the United States, particularly on issues for which the U.S. State Department actively lobbies, are a stern rejection of America's moral authority.

Given that anti-Americanism and anti-Bushism predict voting patterns in the UNGA, two points arise. First, to what extent is anti-Americanism synonymous with anti-Bushism? Although some scholars (e.g., Everts 2006; Isernia 2007) distinguish the two, a wide literature has emerged recently in which scholars characterize anti-Americanism as consisting of many valences, including feelings of resentment against the U.S. government, Americans, U.S. culture, and U.S. foreign policy, perhaps making the term “anti-Americanisms” more appropriate (Katzenstein and Keohane 2007a, 2007b). To the extent that anti-Bushism is a valence of anti-Americanism, the results of this study suggest disapproval of the U.S. or its leadership is predictive of outcomes consequential to the U.S. material interest. Given that the measure of anti-Americanism in this study is a

rudimentary, yet parsimonious, measure of percent favorable opinion toward the United States, future research should continue to disaggregate and empirically test the different nuances of what anti-Americanism entails and how it might relate to outcomes significant to the United States.

Lastly, in this paper I propose and test a predictive theory, but not a full causal theory, of the consequences of anti-Americanism in the United Nations General Assembly. Future case-study work should consider how and when certain causal mechanisms translate attitudes from the level of the mass public at time  $t$  to the level of elites at time  $t + 1$ , who then enact policy at the state-level of analysis.

### Appendix

TABLE A1. A Comparison of Question Wording on Attitudes toward the United States from the Pew Research Center (Pew) and the United States Information Agency (USIA)

<i>Country</i>	<i>Source</i>	<i>Question Wording</i>
Argentina, Canada, Czech. Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom	Pew	"Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of (the United States)?"
Canada, France, Italy, Japan, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Thailand	USIA	"What is your overall opinion of the United States: do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?"
Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Hungary	USIA	"I would like to ask you a few questions about your feelings toward different countries. First, do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of the United States?"
Argentina	USIA	"In general, do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the United States? Is that somewhat very favorable/unfavorable or favorable/unfavorable?"
Brazil, Germany, Turkey	USIA	"Now I would like your opinion about various countries. What about the United States, overall, do you have a very favorable, a somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable or very unfavorable opinion of the U.S.?"
Britain	USIA	"What about the United States? Do you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, very unfavorable opinion of the United States?"
Mexico	USIA	"Now, thinking about the United States—all things considered, do you have a favorable or an unfavorable opinion of the U.S.? Is that very or somewhat favorable/ unfavorable?"
Russia	USIA	"Now I would like your opinion about various foreign countries. On the whole, is your opinion of [Name of Country] very favorable, more favorable than unfavorable, more unfavorable than favorable, or very unfavorable?"

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