THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
OF HOMICIDE

San Antonio, TX | June 4 - 7, 2014

Program Co-Chairs: Jaclyn Schildkraut & Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller
Local Arrangements: Candice Batton
The Changing Landscape Of Homicide:
Proceedings of the 2014 Meeting of the Homicide Research Working Group
San Antonio, Texas

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Homicide Research Working Group Goals

The Homicide Research Working Group (HRWG) is an international and interdisciplinary organization of volunteers dedicated to cooperation among researchers and practitioners who are trying to understand and limit lethal violence. The HRWG has the following goals:

♦ to forge links between research, epidemiology and practical programs to reduce levels of mortality from violence;
♦ to promote improved data quality and the linking of diverse homicide data sources;
♦ to foster collaborative, interdisciplinary research on lethal and non-lethal violence;
♦ to encourage more efficient sharing of techniques for measuring and analyzing homicide;
♦ to create and maintain a communication network among those collecting, maintaining and analyzing homicide data sets; and
♦ to generate a stronger working relationship among homicide researchers.

Homicide Research Working Group publications include the Proceedings of each annual Intensive Workshop (beginning in 1991) and the journal, Homicide Studies, (beginning in 1997).

More information is available on the HRWG web site at http://www.homicideresearchworkinggroup.org/


The views expressed in the Proceedings are those of the authors and speakers, and not necessarily those of the Homicide Research Working Group or the co-editors of this volume.

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Welcome to San Antonio, Texas!

We are very excited to host this year’s meeting right on the River Walk in San Antonio, deep within the heart of Central Texas. The area boasts many sights, sounds, and a tremendous history that is unparalleled with other destinations. Additionally, with the added convenience of the River Walk location, everything you could need (or want) is right at your fingertips.

We have a really exciting meeting planned for you this year. We are pleased to welcome our keynote speaker, Michele Gay, co-founder of Safe and Sound: A Sandy Hook Initiative (see page 2). Michele brings a unique perspective on the challenges of safety and school security, and we are excited to have her join us to share some of what she has learned. More information about Safe and Sound can be found on their website here: www.safeandsoundschools.org.

We also have an exciting field trip planned to the facilities of ALERRT, which stands for Active Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training. The ALERRT Center has been named by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (2013) as their standard for active shooter response. Over 50,000 police officers nationwide have been trained using the ALERRT curriculum, which our group will get a taste of during our visit. Training demonstrations, as well as a presentation on the research currently being conducted by ALERRT, is on the agenda. For more information, please visit www.alerrt.org.

We would like to take a moment to thank Don Montague, Dr. Pete Blair, and the ALERRT team for hosting our group at their facilities. We also would like thank Dr. Christine Sellers and the School of Criminal Justice at Texas State University for their generous co-sponsorship of our welcoming reception.

Should you need any assistance prior to or during the meetings, please do not hesitate to contact this year’s program co-chairs, Jackie Schildkraut and Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller.

So, as they say here in the Lone Star State, kick up your boots and enjoy the show… and remember, Don’t Mess with Texas!
HRWG IS PLEASED TO WELCOME OUR KEYNOTE SPEAKER!

MICHELE GAY

NATIONAL LEVEL SPEAKER AND CO-FOUNDER OF SAFE AND SOUND: A SANDY HOOK INITIATIVE

Michele Gay is a mother, former teacher, and now one of the founders of Safe and Sound: A Sandy Hook Initiative. After losing her daughter, Josephine Grace, on December 14, 2012, she chose to take action as an advocate for improved school security and safety in our nation’s schools.

Michele’s background as a teacher and involved parent, along with her personal loss and post tragedy perspective, have left her uniquely positioned to help school communities prevent tragedy, and better prepare and respond in the event of an emergency in their own schools.

Michele holds a Bachelor of Science in Elementary Education from Towson University and a Master’s degree in Curriculum and Instruction from McDaniel College. She taught at the elementary level in Maryland and Virginia public schools before staying home to raise her three daughters and advocate for the special needs of her youngest daughter, Josephine. Michele is dedicated to honoring Josephine in her work to make schools in our country more safe and secure.

Keynote Speaker

Michele Gay, co-founder of Safe and Sound: A Sandy Hook Initiative shares her personal story and lessons learned on December 14, 2012. She will introduce the inspiring way she has chosen to help school communities improve school safety in honor of her daughter, Josephine and the other 19 children and 6 teachers lost on December 14, 2012. Michele’s perspective as the mother of a special needs child and former elementary school teacher provides unique insight and inspiration for parents, administrators, school staff, emergency responders and community members who strive to make their schools safer. Michele Gay and the Safe and Sound foundation, bring an important message to our communities, and represent a powerful presence in our school safety community.

6101 Preservation Drive
Chattanooga, TN 37416
www.ncyi.org
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HRWG Program Overview

Wednesday, June 4th

5:30 – 9:00 pm  Welcoming Reception – Verona Ballroom  
Co-Sponsored by: Texas State University and HRWG  
Open bar and hors d’oeuvres begin at 5:30 pm

7:00 – 8:00 pm  Keynote Speaker: Michele Gay  
Safe & Sound: A Sandy Hook Initiative

Thursday, June 5th

6:30 – 8:00 am  Breakfast

8:00 – 8:15 am  Verona Ballroom  
Opening Announcements and Introductions

8:15 – 10:15 am  Panel Session #1: Investigations and Prevention  
Chair: Jay Corzine & Recorder: Vanessa Leggett

Understanding Violent Crime Clearance Rates: Beyond Examining Homicide  
Ashley Mancik, University of Delaware  
Wendy C. Regoeczi  
John Jarvis, Behavioral Science Unit, FBI

Investigations and Prosecutions of Homicides in Cleveland, Ohio  
Tom McEwen, McEwen and Associates, LLC  
Wendy C. Regoeczi, Cleveland State University

The Impact of Organizational Factors on Homicide Clearance Outcomes: Perspectives of Homicide Investigators  
Christina Witt, Mount Royal University/Calgary Police Services  
Tanya Trussler, Mount Royal University

Ringmasters, Magicians, & the Traveling Sideshow: Enter the Carnival of Homicide Prevention  
Dallas Drake, Center for Homicide Research

10:15 – 10:30 am  Morning Break
10:30 – 12:00 pm  Panel Session #2: Education and Research in Homicide  
Chair: Lin Huff-Corzine

*Understanding Crisis Communications: Examining Students’ Perceptions about Campus Notification Systems*
Joseph McKenna, Texas State University  
Jaclyn Schildkraut, Texas State University  
H. Jaymi Elsass, Texas State University

*Homicide Classification: The Expressive/Instrumental Classification and Hybrid Crime Scenes*
Dara Drawbridge, Northeastern University  
C. Gabrielle Salfati, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

*Making the Number of Murders Real: Active Learning in a Murder Class*
Kim Davies, Georgia Regents University

*Putting Forward a Framework for Studying Active Shooter Events*
Jeffrey Osborne & C. Gabrielle Salfati, John Jay College of Criminal Justice

12:00 – 1:00 pm  Lunch: Verona Ballroom (cost included in registration)

1:00 – 2:00 pm  Business Meeting #1

2:00 – 3:30 pm  Panel Session #3: Special Offender Populations in Homicide  
Chair: Wendy Regoeczi & Recorder: Ashley Mancik

*Juvenile Gang Homicide*
Alec Szalewski, Lakeland College  
Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller, Lakeland College

*Ladies’ Choice: Weapon Selection Among Solo Female Homicide Offenders*
Mindy Weller, University of Central Florida  
Sarah Ann Sacra, University of Central Florida

*Juvenile and Adult Involvement in Double Parricide in the U.S.: An Empirical Analysis of 20 Years of Data*
Averi Fegadel & Kathleen Heide, University of South Florida

3:30 – 3:45 pm  Afternoon Break
3:45 – 5:00 pm  
**Panel Session #4: Location-Based Homicides**  
Chair: Chris Rasche & Recorder: J. Amber Scherer

*Murder-Suicides in Cuyahoga County, 1991-2012*  
Wendy C. Regoeczi, Cleveland State University  
Thomas Gilson, Cuyahoga County Medical Examiner’s Office

*Life and Death in the Big Easy: Homicide and Lethality in 21st Century New Orleans*  
Jay Corzine, University of Central Florida  
Lin Huff-Corzine, University of Central Florida  
Aaron Poole, University of Central Florida  
James McCutcheon, University of Memphis  
Sarah Ann Sacra, University of Central Florida

*Distance Traveled in Homicides – A Three Year Population-Based Study from Sweden*  
Joakim Sturup & Marianne Kristiansson, National Board of Forensic Medicine, Stockholm

5:00 – 5:30 pm  
**Poster Session**

*Examining Gang-Involved Homicide in New Orleans*  
Christian Bolden & Rae Taylor, Loyola University

*A Population-Based Study of Homicide-Suicide Offenders*  
Joakim Sturup, National Board of Forensic Medicine Stockholm

*Juvenile Gang Homicide Characteristics and Data Comparison*  
Alec Szalewski, Lakeland College  
Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller, Lakeland College

5:30 – 5:45 pm  
**Concluding Announcements**

6:00 pm  
Meet in Lobby for Dinner: Rio Rio Cantina, San Antonio, TX
Friday, June 6th

6:30 – 8:00 am  Breakfast

8:00 – 9:30 am  Meet in hotel lobby: Transportation to ALERRT

9:30 am – 12:00 pm  ALERRT tour and research presentation

12:30 – 2:00 pm  Lunch: Saltgrass Steakhouse, San Marcos, TX

2:00 – 3:00 pm  Transportation back to hotel

3:30 – 5:30 pm  Panel Session #5: Offender Characteristics and Patterns  
Chair: Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller & Recorder: Amanda Farrell

- Drug Arrests and Homicide Rates: Exploring the Criminogenic Impact of the Drug War  
  Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

- Examination of Recidivism Patterns among Two Types of Juvenile Homicide Offenders  
  Norair Khachatryan & Kathleen Heide, University of South Florida

- Getting Away with Murder: An Examination of Homicides Staged as Suicides  
  Claire Ferguson, University of New England, Australia

- In Cold Blood: A Comparison of Native American and Black Homicides  
  Kayla Ward, University of Central Florida

6:15 – 6:30 pm  Meet in Lobby for Dinner: Rita’s on the River, San Antonio, TX
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Saturday, June 7th

6:30 – 8:00 am  Breakfast

8:00 – 9:00 am  Morning Announcements & Business Meeting #2

9:00 – 10:30 am  Panel Session #6: Special Topics in Homicide Research  
Chair: James McCutcheon & Recorder: Sarah Ann Sacra

* American Newspapers and the Development of the Classification of Serial Murder: Some Components Before 1915  
  Vance McLaughlin, Jacksonville State University

* Beyond the Wolfgang Paradigm  
  Barrie Ritter & Jack Ritter

* The Dog that Stopped Barking: Mass Legal Executions in 21st Century America  
  Paul H. Blackman, Independence Institution  
  Vance McLaughlin, Jacksonville State University

10:30 – 10:45 am  Morning Break

10:45 – 11:45 am  Panel Session #7: Victimization Considerations  
Chair: Jaclyn Schildkraut & Recorder: Kayla Ward

* A Tale of Two Cities: Testing Ecological Theories of Police Shootings on a Small Scale  
  Amanda Farrell, Old Dominion University  
  Anne Lee, Old Dominion University

* Living Homicide Victims: Exploring the Effects of Homicide on Significant Others  
  Greg Weaver, Auburn University  
  Lin Huff-Corzine, University of Central Florida  
  Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller, Lakeland College  
  J. Amber Scherer, George Mason University

* Race, Sex, and Homicide Victimization Trends Over Time  
  Terrance Taylor, University of Missouri-St. Louis  
  Shytierra Gaston, University of Missouri-St. Louis  
  CheyOnna Sewell, University of Missouri-St. Louis

11:45 – 12:00 pm  Concluding Announcements – 1:00 pm Hotel check-out
Information about the San Antonio Area

The River Walk is one of the most visited places in the greater San Antonio area and all of Texas. As a public park that is open 365 days a year, the River Walk combines dining, hotels, nightlife, shopping, and more to give guests an all-encompassing experience. Located in the heart of San Antonio, the River Walk includes 15 miles of sidewalks and paths, providing easy access to museums, the King William Historic District, 300-year-old Spanish missions, and new adventures around every turn. Also known as Paseo del Rio, the River Walk is the largest urban ecosystem in the nation.

More than 20 million visitors enjoy San Antonio each year! According to VisitSanAntonio.com, the San Antonio River symbolizes the heart and soul of the Alamo City, as San Antonio has come to be known. The river was a gathering place for Native Americans thousands of years ago. In the 1700s, the first civilian Spanish settlers built their homes along the river.

The Alamo was the first Spanish mission to be built along the San Antonio River. In 1836, this iconic Texas landmark offered shelter and protection for local residents who were fighting for independence from Mexico. The country’s dictator, General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, sent troops in to overtake the fort. Even though there were less than 200 Texans, compared to this large army, they were able to fight back and eventually defeated Santa Anna’s troops in the Battle of San Jacinto, with cries of “Remember the Alamo!” as they did. After urging from the Daughters of the Texas Republic, the Alamo was classified as a historic site, and now sits nestled in the heart of a bustling downtown.

Things to See and Do in San Antonio, TX

There are many things to see and do in and around San Antonio. The following are a few of the many highlights the area has to offer:

THE ALAMO

Situated on 4.2 acres in the heart of Downtown San Antonio, the Alamo houses the exhibits on the Texas Revolution and Texas History. The property also features the picturesque Alamo Gardens for your enjoyment.

Website: www.thealamo.org
Hours of Operation: 9:00 am – 7:00 pm daily
Admission Price: FREE
TOWER OF THE AMERICAS

Also known as San Antonio’s Space Needle, the Tower of the Americas sits at 750 feet tall and provides guests with breathtaking views of the Alamo City. The tower includes an observation deck, 4D theater ride, and revolving Chart House Restaurant with panoramic views.

Website: [www.toweroftheamericas.com](http://www.toweroftheamericas.com)
Hours of Operation: 10:00 am – 10:00 pm daily
Admission Price: $10.95 for adults (tax excluded)

RIO SAN ANTONIO CRUISES

Take a tour along the San Antonio River Walk. Lasting around 35 minutes, the informative tour will point out all of the many treasures along the journey. Four different cruise stations are conveniently located Downtown.

Website: [www.riosanantonio.com](http://www.riosanantonio.com)
Hours of Operation: 9:00 am – 9:00 pm daily
Admission Price: $8.25 general admission (tax included)

ALAMO TROLLEY

Take a 60-minute fully narrated tour through the heart of San Antonio. Sights include Hemisfair Park, Tower of the Americas, the Mission Trail, Market Square, and many more. Hop passes give you unlimited boarding all day!

Website: [www.thealamotrolley.com](http://www.thealamotrolley.com)
Hours of Operation: 9:00 am – 4:00 pm (last Trolley)
Admission Price: $21.95 for adults / $25.95 for Hop Pass
SAN ANTONIO MUSEUM OF ART

Another San Antonio treasure steeped in history, the San Antonio Museum of Art features a number of different exhibits from Latin American, ancient Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Asian artists. A must see for the art fan!

Website: www.samuseum.org

Hours of Operation: 10:00 am – 9:00 pm Tu / F / Sa
10:00 am – 5:00 pm W / Th
10:00 am – 6:00 pm Su

Admission Price: $10.00 general admission (tax included) Free Tuesdays (4:00 – 9:00 pm) and Sundays (10:00 am – 12:00 pm)

RIVERCENTER MALL

Self-described as “the premiere shopping, dining, and entertainment destination,” the Rivercenter features over 100 different retailers, a movie theater and IMAX, and seven full-service restaurants, right on San Antonio’s River Walk. It’s sure to have something for everyone!

Website: www.shoprivercenter.com

Hours of Operation: 10:00 am – 9:00 pm M – Sa
12:00 pm – 6:00 pm Su

Admission Price: FREE

Note: For more options, check out any of the tourist information websites provided above.
Understanding Violent Crime Clearance Rates: Beyond Examining Homicide

Ashley Mancik, University of Delaware
Wendy C. Regoeczi, Cleveland State University
John Jarvis, Behavioral Sciences Unit, FBI

Introduction

Over the past 15 years, a growing body of literature has examined the question of what factors influence the likelihood that a homicide will be solved. This research has examined a variety of different elements, including victim characteristics, incident characteristics, investigative aspects of the case, and more recently, the use of forensic evidence in homicide investigations. As a result of these research efforts, the following patterns regarding homicide clearances are generally well established. There is a higher likelihood of clearing homicides involving child victims and a lower likelihood of clearing homicides involving the elderly (Addington, 2006; Cardarelli and Cavanagh, 1994; Lee, 2005; Litwin, 2004; Puckett and Lundman, 2003; Regoeczi, Kennedy, and Silverman, 2000; Riedel and Rinehart, 1996). Homicides involving firearms are less likely to be cleared (Litwin, 2004; Litwin and Xu, 2007; Mouzos and Muller, 2001; Regoeczi et al., 2000), while killings committed with weapons that bring the victim and offender into contact with each other (such as fists, knives, or blunt instruments) increase the likelihood of clearing the case (Addington, 2006; Mouzos and Muller, 2001; Puckett and Lundman, 2003; Roberts, 2007). Felony- and drug-related homicides have lower clearance rates (Cardarelli and Cavanagh, 1994; Lee, 2005; Litwin, 2004; Mouzos and Muller, 2001; Regoeczi and Jarvis, 2013; Regoeczi et al., 2000; Riedel and Rinehart, 1996; Rinehart, 1994; Roberts, 2007). Homicides occurring indoors are more likely to be cleared (Addington, 2006; Litwin, 2004; Litwin and Xu, 2007; Mouzos and Muller, 2001; Wellford and Cronin, 1999).

With respect to other aspects of homicide cases, the findings are more mixed, including the influence of victim gender, victim race, victim prior criminal record, investigator workload, investigator experience, and the availability of forensic evidence.

In spite of the growing consensus over the importance of some aspects of homicides when it comes to clearing cases, much remains unknown about the generalizability of these findings to subtypes of homicides or other forms of violent crime. The current study is an effort to help begin to fill this significant gap. In particular, we focus on the following research questions.
Research Question 1

Do factors which have shown to influence the clearing of homicides in general have a significant influence for clearing robbery homicides and homicides involving sexual assault?

Robbery and sexual assault homicides tend to involve more distant relationships between the victim and perpetrator. This may create unique obstacles for police in solving these crimes.

Research Question 2

Are the factors that influence the clearance of robbery homicides equally important for the clearance of robbery offenses more generally?

The death of a victim in the course of a robbery incident has an important influence on the investigation of the crime to the extent that the primary witness is typically no longer able to provide police with information regarding the suspect. We plan to examine to whether this key distinction generates any differences in terms of the factors that influence the clearance of each type.

Research Question 3

Are the factors that influence the clearance of sexual homicides equally important for the clearance of sexual assault offenses more generally?

As with robbery homicides, the death of the victim in the course of a sexual assault may also significantly impact the course of the investigation and the factors that prove critical to its closure. We begin by assessing whether sexual assault homicides are more likely to be committed by strangers than sexual assault offenses in general, as a positive finding here could provide the basis for an explanation regarding differences in the factors influences the closure of each type of case.

Methodology

The current study uses data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) for the years 2009 to 2011. During this time period, a total of 840,432 violent crimes were reported to NIBRS of which just 482,198 were available for analysis after the appropriate selection criteria were included and duplicates were eliminated. This procedure led to 5,658 homicides remaining of which 60 were robbery homicide incidents and 19 were sex assault homicide incidents. Additionally, 313,595 aggravated assaults, 86,216 robberies, 77,215 sex assaults remained for analysis in this study. These totals were derived from the public use tapes stored at ICPSR and utilized the data. These data were then drawn upon to exam the research questions posed earlier. The tables that will be presented at the conference will depict the analysis that we have produced to this point. It is expected that the magnitude of difference in survival curves for each contrasting offense will be of more importance than a simple displacement of police effort. Additionally, as the research questions suggest, it is expected that the correlates of crime clearance for crimes other than homicide will vary from those that impact homicide. If so, the implications will be important both to further research and to practical aspects of violent crime investigations.
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References


Investigations and Prosecutions of Homicides in Cleveland, Ohio

Tom McEwen, McEwen and Associates, LLC
Wendy C. Regoecci, Cleveland State University

Results presented in this talk are from a study conducted by the authors on 294 homicide cases (315 victims) occurring in Cleveland, Ohio, between 2008 and 2011.¹ The emphasis in the study was on the use of forensic evidence and forensic analysis in investigations and prosecutions. In addition to data collected on victims and arrestees, we documented the types of forensic evidence collected at the scene and we coded results from subsequent analysis of the evidence. Categories of forensic evidence included DNA evidence,² latent prints, firearms, ballistics (shell casings, spent projectiles, etc.), drugs, clothing, trace, and others. Through reports on the analysis of evidence, we determined whether matches (e.g., latent prints from an item at the scene match the fingerprints of a suspect) or exclusions (e.g., DNA profile from an item at the scene does not match the DNA profile of a suspect) were obtained.

Table 1 gives basic statistics on the variables in our study. In general, statistics on victims and arrestees follow national trends. Male victims account for 83.5% of victims and 87.0% of arrestees. Victims averaged 33 years of age and arrestees averaged 28.2 years. Victims were predominantly African-American (79.4%), as were arrestees (80.2%). With regard to forensic evidence, DNA evidence (usually swabs) was collected at two-thirds of the homicide scenes, followed by ballistics evidence (52.4% of scenes), clothing (49.3%), firearms (20.4%), and gunshot residue (GSR) kits (19.4%).

We also collected data on the number of witnesses interviewed by investigators at homicide scenes. During the collection process, we found it beneficial to divide witnesses into two categories: eyewitnesses and hearing witnesses. Eyewitnesses are witnesses who reported to investigators that they saw something associated with the incident (e.g., saw someone running from a house to a car), while hearing witnesses report that they heard, but did not see, something related to the incident (e.g., heard an argument in the apartment next to them). Eyewitnesses were found at 189 homicide scenes (64.3%) and hearing witnesses at 162 scenes (55.1%).

While coding cases from the homicide files, we found nine homicides in which no evidence was collected. Most were “remote” homicides, meaning that significant time elapsed between the precipitating event and the victim’s death. The usual circumstance was that the victim died several weeks or months after an assault, and the medical examiner ruled that the death was a direct result of the assault. At the time of the ruling, the case becomes a homicide and homicide investigators are assigned to the case. In these cases, the offenders are almost always known to the police as a result of the precipitating event and, in fact, seven of the nine cases resulted in arrests for homicides.

¹ The study was supported by a federal grant entitled Forensic Evidence in Homicide Investigations (Grant No. 2011-DN-BX-0007) awarded to the authors by the National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice.
² We use the generally accepted term “DNA evidence” to mean evidence from which a DNA profile may be extracted. From homicide scenes, it is usually swabs of blood, saliva, or semen.
We should point out that the medical examiner’s office for Cuyahoga County is responsible for conducting DNA and trace analysis, while the Forensic Unit within the Cleveland Police Department conducts analysis on latent prints and firearms. Both provided analysis reports for our study.

With regard to forensic evidence, investigators typically ask for comparisons between items of evidence (e.g., between swabs from a scene against the victim, or between swabs from the scene and a suspect). In reading the reports, however, we noted that it was not always possible for forensic analysts to satisfy an investigator’s request. For example, comparisons between a latent print from the scene against a suspect’s fingerprints may not be possible because the latent print is smeared or has insufficient ridge detail. Similarly, a DNA profile from scene evidence may be determined to be a mixture of two or more individuals, which may preclude comparisons with other evidence.

From an investigator’s viewpoint, the most important outcome for advancing an investigation is whether a particular test resulted in a match or exclusion. A match between the DNA profile from blood at the scene and the DNA profile of a suspect is usually important because it places the individual at the scene, although it does not prove that the suspect was the perpetrator. Similarly, a match between a shell casing from the scene and a shell casing fired from a confiscated handgun may be valuable to an investigator. An exclusion (two items are determined to be from different sources) may be important because it may eliminate a suspect from further investigation (e.g., the DNA profile from blood at the scene does not match the suspect).

Results from some analyses may be “inconclusive” on whether the two items are from the same source. When comparing two bullets, for example, the examiner may conclude that they have the same class characteristics (e.g., caliber, width, size and shape of firing pin, etc.), but differ slightly in individual characteristics (e.g., microscopic striations). With inconclusive results, the examiner simply documents the similarities and differences, thereby letting the investigator determine its utility. An inconclusive result is therefore more problematic on whether it is of value to an investigator.

For the purposes of our study, we recorded whether matches or exclusions were made in each case from comparisons involving DNA, latent prints, firearms, and trace evidence. Our view is that matches and exclusions provide probative results to an investigator. That is, they can advance an investigation and can be presented in court as facts in evidence. Further, we do not consider inconclusive results as probative due to the ambiguity associated with them. By making these decisions on what constitutes probative results, we are obtaining a more definitive connection between the contributions of forensic analysis and case outcomes.

An initial finding is that probative results were obtained from forensic analysis in 215 cases (herein called Group 1), while 71 cases had no probative results (herein called Group 2).

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3 Only a few instances of trace comparisons were identified in our study. These included, for example, comparisons between two sets of shoe imprints, comparisons of a broken knife blade to a knife handle, and comparison of paint chips from a victim to paint from a mop. Most comparisons were from DNA evidence, followed by firearms and latent prints.
We determined that the clearance rate for Group 1 was higher than Group 2 (63.1% compared to 56.3%). Further, Table 2 comparing the adjudicatory outcomes for the two groups of cases also shows differences between the two groups: arrestees in Group 1 were more likely to be charged with aggravated murder and more likely to accept a plea to the original or lesser charge. Guilty defendants in Group 1 received prison sentences averaging 13.6 years (n=166) compared to 9.4 years (n=36) for those without probative results. Finally, 19 guilty defendants in Group 1 received life sentences and two received death sentences. Three guilty defendants in Group 2 received life sentences.

As part of the study, we were able to obtain data on hits from the CODIS and AFIS systems available for queries by forensic personnel. We identified 24 cases with CODIS hits and five cases with AFIS hits. Thirteen cases with CODIS hits and three cases with AFIS hits resulted in arrests. Further review of the 13 cases with CODIS hits revealed, however, that the identified ex-offender was already known to investigators. The value of the CODIS hit was that it supported the arrest. Interestingly, 11 cases with CODIS hits did not result in arrests. Two reasons can be given for the lack of success. First, as indicated by investigators, it is sometimes difficult to locate the ex-offender, and second, during an interview, the ex-offender may be able to explain his or her presence at the scene (e.g., had a cigarette at the victim’s house on the day before the incident), and their explanation may exclude them from further investigation.

Finally, a more important finding from our study concerns the time to arrests compared to the time for forensic analysis. In Cleveland, about half of all arrests occur within 2.5 days of investigation and about 80% occur within 20 days. By comparison, forensic analysis generally takes several weeks. The differences between arrest time and forensic analysis time is reflected in our finding that of the 135 clearances in Group 1, probative results prior to arrest were obtained in only 23 cases (17.0%). For the objective of clearance, the value of forensic analysis may therefore be in so-called “whodunit” cases that were solved only after a considerable amount of time had transpired. In these cases, forensic analysis may have been of value in identifying suspects and providing leads to investigators.

By contrast, we have 121 cases in which probative results were obtained after arrest. These results serve two purposes. First, they may support the arrest that investigators have made by placing the arrestee at the scene through a match. Second, prosecutors may find the forensic analysis to be of value in decisions to offer pleas to defendants or proceed to trial.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Victim’s sex</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>83.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Victim’s race</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Female</td>
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The Impact of Organizational Factors on Homicide Clearance Outcomes: Perspectives of Homicide Investigators

Christina Witt, Mount Royal University/Calgary Police Services
Tanya Trussler, Mount Royal University

Homicide Clearance and Organizational Impacts

It is important to understand homicide clearance declines for several reasons: (1) an increase in uncleared cases could reflect a greater risk for violent victimization (Riedel and Rinehart 1996; Regoeczi et al. 2000), and clearance represents the certainty aspect of the deterrence trifecta, its’ absence could therefore lead to an increase in crime (Paré et al. 2007); (2) offenders at large can lead to public uncertainty (Riedel and Rinehart 1996); (3) declining clearance rates draws attention to a state’s inability to accurately manage criminal actors which can delegitimize the state; (4) clearance is often considered a measure of police effectiveness (Cordner 1989; Puckett and Lundman 2003; Paré et al. 2007), and declines as such may lead the public to a decrease trust in the police (Riedel and Jarvis 1998); and, (5) suffering experienced by families of homicide victims appears to be intensified with the existence of an unknown offender (Riedel and Rinehart 1996).

There have been a wide range of factors identified which impede or assist in clearing homicides. This paper focuses on the impact of organizational factors on homicide clearance outcomes. The perception of an unsafe community resulting from declining clearance rates decreases the appeal and value of the area, as a result many resources are often delegated to homicide units, and the political and financial motivations to ensure homicide departments are adequately staffed with the most qualified professionals of any department are a high priority (Eliopulos 2003). In addition, in order to maintain higher level of clearance it is assumed that workload factors are also important. Therefore resources are often cited as essential for homicide investigation. However, there are other organizational factors which have been noted to impact clearance such as: the importance of training and investigator effectiveness (Castleman 2000; Eliopulos 2003; Reasons et al. 2005; Cronin et al. 2007; Wright 2013), the role of management (Geberth 2006), policy and procedures (Cronin et al. 2007), and the need for celerity of investigation (Eliopulos 2003; Wright 2013).

Data and Method

We completed 14 in-depth interviews with Calgary Police Service (CPS) Homicide Investigators and Cold Case Detectives in Calgary, Alberta. The sample included all homicide and cold case investigators in the CPS. This research was exploratory in nature and therefore the interview questions were general, open-ended and semi-structured with room for probing into specific issues. Ethics approval was given on November 14, 2011 by Mount Royal University, interviews began on December 12, 2011 and were completed on March 2, 2012. Data were then transcribed and analyzed for themes as identified by repeated similar content. We identified 5 major themes and multiple sub-themes from the interviews. The five main themes were: (1) case factors and witness factors, (2) organizational factors, (3) media factors, (4) legal factors, and (5)
interagency relationship factors. The current paper focuses on the various insights investigators had related to organizational factors and their impact on clearance outcomes and policing homicide investigations overall.

**Investigators’ Perspectives: The Impact of Organizational Factors on Homicide Clearance**

Within the organizational factors theme, we derived six sub themes which indicate the wide range of issues associated with the structure and function of a police force and a police unit. These were: (1) financial and human resources; (2) management characteristics; (3) investigator characteristics; (4) training techniques; (5) organizational policy and procedure; and (6) celerity of investigation.

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**Financial and Human Resources**

Homicide investigations are costly and investigators require access to considerable human resources. A multitude of support units are utilized to assist homicide investigation such as surveillance teams, undercover operations, technological support, clerical support, crime analysts, illicit drug investigators, crime scene units, polygraphists, cold case unit, and interview teams. An effective homicide unit needs backing from *specialized intelligence units*, a resourceful crime lab, and dynamic relationships with prosecutors, and comprehensive training programs (Cronin et al. 2007: 4). Investigative techniques such as wiretapping, installation of listening devices, and undercover operations require considerable financial and human resources (manpower) and are therefore used only for serious cases where there is a reasonable chance of solution (Mewett and Nakatsuru 2000). A common theme among the detectives interviewed was the high cost of homicide investigations with police agencies having to budget millions of dollars for long-term investigations. With budget and manpower constraints, police management tends to allocate the limited resources to homicide cases that they feel are more likely to be solved.

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**Management Characteristics**

In order to achieve the successful conclusion of a homicide case, team commanders should stress the principle of teamwork and be efficient at coordinating activities such as preparation of briefings and required reports, allocating overtime, identifying case-officer responsibilities, handling of financial and human resources, and overseeing the allocation of police equipment (Geberth 2006). CPS investigators identified that an effective homicide unit requires team commanders with strong leadership skills, and an in-depth understanding of the complexity of the investigations. Additional characteristics identified by detectives in the current study were the need for team commanders skilled in managing differing personalities and their differing skill sets, encouraging the free flow of ideas on a systematic basis to avoid tunnel vision of the investigative team. Finally, it was noted that the team commander must be able to filter communication between upper management and the primary investigator and acquire resources when necessary.

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**Investigator Characteristics**

According to Castleman (2000) homicide investigators must have a desire and interest in death investigations in order to be competent at their job because of its demands, and due to the fact that these positions require sacrifice they can have a strong impact on an investigators personal life. Homicide investigators must also have an understanding of the general elements of
homicide investigations, the criminal laws surrounding homicide, any changes in procedural law such as rules of evidence, and they must stay current on new or improved investigative techniques. Wright (2013) conducted interviews with detectives to test their ability to derive inferences from crime scene photos in order to explore homicide detectives’ intuition. Wright (2013) determined that investigator intuition is a cognitive skill, developed through experience investigating homicides, thus the senior detectives made significantly more inferences than the lower ranking detectives.

Reasons et al. (2005) interviewed homicide detectives from the Seattle Police Department and the Vancouver Police Department in order to gain understanding of their professional ideologies. The following characteristics were identified to be the most important skills as a homicide detective: people skills, organizational skills, interviewing skills, detail orientation, patience, writing skills, persistence, and flexibility. Similarly, homicide detectives from the Calgary Police Service identified the following essential traits for effectiveness: highly motivated, thorough, flexible, strong interviewing and communication skills, willing to share information, and ability to maintain an open mind. It was also noted that senior investigators had abilities and understanding of homicides at a level that new investigators could not match.

Training
In order for a homicide investigation to be successfully prosecuted it is necessary for investigators to participate in ongoing training, specifically in the following areas: current case law, interview and interrogation techniques and advancements in forensic sciences (Cronin et al. 2007). Additional areas of knowledge identified by Geberth (2006) include, but are not limited to: knowledge of law enforcement, medico-legal procedures, evidence collection, preservation and crime scene processing, human behavior, management of resources, testifying in court and the ability to cooperate with other agencies, as well there is a need for ongoing education and training. Due to the high demand of conducting homicide investigations, too often investigators become too involved in their caseload and fail to set aside time for continuing their education through in-service training and /or outside agency training and academic courses (Castleman 2000).

Eliopulos (2003) identified that there is a strong need for financial resources for police departments for training of homicide detectives as these units are seen as high priority. As such the nature of investigator training for new members should consist of intensive formal and directed education and continued training throughout their time in the homicide unit. CPS detectives identified on-going training as an important factor in solving homicides in order to stay current, identify best practices from other agencies, and learn from other investigators through their case studies. The study participants agreed there is a steep learning curve with homicide investigations and investigators must be prepared for all facets to be scrutinized by others (for example; upper management, crown prosecutors, other investigators, the media and victim families). There is a need for all homicide investigators to be mentally and psychologically prepared for the process, which comes with training, mentoring and experience.

Organizational Policy and Procedure
Factors such as organizational practice, labor contracts, relocation policies and supervisory practices impact the methods of selecting and training homicide investigators and are
critical to the success of homicide solution (Cronin et al. 2007). It is the responsibility of management to ensure that the most qualified and experienced detectives are investigating homicides (Geberth 2006).

Homicide solution is impacted by the police departments’ practices and procedures, as well as the investigating detectives (Cronin et al. 2007). Policy considerations for management of homicide units include; centralized versus decentralized homicide units, the presence of cold case investigators, and other areas of law enforcement that could impact a homicide investigation include the use of DNA evidence, eyewitness identification techniques, videotaping interrogations, and police departments working relationship with, and authority over the crime lab (Cronin et al. 2007). Keel et al. (2009: 54) identified the following areas as affecting homicide clearance: “staffing, investigative procedure, analytical processes, demographics of the agency, and the influence of political variables.”

Homicide investigations have been identified as the most detailed and significant type of investigation any police agency will conduct (Eliopulos 2003). Police departments require existing guidelines and procedures in order for the coordination of all the required units and allow for the organization to function efficiently (standard operating procedures) (Geberth 2006). According to Geberth (2006) case management is the official documentation of events and begins with the first responding officer’s observations and actions and continues throughout the course of the investigation until the case is closed. The success of an investigation relies heavily on how the case is managed and can be negatively impacted by any of the following factors, “inappropriate departmental policy and/or procedures regarding investigative strategies, inappropriate interference by high-ranking officials, and interagency rivalry” (Geberth 2006: 909-910).

CPS detectives identified the following organizational policy and procedures important in solving homicides: having the human and financial resources available to support major case management, using a standardized file management system for electronic disclosure, regulated standard operating procedures for training and investigative practices, priority of the organization to delegate resources to high risk victims in addition to high profile cases, and low risk victims, organizational approach to issues such as gang activity with intelligence based policing and proactive measures, the use of confidential informants and agents, and finally the organizations’ willingness to share information within an agency and between outside agencies to promote interagency cooperation while balanced with maintaining the integrity of the homicide investigation.

Celerity of Investigation

Eliopulos (2003) found that the longer it takes to solve a new homicide, the more likely it is to stay unsolved, especially critical are the first 48 - 72 hours of a new homicide. CPS homicide detectives also identified the first 48-72 hours following a homicide as critical in terms of accomplishing witness and scene management, locating people (witnesses or persons of interest), identifying the suspect, obtaining initial interviewing of suspect, neighborhood inquiries, and canvassing for video surveillance. Often referred to in police culture as ‘front end loading,’ requires the availability of resources to properly contain the crime scene and identify, transport and interview witnesses. Respondents also identified that a team approach for the first 7
-14 days of a new homicide investigation was suggested to be an ideal procedure for solving homicides, as the longer the investigation continues, the more difficult it becomes to locate evidence, witnesses and suspects.

One CPS investigator identified that during the initial stages of the investigation, identifying and interviewing witnesses is crucial, as well as collecting evidence and gathering a clear victimology of the deceased person. “The ability to derive inferences and form hypothesis is vital during the early stages of an investigation when the senior investigating officer (SIO) has to swiftly determine the nature of the offence and set lines of enquiry. Police in the UK use the term ‘golden hour’ to emphasize the significance of the decisions made during the initial stages as being crucial to the success of an investigation.” (Wright 2013:184).

Concluding Remarks, Limitations and Future Research

The current research was exploratory in nature and allowed for a wide range of important findings. With the discovery of much insightful information in relation to clearance, many more questions arose. The relative dominance of quantitative research has been limiting in the Canadian context, but also in other locations as well, the current research was able to demonstrate in much detail the complexity of the issue of organizational impacts. The main limitation to this research is the survey of only one police service, preventing generalizability of the findings. Alternatively, homicide detectives in Canada have never been interviewed specifically about homicide solution to the depth that occurred in this study and as such the results provide a foundation for future research.

In addition there were many recurring themes that require further study, for example we found that the most common discussion which arose from the in-depth open ended interviews related to organization was how much investigative techniques and case law have changed in the last 25 years and how critical it is to have training as well as significant resources available to conduct homicide investigations. Considering the importance of properly identifying homicide offenders this finding could have tremendous impact. It would be fruitful to examine the technical and legal changes further in order to better understand the impact on homicide solution. Additionally, we believe that similar questions should be posed to other homicide units’ investigators in order to see if the same themes arise or if there are differences across units, cities or regions. Lastly, from a policy perspective attempting to bridge the gap between academic knowledge and first-hand experience adds depth to the examination of homicide solution. Subsequently with increased understanding comes identification of ‘best practice’ methods of investigating homicides, which can be incorporated into police policy.
The Changing Landscape Of Homicide:  
Proceedings of the 2014 Meeting of the Homicide Research Working Group

References


Ringmasters, Magicians & the Traveling Sideshow: 
Enter the Carnival of Homicide Prevention

Dallas S. Drake
Center for Homicide Research

-- A Work-in Progress --

Abstract

Homicide has dropped in most jurisdictions across the nation. Now is the time to begin assessing what has caused this trend; what worked, and what does not. Using three metaphors: ringmasters, magicians, and traveling sideshows, I will illustrate unique aspects of homicide prevention strategies from a critical criminological perspective. Many prevention strategies are strangely reminiscent of the concepts and consequences so central to the historical idea of carnival sideshows. To move forward ethically, we must identify and expose several of these core operating mechanisms.
Introduction

This paper evolved out of an attempt to classify homicide prevention programs, practices, or strategies. The process seemed futile due to the many ideas offered, but even more so given the divergent and ill-fitted matching of names with operational content. What was needed it seemed was a genealogy to uncover the mixing and morphing of ideas and concepts, but to a degree, even this failed. The result is this present analysis, is an attempt to better understand the nature of the taxonomic problem which left one feeling duped on a midway carnival. The idea of using the metaphor of “carnival” fit quite well. Studying homicide prevention felt quite readily like being trapped on a carnival ride where everything in sight, except us, was confused and blurry. Alternately carnival aptly describes the “theater of the street” in the midst of a production of what criminologist Mike Presdee (2000: 142, 36) calls “an unregulated drama” where life is turned “upside down.” Homicides unfold from a personal performance that is often thrust out into the public sphere, complete with crime-scene tape to keep the audience back.

Homicides involve thrill, excitement and danger. It therefore makes sense then that any response to the homicide problem might also leverage this carnival-like quality to create a joyful and dialectic challenge. In so doing it meets the foe on its own field of play and simultaneously confronts and defuses the maudlin specter of death while delivering its own attendant message.

The interjection of any academic into the very public and political arena of homicide prevention involves an argument that is situated on the terrain of causation. A claim is made that the origin of the problem is known and therefore solvable. Establishing the cause of homicide continues to be a difficult challenge to criminologists. According to Nickles (1981), the solution of any problem is dependent on what one views as the problem. In the homicide arena the problem is how to stop the killing of humans by other humans. The goal is one of social change. Just how and in what manner that change takes place depends on one’s view of what exactly the causal agent and its mechanism are perceived to be. There is much debate as to what actually causes homicide, though poverty is considered by academics to be the best predictor (Pridemore, 2008).

Theories of homicide causation have also given rise to several terms designed to prescribe a mitigation plan. Four terms are used in prevention discourse including: prevention, intervention, suppression (Cahill & Hayeslip, 2010), and more recently, empowerment (Rappaport, 1981). Each is rooted in its own theory of the etiology of homicidal behaviors (Oppel, 2011; Torres, 2014). Each leads to a particular program or treatment.

Likewise, I am seeking to identify what causes this carnival effect? Why are homicide prevention programs so confusing? Why does the carnival effect exist? What does it do for the analysis of homicide prevention? This is the purpose of my investigation.

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4 However, the phrase “homicide prevention” for the purpose of most of this paper will be used interchangeably unless other terms are specified by a referenced violence or homicide prevention program.
Crime Drop

Claims about the efficacy of particular homicide prevention strategies are almost uniformly buttressed against statistical assessments of rates of homicide offending. Homicide prevention evaluations have the added difficulty of trying to demonstrate efficacy during a time of crime decline. Let us now briefly assess the homicide trend over the past several decades, as well as its various misuses, manipulations and misunderstandings.

Waves of homicide and waves of crime are statistically and visually detectible from the charting of crime data over the last 30-40 years. These apparent waves are indicated by the number of homicides gradually increasing or decreasing over each successive year, though always in an incremental fashion.

The modern-day U.S. homicide problem of increased homicide rates first formed in the early to mid-1960s in which most U.S. cities experienced a gradual upward trend of elevated homicide offending (Fagan, Zimring, & Kim, 1997). It peaked, according to Blumstein and Wallman (2006), in 1991 and the following decrease was the impetus for the book: The Crime Drop in America. This book paved the way for many a discussion as to the causes and correlates of the preceding crime waves. Since 1991 homicide has declined significantly (Zimring, 2006, Fagan, 2002; Travis & Waul, 2002), and this drop was not limited to the United States (Farrell, Tilley, Tseloni, & Mailley, 2008). Despite this overall trend, some U.S. cities (Chicago, Flint, Detroit, and New Orleans) have experienced enduring homicide problems (Hagedorn, 2003). These cities are often the focus of new attempts at homicide intervention.

Enter the political and very public minefield of public criminology—a process of increasing direct and indirect interaction between academics and practitioners (or the public) (Drake, 2013). Criminal justice practitioners and public dignitaries are quick to tell you why they think homicide is down (Fagan, Zimring, & Kim, 1997), with emphasis on an intervention closely relating to their own work and mission so they can take credit for it. Police say it is because of the crackdowns (Queally, 2013). Trauma surgeons attribute the reduction to better quality medical care (Harris, Thomas, Fisher & Hirsch, 2002; Hammond, & Breckenridge, 1999). Many academics are more cautious in trying to explain this reduction scientifically, typically situating it in terms of structural social conditions such as falling employment or rising prison populations (Oppel, 2011; Beeghley, 2003). Not surprisingly prevention advocates frequently credit their own programs.

Amidst all of this, there is a longstanding issue of confusing correlations of crime with its causes (Babbie, 1998). Many correlates of homicide are known (Messner, & Rosenfeld, 1999), but it is embarrassing to admit that, despite all the research effort to date, academics still cannot identify the main cause of homicide, though many will try (Oppel, 2011; Torres, 2014; Nettler, 1982).

The analysis of homicide statistics are clouded by other methodological faux pas, such as confusing the larger problem of crime with more specific and smaller problem of homicide (which Blumstein & Wallman (2006) do). Worse yet, there is a common misunderstanding by readers, who may think, crime reduction (of any type) necessarily translates to homicide
reduction. It does not (Morenoff, Sampson & Raudenbush, 2001; Travis & Waul, 2002:3; Dreze, & Khera, 2009; Brandle, 2008; Zimring & Hawkins, 1997). Homicide is only one type of crime (Zimring & Hawkins, 1997). Two exceptions, where conflating these crimes is seemingly acceptable, includes, when enacting situational crime prevention (Rosenbaum, Lurigio, & Davis, 1998), or when examining the category of “serious crime” (Messner, & Rosenfeld, 2001: 92; Harries, 1997). Fagan, Zimring, & Kim, (1997) explain that some serious violence may reflect the overall homicide patterns (aggravated gun assaults pairing with homicide rate) while others (non-gun assaults) do not. Another criticism of prevention strategies is that program evaluations often lack rigorousness. Therefore, outcomes may not be as helpful as desired (Wellford, Pepper & Petrie, 2005; Papachristos, 2011; Seabrook, 2009).

Attributions of causes are an issue in the assessment of homicide interventions. For instance, New Orleans, Louisiana during 2013 homicide fell by 15% from the previous year. Operation Ceasefire using their “group violence reduction strategy” began working there in March of 2012 in hopes of preventing homicide. The mayor also had an anti-violence campaign called NOLA for Life which also took credit for the drop (Martin, 2014:1). David Kennedy in his book, Don't Shoot, says it best. "This kind of post hoc ergo propter hoc--"after this, therefore because of this"--argument is a formal logical fallacy first-year graduate students are taught to avoid like the plague" (Kennedy, 2011: 77). In New Orleans, police responded saying the reduction was due to emergency medical care and recent changes in medical treatment because killings were down in New Orleans, but shootings remained unchanged (Welch, 2013:1). The effect was similar in Newark, NJ, where although killings were abated, shootings remained constant (Boyle, Lanterman, Pascarella, & Cheng, 2010).

In another example, Poyer (2014), found that sex strikes (withholding of sex by female intimates from men who were perceived as perpetrators of violence) were informally evaluated as being successful as a homicide prevention strategy when a 26% drop in homicide was attributed to the sex strikes rather than to the comprehensive program of which they were only one part (p. 2). This implies that other program components were ineffective and had no contribution. This misreading of crime statistics on which program effectiveness is often based is best explained by Braga (2008) who says:

Levitt (2004) analyzed homicide trends over the course of the 1990s and concluded that the impact of innovative policing strategies […] on homicide was limited. Other factors, such as increases in the number of police, the rising prison population, the waning crack-cocaine epidemic, and the legalization of abortion, can account for nearly the entire national decline in homicide, violent crime, and property crime in the 1990s (p. 333).

The implication is that the number of police officers, rather than the intervening strategy, may just as likely been causative. Declines in crime are seldom attributable to any single cause and the correlates are many.

Fagan, Zimring, & Kim (1997) agree with viewing claims about the cause of reductions in offending with caution, saying: “There is no rigorous method available to parse causal responsibility between law enforcement, social trends, and regress for the city’s gun homicide record” (p. 1320). The authors suggest the decline in homicide is simply a regression of epidemic
rates back to the mean as part of a larger cyclic pattern. Others maintain that homicide was in decline prior to any intervention (Papachristos, 2011).

**Assignment of Cause**

The answer to the question of what causes homicide, or homicide declines, tends to be profoundly colored by whichever ideological perspective a person holds (Becket, & Sasson, 2008). It is possible to divide the ideological or theoretical landscape into two broad camps. The first camp is moral justice, and the second is social justice (Schmalleger, 2001: 79). Moral justice is rooted in the Classical School of criminological theory wherein offenders are viewed as exercising free-will and chose to violate law.\(^5\) Crime is viewed as a moral shortcoming. People who hold moral justice perspectives tend to blame the individual. So-called “law and order” politicians tend to be of the conservative moral justice variety. They call for increased arrests and swift and certain punishment as solutions to the problem of crime in general and homicide in particular.

By comparison, social justice believers tend to attribute crime to unequal structuring of the social environment and/or other factors in the social environment which are largely beyond the control of individuals (Beeghley, 2003). Greater blame is assigned to the community rather than to the individual law-breaker, though offenders are seldom given a free walk. Social justice advocates are more likely to assign responsibility for the homicide problem to poverty, poor socialization, the influence of deviant others, and/or the lack of a level playing field in social opportunities.

**What Works, What Doesn’t**

Deciding on a course of action to prevent or reduce homicide depends only in part of one’s political ideology or perspective of justice. Increasingly the federal government has called on academics to evaluate the success or efficacy of homicide prevention interventions in what is called “evidence-based crime prevention” (Farrington, Welsh, & MacKenzie, 2002: 10). In the effort to provide some framework or guidelines for the assessment of prevention programs, the National Institutes of Justice has broken programs down into three main varieties: those that work, those that don’t, and those that show signs of promise (Sherman, Gottfredson, MacKenzie, Eck, Reuter, & Bushway, 1995). Researchers are continuing to evaluate many programs. Maybe not surprisingly some very popular ones have been shown to lack evidence that they actually reduce crime or homicide. In spite of this knowledge, some (and perhaps many) ineffective programs continue to be funded (Papachristos, 2011). According to Papachristos, “programs draw a lot of attention and resources without consistent empirical evidence and consequentially stakeholders have a lot riding on their perceived success” (p. 1058).

**Data as Evidence**

Policy interventions come with an accountability component. Statistical empirical data forms the foundation of program evaluation according to the tenets of science. To properly

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evaluate a prevention program, we look to the number and rate of homicide incidents over the prescribed time frame. The goal is to reduce homicide offending. It is not sufficient to the families of the bereaved, both before or after an intervention, to say that a program improved the emotional climate of a community; or to say that it succeeded because it spurred greater community involvement. The number of homicides must actually be reduced, and that drop must be linked through the causative mechanism to the intervention.

**Methodology**

A qualitative method using metaphorical comparison and analysis is employed to try to gain insight why researchers are having such difficulty organizing and classifying homicide prevention strategies. A theoretical grounding of this analysis involves critical criminology wherein, rather than focusing on the offending, the focus shifts to an analysis of research practice, policy development and perhaps the criminal justice system itself. This new framework affords a greater understanding and useful perch from which to interrogate our own attempts to classify homicide prevention strategies.

Metaphorical analysis is a useful strategy in which it can be employed in a variety of ways (Schmitt, 2005). It can be used as an organizing principle or as insight into “cognitive linguistics” (p. 358). In cognition, ideas often merge within schemes of thought, which are sometimes arranged via metaphors, which then can form “metaphorical thinking patterns” (p. 360). According to Schmitt “the use of metaphors is often unconscious” (p. 362). Burgchardt (1995) expressed that “Metaphoric criticism is not a unified method” and then goes on to add that metaphors are more than superficial ornamentation: they are the means by which arguments are expressed. Moreover, metaphors may provide insight into a speaker’s motives or an audience’s social reality (p. 305). Dislodging a metaphor from its original context is not considered problematic. Metaphors are often used to critique a subject under investigation (Schmitt, 2005). Together, these ideas form a latent picture that we otherwise might not have seen. Criminologist Mike Presdee (2000) applied a metaphor of the carnival to better understand seemingly senseless acts of crime and deviance, much of which was recreational in nature. The result of his analysis provided great insight into the workings of cultural recreational deviance.

The goal of this investigation is not to assign blame amongst the many well-meaning actors who seek to solve the difficult problem of murder, but rather to expose their gamesmanship. As much as possible, personalities have been removed from its discussion, though at times this has proven quite difficult. Many of these personalities are well-known. My attempt is to focus as much as possible on the process of homicide prevention, rather than its people.

**Metaphorical Analysis of Carnival**

And without further ado, “Ladies and gentlemen, boys and girls, children of all ages,” is the familiar opening of circuses and carnivals (Eastman, 2002). Carnivals have had a considerable history of balancing the macabre with entertainment. Presdee (2000) says, “The quest for excitement is directly related to the breaking of boundaries, of confronting parameters and playing at the margins of social life in the challenging of controllers and their control mechanisms” (p. 7). Presdee more specifically says that carnival “is the ritualized mediation
between order and disorder par excellence…” He continues, “furthermore it is a domain in which the pleasure of playing at the boundaries (social and personal) is most clearly provided for” (p. 32). Many people who work in the realms of homicide prevention might operate at these boundaries. For the rest of us as spectators, we want to experience the thrill without getting too close to the danger, yet it is a “proximity of danger” that helps creates the thrill (p. 50).

Carnival appears present in both the act of homicide and to how a community responds to it. At homicide vigils, used to memorialize the dead and reclaim and restore the community, the deceased is mourned and calls for preventative action are common. Attendees often take over the street and traffic is then rerouted. Sometimes pop-up tents are erected, which has a bit of circus-like atmosphere. Sometimes attendees come bearing balloons, teddy bears, or other tokens. This sense of creating a carnival perhaps helps forestall the atmosphere of death by bringing things back to life. Crowds pull up close to hear the speakers and support the family like crowds at the carnival podium. Various contingents may wear their “colors” – t-shirts indicating to which prevention unit or bereaved family they belong (CHR, 2008). Occasionally, (at larger vigils) food vendors are present (Curnutte, 2010). Gangbangers may drive by strafing the arena like fireworks following a day at the state fair (LaBelle, 2013; Shots fired at memorial, 1996).

Carnival is clearly involved in the implementing of certain types of homicide prevention programs. Call-ins, are a key component of many homicide prevention strategies that brings gang members, law-enforcement, and the community face to face, in what Presdee (2000) would call a “knife-edge balance” (p. 42) where both sides are present and neither side is quite sure what will happen. This process includes suspense, thrill (coming face-to-face with danger), and oftentimes food. Call-ins were once described in The New Yorker (Seabrook, 2009) as including “intensely dramatic events” (p. 37). In one of the Cincinnati call-ins, authorities said they actually “lost control of the room” (p. 38). Some men enter the room shackled straight from the lock-up. Surveillance pictures or videos of men in the room as they were buying or selling drugs are sometimes projected on a large screen. It’s a real-life carnival game with a chance to win. A speaker yells at participants, “Your house is on fire! Your building is burning! You’ve got to save yourselves! Stand up!” (p. 38). “After all, carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people but lived by them” (Presdee, 2000: 40). Each participant is viewed as enacting a role.

Three sub-metaphors are identified within the carnival metaphor which can be used to better sort out the confusion in homicide prevention interventions. These sub-metaphors include: 1) the Ringmasters who are akin to moral entrepreneurs, loud sales people, shallow dignitaries; 2) the Magicians who specialize in misdirection, misnaming and dazzling the audience; and 3) the Traveling Sideshow – prestige through travel (Tsing, 1993), outside expertise, and the promise of a better life.

Ringmasters!

Qualities of a ringmaster include that one must be loud, confident, and overly dramatic. The rhetoric of ringmasters is grandiose, yet shallow. This circus is called the "greatest show on earth." Each act is more “death defying” than the next; every performer is “world class.” The

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6 “Greatest Show on Earth” is now a registered trademark of Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey Circus, although its origins can be traced to earlier shows in varying circuses.
ringmaster never publicly backtracks to acknowledge that, "well today we didn’t perform as well as we might have. Our program failed." Realistically, everyone knows this performance might not be the best and instead, recognizes the tradition and formality of a ringmasters’ rhetoric. The propensity of ringmasters to overstate or exaggerate their effectiveness or impact is perhaps universal because within their banter is a sales pitch in search of persuasion (Wikipedia, 2014).

Metaphorically, ringmasters represent the mayors, chiefs of police, notable academics, neighborhood activists and organizers. They are the public figures behind each of the prevention programs. We are not talking about specific people here, but rather the roles they fulfill. To a certain degree, it would not matter who the specific individuals involved, though some specific people have innate talents or charisma which are conducive to their effectiveness as promoters.

Ringmasters gain social status in the form of media and social attention. Success thrusts some actors more deeply into their role (MPR News, 2011). Non-charismatic actors may not effectively perform in the role of ringmaster for long. People also with an excusing attitude recognize the efforts engaged in by well-meaning activists for at least trying to do something. These people may be held less accountable due to their positions of power as well.

The ringmasters are lauded with awards and adulation thereby cementing a view of their performance as being positive (Cicero News Wire, 2011; Caruso, 2008; Malaska, 2011). Allowing outsiders to speak at law-enforcement press conferences gives them prestige and power, as do opportunities to be keynote speakers at educational or organizing conferences (Impact Speakers, 2014). Lecturing circuits provide another status-builder to appear before groups across the country. Ringmasters travel the country talking about the virtues of this or that program, this or that philosophy. Then the books are written, published, and sold, for who can control the ring without a public podium.

Other benefits of ring-mastering include creating a forum to meet or interact with outside leaders or dignitaries (Silberstein, 2013; Hardiman, 2014; Baynham, 2010); by providing accomplishment touchstones for political aspirations (Hardiman, 2014; Samuels, 2013), or as stepping stone toward higher positions of management or leadership (FBI, 2013).

Awards and honors are also the adhesive that helps keep ineffective programs in place. This makes it difficult to weed out unsuccessful programs. Most programs seek to give out awards to their key stakeholders early in their development. This action may ingratiate those stakeholders to limit program criticism. Additional examples of this includes the act of promoting work partners into teaching positions at major educational institutions or by the bestowing honorary degrees unto perhaps undeserving people (Giardinelli, 2011). These awards motivate ringmasters, reinforce unsuccessful programs, and reward supporters who play along.

These examples, among others, feed into a frenzy of group-think about homicide prevention, because if your program doesn’t work, what are you going to do, give back all your awards? Several homicide or crime prevention programs issue their own awards, thereby

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7 David Kennedy of Harvard University, when interviewed by Minnesota Public Radio, talks about how he is perplexed as to how he ended up as a homicide prevention expert and that it was never his intent. See transcript.
ingratiating their institution to the recipients. Kennedy explained the political discord as a clash of ideas. Dr. Victor Garcia, initially one of Ceasefire’s most ardent supporters and winner of Cincinnati’s Jefferson Award for Public Service, openly challenged Ceasefire. He was then removed from the CIRV team by the City Council (Seabrook, 2009; Caruso, 2008; Malaska, 2011). Garcia was critical of the short-lived impact of Ceasefire and wanted a longer-term commitment to eradicating the root causes of homicide—poverty (Victorgarcia, 2009).

Magicians!

Although the public knows that deception is involved in a magician's work, the viewer’s intense gaze assists in the deception through an art of misdirection (Nelms, 2000). Magicians engage in a number of illusions (Whaley, 1982), one of which is called the shell game. This gambling game involves the shuffling of three half-shell objects or cups with a small object under one. The magician confuses the audience with this shuffling action (Meriam-Webster, 2014; Marshall, Benford, & Pridmore, 2010).

The magician’s skill lies in misdirecting the audience members and in encouraging them to suspend their disbelief (Swiss, 2008). People want to, and perhaps have a need to, believe in magic. People have a desire to give in to the game. The fewer the games, the more important it is to believe in at least one of them. The authority of the magician comes with his or her costume, which garners attention and his rapid rhetoric. Like the ringmaster, s/he needs your full attention for any misdirection to successfully work. Magician Jamy Ian Swiss further indicates that scientists are particularly vulnerable due to their scrutinizing attention as they watch for deceit.

In homicide prevention, the shell game occurs with the naming of the programs or tactics. Name changes are like shells, they hide the program's identity and their failures. For example, The Boston Gun Project became Operation Ceasefire (Case study: The Boston Gun, 2006). Operation Ceasefire then became Boston Ceasefire. In Chicago it became Chicago Ceasefire and then later CURE Violence (MPR News, 2011). In Flint, Michigan, Flint Ceasefire was renamed Flint Lifelines (City of Flint, 2013). One component of several programs included a practice of calling in targeted criminals for a community meeting where high-risk offenders are put on notice. These “call-in meetings” were initially called “forums” (MPR News, 2011) and sometimes “notifications” (MPR News, 2011). In other communities the Ceasefire model is called Indianapolis IVRP, Stockton Operation Peacekeeper, Lowell PSN, Cincinnati CIRV, and so forth (Braga and Weisburd, 2012). What’s known as Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia, is known as FACE 5 in Atlanta, Georgia (Kellermann, & Fuqua-Whitley, 2002: 14), or The Joshua Project in Detroit, MI (Joshua Project Primer, 2006). Before Exile, basics of the program were called Project DISARM in Baltimore, Maryland (American Prosecutors Research Institute, 2002). The shell game makes it difficult to track and/or classify programs because they frequently change names and many differently named programs often use same, if not similar practices. As one researcher put it, “everybody throwing the terms Project Exile around makes it difficult to search out. Is every reference to it connected to the original, or are they just using that name? The more I read about this, the less I understand” (A. Atmore, personal communication, May 14, 2014).

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8 The Jefferson Award is named in honor of U.S. dignitaries as a sort of “Nobel Prize’ for public and community service” (Caruso, 2008; Malaska, 2011).
A limited number of (program specific) sources have been published to try to make sense of prevention programs. In the report titled: Promising Strategies to Reduce Gun Violence (Stucky, Nunn & Quinet, 2008), a profile called “Boston Strategy to Prevent Youth Violence” lists three “public safety strategies,” two of which were Operation Ceasefire, and the Boston Gun Project (p. 32). According to David Kennedy, Operation Ceasefire is a simply an evolution of the Boston Gun Project (Kennedy, 2011). The term “Ceasefire” appears to been a campaign slogan for what went on within the forums (p. 67). No two successive programs were entirely overlapping, yet each program appears to be a continuation of the next. The programs profiled in this paper focuses exclusively on firearm homicide. Prevention involving killings using other weapon types is quite rare.

In magicianry, it is vitally important to protect the secrets of the art and how illusions are constructed (Nelms, 2000). Magicians keep their book of magic. It’s all part of the mysterium tremendum [Latin for: “overwhelming mystery”] of the magician. A major shortcoming of nearly all prevention programs is a lack of documentation (book of magic) to provide for implementation or accountability. One might expect program leaders should document their programs and release that documentation to the public for outside scrutiny. A public search turned up few program manuals. COPS in 2013 finally produced a step-by-step guide for Ceasefire type strategies (National Network for Safe Communities, 2013). Smaller programs’ documentation is even more difficult to find. In Minneapolis, calls to the county prosecutor’s office revealed there was no documentation for the Minnesota program called Project Exile. This program received much news coverage and fanfare. In Omaha, Nebraska, Omaha 360 says much of what they do is based on a previously published book aimed at transforming churches (Omaha 360, 2014).

This propensity to morph programs and names and to create slight alterations appears to be one of the more common aspects of the deception. When Project DARE was criticized for being one of a number of programs shown by the National Institutes for Justice known to not work (Sherman et al., 1995), promoters of the program defended its reputation. They asserted that since they had changed some specific features of the program, this version had never been officially evaluated (Hanson, 2014). Granted, DARE is not exactly a homicide prevention program in the usual sense.

For magic to work, one must believe very hard. In Cincinnati in 2005, Mayor Luken set up a carnival-style blame game by shifting responsibility for program failure by shifting it from the administration and onto the community. He states, “Successful crime prevention in many cities across the United States involves community participation…If we miss the point of personal accountability…then I think we will not ultimately be successful” (Osborne, 2005: 1). It is true that community members are collaborative partners and part of a successful strategy must encompass motivating any disinterested parties. When the expected drop does not occur, or is not sustained, it seems unethical however to blame the failure on collaborative partners as some program promoters have done, (see: Braga, Hureau, Winship, 2008; Epstein, 2003; Scinto, 2013; Adams, 2013) rather than on a program’s design centered factors?
Traveling Sideshow!

Sideshows were the “pre-shows” and “post show” associated with virtually any circus. They evolved from traveling medicine shows of old (Gangi, 2010) where elixirs would perhaps require vendors to bounce around the countryside in order to avoid unhappy customers who had been duped into buying little more than alcohol laced with laudanum (Anderson, 2004). Caron & Brouws (2001) label this “flagrant huckster capitalism” (p. 7). In carnival days, sideshows would draw in customers early, convincing them to spend money to see a somewhat contrived but supposedly incredible anomaly of nature. It was not uncommon for the showman to make outrageous claims. Circus go-ers were lured in by the narrative of the pitchman—the guy who describes the upcoming act or oddity (Zeitlin, 1992). They often exaggerated. The more outrageous, the more it seemed people wanted to believe them. The promise was seldom fulfilled, or the result was often simply an illusion created through gross comparisons or other means, but seldom the real thing (Nickell, 2005; Adams, 2001).

Carnival sideshows were all about capitalist enterprise (Caron, & Brouws, 2001). At its height, it wasn’t just talking audience members into buying a ticket price to see the bearded lady. It also was to draw a crowd where pick-pockets could ply their trade (Margittay, 2009; Nickell, 2005). “In short, there was money to be made coming and going, and the carnival made sure that even the smallest coin could find a new pocket by the end of the day” (Caron, & Brouws, 2001: 79).

Government spending on homicide prevention strategies and programs—such as hiring more police officers, sales of bereavement t-shirts, cost of outdoor tents; commemorative balloons, reward or gun buyback funds, BBQ rallies, and memorial funds—all constitute components of this capitalist arcade. In homicide prevention, money also ensures the success of any intervention. Funding is required to run any prevention program, but at times it might instead become the driving force of that program.

Part of the traveling side show’s role is to sell the product. In Cincinnati in 2007-2008, Ceasefire sought $300,000 for one year but, in tandem with a $1 million “youth violence prevention program… overseen by the Police” and $1 million for “youth training and employment” (Osborne, 2007:1). In Cincinnati, CIRV’s annual budget is nearly $900,000 (Baynham, 2010:1) with a four-year funding total of $2,425,000 (Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, n.d.). Although not specifically a homicide prevention program, for police officer salary, Project DARE alone accounts for $215 million a year, with federal support of $41 million in year 2000 (Shephard, 2001: 3). In 1995-1997. Operation Ceasefire funding in one city, Washington, D.C., was nearly a million dollars according to the U.S. Accounting Office (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998).

With multiple programs operating, it is difficult, if not impossible, to sort out programs, costs and impacts. In Chicago, between 2004 and 2006, “approximately $19 million” was spent on their Ceasefire program and a small portion was unaccounted for (Over $600,000). (Hawthorne, 2010: 1; Chicago Justice Project, 2014). Although there was an overall reduction of
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homicide in the city, two neighborhoods\textsuperscript{9} which Ceasefire was working with actually increased in the number of homicides (Katz, 2013; Skogan, Harnett, Bump, & Dubois, 2008). David Kennedy, of Harvard University and founder of the Ceasefire program in Boston, sought to distance Boston's Ceasefire from Chicago's by saying “They called themselves Chicago Cease Fire. They do something very different” (MPR News, 2011: 1).

Sometimes there was a sense of unease about outsiders. Historically, traveling sideshows themselves were associated with criminals and criminality (Bogdan, 1990: 89). In Minneapolis in 2010, a fight occurred over the origin and payout of funding to bring a “violence interrupters” style program to North Minneapolis--traveling-sideshow-style (Van Denburg, 2010). It led to an immediate backlash as politicians ran for political cover. Local activists wondered why money wasn’t paid directly to them and why outsiders were being brought in (Williams, 2010). They after all had been doing the work for years.

Flint, Michigan organizers took the phrase \textit{traveling side-show} a step further and arranged a bus to tour them around the state (named the Reinvest Express) so they could promote funding of their violence prevention programs. An outside national expert on Ceasefire was brought in specifically for this tour (Aldridge, 2013). That same expert in his violence prevention book exclaims at the end of each chapter: “looks like it will travel” (Kennedy, 2011).

There is no empirical evidence that Mad Dads has any impact on homicide prevention or even violence. Exaggerating their success is fits neatly within the sideshow metaphor. Mad Dads is a morally-based program that was formed to address gang violence and illegal drugs. Begun in Omaha, Nebraska, their program has spread to 67 U.S. cities but with only 11 still active chapters (Mad Dads, 2014). Participation in a traveling street patrol is a requirement for membership. In Minneapolis their trademark is their refurbished ambulance which they dub, “Mad Dads Mobile.” At the site of each new homicide, their vehicle is set up, often to block the street, and sound speakers are erected. A car table is set out so those in attendance can sign a condolence card for the family (CHR, 2008). Their leader takes to the mike and begins a slow buildup of hyperbole toward a carnival pitch, which begs you to get involved. Subsequently, Mad Dads of Minneapolis has been evaluated by a local outside research agency. In it Mad Dads are credited with the homicide reduction that was already in free-fall elsewhere (Gerrard, & Cooper, 2010). While Mad Dads likely has many positive benefits (such as community empowerment), there is no empirical evidence that they actually prevent or reduce homicide offending.

\textbf{Discussion}

Homicide offending is met by the social force of a community that is threatening retributive harm, either by gangs, by the citizenry, or by the police. A central issue in homicide prevention is to uncover the exact cause of homicide offending so that it can be dealt with and a permanent solution enacted.

Some of the political success for program innovators is rooted in a perspective about the causes of homicide and lethal violence based in idealism and criminology. For instance,

\textsuperscript{9} Skogan, et al. (2008) shows that only one neighborhood show and increase in the treatment area (p. 250).
Kennedy identified a conservative ally who was willing to support the Ceasefire strategy because it sidestepped the social justice perspective of having to deal with poverty before the killing can be stopped (Romano, 2012; MPR News, 2011). This strategy does not focus on causes of violence, but rather the behavior of individual violent actors, which Kennedy calls “suppression,” rather than prevention (Kennedy, 2011: 217).

If we follow this claim, then the effects of poverty and deprivation are ignored and the social justice argument posed by inner-city community members (largely minorities) is negated. Economic help is judged unnecessary and minorities are discounted as immoral. Heather MacDonald writes in the Wisconsin State Journal (2010) that the “root causes theory let[s] them off the hook for rising lawlessness” (p. 1). With a lack of social justice however, there is a propensity to violate moral codes through the chains of social disorder as citizens seek to survive. This means that homicide suppression is but a temporary fix to a more permanent and costly problem—poverty.

In cities across the nation, communities that once implemented Exile or Ceasefire eventually saw a return to epidemic rates of homicide offending. In Minneapolis, the second city to implement the tenets of Ceasefire, once the ringmaster left (from 2003-2006) homicide rose once again (MPR, 2011). There was no ability to sustain a drop, even if it occurred. Once the treatment is withdrawn, the homicide offending quickly rises. Group Violence Intervention (National Network for Safe Communities, 2013) or Group Violence Reduction Strategy (as it’s known at John Jay Center for Crime Prevention and Control) is not a permanent solution. Suppression of homicides does nothing to cure the underlying or root causes of homicide, and is not sustainable.

If group intimidation on individual behavior is an effective (Ceasefire) tactic, how does that translate to other types of homicide in say, rural areas, presumably areas without violent families or gang networks? Can it work without this group component? As with elixirs sold by traveling medicine men, buy our brand and it will cure all that ails you.

**Conclusion**

Much can be made of the preceding analysis. Homicide prevention programs and practices have been so unregulated that the National Institutes of Justice called for greater accountability (Sherman, et al., 1995). They have openly listed policy interventions that do not work. They have also called for increasingly rigorous program evaluations. Yet all this has led to programs evaluating themselves (Seabrook, 2009). Terms like “homicide” blur with words like “violence” and “crime;” impacts on juveniles and youths are blended with that of adults. It seems that the arena of homicide prevention is like a large, secret, unmonitored play land on the carnival midway where anything goes.

Hucksterism and chicanery seemingly abounds in the arena of public anti-crime policy. Many prevention/intervention programs/suppression are proven to be ineffective (Sherman, et al., 1995). Though some prevention practices may actually work, others could increase the harm. Even if programs initially work, there is concern that their effects will not last long-term (Victorgarcia, 2009; McGarrell, Hipple, Bynum, Perez, Gregory, Kane, & Ransford, 2013; Engel, Corsaro, & Tillyer, 2010). Several examples exist of a reemerging homicide rate.
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(Kennedy, 2011; McKee, 2014; Baynham, 2010). Moral justice strategies of suppression and deterrence appear to be winning out against recognition of environmental determinants for homicide. High rates of killing may return if the root causes of homicide are never adequately addressed, leading to even more deaths. The resulting landscape of homicide prevention becomes one big game of Whack-a-Mole.

When any lull in killings occurs, homicide prevention should be leveraged by using this time to advocate for longer-acting solutions. Several are known about the long-term reduction of homicide that may be of help. Interventions to reduce the rate of poverty or to build on various resiliency factors of local residents might be a starting point. One strategy might be to attract new immigrants who tend to provide jobs and increase neighborhood stability (Sampson, 2008). Encouraging construction projects in high visibility areas of neighborhoods that are most impacted by the homicide problem is another. These projects can signal a dramatic change in neighborhood climate as well as bring hope to its residents. All this should quickly be followed up by seeking to attract service or entry level jobs to create faster employment access for lesser qualified or entry-level workers.

Several questions remain which could be the subject of future research. What is the reason for continuing to promote programs that have been shown to not work? Are they pursued as a result of cognitive error, ideology, social status and power, or is it intentional fraud in the pursuit of financial resources. What role does resource acquisition and retention play? Do citizens and leaders get caught up in the excitement and wishful thinking of various program promises, thereby losing perspective? Is this capitalism at its worst or a deceptive sales job on the midway of crime?

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Panel Session 1: Investigation and Prevention - Recorder’s Notes

Recorder: Vanessa Leggett, University of Houston-Downtown

Roland Chilton: I have questions for three of them and a comment for the fourth, so I’ll just start out my remarks with a comment, and that’s Dallas Drake’s presentation. I have so wondered why we never took seriously all the magicians that have been lurking in this area. I just found it so enlightening that this approach is probably the way we need to look at it. These aren’t just people that are self-promoting. I mean, they’re getting away with it in spades. And why the city of Chicago constantly has really high homicide rates in spite the work of all these magicians and pitchmen. So that’s just a comment. I thought that was a wonderful presentation.

Ned Levine: I have a couple of questions. First, for John Jarvis: Are there any regional or sub-regional variations? Because I wonder if your logistic regressions are hiding some of those effects that are due to regional variations.

John Jarvis: Yeah. Some of the future variables that we need to look at—it’s possible that there are regional variations. Perhaps Jay and Lynne have looked at this and can speak to that better. But we need to inspect the data for that to find out if there are regional variations that are substantive. My recollection from separate work is that there are differences, but they’re not substantive once you control for all the other impacts. That said, and I’m speculating here—we have to look at the data—we intended on including both population as well as region as demographics were controlled.

Ned Levine: Does the NIBRS have geographical data inside of it?

John Jarvis: Yes, it does. It goes down to state and we can get sub-state analysis down to agency-level. When you start cross-referencing, NIBRS can get a little complicated, but there are some opportunities there.

Ned Levine: Second question—I think Tom, you’re being much too humble about the effects of DNA evidence. Because is it simply confirmatory in terms of decisions made by say the prosecutor, then somebody can say, Why bother? But I think your data—even though they’re small numbers—seem to suggest that it increases the number of arrests slightly and it increases the number of convictions. I was doing mental gymnastics.

Tom McEwen: Yeah, I think it does play an important role in terms of—I wasn’t trying to downplay the role in it. Because I think it—the role it plays is in the hard-to-solve case where investigators have gone for weeks and weeks and they’ve exhausted every lead—and it’s almost along that line that they turn to the lab for some assistance. And not necessarily ask for comparisons or analysis at the beginning of the case, which, I think, they should be doing. But after they’ve gone through a lot of investigative processes then they turn to the lab to help them out. And I think in that case that, especially the DNA, analysis can be very helpful.

Ned Levine: Even though you have small numbers, you can use that kind of empirical-base approach to show that they’re actually contributing to the event. And then the third question goes to Christina—Is Canada’s homicides dropping like they are in the United States?

Christina Witt: They are.

Ned Levine: I wonder what effect that has on the organizational dimension.
Christina Witt: Yeah, I think it’s very similar to the U.S. It’s the same issues that the U.S. would face. I can really only speak to our city as far as rates. It depends on who’s in jail and what our gang situation is like. But, in fairness, I think that some of the initiatives in terms of research with domestic violence, we’re very proactive. We have courts that deal with domestic violence. Those are contributing to our decrease in homicide.

James McCutcheon: I have two questions. I have one for John Jarvis and one for Dallas Drake. John, could you create a variable to look at a combination of race and sex? Because I think that could add something to your data.

John Jarvis: Yes. Wendy and I looked at eight or ten interaction effects there. And we haven’t found that in this particular work, but that’s something to talk about.

Jim McCutcheon: Yeah, I think that would be interesting. Dallas, I do have a question. As a person who’s—I’m finishing my first year, and I saw all these things that you described in my first year, so I can’t speak too much about it because I’m still not tenured (laughter). But any advice for navigating programs that exist for you and that have these sort of elements and how to start up anew and not take on these roles.

Dallas Drake: Well, first off, this is a fairly cynical view, but realistic at the same time. That being said, is suppression a good thing? Well, if people are being murdered, anything’s a good thing right now. That’s part of the problem because we’re all like, let’s jump on this, because something’s got to work. So, if my city is having a problem, I want them to do Ceasefire. But I’m not going to believe all their rhetoric. And I know that we’d better have an end-game plan, because this is only going to work for maybe two years. They’ve given them many outposts. But as soon as they left, homicide rates spiked right back up, and it’s just as worse as ever. So, you have to have something else to follow it up with, because nobody’s going to play together for that length of time. David Kennedy is amazing in that he can come in and get people to play together. And he’s really been good at building that political coalition to make something happen. What you can’t do yet is keep that; and that’s just the human condition. So, given that, if the community needs a respite from this so that they can think more clearly while it’s going on, we can’t stop there. The programs have to be continually monitored. As soon as it works, you can’t go, ‘Wup—homicide’s down. Now we need money over here for this.’ It has to stay there; the money has to stay there. And we have to continue to look at root causes and, ultimately, acknowledge that we’re not investigating root causes and if you don’t address the root cause, it’s just going to come back. Yeah, I could swat the bees right now. But if the hive’s right behind me, it’s not going to help. I think it’s important to use this as kind of an eye-opener—[i.e.] okay, here’s where we’re at—we’re still using suppression and there’s hardly any other program in the United States that uses something else. They’re doing [collective] efficacy in Omaha, that’s great. But it hasn’t shown an impact yet on homicides. So, at least we know what the problem is now. Because I don’t think we understood what the problem was before.

John Jarvis: Let me add one other thing, because this is not limited to homicide and crime. This problem of pooling resources to come up with a programmatic response to a problem and then losing those resources once that problem appears to be alleviated persists across public safety throughout the whole spectrum. So it’s not limited to just crime.

Dallas Drake: And I think if you look to Chicago as an excellent example because it’s been in
the news so much lately. And they have a really severe homicide problem and they’ve managed to kind of calm things down. Is where was the root problem? It erupted as domestic violence. And it erupted as drug dealing for five or six of the interrupters that went back to drug dealing. It didn’t solve their problem. And so you start to see the fractures develop and it just starts to crumble.

**Amanda Farrell:** First of all, all four presentations were fantastic. Thank you. And I had a comment first, and then I have questions for Tom. But the comment is, I think you drive a really good point, Dallas, in that we have to be careful how much we buy into this as a community of researchers. I don’t know how many of you were aware, but when we had ASC in Chicago, the Division on People of Color and Crime had Ameena Matthews as their keynote lunch speaker and she was there selling copies of *The Interrupters* and perpetuating that whole thing. So it was quite interesting to see that dynamic and that spectacle in an arena where we’re usually talking about empirical basis as a foundation and all of these kinds of things. Tom, I loved your presentation. For those of you who don’t know, I have a background in field forensics as well and some of these things are issues that the American Academy of Forensic Sciences is really starting to get into and talk about. Particularly in terms of—you brought up—some of the DNA issues. We’re actually starting to see a backlash on DNA now because the technology has gotten so exquisitely specific that it’s now clouding the prosecution on the other side. So, if you can’t do context and show where the evidence came from and why it’s valid for the case—just because you have an unknown profile in a hotel room it doesn’t mean it’s your offender but it opens up the door for the defense. So, that’s something that I didn’t know if you guys were kind of looking at considering how this dual-edge sort of technology is going to possibly crucify us in some cases rather than help us.

**Tom McEwen:** Well, we looked at interviews with several prosecutors and it’s an area where there needs to be more work. Prosecutors are interesting to talk to and you find out in a case whether they’re going to do a plea or whether they’re going to take this to trial. And I think that one of the prosecutors used the phrase ‘we look at a totality of evidence.’ And Wendy would say, ‘What about witnesses?’ And he said, ‘Well, sometimes a witness is important—sometimes it’s not important at all.’ ‘What about DNA analysis?’ ‘Well, sometimes it’s important and sometimes it’s not important.’ So it was hard to get a good answer out of them for that. But, specific to what you’re asking, I think prosecutors are very aware of the problems of DNA when it’s an unknown and they have to identify who that person is. And, again, there seems to be a difference in prosecutors. I wish we had more information on this. Some of them when they go to trial will avoid presenting any forensic analysis unless it’s very specific to the case. And others will just present everything—they’ll put in every piece of evidence and every analysis that was done and go on for a long period of time asking questions to show jurors what the evidence shows. So it’s an important area and there needs to be more research in that area.

**Amanda Farrell:** And the other part you brought up with not submitting for testing. And I think the beauty of this particular panel that you might want to consider is where Christina talked about financial management and the resources—I know some of the agencies that I’ve worked with—they aren’t allowed to submit a lot of things to the lab because of the cost. They’re told like the top five things and that’s all that’s going. So that might also be something that you could look at.
**Tom McEwen:** I remember a case in one of the counties—and I’ve seen that elsewhere, where investigators, prosecutors can only send five pieces of evidence at a time for analysis, and then have to justify the next five, et cetera. Yeah.

**Christina Witt:** I just had a point with that as well. We do experience that in the RCMP crime lab that we use. So, we’re limited also—the time frames. It takes a minimum of four months, sometimes six months, so you’re so far into the investigation at that point that it comes after the fact where you just don’t use it as a tool at that point.

**Tom McEwen:** You’ve gone on to other cases.

**Christina Witt:** Yeah.

**Kathleen Heide:** A few comments. I thought it was an excellent panel. I really enjoyed it. With respect to Dallas’s presentation, I thought it was brilliant. And we see the use of metaphors—I think that’s why we really all enjoyed it. It was very clever and very powerful. And it was kind of moving from a different methodology than we usually use—the method of metaphors. So, I really enjoyed that. I have two, kind of what I call ‘baby questions’ for Christina and then something more substantive for John and Tom. And with Christina, I wanted to just ask you—and I may have missed this—but on the homicide that you were talking about, the investigation. You said a million dollars was spent, which is, you said, an enormous amount of money to spend. What I think I missed is why was that homicide so—why did it get chosen for that kind of expenditure?

**Christina Witt:** Well, unfortunately, that isn’t the only kind. We spend that any day on other homicides as well—when we’re trying to prove organized crime, we end up spending that kind of money. The reason this one—he was a true victim [and] there was quite a bit of media pressure to figure this out. People were concerned why someone would get abducted and killed and there would be no criminal ties or anything like that. And, fortunately, I just think screamed loud enough to get the resources. So, it can be hit or miss. As an ex-child abuse investigator, those investigators are far more important, but you don’t always get the resources. It comes down to sometimes pressure on the service and all those kind of things. And you have two suspects identified, so you have a high likelihood [of solvability]. So because of those reasons as well, it seemed like a good risk to put all this money into solving this case.

**Kathleen Heide:** Thank you. That makes sense. And then the other thing—I don’t know if I heard this right—you had a wiretap on a reporter? Was he part of the group that was wiretapped?

**Christina Witt:** Yes, she was.

**Kathleen Heide:** Was that because—

**Christina Witt:** It didn’t go so well. (Laughter)

**Kathleen Heide:** I was just curious. Was that because she had knowledge or was involved or she was inappropriate or?

**Christina Witt:** No, I’m not sure how it works here, but at home [in Canada], we have ‘persons of known interest,’ those are our targets. And then ‘other known persons’—who are associated [with] the targets—that may give us information. So she was an ‘other known person’ because
she had meddled so much with our suspects and had so many people and had gone into their homes. . . . And, of course, this target wasn’t speaking to us. And a lot of texting. And then she had the targets go to BPM because we can—for what she knew—we could intercept the BDM messaging—on Blackberry, the instant messaging—we were able to intercept those. But she just meddled too much and had too much information so we just treated her as someone we were interested in.

Kathleen Heide: Fascinating. Thank you. I just want to take this opportunity—because we’ve got such expertise here, not only the speakers, but people in the room—[to address] something that really has baffled me. The clearance rate since the 1960s has been going down. John mentioned that. John knows this data as well, if not better, than anybody else. You look at the sophistication and the training of police—that has gone up. The technology has gone up over those last fifty years. And yet our clearance rate is going down by about thirty percent. So the question I have for John and Tom and also for Wendy and other experts in the room is—Why is that? Has the nature of homicide changed in the U.S. and partly somewhat in Canada too? That’s something that I wonder—with the expertise here—if we could just address for a few minutes.

John Jarvis: All right. I’ll speak to that first. It’s a little bit of a misnomer to say that it’s going down. In fact, the clearance rates have been fairly stable over the last ten to fifteen years—around sixty percent.

Kathleen Heide: Right.

John Jarvis: We had that initial drop from 1960 till about 1980, from ninety-two percent down to sixty percent. So, that’s what people focus on—that big drop. But that’s not been the case in recent history. So, in the twenty-first century, that’s not been the case; it’s been fairly stable. That said, there are a number of arguments out there. Paul Cassell, at [the University of Utah] Law School, makes the argument that the Miranda decision, in 1966, is what he attributes to the big drop in the clearance rates from ninety [percent] to about 1975 or so. Because the implication is that Miranda, he argues, handcuffed the police ability to effectively investigate cases. Now, I think we’ve had extended debate over the reasonableness of that. I will tell you, my familiarity with his modeling of that suggests that there was an effect, but most of that effect would have been realized from about 1966 to about 1970, as Miranda became the standard in the land—people learned how to administer Miranda and use that in investigations. So, I would argue that it’s certainly not having an effect from 1972 [forward], is my opinion on this. But his point is well-taken. There are a number of safeguards that are now present in police investigations that weren’t present in 1960. So that certainly has had some effect. Demonstrating that effect and all the nuances and time-series data and other methods has been open to a lot of debate. But, more to your question about, Is there a fundamental change in the nature of homicide? I don’t think there is. Most of the work—and Wendy knows and can jump in here as well—over time, the popular notions are that there’s more ‘stranger crime.’ There’s more ‘unknown’ categories. I mean, you saw that in some of our numbers. There’s this notion—of What is a ‘stranger’ and What is an ‘acquaintance’—these days that’s much different than what it was even ten years ago. So there’s some complexities in terms of the categories we use. One of the problems we’ve had in a lot of this data is we’re using categories—nominal- and ordinal-type categories; mostly nominal—that were designed in 1929, and they persist today. All you have to do is look at the NIBRS data. So, we may not be able to get to the fine-grain differences that you need to get to to understand the
complexities. That’s why it does make some sense—and Amanda is going to drop her jaw when I say this—to look at these things qualitatively. Look at the case files. Do what Wendy and Tom are doing and actually go and read the case file. Because we rely so much on these broad datasets—you know, SHR, NIBRS, NCVS—and we’re all fishing through those. Why? Because they’re available. I have to say, I felt a little guilty when Dallas was talking about this, because we do the same thing he’s talking about. What do we do? We’ve read papers, we’ve got to have a pedigree of publications in the academic world. We go to the data that’s available. We mine that data as much as we can. We come up with reports. And we benefit from that when it’s all said and done. Now, I’m not saying that we’re necessarily evil for doing that, but what I’m saying is that we do benefit, as well. So that’s a whole other separate issue. But the point is—if we rely only on those very large datasets to understand all the underlying dynamics of homicide clearance—we’re probably not going to get any answers. Tom, you want to add anything?

Tom McEwen: I would agree with what John was saying. I guess the thing I would add, just anecdotally, in talking to investigators is—one of the changes is that I don’t think investigators get the cooperation from citizens for information that they used to get. And most homicide units operate independent of the rest of the department. And they’re not ingrained in the community. One of the changes I’ve seen take place—and there aren’t many—is for the homicide units to interact more with the patrol units who are working at the neighborhood level. My gut feeling—and I’m not an investigator—is that there are people out there that know what happened, in virtually every homicide. And the trick—the difficulties—in reaching them, I think that there’s a bigger gap than there used to be because of changes in the neighborhoods, changes in the police departments, et cetera.

John Jarvis: One other fine point—I’m not saying that we can’t gain anything by looking at NIBRS data. I’m not saying, don’t go that way, or don’t look at that. I’m just saying that every data set has its own challenges.

Christina Witt: I just have a comment from a police perspective. I agree with Tom—there isn’t the willingness of the community for a lot of reasons: social perception of being a ‘rat’; people don’t want to get involved [because of] their safety; as well as our court process at home [in Canada] is incredibly long. So this case that I’m talking about—I arrested these people in November of 2011. It won’t be until 2015 that they actually go to trial. So now you’re asking them to be witnesses, and because there’s (to continue) and six defense lawyers, and two (to continue) there’s a huge impact on the families. I would also say our suspects are far more sophisticated now than they used to be. You can google anything and figure out how to do something (to continue). As far as using (to continue) I know (to continue) actually do quite a bit more than—we can use scenarios that can’t be used in the U.S. (to continue) these scenarios now. It’s all in the media, television shows—that impacts our disclosure. We have to disclose our techniques in court. So these people go to court and they pass this information that defense lawyers give to disclose to our bad guys and they pass that along to their buddies. So that (to continue) we have our (to continue) that are highly organized and sophisticated, so to try to avert us intercepting their text messaging—which is a huge way they communicate in their operation—they’ll buy a server so that we can’t access it. And because we can’t access that server, they’re untouchable. So try (to continue) and they’re using a server that no one else can access. How do you do that? So they’re far more sophisticated and the (to continue) you said, is enormous—for us to pick and choose which ones we’re going to investigate. (to continue) from a
police perspective.

Chris Rasche: A couple of questions. A follow-up on what John (to continue) Would you agree that not only are the problems the categories going back to the 1920s, but those categories in both NIBRS and UCR, that data is being filled in by practitioners, not researchers. And in domestic homicide—and maybe those of you who study that—one of the persistent problems is how is that data assigned or described? So domestic homicides often end up being called ‘acquaintance’ at first, or they’ll end up under a category called ‘argument,’ which covers everything from bar fights to gang warfare, so it’s incredibly muddled. So I wondered if you had any sense to which to try and clarify the categories and define—literally define—them uniformly, which was the idea of the UCR in the first place. Have we made any progress there?

John Jarvis: This is a complicated issue. You have the (to continue) response categories that are designed in NIBRS. People are trained, at least in NIBRS, and there was (to continue) to some extent in the UCR, but in NIBRS—in that you go in and train police departments to make sure they’re filling them out in accordance with the definitions and the rules they’re supposed to follow. The problem you run into is we don’t that (to continue) the rules (to continue) our rules are for the FBI and for uniform reporting. You have 18,000 law enforcement agencies, 18,000 different ways of doing it. Even if they know what the definitions are, their state codes and the way they proceed is different than what we do at UCR. So we end up with different sets of books. UCR, NIBRS books, and then we’ve got (to continue) cause political problems if (to continue) they shouldn’t—that’s another story. Specific to your point about particular attributes or response categories and not NIBRS or SHR—one of the difficulties we run into, and this is not (to continue) this is persistent since the UCR was born in 1929: Just because a block is checked, just because that was recorded, there’s variance in what they (to continue)

Chris Rasche: Exactly.

John Jarvis: And what they knew at the time—the design of the coding mechanisms for all of these systems are, what did they know at the time—not what they knew when they did the investigation, like Wendy and Tom are covering. But what did they know at the time that they rolled up onto this scene? What did they discover in the first six hours? They’re going to write down this stuff. Now what they’re supposed to do is as they develop more, they’re supposed to go back and fill in [more accurate data]. But this is a crime report. They’re not doing this for investigation. They’re doing this as administrative operational stuff for our agency. So as a result you’re going to get departures. But when you actually look at the cases—and we’ve had a few people out there who’ve audited the actual cases that are reflected in SHR and they find differences, and they act if there’s some mystery or some conspiracy. And it’s not a conspiracy. It’s just the way they do business. Unfortunately, what we’re left with is whatever’s in this data file. And we were talking about this thing in our paper: The data is what the data is. I can’t change the data that’s reported there. But I do have (to continue) limitations which suggest that there are certain elements of the data that you have to be careful how you interpret. (to continue) all-day workshop on looking at this kind of issue among a number of other things that (to continue) proper uses and abuses associated with these kinds of datasets. Because people misinterpret them. One of the ones—I don’t want to go into a protracted (to continue)—they tend to look at weapon selection (to continue) weapon choice—in NIBRS, there’s no way to know whether they selected them or (to
what weapon was used in this offense. We don’t have a choice when—we don’t have data on all the alternatives. And we don’t even know how that weapon was used; we just know it was used. So was he shot six times? Eight times? Did it hit him in the head? Did it hit him in the knee? We don’t know.

Chris Rasche: Okay. But I just think that’s a persistent, ongoing thing.

John Jarvis: It is.

Chris Rasche: And, Tom, I may have missed this in the very beginning of your presentation, but all of the cases that you were looking at—all the were done—involved injury to suspects, right?

Tom McEwen: Yes.

Chris Rasche: Okay. So, these are all cases where there was data on the living suspect who might be prosecuted that they didn’t want to submit. Because I think that makes that an even more astounding observation.

Vance McLaughlin: Dallas, that reminds me of Chief. One of his favorite sayings is ‘You’re getting dangerously close to the truth.’ I would think it would be—I think you’re too optimistic, or I’m too cynical. I would think it might be a nice project for one of your students to look at the past twenty years of that went to federal prison, and see how many of them were campaigns in a race for one of these crime-fighting programs. And I think that, to me, is appreciate your presentation.

Vanessa Leggett: I wanted to pick up on what Kathleen had addressed, as far as the discrepancy—why does it seem that we have all these resources now, yet the resolution or solving of crime has gone down. I think what John said is true—about the decision—and there were subsequent decisions related to search and seizure law that have had a great impact—the exclusionary rule, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine—that have really contributed [to drop in rates of solving]. So, I think legislation has added to that. And what Christine said about gangs—the proliferation of gangs has caused a unique problem, and this was something that was not around fifty years ago—not to the degree that it is now. And there are many different sects of gangs now and it’s very difficult to prove any crime involving more than one person from the outset. But proving it with gangs, as Christine pointed out, is nearly impossible, in a lot of cases. I also think that the media has some role in this as well. There’s something called the ‘CSI Effect.’ Now juries are expecting forensic evidence. They want proof, they want DNA, they want all of these things, or they’re going to buy the reasonable doubt of the defense. And so I think by and large the public is more suspect of the whole system. And there’s these—they’re not legal loopholes, but—protections that we have to protect the innocent, not the guilty, that are allowing the appearance of the resolution rate to go down.

Dallas Drake: I’d like to make a comment on that. Number one, we don’t have gangs in the

United States. And number two, everything you really need to know about homicide investigation you can learn from television. So, in *The First 48*, if you watch the detectives from what they’re trying to tell you—from what they’re *not* telling you—is that we know that a lot of homicides are solved by what? A citizen calls in a lead, where someone calls, because when they run out of every (to continue) guys, supposedly, because that’s what they do on *The First 48*, and then they’re just waiting. ‘We don’t know what to do.’ They look around, and then the phone rings and somebody called in a lead. Well, there’s so much mistrust now, in many cities across the nation—which is what Tom said, in a little different way. There’s a lot of mistrust, so people aren’t calling in the leads. So we have to resort to the forensic information, which is never enough, because it doesn’t always explain what happened—its proof of what happened.

**Vanessa Leggett:** There’s also been an influx of illegal aliens as well.

**Christina Witt:** I just wanted to touch on when you talked about *Miranda*. We [in Canada] have the charter. That impacts even how we conduct an interrogation. So, we have so many rules now that if someone said fifteen times ‘I want to speak to my lawyer’—you have to stop talking. We [in Canada] don’t have to stop talking. They can say they need to speak to their lawyer once and we can keep talking to them (to continue) charter (to continue) as well. And then we also have things that (to continue) information and protection of ICE. So, in order for me to get any type of information about someone, I have to write a search warrant. And our search warrants (to continue) my (to continue) go back to I’m a writer, I didn’t do that (to continue) condense (to continue) I do that every two months, and it’s like detailed, detailed information. If I want to get somebody’s medical records, I have to write a search warrant (to continue) hospital now and speak to the doctor (to continue) unless you get a really good doctor who’s willing to put his neck on the line to give you information. If the person’s dead, (to continue) I have to go through the (to continue) and the executor (to continue) records and production (to continue) and you have to wait (to continue) so all of these things just snowball and make the investigation longer, and more expensive, and (to continue) And then I mentioned to John—and I’m sure it’s the same here [in the U.S.]—but our data (to continue) turn it over in six months and make a million dollars. Well, we don’t generate that in this agency, so that’s one person doing that. You have (to continue) so there’s a lot of resources for them to be evading ICE.

**Paul Blackman:** I have [a question] for Dallas. When David Kennedy was first getting involved in the Boston Project, he decided there was federal money involved and he was going to clear it with the gun lobby so we didn’t oppose it, and he assured everyone that the project was intended solely and exclusively for Boston, and it wasn’t intended to be used in any other city or (to continue), was he being disingenuous? Or did he change his mind?

**Dallas Drake:** I’ve heard David Kennedy in person and I’ve read great portions of his book, and I think this was a moving ball. This was—it started to look like, *maybe this is working*—they’re all convincing themselves that it was working. But, it was The Boston Miracle, right? Because who decided that it was working? The media—it was headlined. That was the first time they (to continue) terrific, when they read in the newspaper. That was the first that they had heard of it. *Well, we’d better run with this.* So, I think it’s something that kind of got out of control and they’re still trying to rein it in and what he told me two weeks ago was—I said, ‘How is [Project] Exile different from Ceasefire?’ And he said, ‘Oh, they’re totally different—not the same thing.
at all.’ Which, obviously, they are. I don’t think that part was intentional. But one of the problems with federal prosecutions is that you’re handing state’s rights over to the federal government. You’re using federalization of the laws. And so in Virginia now they have state laws at the same level as federal (to continue) Feds going to pay for (to continue) I don’t believe (to continue) And so I think more states are going to follow suit with those types of laws so that there can be some kind of (to continue) prosecution (to continue) if a felon gets caught (to continue)

Jay Corzine: I wanted to make a couple of comments very briefly. There’s a paper to be written—Lin and I have talked about this firsthand periodically—on the politics of homicide. We frequently forget that county sheriffs in most states. If they’re a successful sheriff, if they’re a successful politician, they have to run every four years for reelection. If they’re not elected, we call them ‘bad sheriffs.’ Mayors are politicians by proxy. Our police chiefs are politicians by proxy because the mayor involves them in any crime-related issue that may have a negative impact on (to continue). And, in most cities, the public really doesn’t get upset if a newspaper runs a headline: ‘Larceny rates in Orlando increase.’ What the public gets concerned about is homicide. There’s also a great study that somebody will do on the relationship between the police and the media. We have a number of current and former police officers in our doctorate program. [We had] a guy who was ideally suited to do this study, Jeff Williamson, who’s the head PIO (Public Information Officer) for Orlando—the Orange County Sheriff’s Office—and he’s a former news anchor from Cincinnati, so he’s worked it from both sides. Unfortunately, his dissertation research went in a different direction. But these are areas we frequently don’t pay attention to because they impact things like homicide clearance rates.
Understanding Crisis Communications: Examining Students’ Perceptions about Campus Notification Systems

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Following the 2007 shootings at Virginia Tech, which remains (to date) the largest mass casualty shooting, both in a school and the U.S. at large, a Review Panel was assembled to investigate the event. One of the main areas of inquiry was the emergency response protocols, particularly as they related to notification systems. On the day of the shootings, there were no text message alerts in place, and due to the chain-of-command structure at the University, combined with the ongoing investigation at the West Ambler Johnston (WAJ) dormitory, email notifications about both shootings were delayed. In fact, despite that the shootings at WAJ occurred two hours earlier, the initial notification was not even sent until 9:26 a.m., at which time the shooter was in the process of chaining the doors shut at Norris Hall. The email notification about the active shooter at Norris Hall was sent at 9:50 a.m., nearly 10 minutes after this second shooting began and one minute before the perpetrator committed suicide. Thus, it has been suggested that with earlier notification, some or all of the 30 lives claimed at Norris Hall may have been spared.

Following these fateful events, colleges and universities around the nation began the arduous task of implementing new systems or evaluating and overhauling existing protocols. Researchers also have examined what went wrong on the day of the shootings, the various technologies that are available to be used within such emergencies, how to increase enrollment and participation, and how to improve transmission rates of messages (see Bambanek & Klus, 2008; Foster, 2007; Gulum & Murray, 2009; Halligan, 2009; Hamblen, 2008; Latimer, 2008; Mark, 2008; Mastrodicasa, 2008; Schneider, 2010). While nearly all of these researchers advocate for the use of a multimodal system to reach the greatest number of respondents, these studies also focus on the technology, rather than its users. As such, a noticeable gap in the literature exists about student perceptions of these emergency notification systems, and how such technology can be reconciled between the needs and wants of users and universities themselves. The present study seeks to fill this gap by assessing student perceptions of the emergency notification system at a mid-sized university in Central Texas.

WAJ was the scene of the first shooting at approximately 7:15 a.m. on April 16, 2007. Freshman Emily Hilscher and Senior Ryan Clark both were killed in this first event. Nearly two-and-a-half hours later, 25 other students and five faculty members were shot and killed in Norris Hall across campus. An additional 23 people were wounded in the second shooting.
Methodology

The present research was focused on three key questions:
(1) How do students perceive the current emergency notification system?
(2) How is this current system being used by students?
(3) How do students believe this system should be used moving forward?

In order to answer these questions, paper-and-pencil surveys were disseminated during the fall 2013 semester. Information was collected about awareness of the system, how this resource is currently being used by students, overall perceptions of the current technology, and how it could be used in the future. Data from a convenience sample of 386 students from a variety of disciplines across the University were collected. The sample itself was similar in composition to the University’s undergraduate students’ demographics as a whole in respects to gender, age, race/ethnicity, and class standing.

Findings

The data yielded a number of interesting findings relating to the University’s current emergency notification system. First, while nearly all students (95.3%) are aware that a system was in place, just about half (50.9%) report knowing how to sign up for notifications. Such a finding is particularly noteworthy, as it highlights a need for better education on enrolling in these alert programs. When looking at specific technologies, this disparity is further illuminated. For example, though nearly 99% of students report owning a cell phone with text messaging capabilities, less than 31% are signed up to receive emergency alerts through this particular mode. Further, even though about 26% of respondents who are enrolled in the text alerts portion of the emergency report reading every message that comes in, the majority of student cell phone owners are not even registered to receive the messages in the first place.

Email is another important mode to consider when disseminating emergency alerts. The findings of the study indicate that nearly 90% of students are signed up to receive emergency emails. The high rate of enrollment may be due, in part, to the University’s employment of an “opt-out” system for emails, whereby all university email addresses are automatically enrolled and students must specifically exclude themselves, rather than an “opt-in” system, in users must register manually. Interestingly, however, given the advances in cellular technology, only 73% of users confirmed receiving campus email on their cell phones, despite that nearly 88% of respondents reported having any email capabilities on these devices. Addressing this gap between email and cell phone technology is particularly important, as almost 60% of users also reported checking these accounts several times a day and 46% report reading emergency notification emails each time they are received. As such, increasing connectivity to their email accounts also may reduce potential delays in receiving, reading, and responding to emergency alerts.

Students also were asked about their perceptions of the current emergency notification system, including the number and content of the messages transmitted. When asked if the University sends out too many messages, nearly 58% of respondents disagreed. Additionally, 63% reported that fewer messages being sent would not increase their interest in the system. Interestingly, however, while 45% of the students surveyed stated that the content overall was
not vague, 40% agreed that more information was needed about what to do in the event of an emergency. This is especially important as just around 25% reported that they would know what actions to take if an emergency event occurred on campus, while 44% stated that they did not. Including more information in the messages about what actions are needed during a specific emergency is imperative, as this is where students glean the majority of their information. It therefore is important to provide as much detail as possible, even within the space limitations (e.g., text messages).

Information also was gathered to help inform administrators on how students would like the system to be used moving forward. While the majority of students preferred to receive alerts by either text message or email, there is no one single mode that emerged as the overwhelming favorite among users. This highlights the need to further the use of a multimodal system in order to satisfy a broader audience. Students also nearly unanimously (99%) wanted to be notified of emergency situations on campus, but were less likely to be interested in general requests for information (26.4%). One way in which this could be addressed is through the use of a tiered messaging system, whereby messages are categorized based on their severity or threat. On a scale of 0 (not at all useful) to 10 (very useful), 64% of students provided a response of seven or greater, thus providing support for the use of a tiered system.

**Discussion**

Meeting the needs of prospective users is just one of the many challenges faced by universities, such as the one examined in the present study, when choosing an emergency notification system. From the findings discussed here, several policy recommendations are offered in relation to strengthening the use of and participation in such systems. First, universities should continue to utilize multimodal notification systems in order to reach the largest possible audience. Such a system provides backups in the event of one technology or mode failing, and also can address concerns over transmission rates of certain outlets, such as text messages, which may be slower to reach intended recipients than emails. Second, adoption of a tiered messaging notification system will allow both the universities and message recipients to prioritize a given threat and may increase attentiveness to the most severe alerts. Operations of the overall system also can be improved by transitioning from an “opt-in” system to one that is “opt-out,” particularly for text messages; requiring continual updates of user contact information; developing pre-written or “canned” alert messages to avoid errors, omissions of critical information, or sensationalization of details; strengthening content to include directions for action; and differentiating between emergencies and timely warnings. Finally, the results of this study indicate a need for both initial and continual education on how to use the system. In a post-Virginia Tech world, it simply is not enough to have an emergency system in place – continued assessment, evaluation, and maintenance is required.
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The Changing Landscape Of Homicide:
Proceedings of the 2014 Meeting of the Homicide Research Working Group

Homicide Classification:
The Expressive/Instrumental Classification and Hybrid Crime Scenes

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INTRODUCTION

Studies have shown that the nature of the relationship between individuals involved in homicide is reflected in offenders’ crime scene behaviors and can serve as a basis of categorization (e.g. Salfati, 2000). The expressive/instrumental classification of homicide proposed by Salfati (Salfati & Canter, 1999; Salfati, 2000) reflects these ideas. Behaviors that comprise expressive homicides suggest that victims themselves are important to offenders, signifying a prior relationship. Conversely, behaviors in instrumental homicides suggest that victims as people are secondary to offenders’ personal gain.

Classifying homicide crime scenes according to the expressive/instrumental model has practical implications, for example as the basis for offender profiling (Salfati, 2000). Offender profiling is a form of behavioral investigative advice (Rainbow, 2008) that involves deducing characteristics of offenders from their actions at a crime scene in order to aid law enforcement in limiting the suspect pool (Douglas, Ressler, Burgess & Hartman, 1986). Recently, the academic and professional realms have emphasized that behavioral investigative advice must be supported by empirical research (Alison, Smith, Easton, & Rainbow, 2003; Rainbow, 2008). In other words, classification schemes must demonstrate that they effectively classify crime scenes.

Previous research establishes that the expressive/instrumental model has the ability to classify approximately 60% of homicide crime scenes in datasets (e.g. Salfati & Haratsis, 2001; Salfati & Park, 2007). However, the remaining roughly 40% of crime scenes, which researchers refer to as hybrids, cannot be classified into either subtype because they contain roughly the same number of expressive and instrumental behaviors. The existence of hybrid crime scenes limits the strength of empirical support for the expressive/instrumental classification; therefore, further research in this area is warranted. Trojan and Salfati (2008) acknowledge that the individual behaviors selected for inclusion in the classification impact its overall validity. A further examination and refinement of these individual behaviors is needed to identify behaviors that are most essential to expressiveness and instrumentality (Salfati, 2008). The present study addresses this gap in the literature.

THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS

To provide a scientific basis for offender profiling, the expressive/instrumental classification must be able to assign crime scenes into types. The process of assigning crime scenes into types has been referred to as individual differentiation by David Canter (2000). Individual differentiation serves as the foundation for behavioral classifications (Salfati & Canter, 1999; Salfati, 2000) and suggests that offenders engage in different types of crime scene behaviors, which reflect different psychological meanings. Expressiveness and instrumentality represent two different interpersonal styles in homicide, which reflect differences in the underlying meaning of victims to offenders (Salfati, 2000).
The changing landscape of homicide was derived from Feshbach’s (1964) theory of instrumental/expressive (hostile) aggression. Salfati and colleagues (Salfati, 2000; Salfati & Canter, 1999) applied this theoretical framework to the actions of homicide offenders and established two distinct types of crime scene behaviors, expressive and instrumental. In homicide, expressive and instrumental behaviors signify differences in the meaning of victims to offenders. Expressive homicides are characterized by behaviors which suggest that victims as people are important to offenders. Instrumental homicide behaviors suggest victims are not of primary importance to offenders; rather victims are secondary to offenders’ ulterior motives, which may center on money or sex (Salfati, 2000).

Salfati’s (2000) study generated a body of research that spans several different but related areas, including the expression of impulsivity and control in homicide crime scene behaviors (Salfati, 2003), behavioral consistency and inconsistency in serial homicide (Salfati & Bateman, 2005; Sorochinski & Salfati, 2010), and studies of homicide across different cultures (e.g. Salfati & Haratsis, 2001). Moreover, with some variation, the expressive/instrumental model has been replicated and supported in Greek (Salfati & Haratsis, 2001), Finnish (Santtila, Canter, Elfgren, & Hakkanen, 2001), Canadian, (Salfati & Dupont, 2006), South Korean (Salfati & Park, 2007), and serial (Salfati & Bateman, 2005) homicides. While many replication studies support the overarching expressive and instrumental subtypes, hybrid scenes continue to pose a problem.

**Present study and aims**

Although hybrid scenes detract from the validity of the categorization system, little is known about the behavioral make-up of these cases. And, it is possible that hybrid scenes are, at least in part, a consequence of the inclusion of behaviors that do not represent salient features of expressiveness or instrumentality. Therefore, an examination and refinement of these individual behaviors is needed. To address the problem of hybrid scenes, the present study investigates hybrid scenes in-depth and assesses the efficacy of behavioral variables in discriminating between expressive and instrumental classification through three related aims.

1. The first aim will be to establish expressive and instrumental themes in a U.S. dataset with the use of SSA and to compare the individual behaviors that comprise each theme with previous replications of the model. Comparing the behavioral makeup of themes in the present study with previous research identifies important differences and similarities in the co-occurrence of behaviors in the dataset. A measure of internal consistency, Cronbach’s alpha, will also conducted to assess the strength of the relationship between behaviors in each theme.

2. The second aim will be to examine the individual behaviors that comprised expressive, instrumental, and hybrid crime scenes. The frequency with which each behavior is present across classification categories will be determined through a frequency analysis. The frequency with which each behavior is present across expressive, instrumental, and hybrid scenes will also be superimposed on the SSA plot providing a visual representation of the distribution of behaviors across the different classifications.

3. The final aim will be to determine the efficacy of behavioral variables in discriminating between expressive or instrumental classification. Group membership (expressive/instrumental classification) will be predicted from behavioral variables through two logistic regression models. The first model will enter all forty-one crime...
scene behaviors into the model, simultaneously, to examine the predictive ability of crime scene behaviors individually. The second model is a forward stepwise regression model. In this model behavioral domains will be entered into the equation in a forward stepwise fashion, in order to identify the optimal combination of behaviors for prediction purposes.

**CONCLUSIONS**

As a model designed to support investigative techniques, the expressive/instrumental classification must effectively categorize crime scenes. Presently, hybrid scenes detract from the model’s ability to account for all crime scenes within datasets. Therefore, to address the problem of hybrid scenes, the present study will provide an in-depth investigation into the behavioral make-up of hybrid crime scenes and assesses the efficacy of behavioral variables in discriminating between expressive or instrumental subtypes. This research has theoretical and practical implications, as it may improve the validity of the expressive/instrumental classification.
The Changing Landscape Of Homicide:
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References


Making the Numbers of Murder Real: Active Learning in a Murder Class

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Introduction

Scholars of teaching and learning make the case for involving students in their own learning through active participation. Some, taking a more theoretical approach, argue that students should not be seen as empty vessels to be filled with our knowledge; but instead, they are active constructors of their own knowledge (Smith, 2000). While others argue from a practical point that because the attention span of a typical undergraduate lasts somewhere between 10 and 15 minutes, active learning is a good way to keep student attention (Robinson, 2000). Using either argument, the goal is student retention of knowledge. Much research indicates that active learning increases student retention of knowledge, as well as student's attention and interest (Bonwell & Sutherland, 1996; Rahn & Moraga, 2007; Robinson, 2000). Further, Robison (2000) argues that because of the variety of complex and provocative topics in criminal justice, it is an ideal discipline for employing active learning. In this paper, I present an activity that I have sporadically used in my Sociology of Murder course that could be adapted for other courses that focus on crime, demography, or other areas in which we want students to understand numbers in a more visceral sense. It will include an overview of the course where I include this activity, a description of the first time I gave this activity as well as adaptations I have made, and my observations on the value and success the activity.

Sociology of Murder

While I first taught Sociology of Murder in 2002, it was not until 2008 that I began teaching it every year. I offer it as both a 5 week summer course that meets 2 hours four days a week and also during the regular 14 week semester. The semester course meets twice a week for 75 minutes at a time. It is an elective 3 semester hour 3000 level course (SOCl 3187) that sociology and criminal justice majors and minors can include as part of their required elective courses. However, the course, is never limited to these majors and I always have psychology, political science, and biology majors and there are often also communication majors and a smattering of students with other majors. The class averages around 40 students with as few as 30 and as many as 56. The course is a lecture/discussion course with grades based upon a midterm, a final, four or five in-class writings, class participation, and a murder data assignment (explained below).

Comprehending the Overwhelming Numbers of Murder in the U.S.

I dedicate one day of our course meeting time to covering the patterns and trends of murder. I commonly cover this material on the fifth day we meet as a class which usually falls in the second week of a summer course offering or week three of a semester course offering. I used to present a lecture to the students in which I reviewed the most recent statistics on murder in the U.S. and other countries including data on circumstances, victim offender relationships, and weapons used. Each time I taught it, despite having engaged students, it became a blur of numbers. Thus, I instituted a data assignment that requires students to go to various legitimate data sources on the internet and find answers to specific questions about the number of murders in different places and the number of different types of murder. This assignment seems to work well in introducing students to valuable data sources available on the web and the recognition of
the trends in murder (especially the decreasing trend in recent years that is a surprise to them). However, I never got the sense that students (or myself for that matter), really understood how much murder there really is in the United States.

Thus, in the spring of 2008 I decided to use a teaching suggestion given in the instructor's manual for the textbook I use for this class (The Murder Book: Examining Homicide, 2008 - written by me, Kim Davies). In the instructor's manual, I include the following as a suggestion:

According to the FBI, there were 16,692 homicides in the U.S. in 2005. Have students count out 16,692 of some object such as paperclips or M & M's. You could have them make this into a presentation for others at your university to emphasize the reality of this number (Davies 2008).

On the first day of class, I told the 30 enrolled students that they would each need to bring in over 500 paperclips to represent the 16,740 murders in the United States that were reported by the UCR for 2006 (the last year for which we had data at the time). I explained to the students that they would be linking the paperclips together and stringing them across campus as a visual representation of the number of murders in the United States. I noted that I thought paperclips were a reasonable thing to use as they were relatively inexpensive.

On the day we strung the paperclips together, I explained (again briefly) that I wanted them to do this activity so that we could see the overwhelming number of murders that we had in the United States.

I emphasized that the students should think about how many people were impacted by these murders and that we should think about not only the victim and all of those who loved and knew the victim but also about the murderer and those in his or her family that may have been impacted by the murder. Additionally, I told the students that part of their participation grade was based on their interaction with other students. I directed them to be ready to explain to students and others out in the campus what we were doing and why.

We started by sitting in class making long chains of paperclips. It soon became apparent that some students had failed to bring enough paperclips and I quickly visited departments in the building I was teaching; asking various departments to donate paperclips (which they did) and the administrative staff in my office joined in and helped bring us more paperclips as well. As the chains grew, students began linking them together and stringing them out of our classroom down the hall, down three flights of stairs and out into our university's common area. Eventually the chain reached across our university at a length a local news channel (who had been called by our public relations department to cover the story) estimated to be about 1,300 feet long.

Several students and other who were outside ask our students what they were doing and the students explained wonderfully. They also explained to the media that had gathered (local paper and television news).

11 The impetus for suggesting this assignment came from my experience with Take Back the Night Events including the Clothesline Project in which survivors and other decorated-shirts which hung on clothesline where the rest of campus could observe the messages of survivors and see the overwhelming number of victims represented.
To be totally honest, we were short a couple thousand paperclips, but the assignment still appeared to have the impact that I wanted. The students in my class, and other people who inquired about what they were doing, were amazed and overwhelmed by the number of paperclips that we had and how far the chain stretched. We did run out of class time and some students had to leave before the entire chain was complete; but others who did not have another class immediately after mine stayed to continue until we had all the paperclips chained together. At the beginning of the next class, student talked about how they were impacted by the assignment. They said that the paperclip chain was a good way for them to really see how big 16,740 really was even though we did not even end up with that many paperclips. Many students also indicated that they told their friends and family about what we had done and thus the learning that happened during our class time clearly moved beyond the limits of our class and helped students’ further process the information they were learning.

A downside to this activity, however, was that I ended up with over 14,000 paperclips chained together in one big ball. I suggested to our student worker that she disassemble the paperclips as we needed them but for a long time, the paperclips sat in a paper box in our department meeting room collecting dust. Just last year in 2013, I decided to display them as artwork in the middle of our department meeting room. Then, during department meetings, I began encouraging faculty to take the chains apart and put them in bowls I scattered around the table. I am now happy to report that all chains have been dissembled and placed in our supply cabinet and we will not have to order paperclips in my department for years.

After the paperclip chain, the next time I taught the class I wanted to do something similar to the paperclip chain, but I did not want to be left with so many paperclips and I wanted to try to do something that would take less time but still show the numbers of homicide while keeping the assignment cheap for students. I brainstormed with my class, and we decided to collect pennies. One penny was to represent each of the approximately 16,000 murders that had occurred the year for which we had data. This was a bigger class and the students did a good job in bringing in enough pennies. They had signed up to bring pennies to represent one state or a few states they had signed up for.

One student had a big bin that we used to collect the pennies. Students took turns dumping their pennies by state. Then, later in the term after the pennies had been on display in our department, the class voted to donate the pennies (over $160.00) to the local domestic violence shelter as a place that might have an impact on preventing murder.

The impact of the pennies was less than that of the paperclips - the public aspect of the display was missing though students did get to present a check to the shelter as a representative was nice enough to come to our class. Thus, the next time I did this assignment - during the summer when we had a longer class period - I had the students bring photos cut from magazines, which we then used to make a giant collage that was on display in a student snack bar area for two weeks. Though, some of my students found the pasting of around 16,000 faces on poster board a bit tedious, they did seem to get the same impact as the paperclips. The students and those who saw our display, remarked often about the amazing numbers and the use of real faces seemed to have a greater impact in getting the students to think about real people.

During another semester, we collected canned goods to donate to a shelter and we worked to collect enough to represent the murders in our own state but were unsuccessful in
collecting enough though students said the activity was valuable and several even commented on 
the activity as one to keep on the class evaluations (without my prompting).

Most recently, in the fall of 2013, I realized that my department had a lot of chalk that we 
no longer used (since we have whiteboards and not chalkboards in our buildings). So I decided 
that we could use the chalk for this activity. I had the class help me decide what we should do 
and we decided to do tally marks for each of the 14,612 murders that occurred in the U.S. in 
2011. Some students thought chalk outlines would be good but there were realists amongst us 
who knew that would take forever; though we did include some chalk outlines as can be seen in 
the pictures I present.

While I am new to the term "flipped classroom" this is often how this class operates. I 
have students read and listen to my lectures and then we do some activity and I figure, the more 
memorable it is, the more they will learn and remember. Besides, as noted by Lawson (1995), 
activities often make learning more fun for both the student and the instructor. In future terms, I 
will continue to think about what works for students and their learning and how best to adapt this 
and other activities. For now, I have a big box of chalk and the chalk notations seemed to work 
quickly with my big class and allow them to interact with other students. Additionally, 1003 of 
the students correctly answered a multiple choice question about how many murders had 
occurred in the United States, in 2011, on my course midterm.
References


Putting Forward a Framework for Studying Active Shooter Events

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C. Gabrielle Salfati  
John Jay College of Criminal Justice

Introduction

Active shooter offenders have been generally defined as “individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area” (United States Department of Homeland Security, 2008, p. 3). While several mass shootings have placed increased attention on these phenomena, recent research has attempted to address misconceptions that surround these offenses (Fox & DeLateur, 2014). The current paper introduces an ongoing dissertation project that focuses on this type of offense, with the goal of contributing to the growing body of literature that examines active shooter events.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the structure and theoretical framework of the project. The study uses theories that fall under the Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis (ECCA) umbrella to address the five W and one H questions related to active shooter events (i.e., what, where, when, who, why, & how).

“A Model for Action”

The project is structured after Poyner’s (1986) “A Model for Action,” which focused on analyzing crime problems by breaking down issues into basic components. Through this idea, crime problems can be analyzed by addressing six questions (Clarke & Eck, 2005):

- What happened?
- Where did it happen?
- When did it happen?
- Who was involved?
- Why did it happen?
- How did it happen?

By concentrating on each core question, we can develop a better understanding of active shooter events. This framework provides structured information in a way that can be accessible to academics and practitioners, as well as to lay audiences. As highlighted by Clarke & Eck (2005), these six questions provide the outline of a typical newspaper article. Thus, they argued that by addressing each question, a full picture of the problem can be illustrated.

This framework provides the format for organizing the key information regarding active shooter events that will be used to compile an overview of this type of offense, and provides the overall structure of the current project.
Environmental Criminology & Crime Analysis (ECCA)

ECCA theories place emphasis on the environment where crime occurs, as well as the opportunity factors that may promote or prohibit offenses (Wortley & Mazerolle, 2008). It is argued that crime can be reduced by adjusting the opportunities that are required for offenses to occur (Clarke, 2008). It is important to note that many ECCA theories were created to address high-volume predatory behavior, such as the use of the routine activity approach (Cohen & Felson; 1979; Felson, 2008) and crime script analysis (Cornish, 1994; Cornish & Clarke, 2008) to study burglary and auto-theft. Recently, though, these theories have been extended to violent offenses that occur less frequently, including serial sexual assault (Beauregard, Proulx, Rossmo, Leclerc, & Allaire, 2007), homicide (Rossmo, 2000), and suicide bombings (Clarke & Newman, 2006).

Since the goal of the current project is acquiring information, theory will be used as a framework rather than being the focus. Instead of conducting theoretical refinement or testing, ECCA principles will serve as the template for organizing data concerning these events. Figure 1 illustrates how ECCA theories were matched with the five W and one H questions to create the framework for the current study.
Figure 1. Model framework for studying active shooter events

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Using the Appropriate Data

While there has been a limited amount of research focusing specifically on active shooter events, mass homicide has received a comparatively large amount of scholarly attention. This body of work has highlighted several lessons learned regarding not only the various types of data that exist, but also what issues may impact reliability.

Mass homicide data tend to originate from media sources (e.g., newspaper articles & online searches), with official reports from law enforcement agencies seldom used (Huff-Corzine, McCutcheon, Corzine, Jarvis, Tetzlaff-Bemiller, Weller, & Landon, 2014). While media sources are popular—and at times the only available option—sometimes there are reliability concerns. Similar to previous work (see Bowers, Holmes, & Rhom, 2010; Huff-Corzine et al., 2014; Lankford, 2013), when reviewing media reports for active shooter events occurring within the last decade, Osborne and Capellan (2013, November) noted four factors that may influence the number of news articles written about an active shooter event:

- The number of victims
- The type of victim
- The location of the event
- The year of the event

These various reliability issues create a methodological concern—recent events are more likely to have more information available online, but news stories shortly following events are at risk of having incorrect or incomplete information.

Based on previous work, it may be possible to identify and address potential data-related issues before they become problems. However, research has suggested that some of these reliability issues are difficult to remedy. One promising approach would be to combine multiple sources of data, for instance supplementing official data with media reports. Through this, researchers would be able to triangulate their information, thus increasing reliability and validity. The project is currently examining what data are needed, as well as what type of data source would be most appropriate.

Conclusion

The overarching goal of the ongoing project is to empirically assess the six different components of active shooter events by following the framework outlined in Poyner (1986). Once the what, where, when, who, why, and how questions are addressed individually, research can begin to examine the interaction between each facet. By relying on ECCA theories and principles, it is hypothesized that clearer understanding will be acquired. The results may help contribute to the growing body of knowledge concerning active shooter events, and possibly aid prevention and prediction efforts. First, however, the theoretical framework and structure of project must be finalized. Once this is achieved, attention can be placed on data collection.
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Juvenile Delinquency and Gangs

According to Smith (2008), confusion is widespread when dealing with juvenile delinquency as a concept. This is in part due to the media. Media misrepresent the term causing legal culture and popular culture to have different conceptualizations and speculations (Smith, 2008). Many scholars agree that the public’s inaccurate, stereotypical, and grisly images and ideas of gangs are directly as a result of media sensationalism that comes from multiple sources and outlets (Sheldon, Tracy, & Brown, 2012). Smith (2008) discusses that juvenile delinquency in all reality is a legal term referring to illicit acts committed by persons under eighteen. These acts can range from status offenses to violent offenses (Agnew, 2005). This definition coupled with what media has portrayed has made it easy for popular opinion to view juvenile gangs as delinquent.

Delinquent youth groups have been around for a long time. According to Shelden, Tracy, and Brown (2012), youth groups (gangs) have been in existence since the fourteenth or fifteenth centuries in early Roman society. However, it is argued that gang violence, as we know it today, became its most dangerous in the 1970s due to factors such as honor, defending turf, control, and gain (Miller, 1992). Concerning homicides, juvenile gangs commit such heinous acts at an accelerated pace today. This could be due to the availability and use of lethal weapons of higher potency. Howell (1998) suggests that while gang assaults have not always increased, gang homicides have because of the correlation between these dangerous weapons and death. The death effect becomes even more terrorizing when dealing with supergangs, which can be made up of thousands of members.

Prevalence

While it is known that gangs are represented throughout our County, the actual number of gangs and gang members is harder to determine. According to the FBI (2011) the prevalence of youth gangs tends to vary depending on the area. For example, larger cities tend to have the most gang activity followed by suburban areas, small cities, and rural counties. The largest gang problems may in fact be concentrated in few cities around the United States of America due to chronic issues persisting (Howell, 1998). Davis (2008) reports that most juvenile homicide may occur in only 6% to 12% of the counties in the United States. Howell mentions that actual
concrete data on gang homicides as a whole are few and far between, but homicide as a whole are on a downward trajectory. Still a more recent estimate finds that Some 33,000 violent street gangs, motorcycle gangs, and prison gangs with about 1.4 million members are criminally active in the U.S. today (FBI, 2011). Obviously, this estimate is not solely focused on juvenile gangs, but it does provide an overall estimate. Generally, complete and accurate data is hard to obtain for gangs as a whole, let alone juvenile gangs.

Characteristics

When studies examining gangs, and more specifically juvenile gangs, have been completed we have found some commonalities. The majority of research focuses on characteristics that include demographics, contextual and situational factors. When taken as a whole, we can develop an idea of risk factors associated with gang membership in generally, and gang violence and homicide in particular.

Demographic

Concerning age, delinquency tends to peak around the ages fifteen to nineteen (Snyder & Sickmund, 2006), and yet gang members on average are about seventeen or eighteen (Curry & Decker, 1998). Still, Howell (1998) advises, that gang members tend to be from the ages of twelve to twenty-four. Generally speaking, it is evident that gang members tend to be younger than older. Race and ethnicity have also been studied. While the majority of gang members are said to be black and Hispanic, Caucasian tend to be more involved than in the past (Howell, 1998). It is also more common for males to be gang members, yet some studies have implied that the gender gap may be narrowing some (Howell, 1998).

Contextual

Just as demographics are important to look at, so are other elements of the behavior and/or crime. Several studies have also examined contextual factors including structural issues, community, cultural, family, school, peer group, and individual issues (Howell, 1998). Long term risk factors for violence include criminal/delinquent social groups which may include family members and peers (Loeber, Pardini, Homish, Wei, Crawford, Farrington, & Rosenfeld, 2005). Loeber et al., (2005) also suggests that proximal risk factors can overlap with long term and included weapon carrying, peer group, and drug use. However, neither of these are an inclusive nor exhaustive list of risk factors.

Risk Factors

It is necessary to examine such characteristics in order to completely grasp the situation and attempt to understand violent juvenile gang behavior. The simple reason for this is because it will help identify the risk factors and problems associated with this type of behavior. Juvenile gang homicide characteristics are the risk factors that need to be better identified to help at risk youth better succeed in life without succumbing to what they feel is the only option—gangs. Identification of risk factors would help corrective measures to be put into place. These measures could then help existing populations and future generations before the problem becomes worse. The corrective measures could be anything from policy, to programs, to funds. These corrective measures would be put in place to help lower the risk factors and ultimately the propensity for a juvenile to join a gang, be violent, and commit an act of homicide.
Present Study

The present study looks at the socio-demographic and contextual characteristics of juvenile gang homicide. This study is in its preliminary stages and is used to examine the characteristics in order to attempt to find patterns. This is the second part of the study and is still ongoing. This study is guided by past research which informs us of certain characteristics to focus on. This study examines factors in relation to juvenile gang homicide including offense, victim and offender characteristics. These characteristics include demographics of the offender and victims, weapon, circumstance, and location. The data used comes from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS) extract files for 2010. This research aims to create increasing awareness on juvenile gang homicidal characteristics so future researchers can expand on the problem at large in hopes for a better solution. In addition, once completed, the researchers hope to aid in development of corrective measures.
References


Available literature on female homicide offenders has been steadily growing over the past few decades. Topics in this area have generally focused on causal components such as circumstances of domestic abuse and neglect and the passivity of their killing methods (Adler 2003; Feld 2009; Murdoch, Vess, & Ward 2012; Wijkman, Bijleveld, & Hendricks 2011). Observation and empirical research on female homicide offenders, as the aggressor, is uncommon and usually appears as a comparison to male homicide offenders. In part, this can be accredited to the way in which society has typically viewed women and their potential to commit such atrocities. For example, Thompson (1998) discussed society’s aversion to view women as violent and how, when women did commit violent acts, they were often met with societal outrage because such behavior railed against the gendered stereotype. As such, previous research has often neglected to analyze varying components involved in female perpetrated homicide without the inclusion of a male comparison.

In response to this and in an effort to better understand the female homicide offender, our research focuses on the weapon selection of females who committed homicide without the aid of an accomplice and excludes a comparison to male homicide offenders. This was done to remove any external influences that might skew the analysis results. Our study primarily focuses on the weapon selection of women as estimated by the varying demographic and victim/offender relationships involved. It has been noted in previous research that women have employed knives or bladed weapons more often than other types of weapons in the commission of a homicide (Fox & Levin, 2006; Wilbanks, 1983). A study conducted by Chan and Frei (2012) raised questions regarding the basic components and demographic characteristics of female perpetrated murder in regard to sexual homicide offenders, independent of a male comparison. Following their work, but expanding it past their focus of female sexual homicide offenders, we study the types of weapons women have employed in homicide offenses and how the victim and offenders’ relationship, age, race, and sex are associated with weapon selection. It is from here that we began our inquiry.

One of the earliest studies to incorporate female offenders was conducted by Wilbanks (1983) which indicated that women used firearms more often than poison in the commission of a homicide. This was surprising for the time since, as noted by Wilbanks, it was a commonly held belief that women preferred poison over invasive weapons, such as firearms, to commit murder. Between 1980 and 2008 the Bureau of justice Statistics (BJS) reported that women utilized poison in 39.5% of homicides and firearms in only 7.9% of homicides (Cooper & Smith, 2011). Other research reports that the type of weapon utilized by women is related to their relationship with the victim (Fox & Allen, 2013; Muftic, 2012; Wilbanks, 1983). In these studies, it was more common for family members and acquaintances to die by means of firearms, knives, and blunt objects than strangers in female perpetrated homicide. The conflicting results presented by all of
these studies were produced from male to female comparisons with varying sample sizes and differing data sources which are believed to account for these discrepancies.

Our study seeks to add to the current body of literature on women who kill by analyzing components that may influence weapon selection of female perpetrated homicide without a comparison to males. To accomplish this, data were obtained for the years of 2002 through 2011 from the Supplemental Homicide Reports (SHR). Data obtained from the SHR include information on weapon employed, victim/offender relationship, demographic information on offender and victim, and the region in which these offenses occurred. It is well known that southern regions tend to have higher homicide rates and higher quantities of reported gun ownership which may weight our results (Felson and Pare 2010; Nelsen, Corzine, & Huff-Corzine 1994). Instead of using the ten geographical regions provided by the SHR, we utilized the census regions as designated by the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). Only cases where a solo female homicide offender was documented were used in the analysis. The final resulting sample size extracted from the main SHR database resulted in a total of 6,887 valid cases for this analysis.

Three queries guide this research. The first is to determine if knives or bladed weapons continue to be the most common weapon utilized by female homicide offenders. Second, is to identify if the extent of the gap between knives, or bladed weapons, and firearm usage in these incidents. Third, is to determine which types of demographic factors influence weapon selection among female homicide offenders. This final premise is the foundation of our main query and analysis for this study. We are employing a multinomial logistic regression for this analysis. This was determined to be the best fit analysis since our dependent variable is a nominal categorical variable with each category representing a different weapon type derived from the seventeen weapon categories provided by the SHR. Though the available literature is somewhat split on which type of weapon is women employ more frequently, a good portion of the literature leans toward women using knives and bladed weapons more often than other weapons. Taking this into consideration we have decided that knives, bladed weapons and other striking type weapons will constitute our reference category in the analysis.

Our research is currently in the preliminary stages of analysis and as such we are only able to report some preliminary findings. What can be expressed is that preliminary frequencies indicate that firearms and striking weapons are the most prevalent weapons reported in cases of female perpetrated murder. Currently we have defined striking weapons as the use of an object to beat, bludgeon, cut or stab. This includes knives and bladed weapons as indicated in other studies. Our preliminary frequencies indicate that the reported number of incidents where firearms where used exceeded the use of striking weapons in 2004, 2006, and then again slightly in 2009. Explanations for these fluctuations are currently being tested. As of 2011, striking weapons outnumbered firearms in reported incidents of female perpetrated homicide.

Preliminary tests have also been conducted to identify if there is or is not an influential relationship between victim/offender relationship, race, age, victim sex, and the region in which they occur. At the moment we have identified that 55.3% of our sample population is White and 44.7% of our sample is Black in comparison to all other races identified in the SHR data. Other races include Asian, Native American, and Native Pacific Islander. These results are similar to
the Chan and Frei (2012) study of female sexual homicide offenders; where 53% were White and 47% were black. However, their study consisted of a much smaller sample size (N=199) than ours. With this in mind we are attempting to determine if Black females have been over represented in our sample. Ethnicity is also provided for some cases in the original SHR data, either indicating of Hispanic origin, not of Hispanic origin, or unknown. However, ethnicity was not included in our analysis since only 35% of offenders in the preliminary dataset (pre-non-white or black deletion) were indicated as being of Hispanic origin or not of Hispanic origin; the other data were missing or unknown. This means that less than 35% of cases in our initial data sample documented as Hispanic. There were not enough completed Hispanic cases to incorporate a representative measure. As with the other eliminations, excluding these cases had no effect on the findings of our preliminary analysis.

The final results of our preliminary analysis suggest that women tended to kill victims who were, on average, 1.5 years younger than them. This makes sense that the victims would be younger, based on information found in the current body of literature which indicates that a sizable number of their victims are children (Farrell et al 2013; Silverman & Kennedy 1988). However, the 1.5 year age difference does not suggest that children are the primary targets of our sample based solely off of the lack of a substantial age gap. Is it likely, in this case, that female killers with multiple victims will be more likely to kill their children while incidents reporting one victim are more likely to target someone closer in age?

There are several limitations of our research that need to be noted. The first is in regard to the victim/offender relationship. The SHR data only records the victim/offender relationship between first victim and first offender listed which limits our ability to disseminate the social relationships between the female killer and multiple victims. With this in mind, our final results will only be able to add context to a portion of victim offender relationships. Also, as depicted by the exclusion of Hispanics, there are issues with missing or incomplete data. These issues are being addressed and will be documented in our final analysis.


INTRODUCTION

While technically referring to the killing of a close relative, the term parricide has become synonymous with the slaying of one or both parents by a biological child (Heide, 1992). This phenomenon is a rare variant of intrafamilial violence that accounts for approximately 2% of all homicide cases (Heide, 1989; 2013c). Parricide has fascinated the public since antiquity. It became particularly salient in the United States during the 1980s when media coverage of severely abused adolescent sons and daughters who killed their parents was featured on broadcast news and covered widely by the print media (Heide, 2013c). When parricide incidents involve multiple victims, multiple offenders, or juvenile offenders, they are perceived as even more shocking and result in widespread news broadcasting across the globe (Boots & Heide, 2006).

One of the most notorious of these cases involved the Menendez brothers, Erik and Lyle. In August 1989, 18 year-old Erik and his 21 year-old brother, Lyle, shot and killed their father and mother in their Beverly Hills home (Hubbard, 2012). In their confession, the brothers maintained that they had been sexually and psychologically abused for years. Although they asserted that they killed because they were in fear of their lives, some argued that their rage over the alleged secret of incest is what led them to kill (Hubbard, 2012). In stark contrast, the prosecution argued that the abuse was a myth and the brothers killed to inherit their parents’ estate valued at $14 million dollars (Heide, 2013c). Both men were convicted of two counts of first degree murder and are serving life sentences.

Interest in parricide cases is due in part to “cultural views about family and a general reluctance in modern society to place blame on children for norm-violating behavior” (Walsh & Krienert, 2009, p. 313). Parricide incidents like that of the Menendez brothers is one of the rarest types of parricide, those that include multiple victims (Heide, 2013c). The Menendez brothers’ case is classified as a double parricide, wherein both parents, whether biological, step, or adoptive, are slain by their offspring.

Multiple-victim parricide is a rare occurrence. Of the parricide offenders arrested in the United States during the period 1976-2007, only 7.8% of them were involved in the killing of multiple victims (Heide, 2013c). The percentage of stepparricide offenders involved in multiple victim killings was even smaller (4.3%). Very little is known about the phenomena of multiple-victim parricide. Previous analyses on parricide have been restricted primarily to single-victim, single-offender incidents and clinical case reports.
This study will focus on double parricide incidents involving a single offender and double parricide incidents involving multiple offenders. Using 20 years of data from the FBI’s National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), analyses will be conducted to determine characteristics of the victim(s), offender(s), and incidents. Furthermore, limitations of this study will be addressed, and suggestions/implications for future research will be discussed.

LITERATURE REVIEW

This section explored the literature on double parricide in order to better understand the dynamics of these phenomena. Several clinical evaluations were examined which provided limited information regarding the commonalities and differences within double parricide situations. Based on the prior literature, it was clear that assessment was critical as there was no single factor or pathway that led a son or daughter to engage in double parricide. While the literature suggested that the majority of adult double parricide offenders tend to suffer from a major mental illness, this factor was not always the case, as demonstrated. Consistent with literature on juvenile involvement in single-victim parricide, juvenile-perpetrated double parricides often involved a youth who killed as a means to ending neglect and abuse from their parents. Female-perpetrated double parricide was very rare and it was more likely that they killed with a male associate (Weisman, Ehrenclou, & Sharma, 2002).

METHODS

Data

Data for this study were drawn from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which is a part of the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program. Participating local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies collected data on each single crime occurrence, and NIBRS received these data from these agencies’ automated records systems. NIBRS produced more detailed and complete data than the other summary reporting systems. NIBRS collected offense information on 48 crimes known as Group A offenses, compared to the summary reporting system that collected offense information on eight crimes known as Part I offenses (FBI, 2009). In the summary reporting system, the “Hierarchy Rule” was used for multiple offense reporting (i.e., if one offender committed more than one crime at any instant, only the “highest” crime was reported). NIBRS, however, reported each crime as an offense within the same incident (FBI, 2009).

The most current data available indicated that as of 2007, 6,444 law enforcement agencies contributed NIBRS data to the UCR program. Data from those agencies were representative of 25% of the U.S. population and 25% of the crime statistics collected by the UCR system (FBI, 2009). The FBI has certified 31 state UCR programs for NIBRS participation (FBI, 2009).

Data from the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports (SHR) linked the victim-offender relationship only to the first victim killed. Since NIBRS data were coded to include every offense at every incident, this problem is eliminated. In other words, if a NIBRS incident reported three slain victims, the relationship of the victim to the offender was known for each of the victims and not just the first victim killed as with the SHR. These data were available for up to three
offenders; if an incident involved four offenders, data were only available for the first three offenders.

Dataset construction

For this study, 20 consecutive years of NIBRS data sets were merged in order to examine double parricide incidents (1991-2010). This procedure was done in SPSS using NIBRS Extract Files for each of the 20 years. The merging of these data sets yielded 56,641,941 incidents – this number included any reported incidents during those 20 years. A count variable was created in order to filter the incidents to only include incidents coded as homicide/non-negligent manslaughter. This process yielded a sample size of N=34,760 incidents.

Two variables were then created to determine if the victim was a parent or stepparent. Frequencies were run on these two variables to determine the number of parents and stepparents killed during the 20-year period. This process yielded a sample size of N=664 incidents wherein at least one parent was slain, and a sample size of N=138 incidents wherein at least one stepparent was slain.

Two separate datasets were then created to determine how many incidents of double parricide and double stepparricide occurred over the 20 years. This process was done using the “select cases” option in SPSS. Cases were selected based upon certain criteria, and SPSS then filtered through the cases and included only those cases that fit our request.

Sample

The double parricide data set consisted of 77 cases. In 60 of the double parricide incidents the killers acted alone; in the remaining 17 cases, one or more accomplices were involved. A summary of parent type victims across parricide groups is depicted in table 1.

Table 1. Summary of parent type victims across double parricide groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Mothers</th>
<th>Fathers</th>
<th>Stepmothers</th>
<th>Stepfathers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single-offender double parricide</td>
<td>N=95</td>
<td>N=49</td>
<td>N=32</td>
<td>N=4</td>
<td>N=10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple-offender double parricide</td>
<td>N=29</td>
<td>N=13</td>
<td>N=12</td>
<td>N=3</td>
<td>N=1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANALYSIS

Using SPSS, this study reported the frequencies and descriptive statistics of the double parricide incidents that occurred between 1991 and 2010 using data drawn from the NIBRS. All possible dyads were explored wherein at least one parent and one other person was slain by a single offender or multiple offenders.

RESULTS

The number of single and multiple offender double parricide incidents during the 20 year period was small, however, the information obtained from the analyses proved invaluable. There were 60 offenders involved in single-offender double parricide incidents, 35 of whom killed two
parent types. There were 17 incidents of double parricides and stepparricides committed by multiple offenders. Forty-seven offenders were involved in these 17 incidents, 27 of whom killed two parent types. Future research will examine the characteristics of the offspring and non-offspring offenders involved in each incident, as well as the characteristics of the parent type victims and non-parental victims, and types of weapons used in each incident.
REFERENCES


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Proceedings of the 2014 Meeting of the Homicide Research Working Group


The Changing Landscape Of Homicide:
Proceedings of the 2014 Meeting of the Homicide Research Working Group


Juvenile Gang Homicide
Alec Szalewski and Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller

Roland Chilton - Suggests looking at SHR or NIBRS data. Can tell gang-related because the “gangs” was checked on the reported form. Suggests they talk to police department to decide how they decide whether to check that the case is gang-related. Suggests to not concentrate strictly on juveniles.

Anthony Ciaglia – How does FBI define gangs? Start with existing procedures.

Dallas Drake – talk with gang homicide investigators and get their input. Law enforcement officers have been effective in cracking down on gangs. This has led to groups splintering and they become smaller groups. Police officers pull over cars with gang members from multiple groups. Power structure is so fractured and not really there anymore.

Christian Bolden – You won’t find a uniform definition of gangs. Every jurisdiction has its own. Just need to pick one. NIGS has a national youth gang survey. Contact different jurisdictions and however they define it is what they use. Might want to look just at specific locations instead of something overall. Huff and Barrows article goes through each state’s definitions. Subcultural theories are okay, but should look at more recent theories (e.g., multiple marginality; William Julius Wilson’s underclass theory). Look at Wilson’s work. Issue of gangs and networks is a debate in the field.

TJ Taylor – Suggests looking at state-level data as a starting point instead of NIBRS or national data.

Ladies’ Choice: Weapon Selection Among Solo Female Homicide Offenders
Mindy Weller and Sarah Ann Sacra

Paul Blackman – When discussing regions and firearms, doesn’t think lumping together all of the Western states will work. Need to break up the western states.

Anthony Ciaglia – Why solo female homicide? Did study of weapon use for robberies and found that the presence of accomplices increases prevalence that women will use firearms more often. They wanted to look at weapon use regardless of other offenders. Suggests they might want to consider this for future. Also suggests they look at the time period (e.g., day/night) and distinction between rural and urban.

Mindy and Sarah – Did both single offender/single victim and single offender/multiple victims. Data was problematic because it was only coded to the first victim.

Kathleen Heide – Look at patterns for all female offenders to see if they are the same. May find that juveniles and adults differ in weapon selection. Victims could be any age. Would take juveniles out. Findings may differ if restricted to adults only. Suggests four categories for victim-offender relationship: family (all but intimate-partner), intimate partner (e.g.,
boyfriend/girlfriend, spouse, and homosexual relationships), acquaintance, and stranger. Look and see if the findings differ based on relationship.

**Chris Rasche** – concurs with Kathleen’s recommendation of the four categories. Gun ownership by women has gone way up in the past decade. Might want to track that. May be a reflection of gun ownership versus women offenders. Check NRA for data. Also look at Wilbanks earlier study of female homicide offenders. A rich history of studies exist, not all statistical. Draw from these. Also check out Marvin Wolfgang’s work and Pauline Ternaskey’s work. Get citations from Chris.

**Dallas Drake** – where did you look for information on knife use? The medical examiner literature has a lot of information on knife use. Look up “wound patterns.” Missing from sociological and criminological literature. Issue with arson – women commit more arson homicides and oftentimes there are an unexpected number of victims.

**Amanda Farrell** – Rolled all infants into one. Suggests go back and look at neonaticide stuff. SHR has 3-4 different categories for those under the age of 1. At least 24 hours is coded as 1 year old.

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**Juvenile and Adult Involvement in Double Parricide in the U.S.:**

An Empirical Analysis of 20 Years of Data

Averi Fegadel and Kathleen Heide

**Christian Bolden** – were adopted and stepparents included? Limitations because of biological definitions. Consider issues from the literature about adopted child syndrome.

**Chris Rasche** – Originally defined as biological and stepparents. Need footnote to explain that stepparents are included.

**Claire Ferguson** – What about inlaws? Averi – there were no cases, but will check again. Was looking more at people raised versus marital relations. SHR lumped inlaws with other family. There is a code for mother-in-law in NIBRS, but the nature of the relationship is different.

**Vanessa Leggett** – In the case of a fire with multiple offenders, could it be that the fire was set to cover the true cause of death? One of problems with the data is they may check “fire” and later find out it was a cover up, but has already been marked. They are supposed to go back and change if this is the case but they often don’t. This can lead to errors in the data. May show both if it was clear that they were shot and stabbed, but not necessarily the case if they discover it later. May be that fire was not the cause of death at all. Suggest maybe a conspiracy between two people.

**Kim Davies** – data doesn’t indicate custodial parent or when they got married. Can’t control for that because they don’t know when the stepparent came in. Some of the stepparents are older and the child is likely no longer living in the household. Stepparents mostly killed by children 24 and under. Mostly stepparents killed by younger children, but they didn’t analyze because not enough data. Can’t know if they live with them. May have been the result of a conflict, and may not. Because of the nature of it there is no way to know. Could be an inheritance issue and they were killed because of a concern about getting the money.
**John Jarvis** – there may be a way to get at that. There is an indicator on the victim and offender segment to see if they are a resident of the same jurisdiction. Would be limited because still wouldn’t know if they are in the same household.

**Roland Chilton** – Include a summary of those who kill one or both parents and how those differ from other homicide offenders. Averi – my thesis also included this, just not in the presentation. Compared to general homicide offenders. Found that there were more whites in parricide incidents, victims tend to be older, fewer female offenders in general homicide than in parricide. Multiple offender parricides have more females involved than homicides in general.

**Amanda Farrell** – Future research should consider the socio-contextual issues in society (e.g., grandparents or other family members acting as parents). Consider same sex parents too. Check out Wade Meyers data on parricide – he’s done work on psychopathy but not on grandparents.

**Chris Rasche** – Census tells us that today more expanded families are living under one roof. There may be a way to look at increases and compare to changes in the family structure. Is there a code for legal guardian? SHR data and jurisdictions and went to newspapers to track down additional information. Then you could go back to the police agency but would get down to those. Do search and see what shows up in the newspaper accounts. A grant to do this would be ideal. They were restricted by the data set. Could only use what was convenient and available.

**Paul Blackman** – Any theories as to why these are skewed white? Only 35 states and not all report. Possibly more rural. Family structure in the black community could explain it. Could be that they have more respect for mom because of what she’s trying to do.

**Joakim Sturup** – any homicide suicides? Averi – None. Would differ if looking at parents who kill their children, but you don’t see a lot of children killing their parents. It is a rare instance (e.g., Adam Lanza). In Sweden, there are altruistic homicide suicide cases. In the literature on adult parricide offenders, you tend to see more serious mental illness, especially children that kill their mothers.
Life and Death in the Big Easy:
Homicide and Lethality in 21st Century New Orleans\textsuperscript{11}

Jay Corzine
Lin Huff-Corzine
Aaron Poole
University of Central Florida

James McCutcheon
University of Memphis

Sarah Ann Sacra
University of Central Florida

Although New Orleans has consistently tallied one of the higher homicide rates in the U.S. during the 21st century, often placing in the top five for cities with 250,000+ population, the number of killings per capita spiked after the widespread social dislocations wrought by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Until being overtaken by Detroit in 2012, New Orleans led the nation in urban homicide rates for several years, with an unparalleled rate of over 90 per 100,000 population in 2007 (Wellford, Bond, & Goodison, 2011). Although New Orleans’ homicide rate for 2012, 53 per 100,000 residents represents a decrease of almost 50 percent from this high point and the rate continued to decline in 2013, it is still approximately 10 times the homicide rate for the U.S.\textsuperscript{12}

The impetus for this study occurred in 2011 when the first author received a call from a reporter with the \textit{New Orleans Times-Picayune} who was seeking a comment on New Orleans’ Police Superintendent Ronal Serpas’ public statement that, overall, New Orleans was a safer city than Orlando (Maggi, 2011). This claim was surprising because the authors’ knew that Orlando typically has a low to moderate homicide rate for cities of a similar size. But, in fact, his statement is supported by a 2009 study that reported the overall violent crime rate in Orlando as 1197 per 100,000 compared to 777 per 100,000 in New Orleans (Wellford et al., 2011). New Orleans, in the 21st century, stands out as something of an anomaly, a major city with a very high homicide level but an overall low to moderate level of violent crime. Perhaps the Crescent City’s contemporary homicide problem can better be described as a lethality problem.

\textsuperscript{11} An earlier version of this paper was presented at a symposium, “Preventing Lethal Violence in New Orleans: Research & Analysis, A Roundtable Discussion,” held at Loyola University New Orleans, October 27, 2012.
Lethality is a term used mostly by violence researchers (Weaver et al., 2004). The concept recognizes that only a small percentage of violent encounters that could result in a death actually have a fatal outcome. The factors that affect the odds of a physical altercation resulting in a fatality are multiple, including the use of a firearm, the quality of emergency medical care, and the speed of ambulance service. It is important to note that several variables that affect lethality, e.g., the presence of a trauma center, do not increase violent crime but instead affect its outcome.

The purpose of this research is to apply the concept of lethality to contemporary New Orleans to determine if it can provide increased understanding of its homicide problem. Lethality is defined as the number of homicides divided by the number of homicides plus aggravated assaults in a given jurisdiction for a given time period. The resulting number varies from “0” to “1,” and is often multiplied by 100 to produce a rate-based measure. In this chapter we use the following formula to measure lethality:

\[
\text{Lethality Rate} = \frac{\text{Murders}}{\text{Murders} + \text{Aggravated Assaults}} \times 100
\]

Using this formula, the U.S. Lethality Rate during the past several years has hovered around 2, meaning that there have been approximately 2 homicides per 100 violent assaults that potentially could have produced a homicide.

**Lethal Violence in 21st Century New Orleans**

The demographics of homicide victims and offenders in New Orleans closely reflect those for most other large cities with young African-American and other minority males disproportionately involved in the transactions that lead to killings in the central cities of the Northeast, Midwest, and South. Wellford and his colleagues’ (2011) recent analysis of 200 New Orleans homicides occurring in 2009 and 2010 underscores the Big Easy’s similarities and differences from other cities that annually register high homicide counts. Of the 200 victims, 92 percent were Black; 86 percent were men, and over half were under 28 years old. Almost three-fourths, 73 percent, had a criminal record, with over two-thirds having a prior drug charge (Wellford et al., 2011, p. 11).

Overall, homicide offenders in New Orleans are drawn from the same segment of the population as the victims. Of the 102 known offenders, 97 percent were Black and 95 percent were male. Eighty-three percent had a prior criminal record; 58% had at least one drug arrest. Offenders were somewhat younger than victims, with half under 24 years old at the time of the killing.

Of the 200 homicide victims, 189 succumbed to “penetrating wounds,” i.e., that is they were shot or stabbed. Only 11 victims died of some other cause, e.g., a blunt object or the offender’s hands, fists, or feet, than a firearm or knife/cutting instrument.

**New Orleans Lethality Rates**

In the following two figures, we compare New Orleans to seven other cities. Baltimore, St. Louis, and Detroit are included in this group because they are the other three cities along with
New Orleans that consistently are among those with the five highest homicide rates. The inclusion of Orlando is obvious. New York and Philadelphia are large northern cities with low to moderate homicide levels. The Lethality Rates for 2010 in the eight selected cities are displayed in Figure 1. New Orleans’ Lethality Rate of 11.70 is amazingly high both *sui generis* and in reference to the other cities. Remember that the Lethality Rate for the U.S. is typically close to 2, and Baltimore’s Lethality Rate of 3.90, although second highest, is still one third that of New Orleans. At the low end of the distribution, Orlando’s rate of 1.01 is approximately one-half of that for the nation. These differences are important. An individual who is the victim of a serious violent assault is approximately 12 times more likely to die in New Orleans than in Orlando. The primary driver behind New Orleans’ high homicide rate for 2010 is not the overall level of violent crime, but its atypically high lethality rate.

![Figure 1: 2010 Lethality Rates for Selected Cities](image)

It is important to further investigate if New Orleans’ lethality rate of 11.70 is a one-year anomaly, a long-term characteristic of violence in the city, or reflective of the changes brought about by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Figure 4 presents the city’s lethality rates for each year between 1996 and 2010 with the exception of 2005. The immediate effect of Katrina in that year makes it very difficult to calculate a lethality rate (or any crime rate) that has much credibility because the true population figure is especially difficult to estimate.
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The first important finding from Figure 2 is that the 2010 Lethality Rate for New Orleans is not an outlier; the lowest recorded lethality rate, 5.41 in 1999, is significantly higher than the lowest rate recorded for any of the cities in Figure 3. During the earlier years, the city’s lethality rate varied within a narrow range of 5.41 in 1999 to 7.61 in 2000, and then rapidly spiked from 7.37 in 2001 to 10.75 in 2002. Except for a rate of 9.58 in 2007, it has remained above 10 for the past 10 years reaching a high of 13.11 in 2011. Notably, the sharp increase in New Orleans’ lethality rates occurred three years before Katrina.

The variance in lethality rates in New Orleans before and after 2001 makes a difference. The mean lethality rate for the earlier period, 1996 to 2001, is 6.70. For the later period, 2002 to 2013, it is 11.69. If the lethality rate for the early years was in effect for 2012, the city would have experienced 118 homicides for a rate of 32.44. Viewed from a different angle, 75 lives would not have been lost.

The Road Ahead

Our assessment at this point is that further investigations of New Orleans violence should focus on

- Gun use in serious assaults,
- The structure of the illegal drug trade, and
- The provision of emergency medical services for violent crime victims.
Notes

1. Homicides in New Orleans during the first six months of 2013 were down sharply from the 2012. A difficulty in calculating homicide rates for the city in 2005 and 2006 is the varying population estimates for these anomalous post-Katrina years, but there is a consensus that they increased significantly from that in 2004 (VanLandingham, 2007).

References


Distance Traveled in Homicides –
A Three Year Population-Based Study from Sweden

Joakim Sturup
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Background

There is a lack of Swedish studies on the geographical behavior in homicides and no studies has examined if there is any difference between offenders from different diagnostic groups. In short has a Swedish study reported that among offenders who underwent a forensic psychiatric evaluation at the department of forensic psychiatry in Stockholm had offenders with psychotic disorder many had committed the crime in near proximity to their home and travelled considerably shorter to the crime scene then other offenders (Sturup et al., 2012). The study was set up to investigate the differences in distance travelled in homicide offenders.

Material and methods

This is a consecutive study of all cases of homicide in Sweden between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 2009. All homicide victims (n=273; 9 double homicides) offenders (n=249) were identified through an official crime register and an administrative forensic pathology database. Data was collected from police files, court verdicts, forensic psychiatric and psychological evaluations conducted by the National Board of Forensic Medicine and the Prison and Probation Services. Coordinates for offender’s home, victim’s home and crime scene was used to calculate distance and reported in kilometers.

The term “homicide” refers to the Swedish legal concepts of ‘murder’, ‘manslaughter’, ‘infanticide’ and ‘(aggravated) assault and causing another’s death’. All in all there were 266 cases during the observed period, whereof seven included two victims, so called double homicides.

Data concerning presence or absence of mental disorder, and diagnoses, were collected from the forensic psychiatric evaluations through the register PsykBase, held by the National Board of Forensic Medicine. Psychiatric diagnoses were also collected from the Swedish Health register. Data were collected from police files, court verdicts, forensic psychiatric evaluations conducted by the National Board of Forensic Medicine and from the National reception unit at Kumla Prison at the Prison and Probation Services.

As offenders and victims in some cases lived irregular lives at the time of the crime, data on residency in national registers were not always accurate. Thorough searches in the material, e.g. interrogations, police investigations etc. were conducted to establish where the offender resided at the time of the crime. Coordinates were determined for the specific addresses using Google Maps. The same procedure was used to determine coordinates for crime scenes (except for when coordinates were already provided in the police files). Coordinates for offenders’
home, victims’ home and crime scenes were used to calculate Euclidean distances. Distances between coordinates were calculated with a web-based coordinate tool based on Vincenty’s formulae. Distance was reported in kilometres with an accuracy of one decimal, as a more narrow entity would be provided only in some cases, and therefore would not contribute to statistics.

Euclidean distance is found to be proportionate to street network distance (0.72 in studies by Chainey et al., 2001, replicated by Groff and McEwen). Euclidean distance is always the shortest, and gives less room for differences due to choices made by the person doing the measuring. We found it appropriate to use Euclidean distance as the offender’s haul was not known in most cases, and as it gave less room for variety in measurement. Mean, minimum, maximum, and SD were used for descriptive purposes. Non-parametric tests were used, as outcome data (distance travelled to crime scene) were highly skewed.

Results

The mean distance from the victims home to crime scene did not differ significantly comparing unsolved and solved homicides (3.2 vs. 23.1 km; p=ns) nor the share of victims killed in their homes (48% vs. 53%). Among the 72 individuals assessed with PCL-R, 20 fulfilled the criteria of psychopathy (28%), but there were no significant differences between travelled distance among psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders (9.9 vs.16.8 km). There were not any significant differences between under the influence of alcohol and drugs and those who were not under the influence (13.6 vs. 8.9 km). Most psychotic homicide offenders committed the crime within or in near proximity to where they resided (mean 0.7 km; median=0; p<.001), so did the offenders with Asperger’s syndrome (mean 10.3 km; median=0.05; p=ns) compared to homicide offenders without those diagnosis (mean 26.1 km; median=0.9).

Conclusion

Severe mental disorders do probably influence the ability for planning and carrying out a homicide may be an important factor when examining distance travelled in homicide offenders.

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Panel Session 4: Location-Based Homicides – Recorder’s Notes

Recorder: J. Amber Scherer, George Mason University


Joakim: Thinking about the typology, Marieke Liem has developed this typology and I like that one better. I am blown away about the findings of low filicide-suicide, in Sweden; we have a lot because the motive is revenge on the spouse. You left me, so I am taking the children and you have to live with it.

Chris Rasche: Police reports have to be taken with a grain of salt on this. Some police reports are very thin and I am not sure we know what the motive is.

Joakim: Also with staged homicides, there is a study in Sweden

Vanessa: There was a study in Houston, of staged homicides. It took years to prove. It was definitely a staged familicide, but it looked legitimate.

Ned: Are there any spatial and temporal patterns?

A: We haven’t really dug into that yet.

Paul: What sex were the two children who killed their neighboring parent?

A: Male

Christian: I’m just curious of any details on the cases that didn’t fit?

A: One example I can give is the case involving the 5 victims, that started off as an argument, which didn’t have any history of domestic violence. A couple was there, their kid was there, he went into the room and came out with a firearm and shot the other woman and her twins and daughter.

Christian: That doesn’t fit the disgruntled male category?

A: It’s hard to say, the ones that fit the disgruntled, looking for revenge category had a growing vendetta or a history of mental illness. The only thing we could see about that case was that the perpetrator had a history of offenses.

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Corzine, Huff-Corzine, Poole, McCutcheon, Sacra

Ned: What about potential category drift between aggravated assault and simple assault? A suggestion might be to create a second category to add simple assault.

A: The other thing in New Orleans is that you don’t see comparisons; robberies in New Orleans are much more likely to involve firearms

Joakim: What about hospital data?

A: That is hard to get because of HIPAA
Dwayne: Returning to the aggravated assault question, the one thing I became aware of is the culture of underreporting, the aggravated assault numbers depend on reporting to police.

A: I agree, I think that is also true for Orlando. Even if there was systematic under reporting, something happened in 2002.

Tim Keel: I agree; the issue is that they don’t trust the police; they don’t have to report it. They have the same problems as some of those other cities you talked about. Police have a tendency to under report, and instead of reporting a part I, they report something else.

Christian: This is anecdotal, take it with a grain of salt, in our classes we teach a lot of police officers. The Jefferson parish officers talk about this issue, with some confidence that it is accurate, they claim that NOPD gets so overwhelmed and they claim that they have a hierarchy of what to respond to and they just do not respond to assaults.

Chris Rasche: You could then compare to Detroit and response times

A: These are data that is not so easy to get, one of the reasons we can get it from New Orleans is that it is run by the city government and subject to FOIA

John Jarvis: Can it just be misclassification or does it have to be underreporting? If it is an aggravated assault where no injury occurred…

A: The problem is with many aggravated assault it does not make any different with about half of them, that is why when using response times we only look at cases where they are moving the victim from location

Kim Davies: Is there any data on type of weapon? Or type of firearm?

A: No, no data on that

Roland: Aggravated assault is particularly problematic, a fudge factor. The aggravated assault means that the weapon was present and not necessarily used.

A: None of these cities report to NIBRS

Roland: It would be interesting to look at arrest data for these cities. I think you are making too much out of aggravated assault, it’s the fudge factor. We heard the Chief in NO, he made it very clear that he didn’t give a damn about the UCR.

A: The best data for the 7 index offenses is homicide; number two is robbery, number three even though there is almost no research on it is auto theft. If New Orleans is undercounted aggravated assault, they are doing a great job of it. They do this better than anybody else, in terms of shifting what could be shifting what could be classified as aggravated assault into the simple assault category.

Roland: The year is important. You can’t look at last year, look at the trends of aggravated assault for the last 50 years and you will see it will change, it goes up and down. You can’t compare to other cities for just one year.

A: Sure, the important bar graph up here is the one that shows the significant high trends for New Orleans.
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Sturup & Kristiansson

Kathleen Heide: In Sweden when an offender commits a crime are they routinely evaluated by a psychiatrist?

A: Yes, 70% of those who do not attempt suicide and then if they are going straight to prison, they always go to reception where they are evaluated by a psychiatrist.

Ned: Keep in mind the following, distance to homicide is the result of other decisions that are made. We can analyze the distance but they do not start off by thinking about the distance. So, the distance is the function of the environment. In other words, in a small town the distance is going to be smaller than in say, Stockholm, a large city.

A: We think that in the rural areas, they travel longer

Ned: Yes, sure but I think you need to separate out Stockholm and other cities and then the rural areas. Then if you have the data on the relationships, you can break it down within. For example, someone who lives in the rural areas, probably has to drive. Someone in Stockholm can take the metro.

A: We actually have a guy, after each crime he sat on the bus all bloody, with a knife on him, and no one saw him.

Vanessa: You mentioned no substance abuse, but there were some psychotic homicides in there, do you count psychotropic meds?

A: No those were psychotic disorders.

Vanessa: So do you know if they were on meds?

A: No we do not have that data.
Examining Gang-Involved Homicide in New Orleans  
Christian Bolden & Rae Taylor, Loyola University

A Population-Based Study of Homicide-Suicide Offenders  
Joakim Sturup, National Board of Forensic Medicine Stockholm

Juvenile Gang Homicide Characteristics and Data Comparison  
Alec Szalewski and Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller, Lakeland College

A population-based study of homicide-suicide offenders  
Joakim Sturup

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Background  
Homicide followed by suicide, most often called homicide-suicide (hereafter H-S) is also known as murder-suicide, extended suicide or dyadic death, is rare compared to other major violent crimes but have extremely tragic outcomes and consequences. The definition of H-S differs between studies and the time between the homicide and the suicide has been operationalized from 24 hours to up to 30 days (Harper & Voigt, 2007; Liem, 2010). In this study is the definition of H-S a homicide offence followed by the offenders suicide within 24 hours and before or at the time for the arrest. The issue has drawn a lot scientific attention (Large, Smith & Nielsen, 2009; Liem, 2010) and in short has a recent and important review has in a most informative way summarized the occurrence of H-S (Large, Smith & Nielsen, 2009). Large and colleges conclude that H-S over time and different contexts 8% of all homicides and that the rate is reported to range from 0.01 to 1.33 per 100,000 inhabitants.

With a few exceptions is Swedish research on H-S scarce and the only population-based study, Lindqvist and Gustafsson (1995), examined the northernmost of Sweden during 1970 to 1981. The study found that H-S consisted in 10% of all homicides and that the rate of H-S was 0.2 per 100,000 inhabitants and that the rate of child H-S was 0.07 per 100,000 inhabitants. In a more recent study that examined spousal homicide offenders from 1990 to 1999, Belfrage and Rying (2004) reports that the rate of H-S was high. Twenty four percent of the spousal homicide
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offenders had committed suicide after the offence compared to 6% in the control-group who had killed a non-spousal victim, eg the risk were four-folded among the spousal homicide offenders. The spousal H-S offenders were more often of Swedish background, they were at mean 10 years older, were more often had an employed and were less often under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time for the offence (Belfrage & Rying, 2004). Concerning child homicides Somander and Rammer (1991) conclude that during 1971 and 1980 as many as 46% of interfamilial child homicide offenders committed suicide after the offence with a majority being biological fathers. More than 40% of these cases involved multiple killings and a majority used firearms to commit their killings. Further, Sturup & Granath (in press) report that there has been a considerable decline in child homicides from the 1990s to the 2000s and that the decline mostly consists of a reduction in child H-S cases. The study does not include any experimental analysis but hypothesis that the reduction may be partly be due to the increase in antidepressant medication.

Aims

The aims were to describe the homicide-suicide offenders in aspects of criminological and psychiatric background and to describe the offences and to classify the cases according to Liems (2010) and Harper and Voigts (2007) proposed typology.

Material and method

The study consisted in a case series of all homicide-suicide offenders in Sweden January 1 2007 to December 31 2009 (n=13). All police files and medico-legal autopsy reports were collected from the police departments and the National Board of Forensic Medicine.

Registers

Three national registers were used in the study; ToxBase, Criminal Register and the Patient Register. ToxBase is a forensic chemistry database administrated by the National Board of Forensic Medicine and is an administrative database at the Department of Forensic Chemistry in Linköping that serves the whole of Sweden concerning all toxicological tests at autopsies. The National Register for Criminal Convictions holds data on all convictions in Sweden since 1973 and is administrated at the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention and no case is erased from this register in the event of emigration or death (www.bra.se). The Patient Register is a national database holding information on all inpatient and outpatient contacts in Sweden but in this study only psychiatric data were used.

Results

Thirteen homicide-suicide offenders, all males, killed 15 victims, whereof three children. The cases consisted in 5.2% of all homicide offenders (13/249) and the rate was 0.05 per 100,000 inhabitants, based on the number of victims. The 13 offenders had a mean age of 50.2 years (sd=18.5; median 45 years; range 25 to 89 years) and more than half had previously been
in contact with the psychiatric services. Four had a previous conviction, whereof three of violent crimes. A majority of the offenders were not intoxicated by alcohol or any illegal drug at the time for the offence (7 of 13).

A majority of the victims were adult females (11 of 15) and the mean age of the victims was 42.4 years (median 36). Previous studies has reported an association between multiple victims and homicide-suicide offence and this were supported in this study as well with an OR of 5.9 (p<.05). Nine of the thirteen offenders were involved in serious marital conflicts before or during the offences, and this was also the most common motive and the most common method in both homicides and suicides were guns. Eight of the offenders could be classified in the Intimate partner H-S group according to Liem (2010), while the rest could be classified into familicide H-S (n=1), filicide H-S (n=1), extra-familial H-S (n=1) or other H-S (n=2).

**Discussion**

This population-based study with a mixed method, including both quantitative and qualitative aspects of H-S in Sweden shows that a majority of cases consists of intimate partner homicides which also are in line with previous research (Lindqvist & Gustafsson, 1995; Harper & Voigt, 2007; Large, Smith & Nielssen, 2009; Liem, 2010). On a theoretical base Harper and Voigt (2007; p. 311) conclude that: “Control and power dominance especially characterize the intimate or domestic lethal violence suicide cases”. Seen in this background and that in this study a majority of H-S offenders were male, killing a female (ex)spouse, and/or children to get back at a partner, the work lends to support the work of Harper and Voigt (2007) and Large et al (2009) that has proposed that H-S are closely related to domestic homicides, rather than suicide rates or overall homicide rates. Prevention measures, if possible, should therefore by aimed at high-risk groups for aggravated violence in the domestic sphere.

All H-S offences could be fitted in one of the type in the classification system proposed by Liem (2010). Even though more than half of the offenders had had contact with the mental health services at some point in life, the time mean since the latest contact were rather long (over four years). The qualitative case studies of the cases lends to support that most of the H-S cases are triggered by altercations in marital relationship or that the victim is planning or has already left the offender, but not always aimed directly towards the spouse but also a children or a rival. An interesting, and possibly related factor, is the notion that the rate of homicide by individuals with psychosis has decreased since the 1980-ties (Sturup & Lindqvist, 2014) which may be one of the reasons why so few of the H-S cases were committed by offenders with psychosis and other major mental disorders.
References


Drug Arrests and Homicide Rates: Exploring the Criminogenic Impact of the Drug War

Roland Chilton, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Homicide and Victimless Crime

The first slide in this presentation says that the discussion will focus on the following question. Have urban drug arrests and arrests for other victimless crimes kept homicide rates high for young black men? This is what I mean by exploring the criminogenic impact of the drug war. The term victimless crime in this context refers to crimes in which there are no identifiable victims. There are more complicated aspects to this simple notion, but perhaps the easiest way to see why drug law violations are victimless crimes is to look at the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). In NIBRS, officers responding to a call for service are not asked to provide an indication of the age, race, and sex of victims for five types of offenses. Drug law violations are one type of crime where this applies. Other offenses, which like drug law violations are called crimes against society, are gambling, prostitution, pornography, and weapon law violations. In all these situations, society is thought of as the victim.

This discussion is related to but different from the suggestions made in the early 1990s that drug use can sometimes cause crime pharmacologically, or it may be linked to crime because addiction and the cost of the drug cause some people to commit crime to get the drug, or because the demand for the banned substance makes providing it a lucrative business activity that leads to violent competition for markets or robberies of those selling the drugs. In this discussion I am focusing on the impact of the drug laws and their enforcement on homicide by young black men. I do not limit it to “drug war” violence.

The reason for focusing on this segment of the population is that, in the United States, 15 to 29 year old black men have had the highest homicide victim rates of any age-race-sex category for over thirty years, and because this seems like a good time to explore overlooked explanations for these persistently high rates. In the full presentation, a set of charts will show the persistence of these rates for Chicago, other U.S. cities, and for the United States as whole. My comments here are limited to the patterns for Chicago. Figure 1 shows the Supplementary Homicide Report (SHR) victim rates (per 100,000) by race and sex for four age categories from 1980 to 2010. For most of this period, homicide victim rates were low for those under 15 years of age and for those over 44. In addition to the under 15 race-sex categories, the rates remained relatively low for white women in all four age categories.
The Chicago homicide victim rate for 15-29 year old black men (Figure 1B) was over 200 per 100,000 from 1991 through 2004. It was again above 200 after 2008. No other category fluctuated at this level, although the 30 to 44 year old black male category rose to about 150 in 1992. It then leveled off at 100 per 100,000 for the second half of the thirty-year period. Chicago is a good place to start because like New York and Los Angeles it is one of the largest cities in the U.S. In addition, it has a more striking pattern of drug arrests than either of those cities.

Although not presented here, the patterns for a combined set of 84 cities suggested that the homicide victim rates of young black men were around 150 per 100,000 in 1980 and that, after rising to almost 250 per 100,000, they leveled off at about 150 per 100,000. In addition, the combined set of cities presented patterns showing the white female homicide victim rates were less than 5 per 100,000 for all four age categories. In general, the homicide victim and offender trends for young black men provide convincing evidence that the most salient aspect of homicide in the U.S. is the involvement of young black men as victims and offenders.

The patterns should indicate to anyone interested in understanding high homicide rates in the U.S. the importance of a focus on the 15 to 29 year old black male homicide patterns. In addition, the persistence of high homicide rates for this relatively small segment of the population should call attention to the need to go beyond asking about the possible impact of economic disadvantage on black homicide rates. It suggests that we need to explore the possible contribution of specific police practices when they are combined with the residential separation of black Americans.

Unequal Arrest Rates

I hope everyone realizes that I am not suggesting police misconduct or widespread racial or gender bias by the police when I suggest that a careful look at the procedures developed by police agencies to enforce what are essentially unenforceable laws will reveal selective and systematic unfairness. The four graphs in Figure 2 show the impact of standard procedures to enforce laws against prostitution in Chicago over a fifty year period. For the years before 1990, women and black residents were more likely to be arrested for prostitution than men or white Chicagoans (Figures 2A and 2B). Although the law makes it just as illegal to offer money for sex as to offer sex for money, the arrest rates for black and white women are generally higher than the same rates for black and white men, sometimes much higher. This inequality is not caused by police bias against women but by the procedures developed to enforce laws prohibiting prostitution.

However, gambling law enforcement makes the inequality inherent in laws creating victimless crime even clearer. At least it does this for those of us who were aware of widespread gambling activity in American cities before it became legal. As a teen-ager in Chicago in the 1940s and 50s, I was well aware of small time and large scale illegal gambling that occurred regularly. I was not very knowledgeable about the shadowy organization that provided a variety of gambling services. Nevertheless, it was pretty clear that those providing gambling opportunities were not black, just as it was very clear that a large segment of the white population gambled. This experience is what makes the rates of gambling arrests of black men in Chicago from 1960 to 1990 so questionable (Figure 3). The rise in gambling arrest rates for 15-29 year old black men from 1990 to 2008 is even more questionable (Figure 3B). Knowing what we
know about the attraction of white Chicagoans and white citizens in general to gambling, legal and illegal, it is simply illogical to suggest that black men were almost the only race and sex category in the city illegally gambling from 1960 to 1990. To me it is just as difficult to believe that young black men were the only people in Chicago engaged in illegal gambling from 1990 to 2010.

Clearly, the procedures developed to identify and arrest gambling law violators were and are flawed in some way. In my mind, these flaws developed because of bad law, not bad people. To be sure, if a society creates laws making it illegal to engage in activities that are not seen as immoral by a large part of the population, the ensuing demand will attract some bad people. But, with or without bad people, it will be impossible to enforce the law in a rational and evenhanded way. A law that requires seeing through walls, activities that border on entrapment, the extensive use of wire taps and undercover agents, and that must be enforced without a complaining witness is essentially unenforceable in a free society. Still, the police are expected to enforce these laws, and it should not surprise us if they develop procedures that produce unfair results. In my view, just as laws against prostitution led to the over-arrest of women, the laws against gambling led to disproportionate arrests of black men.

Still, our laws prohibiting the use or sale of a long list of mood altering substances had more impact on black men, especially those between 15 and 29, than laws against gambling or prostitution. The trends shown in Figure 4 are rates per 100,000 persons in the race-sex-age category shown. Not shown are the basic counts, which increased from about two thousand arrests in the early 1960s to over 55,000 drug arrests per year from 1997 to 2007. In 1998, 2000, and 2004 there were over 58,000 drug arrests in Chicago, and 79 to 80 percent of these arrests were arrests of black men. The drug arrest rates shown in Figure 4 indicate that drug arrests were low for all four under-15 race-sex categories (Figure 4A) and relatively low for all 45 and over race-sex categories. It is the pattern of drug arrests for 15 to 29 year old black men that are so striking, whether we focus on the number of arrests or arrest rates.

A frequent reaction to charts showing arrest trends is to suggest that they raise more questions than they answer. This is true, and I want to use the charts to raise some of these questions. Moreover, I want to suggest some possible answers to the questions as a way of exploring possibilities we rarely consider. For example, how could arrest procedures that produce massive, disproportionate arrests of young black men keep the homicide rates for those in this category high?

One way to ask this question might be to ask how drug rates are linked to homicide rates for Chicago. One possible answer is that the drug arrests were a response to the overall homicide rates and that members of the Chicago Police Department believed that by increasing the arrests of young black men for drug law violations they could keep the homicide rate relatively low. Looking only at the overall homicide arrest trend might suggest that this tactic was working. And some might even see this as support for “broken windows theory.” However, the 15 to 29 year old black male homicide rates did not drop after 1991. Unlike the overall rates, they went up slightly and remained high for a decade or more (Figure 1B). The pattern may raise some puzzling questions, but it cannot be used to suggest that increasing drug arrests of 15 to 29 year
old black men helped lower the homicide victim rate for young black men because the young black male homicide victim rate did not drop as arrests of young black men on drug charges rose.

Another possible approach to the question about the linkage of drug rates to homicide rates in Chicago is to suggest that massive arrests on drug charges and other victimless crime make the lives of those arrested more difficult. The resulting early and perhaps lengthy arrest records may reduce employment and marriage prospects and may have encouraged illegal or high risk activities. In addition, the drug arrests may have increased involvement in commercial aspects of drug activity, increased street contacts, and aligned them with existing street gangs or led them to form new gangs. I am not suggesting that it is the impact of the drug arrests alone that produce these results because the impact of the arrest records are aided by the continuing isolation of Chicago residents by race, ethnicity, and income. There were disproportionately high black homicide rates in Chicago before the drug war, but the enforcement of drug laws may be responsible for raising and continuing the high homicide rates for young black men.

Finding empirical evidence to support this kind of explanation will not be easy. Nor will support for other explanations that might be offered for the victim, offender, and arrest trends shown. But support for better explanations than those usually presented will be impossible if we continue to use overall homicide rates and ignore race-sex-age specific rates. The questions raised by the disaggregated rates suggest that we need to pay more, not less, attention to trends in the rates for the most salient segment of the population. Using a newer, more focused homicide measure, some variables reflecting the results of police policies, together with a set of traditional variables, should help us find more convincing explanations for the persistent patterns we see in homicide trends.
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Figure 1. SHR Victim Rates by Race and Sex for Four, Age Categories, Chicago, 1980-2010 (Three Year Averages)

A. Under 15 Years Old

B. 15 to 29

C. 30 to 44 Years Old

D. 45 Years Old or Older

Figure 2. Prostitution Arrest Counts and Rates for Four Race-sex Categories, Chicago, 1960-2010

A. Prostitution Arrests

B. Prostitution Arrests

C. Prostitution Arrest Rates

D. Prostitution Arrest Rates
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Figure 3. Gambling Arrest Rates by Race and Sex for Four, Age Categories, Chicago, 1960-2010

A. Under 15 Years Old

All Four Race-Sex Categories Are Low

B. 15-29 Years Old

Black Male Arrest Rate

C. 30 to 44 Years Old

Black Male Arrest Rate

D. 45 to 99 Years Old

Black Male Arrest Rate

Figure 4. Drug Arrest Rates by Race and Sex for Four, Age Categories, Chicago, 1976-2010

A. Under 15 Years Old

All Four Race-Sex Categories are Relatively Low

B. 15-29 Years Old

Black Male Arrest Rate

Three Other Race-Sex Categories Below

C. 30-44 Years Old

Black Male Arrest Rate

D. 45 Years Old & Older

Black Male Arrest Rate
Examination of Recidivism Patterns among Two Types of Juvenile Homicide Offenders: Preliminary Results

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Juvenile homicide has been a matter of serious concern in the United States since the 1980s. Between 1984 and 1993, the number of juveniles arrested for murder increased every year, until reaching the highest number of arrests on record in 1993 (Heide, 1999). Although the rate of juvenile-perpetrated homicide has been somewhat declining since the mid-1990s, it remains a serious problem; individuals under the age of 18 accounted for almost 10% of 9,775 homicide arrests in 2009 (Heide, Sepowitz, Solomon, & Chan, 2012). Despite the fear generated by these young killers, very little is known about their long-term recidivism patterns.

A recent United States Supreme Court case increased the need for studying the post-release experiences of juvenile homicide offenders (hereinafter, JHOs). In Miller vs. Alabama (2012), the Court struck down mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for juveniles who committed murder. This ruling will likely result in a higher proportion of JHOs being released back into society in the near future. Accordingly, it is important to have empirical data regarding how these individuals fare in society upon release from incarceration.

The current study was designed to compare post-release outcomes between two groups of JHOs: those who committed murder or attempted murder during the commission of another crime (e.g., robbery, burglary) and those who were involved in a homicidal incident due to some type of conflict (arguments with friends, acquaintances, strangers, etc.). This typology by Cornell, Benedek, and Benedek (1987) included a third type of JHOs—those who committed homicide in a state of psychosis. This subgroup is not represented in our sample of JHOs.

Review of the Literature

The typology by Cornell and colleagues was examined in a Canadian study by Toupin (1993). Follow-up data were presented for a sample of 43 JHOs, who were selected from police and youth court records, as well as records from a psychiatric hospital and several residential treatment centers. The homicide offenders were compared to a control sample of property offenders. The follow-up period was approximately seven years.

The researcher found that the 23 conflict-oriented JHOs recidivated on a smaller scale—in terms of any offenses, violent offenses, and serious offenses—compared to the 18 crime-oriented JHOs, as well as the control group. The current study differs from Toupin’s study in that the offenders in the Canadian study were released from a variety of institutional settings, and not strictly prisons.
To date, there have been four studies that have analyzed juvenile homicide recidivism in moderate to large samples following their release from secure institutions. In three of these studies, JHOs were placed in juvenile correctional facilities (Hagan, 1997; Vries & Liem, 2011; Trulson, Caudill, Haerle, & DeLisi, 2012). In the remaining study, JHOs were incarcerated in adult prisons (Heide, Spencer, Thompson, & Solomon, 2001). Hagan (1997) tracked 20 male offenders who were convicted as juveniles of a completed homicide or attempted homicide, and were released back into society in the late 1970s and 1980s. The follow-up period ranged from five to 15 years. Hagan found that none of the offenders had committed another homicide, but that 60% of them had recidivated, and 58% of recidivists had committed another violent act. Additionally, half of the sample received new prison sentences. The author noted that there was no significant difference between the sample of JHOs and a control sample of non-homicide juvenile offenders in relation to post-release criminal activity.

In a follow-up study that investigated recidivism using the same sample that is examined in the present study, Heide and colleagues (2001) followed-up on a sample of 59 male JHOs who were committed to adult prison between 1982 and 1984. This study relied on Department of Corrections (DOC) data to track the commitment, release, and recommitments of the subjects. The follow-up period ranged from 1 year to 16 years.

The researchers found that 43 of the 59 offenders in the sample were released from prison, and that 60% of those who were released received new prison sentences. Eighty percent of the recidivists in the sample reoffended shortly after release (within the first three years after release). The authors emphasized that due to the conservative measure of recidivism employed—return to prison—the percentage of recidivists was likely higher than the 60% reported in the study.

Vries and Liem (2011) conducted a follow-up study of 137 Dutch JHOs, 85% of whom were male and 15% were female. The offenders in this study constituted all the juveniles convicted of homicide between 1992 and 2007 in the Netherlands. The follow-up time frame ranged from 1 year to 16 years.

During the entire follow-up period, more than half of the sample (59%) committed additional offenses after release from incarceration. Three percent of all recidivistic offenses were either completed (two offenses) or attempted (16 offenses) homicides. The authors reported that recidivism outcomes were predicted by three static risk factors (being male, criminal history, and low self-control) and two dynamic risk factors (association with delinquent peers and substance abuse). Surprisingly, substance abuse decreased the likelihood of recidivating.

Trulson and colleagues (2012) examined whether juveniles who committed gang-related homicides were more likely to recidivate than other types of juvenile offenders. Their sample consisted of 1,804 serious and violent male juvenile offenders, who were both incarcerated and released from a large Southern juvenile correctional facility between the years 1987 and 2004. One hundred and twenty six of those offenders were convicted of a gang-related homicide, and 338 of them were convicted of a non-gang-related homicide and were referred to as general homicide offenders. The follow-up period was three years.
The results indicated that juvenile gang murderers were more likely to be arrested again and be arrested for a felony offense, in relation to general homicide offenders and non-homicide offenders. However, juvenile gang murder was not related to the frequency of new arrests. Furthermore, when compared to non-homicide offenders, general homicide offenders were more likely to be arrested for a new felony offense.

The review of the existing literature revealed that follow-up studies of juveniles involved in murder have been few in number and limited to 16 years or less. The present study builds on these previous works by examining a cohort of JHOs approximately 30 years after their incarceration in prison, the longest available follow-up period to date.

Methodology

The sample in this study consists of 59 JHOs from a Southeastern state who were charged as adults with either first degree murder, second degree murder, or attempted murder, and convicted and sentenced to prison in the early 1980s (Heide, 1999). The sample was identified through a computer search performed by the state DOC. The following inclusion criteria were used in the selection process:

1) Male (due to their disproportionate representation among juvenile killers);
2) Under the age of 18 at the time of the homicidal incident;
3) Processed through the adult criminal justice system;
4) Sentenced as an adult, and received by the Department of Corrections between January 1982 and January 1984;
5) Incarcerated in the Department of Corrections less than a year at the time they were identified by the computer search; and
6) 19 or younger at the time of the initial interview.

In-depth psychosocial interviews were conducted with the offenders. Additionally, extensive record data were collected about them, including police reports, prior offense history, substance abuse history, probation department reports, court documents, sentencing information, and DOC records.

Selection Criteria for Present Study

The original homicide police reports were reviewed in order to distinguish between the two types of homicides. A homicide event was classified as crime-related if there was clear evidence of criminal motivation at the beginning of the incident. Both felonies and misdemeanors fit the criteria for this category. In contrast, a homicide was classified as conflict-related if there was clear evidence of a direct conflict between the offender and the victim.

Sample Description

The crime group consisted of 43 offenders, representing 32 homicide incidents. Crime-related offenses included 25 robberies, four home burglaries, one vehicle burglary, one sexual assault, and one case of male prostitution. Nine (21%) of the offenders in this group acted alone.
Fourteen (33%) of them were White and 29 (67%) were Black. At the time of their homicide arrest, these 43 JHOs were between the ages of 14 and 18, with an average of 16.1 years of age.

The conflict group consisted of 16 offenders, representing 15 homicide incidents. The homicides in this group stemmed from conflicts with acquaintances (five incidents), strangers (four incidents), family members (three incidents), and friends (three incidents). Twelve (75%) of these offenders acted alone. Seven (44%) of them were White and the remaining nine (56%) were Black. Racial differences in percentages between the two groups were not significant ($\chi^2 (1) = .637, p = .425$). Conflict group offenders were between the ages of 15 and 17 at the time of their homicide arrest, with an average of 16.1 years of age.

Follow-Up Data and Statistical Analysis

Arrest and incarceration data spanning approximately 30 years were provided by the DOC, presenting recidivistic behavior by the offenders up to December 2012. Cross-tabular analyses were utilized in order to test for significant relationships between homicide circumstances (hereinafter, “Cornell crime type”) and the following variables: release from prison, number of post-homicide arrests, and number of post-homicide violent offenses. The variables that represented arrests and violent offenses were originally continuous, but were re-coded for the purpose of these analyses. Additionally, the Bonferroni method was employed to analyze the relationship between Cornell crime type and each individual value of the dependent variables.

Results

Out of the 59 JHOs in the sample, 10 have never been released from prison for the homicide conviction and five are known to be deceased. Table 1 displays the cross-tabular analysis between Cornell crime type and release from prison. The relationship between the two variables was not significant, as indicated by the Chi Square statistic and the Bonferroni method, meaning that the type of murder committed (crime vs. conflict) was not significantly related to whether an offender was released from prison.

Complete post-release data were available for 37 released offenders; 24 of them were in the crime group and 13 were in the conflict group. Follow-up data showed that 33 of the 37 JHOs for whom data were available had been rearrested after their release from incarceration. Twenty-three of the recidivists had been rearrested for violent offenses, which included two completed homicides and one attempted homicide, various types of robberies (e.g., armed, strong-arm), several sexual assaults, aggravated assaults, armed burglaries, among many others. As shown in Table 2, the highest number of new arrests was 29 ($M = 7.11, SD = 7.355$) and the highest number of violent offenses was 23 ($M = 3.16, SD = 4.375$).
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TABLE 1. Release from Prison by Cornell Crime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never Released from Prison</th>
<th>Cornell Crime Type</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crime (%)</td>
<td>Conflict (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>8 <em>a</em> (18.6%)</td>
<td>2 <em>a</em> (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>35 <em>a</em> (81.4%)</td>
<td>14 <em>a</em> (87.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Not significant</em> Chi</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>43 (100%)</td>
<td>16 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Square/Bonferroni factor Note: $\chi^2 (1) = 0.309, p = .578$

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Arrest Total and Violent Offenses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Number Of Arreasts</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7.11</td>
<td>7.355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Number Of Violent Offenses</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>3.16</td>
<td>4.375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cross-tabular analyses between Cornell crime type and the remaining dependent variables are presented in Tables 3 and 4. Inspection of Table 3 reveals that the two groups did not differ significantly in terms of the number of arrests. The “a” subscripts signified that there was no significant difference between Cornell crime type values for any of the values on the dependent variable. However, it is interesting to note that approximately 38% of the crime group offenders were rearrested nine or more times; in contrast, the same percentage of conflict group offenders were rearrested either zero or one time.

Similarly, as shown in Table 4, no significant difference emerged between the two groups with respect to the number of violent offenses. Notably, the majority of offenders in both groups either did not commit any violent offenses or committed four or more violent offenses.
Table 3. Total Number of Arrests by Cornell Crime Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cornell Crime Type</th>
<th>Crime (%)</th>
<th>Conflict (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total (%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>10 (^a) (41.7%)</td>
<td>4 (^a) (30.8%)</td>
<td>14 (37.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (^a) (4.2%)</td>
<td>2 (^a) (15.4%)</td>
<td>3 (8.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 (^a) (12.5%)</td>
<td>3 (^a) (23.1%)</td>
<td>6 (16.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 or more</td>
<td>10 (^a) (41.7%)</td>
<td>4 (^a) (30.8%)</td>
<td>14 (37.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24 (100%)</td>
<td>13 (100%)</td>
<td>37 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Not significant Chi Square/Bonferroni factorNote: \( \chi^2 (3) = 2.420, p = .490 \)

**Discussion**

The results presented in this study were preliminary; the authors are expecting to receive data on 10 other released offenders. The findings to date indicate, however, that homicide circumstances (i.e., crime vs. conflict) had no effect on general post-release recidivism or violent recidivism, so the preliminary findings did not provide support for this juvenile homicide typology. The findings are inconsistent with the follow-up study by Toupin (1993), who did observe significant differences between crime-oriented offenders and conflict-oriented offenders.

There are several possible explanations for the discrepancy in results between the two studies: first, the follow-up period in this study was much longer (30 years vs. seven years). It is possible that the differences in reoffending patterns between the two groups in this study simply disappeared over time. Second, the sample in Toupin’s study was collected from a variety of institutional settings, such as prison and treatment facilities, whereas the sample in the present study only included JHOs who were incarcerated in adult prisons. Therefore, the inconsistent results could be a product of differential experiences during confinement. Third, the offenders in Toupin’s study were all from the Quebec province in Canada, whereas the offenders in the present study are all from one U.S. state; cultural differences between the two samples could have contributed to the nature of the findings.

The preliminary findings have several implications. First, the fact that almost 90% of JHOs who had been released from incarceration recidivated is troubling, indicating that prison does not have a deterrent effect and suggesting that treatment and rehabilitative programs are not
adequate for JHOs in adult prisons. Second, our research so far indicates that, in contrast to what Cornell, Benedek, and Benedek (1987) predicted, crime-oriented JHOs do not represent a greater risk to society than their conflict oriented counterparts. Third, since there was no difference in recidivism outcomes between the two groups, there is no indication that crime- and conflict-oriented JHOs should be exposed to different levels of treatment during incarceration (provided that treatment programs are even available). It would seem that both groups need rehabilitative and re-entry assistance. Lastly, in the context of the Miller v. Alabama case, the findings suggest that homicide circumstances have no effect on whether a JHO will be granted an early release from prison.

**Limitation and Future Research**

The small sample in this study was from a single U.S. state, so the findings cannot be generalized to the overall incarcerated juvenile homicide population in the United States. Future studies should be conducted with larger, nationwide samples in order to produce more generalizable conclusions about JHOs. Also, future U.S. studies should investigate recidivism with respect to crime- and conflict-oriented JHOs from multiple institutional settings, including treatment facilities, to examine whether there is an institutional effect on post-release outcome in the context of this typology.

The arrest data used in this study may not have revealed the true extent of recidivistic behavior for the two groups of JHOs. Qualitative studies need to be designed in order to gain a deeper understanding of how these offenders fare after release from prison, in terms of recidivism and also non-legal aspects of life, such as employment and marriage.
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References


The current study of staged suicides was undertaken as part of a larger study involving many different types of staged homicides. The goal of the main analysis was to identify common behaviors carried out by offenders staging death scenes and to examine the details of these types of behaviors. It was hoped that this would allow the authors to offer some guidelines to investigators on what to look for in these scenes. Analysis of this suicide sub-sample sought to determine what elements of the crime would most often be staged when the scene is staged to appear as a suicide, rather than a homicide, accidental death, or whatever else. The study addressed the questions:

1. What types of victim and offender relationships are most common in staged suicides?
2. How are staged suicides most commonly perpetrated by offenders? Are they premeditated and what are the common causes of death?
3. Is the frequency of staged suicide cases increasing across time, as proposed by Hazelwood and Napier (2004), and Geberth (1996)?

Methods

In order to empirically examine crime scene staging in supposed suicide cases, a sample of staged homicide case files was drawn from the legal database Westlaw. The sample included case files of all staged homicides, which could be located, spanning the 24 years between 1973 and 2007. In these files, the facts of the case were presented in the ‘Factual Summary’ or ‘Background’ as determined by the Judge/Jury in the process of convicting the offender, and assessing their appeals. These facts are those deemed admissible by the trial Judge, therefore some details may not have been heard by the jury, and thus not included in this analysis. No access was available to primary materials such as police reports, crime scene photographs and so on.

An initial sample of 215 cases was found and further scrutinized. Only those cases involving a homicide where an expert opined about the presence of staging, or the offender confessed to staging the scene were included. In cases involving expert witnesses, they either opined directly about the presence of staging, or about inconsistencies between the physical evidence and the way the scene presented which met the definition of staging used herein. For example, in some cases the scene presented as if the victim had shot themselves (such as by a handgun being found in their grasp at the death scene and the existence of a supposed suicide note) but the forensic pathologist found that the victim was killed with a shotgun blast to the head from a significant distance. In this case the expert opined to cause of death and the presence of staging was inferred by the author based on the described presentation of the scene.

In cases involving confessions, it was necessary for the offender’s admission to comport with the physical evidence as presented in the known facts of the case. Those cases where a
detective or other investigator themselves opined, as a fact witness, as to staging behaviors were excluded, as were those with confessions which did not comport with the known facts of the case. Final inclusion into the sample of 115 staged homicide cases was determined solely by the author, and in no cases did her opinion differ from the verdict of the court, nor the opinions of the prosecution experts where present. In all cases, the confession or the expert opinion outlining the staging behaviors carried out was accepted by the court, and led to a conviction. The author is not aware of any case where the conviction has since been overturned on appeal; where there was a miscarriage of justice related to factual innocence; or where there was a false confession.

The total resultant sample of the main analysis included 115 staged homicide cases. The research was aimed at determining the common elements of the offenses, characteristics of the victim and the offender, and the evidence staged by the offender. Several questions within each domain were asked, producing a number of variables. Within **Offender Characteristics** there were: number of offenders, sex of offenders, and law enforcement involvement. **Victim Characteristics** included: number of victims, age, sex, and relationship to offender. **Crime Characteristics** included: victim discovery, cause of death, availability of weapons, motive, overkill, confrontation, and case type (confession/expert). For **staged elements** the variables included: type of staging, point of entry/exit, valuables taken, personal items taken, weapon arrangement, transportation of deceased, fire-setting to the scene or body, body arrangement, fake notes, drugs planted, simulated self-injury, telephone/lighting manipulation, ransacking, staged bloodstains, clean up, mutilation of the body, self-injury of offender, and alibi.

**Discussion**

The prevalence of staged suicides seems to be increasing according to this sample. In the decades prior to 1990 (1974-1979 and 1980-1989) there were only 2 cases identified by this sampling approach, whereas from 1990 to 1999 there were 4 cases, and from 2000 to 2007 there were an additional 10 cases. This finding may not be due to an actual increase, but an improvement in investigator’s ability to identify these scenes, possibly based on advances in forensic science. This finding may also be based on the sampling method used, where perhaps prior to 1990 experts were not used or staged cases were called something else. On the other hand, this finding may also show that offenders are becoming more likely to carry out these behaviors in an effort to not be apprehended. This could potentially be a further outcrop of the CSI effect, as it is possible that offenders, jurors, and the public are equally exposed to media portraying forensic techniques (as predicted by Geberth (1996) and Hazelwood and Napier (2004)). In the United Kingdom, Prainsack and Kitzberger (2009) discovered that offenders they interviewed believed new forensic techniques would lead to their capture more easily, and that their previous techniques for evading capture would no longer be successful.

**Red Flags for Staged Suicides**

**Firearms.** Staged suicides in the USA most often involved a firearm. This is likely not much help to investigators, as one of the most common weapons for true suicides was a firearm between 1985 and 2004 (Barber, n.d).

**Asphyxiation.** As a large number of the victims in this study were female, it is important to note that real suicide trends may be changing, and that for females the most common
mechanism for suicide between 2002 and 2006 was poisoning (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), 2002-2006). Although in this sample ‘suicides’ by firearm were most common, deaths involving strangulation were a close second. Deaths by hanging or suffocation happened more often in the small staged sample than the much larger CDC sample of true suicides. Therefore, the use of a firearm by a female, or the supposed hanging or asphyxiation death of either a male or a female may be viewed as a potential red flag for staged suicides.

**Relationships.** The relationship between the victim and offender was often friends or non-domestic family members in the supposed suicide, along with domestic relationships. This is an interesting finding as traditionally staged scenes have been thought to involve mostly intimate or domestic partners. Indeed, very little literature addresses other known individuals aside from domestic partners, with the exception of Schlesinger and colleagues (2012). Although not a red flag for staging, the prevalence of other relationships may be helpful in resolving these cases after the staging has been properly identified.

**Discovery.** The findings suggest that when investigating possible staged suicides, investigators should be wary of victims being discovered by friends or non-cohabiting family members. In Turvey’s study (2000) the offender was most likely to ‘discover’ the victim. Although this was also the case here, discovery of the staged suicide victim was much more evenly distributed across offenders as well as their friends, acquaintances, and the like. If a cohabiting partner should have been present to discover the victim of a supposed suicide, or should have been concerned about their whereabouts or welfare but was not, this would certainly be a red flag to investigators.

**Valuables.** Valuables were removed from the staged suicide scene in five cases (31.3%) and in another two cases non-valuable personal items belonging to the victim or scene were removed by the offender. This is significant as it would not be expected in a legitimate suicide and could be offered as a reliable red flag to investigators.

**Body/Weapon Arrangement.** Weapons were almost always arranged at these scenes to give the appearance of a suicide. The body was not often transported away from the primary scene but was re-arranged or re-positioned at the primary scene of the homicide. Investigators should therefore take note of any indication that a weapon or the body has been re-arranged or re-positioned post or peri-mortem as indicated by movements through blood, positioning of clothing and hair, inconsistent livor or rigor mortis, and the like. This having been done during resuscitation efforts should, of course be ruled out.

**Planning.** In terms of how the weapon came to be about at the scene, Douglas and Munn (1992) and Douglas and Douglas (2006) predicted that weapons would often be those of opportunity. This was supported by the current findings. This also speaks to the planning or lack thereof in these homicides, where the available weapon and evidence of a confrontation before the fatal violence indicate potential spontaneity. The lack of an attempt to establish an alibi in these cases lends credence to an absence of preplanning. Certainly failing to utilize suicide notes or other elaborate behaviors also speaks to the sophistication of these efforts or the thoroughness of the offender’s preplanning, should any have been present.
Suicide Notes. Writing a fake note was not a usual behavior for the offenders in these staged suicides, although this may be in light of the fact that some are aware of forensic techniques in handwriting comparison. This could also be due to the likelihood of these homicides being spontaneous and unplanned, and therefore a suicide note may not have been feasible due to time constraints or panic.

Confrontation. In this sample violence was likely to happen during a physical or verbal argument between the parties. Evidence of a confrontation before the death is thus a red flag which could be easily evidenced by over-turned furniture, witness reports of yelling or perceived conflict, or other physical or behavioral indicators as the case may dictate.

Clean Up. Some authors mention that evidence of, and any attempts to clean up or destroy signs of the actual events would be common (Svensson & Wendel, 1974). This too was supported here, although only partially, as nearly half the cases did not involve the destruction of evidence and attempts to clean up. Clean-up is also potentially a red flag then, and may be easy to spot. Any evidence of tidying up, the smell of cleaning products, missing bedding or carpet, recent renovations and so on should raise suspicion.

Experts. In this sample, staged suicides often involved experts opining that the death was a homicide rather than a suicide (43.8%) and thus the presence of staging. This finding highlights the important role that a forensic pathologist may play. Experts of this nature generally opined not only on the manner of death, but also the tendency for the offenders to attempt to simulate self-injuries to the victims by applying hesitation marks, or gunshot wounds to areas such as under the chin, the temple, or the chest. In 75 percent of cases the victim’s body was not mutilated after death, meaning that these supposedly self-inflicted wounds were perpetrated before the victim died. It could be that the offender planned on inflicting these wounds prior to death. More probably, it may be that having shot the victim in the head or strangled them the offender believed that a plausible option to cover up the homicide may have been to stage a suicide as opposed to some other type of scene.

The fact that half of the staged suicide cases involved confessions by the offender also speaks to the power that determinations made by medical experts and detectives have when combined. Often these confessions happened as a result of the suspect being confronted with the inconsistencies discovered in the criminal investigation and the autopsy. When asked to respond to the mismatch between the alleged facts of the case as reported by the suspect and the findings of these investigators, half confessed to their involvement. No doubt these confessions are helpful to resolving the case, as they may answer many of the unknowns regarding the motive, victim, and offender. They may also lead to more timely and less expensive adjudication of the matter before the court when guilty pleas are entered.

Conclusion

When investigators do not consider the possibility of staging early in an investigation the chance of resolving the staged case is greatly diminished. This can happen if investigators are unfamiliar with how a staged scene presents. An increase in the number of staged suicides in this sample between 1990 and 2007 may mean that investigators are getting better at identifying
staged elements, or that improvements in forensic detection through physical evidence are allowing for better and more accurate inquiries. However, this increase may also indicate that more offenders are choosing to stage homicides as suicides. If this is true investigators need to continue to learn more about staged scenes in order to identify them accurately. While there are indicators investigators may rely upon as red flags, there is still no objective test through which to identify staged efforts. This study, while relatively small in scope, will hopefully assist investigative efforts by highlighting new, empirically based, lines of inquiry.
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References


In Cold Blood: A Comparison of Native American and Black Homicides

Kayla Ward, University of Central Florida

According to the Centers for Disease Control, violence is a leading cause of death in the United States. However, it is particularly a concern for American Indians and Alaskan Natives or Native Americans. Between 1979 and 1992, 2,324 Native Americans were homicide victims (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Between 1990 and 1992, homicide was the ninth leading cause of death for all Native Americans (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Between 1979 and 1986, homicide rates amongst Native Americans were twice that of the United States rates, and they continued to exceed the national average throughout the remainder of the study (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). For Native Americans under the age of sixty-five, homicide was the third leading cause of death between 1990 and 1992 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). The causes proceeding homicide for Native Americans under sixty-five were unintentional injury and heart disease. Lastly, during 1990-1992, homicide was the second leading cause of death for girls 1-4 years old and the third leading cause for girls 15-34 years old (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).

Most research on the topic of homicide in regards to race has focused on either white offenders or victims or African American offenders or victims, most likely due to the higher prevalence of these homicides in the United States. Additionally, Native Americans are one of the smallest minority populations, and they are slightly secluded from the general population so they are often overlooked. The 2010 U.S. Census Bureau reports that there were approximately 2.9 million people who identified solely as Native Americans living in the United States, which equates to roughly 1 percent of the United States’ total population. Conversely, those who identified solely as white comprised 72.4 percent of the population, or 223.5 million, and those who solely identified as black comprised 12.6 percent of the population, or 38.9 million. As previously stated though, Native American homicides exceed the national average, which leads to an interest in further researching this population’s homicide offenses.

This study proposes to look at Native American homicide offenders in the United States. It aims to compare black and Native American homicide offenses. It gathers data from the 2011 Supplementary Homicide Reports from the Uniform Crime Report (United States Department of Justice). Knowing how these variables interact will grant a better understanding of Native American homicide offenses and show how they differ from black homicide offenses.

An Overview of Homicide Trends

Between the periods of 1979 and 1992, homicide rates were highest for black males. After black males, the highest rates were for Native American males and then black females. Homicide rates for white males were comparable to those of Native American females and they were higher than the homicide rates of white women (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). In 1979, the rate of homicide for Native Americans was 23.7 per 100,000, while the rate of homicide for blacks was 47.7 per 100,000 (Fox & Zawitz, 1999). Homicide is most common amongst young adults for Native Americans. Between 1979 and 1992, the average age
of a Native American homicide victim was 28 years old (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Nationally, the average age of homicide victims was 35.2 years old in 1976 and fell to 31.3 years old in 1994 (Fox & Zawitz, 1999).

Sixty percent of all Native American homicide victims are males between the ages of fifteen and forty-four. The highest risk group for homicide amongst Native Americans was males between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four at 47 per 100,000 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Homicide ranked as the ninth overall leading cause of death for Native American males in the United States between 1990 and 1992; however, it ranked as the second leading cause of death for Native American males between twenty-five and thirty-four, and the third leading cause of death for Native American males between one and four as well as between ten and twenty-four (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Native American females between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four were at the highest risk for female homicide victims at 13.8 per 100,000 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). While it was not in the overall top ten causes of death for Native American females, it was the second leading cause of death for Native American females between the ages of one and four and the third leading cause for Native American females between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).

Blacks are disproportionately represented as both victims and offenders of homicide, having seven times higher rates than whites for offending and six times higher rates than whites for victimization (Fox & Zawitz, 1999). Black males between the ages of 18 and 24 have the highest rates of homicide victimization (Fox & Zawitz, 1999). Furthermore, blacks are more likely to be involved in a drug related homicide than sex-related homicides, workplace homicides, and homicide by poison (Fox & Zawitz, 1999). 94% of black victims are killed by black offenders (Fox & Zawitz, 1999).

The Centers for Disease Control reports from the 1988-1991 Supplementary Homicide Reports that forty-four percent of Native American homicides involved a firearm, sixty-four percent of which involved a handgun (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Male victims were most likely to be killed by a firearm with forty-eight percent of Native American males being killed by a firearm. Female victims were more likely to be killed by another method, such as blunt objects, strangulation, or by bodily force (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Twenty-nine percent of Native American males and twenty-three percent of females were killed by cutting or stabbing (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Between 1979 and 1992, firearms were the weapons of choice overall in the United States for sixty-three percent of homicides; conversely it was only the weapon of choice in thirty-eight percent of homicides for Native Americans. So, although firearms are the predominant weapons of choice in Native American homicides, they are less likely to be used in Native American homicides than the overall United States homicides (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).

Between 1988 and 1991, two-thirds of Native American homicide victims were killed by someone that they knew, nineteen percent by a family member and forty-seven percent by an acquaintance (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). This proportion was higher than that of the national average. Overall, most Native Americans were killed by either a
Native American offender, fifty-one percent, or by a white offender, thirty-nine percent. Most Native American females, fifty-nine percent, were killed by a Native American (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). The Centers for Disease Control proposes that the high incidences of homicides offenders knowing their victim and the large proportion of Native American homicides not involving firearms could indicate high rates of alcohol induced violence among Native Americans (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).

Social Disorganization and Economic Deprivation

Most research that focuses on Native American homicides focuses on the potential causes for the high rates of homicide amongst Native Americans. The research focuses specifically on social disorganization theory (Bachman 1991; Bachman 1992; Huff-Corzine & Lanier 2006; Lester 1995) and economic deprivation theory (Bachman 1991; Bachman 1992; Lanier 2010; Painter-Davis 2012).

Bachman (1992) measured social disorganization theory by the percent of the population that was single parent, female-headed households and by how often a family has moved in the last five years, which is a measure of mobility. Bachman (1992) looked at economic deprivation in conjunction with social disorganization, measuring economic deprivation by the percent of the Native American population in poverty, the Native American unemployment rate, and the Native American high school dropout rates (Bachman 1992). Bachman reports high levels of unemployment, high rates of poverty, and high dropout rates among Native Americans. Based on these measures, she concluded that both economic deprivation theory and social disorganization theory could be used to explain the high rates of homicide amongst Native Americans. Huff-Corzine and Lanier (2006) found similar findings in regards to social disorganization theory, measuring it by single parent, female households and family disruption; however, they found that poverty was not a significant predictor of homicide for Native Americans. They proposed that this might be because low socioeconomic status is common amongst all Native Americans so there is little variation in economic statuses. Native Americans are all amongst the lowest socioeconomic group in the United States, making poverty more of the norm than the exception (Huff-Corzine & Lanier, 2006). Lanier (2010) focused more on poverty as a cause for Native American homicide, reporting that Native American poverty and unemployment rates were double those of the national average. She reports that the percentage of single parent, female-headed households was 14.08% and the percentage of divorced American Indians is 13.82% (Lanier 2010).

Furthermore, literature shows that blacks high rates of concentrated disadvantage and residential instability influence certain types of homicides (Kurbin & Wadsworth, 2003). These factors tend to have a stronger influence on non-economically motivated homicide offenders (Kurbin & Wadsworth, 2003). In line with social disorganization theory, these violent acts are committed in order to earn respect, build and maintain reputations, and express frustration (Anderson, 1999; Bruce et al., 1998; Horowitz, 1983; Sampson & Wilson, 1995).

This study seeks to find a distinction between Native American and black homicide offenses, despite the similar circumstances that are noted between the two populations. It is important to look at Native American homicides in comparison to a more often researched
population, blacks, to see how different these population’s homicides are. These are both minority populations and both populations prominently feature social disorganization. The differences pointed out will show that there is a need to further research this unusual phenomenon.

**Methods**

**Data**

The data that will be used in this study is the Uniform Crime Report: Supplementary Homicide Reports (2011) data that has been gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Uniform Crime Report data are submitted voluntarily by city, county and state law enforcement agencies. The Supplementary Homicide Reports provide detailed information on criminal homicides as reported to the police. These homicides include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, and justifiable homicide. There are 13,858 cases recorded in this data set. The unit of analysis in this dataset is the homicide incident. The Supplementary Homicide Reports data records up to eleven victims and eleven offenders for each incident. Victim data includes age, sex, race, and ethnic origin. The offender data includes age, sex, race, ethnic origin, weapon, relationship, circumstance, and sub-circumstance. Relationship data, however, is only provided for the first victim of the given offender. For this study, only cases with a black or Native American offender were included in the analysis. All other cases were excluded. Based on these exclusions, the sample size was 4370 cases.

**Dependent Variable**

The dependent variable in this study is race of the offender. The Supplementary Homicide Report is recorded as Asian or Pacific Islander, black, American Indian or Alaskan Native, unknown, and white. For the purpose of this study, the race variable has been dummy-coded in order to only analyze cases of blacks and Native Americans. Native American is coded as 1 and black is coded as zero. All other cases were discarded.

**Independent Variables**

The independent variables in this study are offender’s relationship to the victim, weapon choice, age of the offender, and additional victim count.

The Supplementary Homicide Report records relationship to the victim is recorded as acquaintance, boyfriend, brother, common-law husband, common-law wife, daughter, employee, employer, father, friend, girlfriend, homosexual relationship, husband, in-law, mother, neighbor, other family, other-known to victim, stepdaughter, stepfather, sister, stepmother, son, stepson, stranger, relationship not determined, wife, ex-husband, and ex-wife. For the purposes of this study, relationship to victim has been dummy coded into two different variables. The first is a variable called family in which family members are coded as 1 and everything else is coded as 0. The family variable includes brother, common-law husband, common-law wife, daughter, father, husband, in-law, mother, other family, stepdaughter, stepfather, sister, stepmother, son, stepson, and wife. The second is a variable called acquaintance in which acquaintances are coded as 1 and everything else is coded as 0. Those included in the acquaintance category are acquaintance, boyfriend, employee, employer, friend, girlfriend, homosexual relationship, neighbor, and other-known to victim. Homosexual relationship is not included in family due to same sex marriage only being legal in a few states; therefore in most cases they would not legally be family.
In the Supplementary Homicide Report, weapon choice is recorded as firearm-type not stated, handgun-pistol, revolver, etc., rifle, shotgun, other gun, knife or cutting instrument, blunt object-hammer, club, etc., personal weapons-includes beating, poison-not including gas, pushed or thrown out window, explosives, fire, narcotics or drugs, drowning, strangulation-hanging, asphyxiati-on includes death by gas, and other or type unknown. For the purposes of this study, weapon choice has been dummy coded. Firearm used is coded as 1 and all other weapons are coded as 0. The firearm category includes firearm-type not stated, handgun-pistol, revolver, etc., rifle, shotgun, and other gun.

Age was not recoded in the study, nor was additional victim count as they are both continuous, numeric values. The Supplementary Homicide Report records up to 10 additional victims and age is recorded up to 99 years old.

Analytic Strategy

The analytic strategy uses binary logistic regression to examine the relationship between black and Native American homicide offenses. The model exhibits a bivariate examination of the relationship between race of the offender and the independent variables.

Results

Table one presents the descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables. The table shows that a gun was used in nearly 70% of all black and Native American homicide offenses. Only 9.61% of homicide offenses were perpetrated against a family member, 44.32% were committed against an acquaintance, leaving about 46% to have been committed against a stranger or an undetermined relationship. Native Americans perpetrated only 1.85% of homicide offenses. The average age of the homicide offender was 26.05 and the average additional victim count was .05.

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, and Proportions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean/Proportions</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firearm Used</td>
<td>.6979</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>.0961</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>.4432</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>.0185</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender Age</td>
<td>26.05</td>
<td>13.856</td>
<td>4370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Victim Count</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>4370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table two presents the results of the bivariate analysis of Native American and black homicide offenses. The binary logistic model was significant, showing that there is a significant difference between Native American and black homicide offenses; however, not all of the independent variables proved to be significant. The table shows that there was not a significant difference between Native American homicide offenders in regards to age, additional victim...
count, or if the victim was an acquaintance. However, there was a significant difference for firearm usage and if the victim was a family member. According to the model, Native Americans are more likely than blacks to commit a homicide offense against a family member. This finding is a unique finding that was not presented in the literature. Additionally, Native Americans are less likely to use a firearm than blacks. This finding is supported by the literature, which explains that Native Americans are less likely than other populations to use a firearm (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996).

It is surprising that there was no significant difference between the numbers of victims. The results of the analysis indicate that Native Americans are more likely than blacks to commit homicide against a family member. While this is a unique finding, it is not entirely surprising due to the ages of Native American victims. It was the third leading cause of death for boys between the ages of 1 and 4 and second leading cause for girls between the ages of 1 and 4 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996), indicating a high likelihood that Native American children are being killed by a family member.

The finding that there is a significant difference between blacks and Native American using firearms is not surprising. The literature supports this finding that Native Americans are less likely to use firearms, despite it being the most used weapon (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Something that is interesting about this finding though is it shows that this finding still holds true after all these years. Often times we wonder if literature is out of date.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>1.115/3.048** (.342)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintance</td>
<td>.493/1.637 (.287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offender Age</td>
<td>-.001/999 (.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Victim Count</td>
<td>.340/1.406 (.382)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>-1.174/309 **(.253)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>-3.739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>4370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-Square</td>
<td>49.206**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cox &amp; Snell R²</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagelkerke R²</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One would assume that black offenders would have more victims due to many of the offenses being drug related (Fox & Zawitz, 1999). Overall though it seems that there were not many additional victims though so this may be why there wasn’t a significant difference.

Table 2: Weapon Choice, Relationship to Victim, Victim Count, and Age Based on Race of the Offender (Binary Logistic Regression)

Cell entries are given as logistic regression coefficients/odds ratios with the standard errors in parentheses. ** p<.01
The finding that there is no difference for committing homicide against an acquaintance is not that surprising either. The literature shows that 47% of Native American homicide victims were killed by an acquaintance (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 1996). Additionally, one could assume that blacks who are involved in drug related homicides know each other to some degree, even if it is just through drug deals, and as previously stated most black homicide offenses are drug related (Fox & Zawitz, 1999).

A strength and weakness of this data is that it is police data. A positive is that it provides a lot of detailed information that would be difficult to gather any other way. Conversely, much of the data results in unknowns, such as an undetermined relationship between the victim and offender or unknown race of the offender. Additionally, it only reports closed cases so an unsolved or unknown case would not be in this data. Another weakness of the data that may have skewed the results is that there are exponentially more black offenses than Native American offenses. The sample sizes do make sense because of the population size, but it does lead the researcher to question the validity of the findings due to the difference in sample size.

Future research could look more closely at just Native American homicide offenses to better understand this population on its own. Although the variables did not all prove to be significant, the model did and serves as evidence that this population should be further researched.
References


Social Explorer Tables (SE), Census 2010, Census Bureau; Social Explorer


Panel Session 5: Offender Characteristics and Patterns – Recorder Notes
Session Recorder: Amanda Farrell, Old Dominion University

Paper 1: Drug Arrests and Homicide Rates: Exploring the Criminogenic Impact of the Drug War

Vance McLaughlin: I think drugs and the amount of violence and competition and seller/user overlap creates situations that are potentially violent.

Roland Chilton: I think the numbers are an accurate reflection.

Vance McLaughlin: Easy intervention and low political capital.

Roland Chilton: Show the numbers. Which years got grants? It may be possible that the arrests are for something else and that drugs arrests are a proxy.

Ned Levine: What about the failure of three strikes?

Roland Chilton: The failure to crack down on small things—broken windows?

Ned Levine: But arrests parallel mass incarceration…

Roland Chilton: The incarceration “binge” is not inaccurate, but you still have increasing drug and homicide rates. If Broken Windows worked, homicide should have decreased (shows additional chart to demonstrate).

T.J. Taylor: What if part of this is that the police crackdown destabilized the drug trade?

Roland Chilton: (Diagram shown)

Dallas Drake: In Minneapolis in 2007, the Chief of Police said to position too many resources in the north of the city, where the homicides were at. In the south, they were flooded with law enforcement officers and homicides increased in the south.

Roland Chilton: Arrest records increased, so long-term benefits are to stop doing drug arrests

Paper 2: Examination of Recidivism Patterns Among Two Types of Juvenile Homicide Offenders

Jackie Schildkraut: Did any offenders kill multiple victims, or are you looking at single offender-single victim cases?

Nora Khachatryan and Kathleen Heide: One killed both parents—but there is some conflict. Almost all were single offender-single victim. In terms of convictions, all were single-single cases, although there were allegations of multiple victims.

Jackie Schildkraut: So, did you treat those as outliers?

Kathleen Heide: No, these were included in the typology.

Chris Rasche: It was said that they should not be treated differently? Using a typology?
Kathleen Heide: Not using a typology, but if no treatment is provided in the conflict versus crime categories, if no treatment is provided, then do not expect different outcomes.

Chris Rasche: I am glad you clarified that did not quite come across in the presentation.

Paper 3: Getting Away with Murder: An Examination of Homicides Staged as Suicides

Vanessa Leggett: There were no law enforcement officers. Were security guards included?

Claire Ferguson: No.

Vanessa Leggett: Were stranger cases considered? Like where someone was hired?

Claire Ferguson: They were not considered strangers in my study—meaning actual strangers with no connection. In two of three cases, they met that day.

Paper 4: In Cold Blood: A Comparison of Native American and Black Homicides

Kathleen Heide: Did Native Americans include Alaskan natives?

Kayla Ward: Yes, Alaskan natives were included.

Kathleen Heide: What was your n?

Kayla Ward: n = 81

Kathleen Heide: For Blacks?

Kayla Ward: The column is given in percentages because of the differences in sample sizes.

Christian Bolden: It may be interesting to look at the intra- versus interracial nature of homicides among Native Americans.

Chris Rasche: There are no explanations, but Native Americans are more likely to be clustered, so women and family members have increased rates of victimization. In the next stage of this research, you may want to try to explain these variations.

Kayla Ward: Most of the literature says it is social disorganization and economic deprivation.

Chris Rasche: But how are Native Americans different from Blacks?

Roland Chilton: (unclear) ignores a segment of American society.

Ned Levine: The potential for this study is good, but the use of chi square creates a stats nightmare because of multiple tests problem. Flip your independent variable and your dependent variable and set up a logit model.

Kayla Ward: In the next paper we are using a binary logistic model.

Ned Levine: Compliments on not using stats on a small sample, it shows you know the limits of the data.
Open Q & A

Jay Corzine for Roland Chilton: Please go back to the next to last slide—Black Male Homicides and Drug Arrests in Chicago. Appears to decrease by about 50, then change around 1990, before then the trends seem to follow, after drug arrests increase, homicide rates decrease…

Roland Chilton: This is a fluctuating rate, so you can’t get too excited.

Jay Corzine: How about a three year moving average?

Roland Chilton: I can try.

Vanessa Leggett for Roland Chilton: What about data on Black gambling? That may be the answer as it may not be equal to homicide fluctuations. This may change because Whites are turning them in or different techniques. (Provides quote about Vice cops in Chinatown stating they do nothing—the incestuous/insidious nature means that they will turn on each other).

Roland Chilton: I don’t understand the question. You cannot assume only Blacks are gambling when you concentrate on “easy” arrests for victimless crimes. These arrests mean there are more arrest records and the after effects (access to jobs, etc.).

Roland Chilton for Claire Ferguson: What about those who successfully stage a crime scene? Do you have a sense of those?

Claire Ferguson: No, I think they exist, but I have no sense of this and am not sure how to tap into it.

Kim Davies: There was a Georgia dentist who killed his wife and was found to have also killed his girlfriend in medical school—both were stages suicides.

Claire Ferguson: (unclear) may be getting better, but some offenders shoot themselves in the foot. How many people can die before someone starts to notice? Some immediate offenses led to opening past suspicious deaths.

Lin Huff Corzine: What about the literature on “accidents” versus the homicide/suicide literature? Did you consider looking at this?

Claire Ferguson: (unclear) looks at suicides framed as accidents (car accidents—but is this a different constellation of behaviors? What do they want to make people think?

Dallas Drake: You might want to go through the sample and look for suspicious deaths in the families of offenders.

Claire Ferguson: It could be possible, but would be very labor intensive.

Dallas Drake: You should look for previous suicides or accidents.

John Jarvis: I think we are focused on the wrong thing here—comparing non-staged. Not just compare within, but see how they are different. The sample size is small, so it is difficult to draw conclusions. You need control groups.
Claire Ferguson: Control groups are needed, and we are getting there in the next steps. Need to separate them into staged types and legitimate cases.
The world has always had people, primarily men, who have killed multiple victims, over the course of their lifetimes. They are usually cast, in myth or fact, in the role of villain or hero, with a portion being somewhere in-between. The purpose of this paper is to offer examples of newspaper articles that provided both stories and theories that laid a foundation for serious thought, including two examples of quasi-profilers.

Criminologists, focusing on the villains, have given a modern meaning to the term “serial murder.” The print media, ninety years ago, had used the term to advertise murder mysteries that were presented in chapters: “It is becoming harder and harder to track numerous serial murder mysteries which are now running in the press daily” (Hot, 1920, p. 8).

Serial murder has various definitions. An example is one formulated by Skrapec (2001): Serial murder is three or more forensically linked murders committed as discrete events by the same person(s) over an extended period of time and when the primary motive is personal gratification. In the same article she suggested that the concept had existed long before the term serial murder was accepted. She stated:

Bolitho (1926) gave examples under this term mass murder. Wakefield (1936) remarked that Landrau “has come to be the arch-type of serial butchers.” Lindsay (1958) mentioned series of murders. Brophy (1967) specifically distinguished “mass murders” from what he referred to as “serial murder”…whose essential character is repetition at intervals of time.

Skrapec confined her examples to those written by academics, who had published in scholarly venues. Her earliest citation in the above paragraph was 1926. I chose to examine various newspapers published ten years before Bolitho’s study and have not included any information written after 1915.

Concomitantly, there are some who like to modify classifications and terminology, including serial murder to garner attention. According to Leyton (2000):

Also rampant in the field is the unscholarly and discourteous practice of
‘borrowing’ ideas and redeploying them as one’s own without pausing to acknowledge their source. This defect is especially (but by no means exclusively) to be found in the less widely read journals, where the professional need for publication and the personal need for status sometimes results in claims that an old and well published idea is the author’s unique invention (p. xvi).

The Bad Man Concept

Americans felt that there were people who were just “bad” men. After the Civil War, many of the unrepentant Confederates, who may have been raiders who used the opportunity of the war to enrich themselves, became the basis of newspaper stories. Jesse James, Frank Younger, and others lead gangs of men to rob trains and banks. While many involved were psychopaths, it made better newspaper copy to refer to them as Robin Hoods of the West. They were depicted as underdogs who never gave up their fight against the invaders from the north. The more people they allegedly killed bolstered their reputations.

Though this article focuses on newspapers, it should be noted that Barclay & Company, Philadelphia, published two books in the 1870s that dealt with true crime and multiple murders. Both had sensational titles and no listed author. In 1872, “The Poison Fiend! Life, Crimes, and Conviction of Lydia Sherman, (The Modern Lucretia Borgia,) Recently Tried in New Haven, Conn., for Poisoning Three Husbands and Eight of Her Children. Her Life in Full! Exciting Account of Her Trial—The Fearful Evidence. The Most Startling and Sensational Series of Crimes Ever Committed in this Country. Her Conviction.” and in 1873, “Life, Trial and Execution of Edward H. Ruloff, The Perpetrator of Eight Murders, Numerous Burglaries and Other Crimes; Who was Recently Hanged at Binghamton, N.Y. A Man Shrouded in Mystery! A Learned Ruffian! Was He a Man or Fiend?” Despite the best efforts of the publisher, neither Sherman nor Roloff achieved widespread notoriety. The titles illustrate the focus on multiple murderers.

There were others who committed multiple murders and were not even semi-famous. When multiple murders could be attributed to one person, the most easily provable murder would be chosen, and if convicted, the killer would hang or be given life at hard labor. A serial murderer, who killed across different law enforcement jurisdictions, was aided in escape by the fact that agencies had little ability to share resources, unless a reward was offered. There were also those, to whom only one murder had been attributed before they died, admitted to other killings. It is thought that some who were to be executed legally or illegally wanted to expiate their sins before they left this world. The following are six examples from newspapers published in the 1880s.

Charley Norton killed a policeman in Kokomo, Colorado. After being escorted from the jail, and before he was lynched, he said that he deserved it because he had murdered three others (Criminal, 1880). Charlie Stevens claimed to have killed a number of people. When he killed John Mahon in Maryville, Missouri in 1880 and found guilty, he was sentenced to prison for ten years. After giving comfort to the warden’s sick daughter, he was pardoned. He returned and killed another man, tried, convicted, and sentenced to death. While in jail he bragged he would again be pardoned. Instead, he was lynched (Omaha, 1884). Alf Little is said to have killed 14
men. While a youngster, he killed a playmate. He murdered three brothers. He went into a house and dragged out an invalid who he kicked to death. He was sentenced to 16 years in federal court for the non-violent crimes forging pension papers and post office orders in Kentucky (The Goshen, 1885). Macy Warner was tried and convicted of killing another convict, Frank Harris, by slashing his throat. He was sentenced to be hanged on March 9, 1888. He had killed three men (Macy, 1887). Ham English, before he died at Casa Grande, Arizona Territory, confessed to killing three men and one woman in the past four years (West, 1887). Stephen Bailey, who committed suicide in Columbia, S.C., confessed to having murdered his three wives (Telegraphic, 1887).

One of the most in-depth confessions by a multiple murderer was written by Syd Jones. Jones was hanged at the jail in Birmingham, Alabama, on June 25, 1915. He was executed for the killing of another convict while he was serving a life sentence for murder. A grammatically challenged document was found in his cell after his death. The closest facsimile to the actual note is as follows:

Sir-This is to Jimmie McAdory. This is a list of my record while I was a convict. I killed four convicts while being in prison. I will give the name of two, Cleve Waters, 1911, and on the 22nd day of May, and another convict in 1907, and another in 1911. I do not care to expose of their names. Of course I will for Will Watson to be hung June 25. But that’s all right. I do not care for that. God will forgive me for all that I have did in this world. But, listen, look on the second page and you will see the names of a many one Lonnie Thompson and Charles Bennet and Deputy Sheriff W.S. Moseley of Crawford, Nebraska.; Tom Shay, white, Sam Lee, a Chinaman, Montreal, California; M & O Brakeman Boyd, Wells, Kentucky; Bessie Humphreys, Huntsville, Ala.; Pattie Quieye, Mexican at Fort Wingate, New Mexico; John Little John, an Indian man, at Sheridan…..

Total amount only 13, that’s all. I am sorry I missed getting Richard Moore, September 12, 1914. Just one more would have made the even number. He is the only one I ever missed yet (His, 1915).

Two portions of his confession have been verified. First, in the same article, it stated that Jones did try to kill Moore at the Jefferson County Jail where they had an argument over food. Jones stabbed Moore several times, which required a two month hospital stay by Moore. Second, combinations of two newspaper articles (Resisted, 1906; Truth, 1915) confirm another incident, but illustrate that Jones’ memory was inexact as to certain specifics when he wrote that he killed Deputy Sheriff W.S. Moseley. Three murders did occur in one night in Crawford, Nebraska on May 16, 1906, involving the 10th cavalry, which was composed entirely of African-American troopers. Syd Jones was a member of the troop at Fort Robinson at the time of the incident. On the night of the murder a number of troopers were sitting on the bank of a creek drinking alcohol. Arthur Moss, not a deputy sheriff, but a night watchman, who was not on good terms with the troopers, was called when the drinkers became too noisy. Moss was shot and killed while approaching the group.

These examples, written before 1916, establish that books and newspapers published stories about killers who had multiple victims over a period of time. London would furnish a
fictional character, consulting detective Sherlock Holmes and a non-fictional murderer known as Jack the Ripper. Their exploits, real or imagined, would add new dimensions to public consciousness.

Jack the Ripper

Holmes first appeared in print in 1887, a year before Jack the Ripper made headlines. In a recent television show, the website touting its content stated the following about the detective: *How Sherlock Changed the World* reveals the impact Sherlock Holmes has had on the development of real criminal investigation and forensic techniques...In an era when eyewitness testimony and “smoking gun” evidence were needed to convict and police incompetence meant that Jack the Ripper stalked the streets freely, Sherlock Holmes used chemistry, bloodstains and fingerprints to catch offenders...Holmes was the first to use ballistics, including bullet trajectory, as evidence in criminal cases...One of the best known forensic scientists in history and an avid reader of Sherlock Holmes stories, Frenchman Edmond Locard built the first real forensics lab in 1910, 23 years after Sir Arthur Conan Doyle dreamed up a fictional one (How, 2013).

At the same time readers marveled in amazement at Sherlock Holmes’ insights, American newspaper readers were inundated with stories of Jack the Ripper, which was the moniker given by the press to the killer of prostitutes in London in 1888. Exaggeration and hyperbole was the coin of the realm and many scribblers tried to raise the stakes. The following story was widely published by newspapers in 1889:

Nothing in the annals of modern crime is at once so mysterious and so fiendish as the series of murders that have been committed in the slum Whitechapel district of London...Of the ghastly twelve bodies eight were disemboweled and mutilated in a peculiar manner, all the same way...One supposition is that the original “ripper” is a ferocious lunatic with some fancied grudge at the unfortunate class of women named. But his work is too systematic and long continued for that. A horrible circumstance attending this series of crimes is that if other wretches the world over read of it and attempt to imitate it. There seems a contagion about it (The Whitechapel, 1889).

In article cited above, the words “series of murders” would become serial murder, “mutilated in a peculiar manner” would become modus operandi and/or signature, “systematic” would become planned and “contagion” would be referred to as copycat or kept unchanged when describing the spread of additional similar crimes.

Six years later, another newspaper article, was to introduce a character, who unlike a plodding police detective, offered insights seemingly beyond the keen of the fictional Holmes. Robert James Lees, a London based educator, claimed to be clairvoyant. His abilities were at their zenith when Jack murdered his first three victims. He had “seen” the next murder in his mind and went to Scotland Yard. He told them he saw a clock had struck 12:40. The world-weary detectives treated him as if he was a lunatic. The next night, a woman left a pub with a man. Her body was found in the area Lees’ described at 12:40 with her throat cut ear to ear as he had described. Later, Lees was riding a bus, and noticed a passenger who he “knew” was Jack

the Ripper. The same night Lees envisioned another murder and when he went to Scotland Yard they showed him a postcard that had just arrived, threatening to kill a ninth victim and to cut off her ears. Lees fainted after reading this written confirmation of his psychic thoughts. After predicting another murder, an inspector used Lees like a “bloodhound.” Lees found the culprit who was a respected physician who was bundled off to an asylum under the name Thomas Mason (Jack, 1895). Critics of the reliability and validity of present day profilers may cite this fictitious story of a charlatan as an early example of a “mind-hunter”.

Some American newspapers began to dub any “unusual” murders of women with a knife as ripper type murders. The following were classified as such and occurred in New York City. Mamie Wilson was killed with a long knife and her abdomen cut (New, 1905). Annie Moore was found in her bed murdered with a knife (Bowery, 1906). Mrs. Mary Veto and her mother Mrs. Maria Bilgneli were found slashed to death in their apartment (Jack, 1907). Julia Connors, age 12, was stabbed 40 times and then jammed into a box where she had a lingering death (Terrifying, 1912).

Some reporters went beyond the “ripper” identifier and started to link specific murders to each other. In 1894, one newspaper connected the murder of three women (Minnie Keldt in New York City on May 31st; Josie Bennett in Buffalo on June 30th, and Mary Eckhart in Cincinnati on July 25th) to Jack the Strangler. When three women were killed in Denver (Lena Tapper on September 26th; Marie Pontasott on October 28th; Kiko Oyama on November 3rd) a reporter dubbed the perpetrator the Denver Strangler. Some reporters connected all six homicides of the homicides to one perpetrator (The Denver, 1894). It seemed of little concern to verify if any of the homicides had resulted in an arrest. The concept of a travelling maniac was a sellable story.

In 1905, Cincinnati had its own ripper. Five white women had been murdered (May McDonald (24) on May 1, 1904; Lulu Mueller (21) October 1, 1904; Alma Steinway (18) on November 4, 1904; Unidentified (about 23) on March 17, 1905; and Lottie Lucas (15) disappeared from orphans home on March 18, 1905. Her bloody clothing found two days later (Abducted, 1905). When a number of African-American women were killed in Atlanta between 1911 and 1912, the killer was dubbed the Atlanta Ripper by the newspapers (McLaughlin & Bing, 2013).

By 1915, newspapers had established two types of murders that could be classified as ripper. The first type were those with an unknown perpetrator that involved more violence than required to extinguish life (overkill) and second, any series of similar murders separated by time and/or geography. In 1911, the murders of three families in Colorado, Illinois, and Kansas, were attributed to the same perpetrator by newspapers. After two other families were killed in Kansas and Iowa in 1912, an investigator would link all five.

Connected Family Murders?

Another outbreak of national focus on multiple murders occurred in 1911. Three incidents were linked by newsmen and then by law enforcement officers. Reporters claimed that three families living in different geographical areas, had been murdered by the same maniac, crushing their skulls as they slept, all on Sunday nights, with two week intervals. The first family reported was actually two families living in adjacent houses (Mrs. Alice Burnham and two
children; Henry Wayne, his wife Blanche, and child) on September 17th in Colorado Springs, Colorado. The next family of victims was W.E. Dawson, his wife, and child on October 1st in Monmouth, Illinois. The third family was Will Showman, his wife, and three children on October 18th in Ellsworth Kansas (A murderous, 1911). Nobody was ever prosecuted for these crimes.

Fingerprints instead of clairvoyance, would be the basis of detection for the next super-sleuth. In 1887 at Joliet Prison, Warden Robert W. Mc Claughry and his clerk, Gallus Miller, began using the Bertillon system to identify prisoners. In 1899, McClauhry was appointed warden of Leavenworth by President McKinley. He was able to hire his son, Matthew W. McClauhry as records clerk. Clerk McClauhry was at the World’s Fair in 1904 where he was introduced to the use of fingerprints as evidence by Sgt. John K. Ferrier of Scotland Yard. By the year’s end, fingerprinting was added to the Bertillon system at Leavenworth (Olsen, 1995). All of the inmates were fingerprinted and additional fingerprints were submitted to Leavenworth by other agencies (Keve, 1991).

Matthew McClauhry decided to dabble in private detection. At that time, federal employees were permitted to accept fees for work outside of their regular duties. The murders of the three groups mentioned above and the need created by the newspapers to find a savior was his opportunity. After two additional ax murders of families took place in June of 1912, the first in rural Kansas, and the second in Villisca, Iowa, McClauhry became involved. The following concerns his arrival and investigation at Villisca.

On Tuesday M.W. McClauhry, an assistant warden and fingerprint expert at Leavenworth Penitentiary, arrived to investigate the scene. Community confidence in this expert was shaken when he left the train falling down drunk. But when sobered, he made a detailed analysis of the scene. No usable fingerprints were found, but he did carefully analyze blood spots and axe cuts made in the ceiling upstairs. His study of these measurements led him to conclude the killer was left-handed and when striking the children in the south room had been in a frenzy, waving the axe one-handed over his head (Epperly, 2012).

McClauhry had been advised by his father, that Henry Lee Moore, would be a good suspect. Moore had been arrested in December of 1912 in Missouri for the murder of his mother and his maternal grandmother and convicted on May 9, 1913. The assistant warden fixated on Moore as being the killer of each of the five families, with a total of 25 victims. His main proof was that Moore was released from the Kansas reformatory before the first of the five incidents occurred in Colorado Springs and incarcerated in Missouri after the Villisca murders (Ax, 1913). This timeline “proving” Moore’s supposed availability to commit the murders, coupled with the fact that he had killed to members of his own family seems to be the only evidence that McClauhry needed to trumpet his accusations. Though Moore was never prosecuted for any of these murders, the newspaper article did create the notion that an outside expert could travel to the scene of a crime and aid in the investigation. Desperate law enforcement agencies still may hope for a Sherlock Holmes to arrive and assist. Not content with a total of 25 murders, a news reporter decided to increase the victim count, by adding other murders committed after the Iowa killings, to bring the total corpses to 33 (Degenerate, 1914).
Conclusion

By 1915, American newspapers had established the concept of a murderer who kills a number of people over an extended period of time, with intervals between the killings. Explanations for the motives of these murders often were “reporter based”. American newspapermen had reported or created the ingredients that criminal investigators and academics would eventually include in their definitions of serial murder. They wrote for profit and embellished that which they wrote to help sell newspapers. They also unknowingly provided an historical archive for researchers. Matthew Mc Claughry’s theory of linked family murders has been revived. Nearly a century later, a retired Colorado Springs police investigator, Dwight Haverkorn, is trying to prove that the person who killed the Burnham and Wayne families in the city was a serial killer, responsible during a two-month period for 25 murders in five towns: Portland, Oregon; Rainier, Washington; Monmouth, Illinois; Ellsworth, Kansas, and Colorado Springs (Emery, 2007).

Abducted orphan may have been murdered. (3/23/1905). Sandusky Star Journal, p. 1.


Degenerate ax-wielder is busy (7/7/1914). Logansport Pharos-Reporter, Indiana, p. 1


His record. (1915, June 26). The Dothan Eagle, p. 3. In two papers outside Alabama, the note was corrected for spelling and grammar and made more readable. In so doing, factual changes to the note were made: Hanged Negro’s note admits 13 murders. (1915, June 26). Galveston Daily News, p. 1; Wholesale murder admitted by Jones. (1915, June 26). Lincoln Daily Star, p. 3. Both newspapers assumed that the convicts were killed at Banner Mines in Birmingham. The M & O railroad stood for the Mobile and Ohio and Sheridan is located in Wyoming.


McLaughlin, V. & Bing, R. The Atlanta Ripper. homicidesearch.com


The Goshen Democrat, (11/18/1885). p. 2. (no title)


Telegraphic Brevities (12/2/1887). Reno Evening Gazette, p. 3.


West and South. (4/16/1887). Elkhart Sentinel, p. 2.
The Changing Landscape Of Homicide:
Proceedings of the 2014 Meeting of the Homicide Research Working Group

Beyond the Wolfgang Paradigm

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Jack Ritter

_Homicide Studies_ was to be the first journal for research on murder from diverse academic disciplines and from practitioners, with the objective of disseminating knowledge for public policies that could reduce death from fatal violence. Shortly thereafter, the articles began to reflect criminology's somewhat unique world view: that aggression and its causes can be explained through clinical assumptions and quantitative analysis of government-generated crime reports on the most powerless of a nation’s citizens. Unless those who are trained in other fields, and who conduct interdisciplinary research, attempt to articulate critical but incompatible research findings, the journal’s goals may be difficult to meet. This is because the dominant explanations of homicide will continue to reign, not because they are valid but because they are untested and unchallenged.

If there is any field of knowledge to which the public is entitled, it is that which pertains to fear-inducing homicides, and the reasons for which people are imprisoned. And if there is any field of knowledge where theories need to be tested, it is criminology, because it has taken responsibility for explaining murder and its sanctions. The problem is that criminological theories become enshrined in social policies and seem as prized for their longevity as their empirical validity. For example, Wolfgang and Ferracuti reveal (1982, p. x) that their text on the subculture of violence theory was part of the final report of the National Violence Commission. Their policy implications for the dispersion of the black subculture became recommendations of Housing and Urban Development, despite the theory’s being described as one of the least tested propositions in the criminological literature (Cao, Adams, & Jensen, 1997). A second example is Jensen’s (2001, pps. 114-115) use of Sutherland’s 1947 textbook to assert that crime is learned in interaction with primary groups rather than through the mass media. According to Jensen, this premise “remains one of the most widely accepted principles of criminological theory among sociologists and criminologists.” Unfortunately, this premise has been difficult to test.

This assertion by Jensen (2001) is at odds with the consensus found among criminologists, from Vold (1958) through Sutherland and Cressey, as described in a later textbook (1978, p. 63). Many criminologists agreed that the field had not developed any adequate theory, and was unlikely to do so in the future. For Vold, the problem was that one’s theory of crime causation determined the nature of the problem, the procedures used to study it, and the penalties derived from it, while predetermining what would be discovered. In Vold’s view, criminological theory would only progress with the whole of the behavioral sciences as they reached a better understanding of human behavior in general, since the criminal is a human being. Sutherland and Cressey believed criminology lacked an adequate theory because quantitative analysis of crime reports produced data without ever being able to explain it. Further, they did not foresee an end to the debate between the psychiatric and sociological schools. They felt an entirely new school would be needed – and one with a new theory at its basis. “Modern behavioral psychology, which is neither sociological nor psychiatric nor punitive in nature, probably will be at the base of this ‘new’ criminology.”
Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1982, p. 150) similarly believed that criminology could benefit from the studies of psychologist Albert Bandura, whose work provided the conceptual bridge between psychology and sociology: “. . . we are convinced that these behavioral constructs of social learning not only are the most directly related to subculture theory, but also are capable of generating an integrated theory in criminology.” Further, Bandura’s (1973) study of aggression has even been cited for offering an understanding of the causes of serial murder, according to Hickey (1991). If these authors all looked to behavioral psychology for some very important answers, why are today’s criminologists not making use of such research? Why are they still embracing theories thought to be unsound, by criminologists from Vold (1958) through Sutherland and Cressey (1978), not to mention unsafe for a democracy? The answer might be found in the notion of a “paradigm.” That is what I will briefly explain here:

A paradigm is introduced through an exemplar of research, accompanied by an untested theory, specialized methods, and new rules of science. Paradigms are non-cumulative scientific lurches, as described by science historian, Kuhn (1962), in regard to the natural sciences. (Paradigms are not found in the social sciences, where research is cumulative). Rather than using explicit rules of science, paradigms take the exemplar as the way “science is done.” Once the paradigm is accepted, textbooks are rewritten, and conflicting views that once held merit are eliminated. Paradigms are concerned with precision, not with novelty, new discovery or theory. Concern with precision ultimately leads to a diminishing resemblance to the real world. The field ignores or hides the anomalies it finds. Natural scientists do, eventually, open the field to debate, test the underlying theory and examine alternative paradigms.

The premise here is that homicide researchers have, perhaps unwittingly, stepped into a paradigm devised and planned out for them by Marvin Wolfgang. By following a 1958 exemplar for research, a field has developed that steadily builds upon the Philadelphia study of homicides: the Marvin Wolfgang Model of homicide research. Perhaps even more important than the 1958 study is Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s (1982, pp. 11-12, 289) text on the subculture of violence. But the text asks for followers, not independent thinkers. The authors wrote that they preferred fusion to interdisciplinary research, “and acceptance of a unified overall theory” – Wolfgang's subculture of violence. They wanted neither isolated work, nor outside influence. Perhaps to mitigate personal responsibility, all work was to be published by “the group.” They also suggested a “master plan” in which policies would be tested in some parochial area with like-minded intellectuals, and then implemented across the nation, all without outside consultation.

What did Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1982, p. 315) hope to accomplish through this effort? They proposed crime prevention through social action “designed (a) to disperse, disrupt and disorganize the representatives of the subculture of violence, and at the same time (b) effect changes in the value system” through involuntary therapy in prisons, and by dispersing certain minority communities. Their efforts were intended to destroy a minority culture’s

13 “Like a wall built one brick at a time the peer-reviewed literature in a field is built by single contributions that together represent the accumulated knowledge of a field. Each contribution must fill a place that before was empty, and each contribution must be sturdy enough to bear the weight of contributions to come” (American Psychological Association’s, APA, Publication Manual, 2001, p. 347-8).
intergenerational communication of values, replacing them with middle-class values, and to eliminate these values' strengths, durability, solace and self-sufficiency, all developed from shared experiences of long-term adversity. They proposed to do this by uprooting blacks from their neighborhoods, to separate them from one another, and to put them amongst whites whose “non-violent values” would be the only ones on display. They also suggested treatment for prisoners – behavior modification, possibly with drugs – to infuse new values into them by inducing "an anomic state of confusion, ... and regression – to the point of psychosis," (a "happy medium. . .between 'brainwashing' and repression."). Upon release, there would be no homes of origin to return to (pp. 309, 311-312).

By contrast, members of the dominant, white, middle-class were purportedly opposed to the use of violence. Their (infrequent) murders involved either psychopathology or premeditation. Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1967) decided that the rarity of premeditated murder (i.e. murder by whites) made such cases an anomaly – unlikely to increase, whether the murderer was treated, punished or ignored. They felt certain that homicide was almost always intraracial, and rarely involved strangers. They arrived at all of this, apparently, without the benefit of history or anthropology. Due to the infrequency of middle and upper-class murders, they argued that such cases should be removed from criminology and relocated in forensic psychology, while criminology would focus on the poor and on minorities.

This is the type of danger Vold (1958, p. 35) forewarned against when discussing positivistic theory: “the ease with which it fits into totalitarian patterns of government.” The danger lies in the “core idea of the superior knowledge and wisdom of the scientific expert who, on the basis of his studies, decides what kind of . . . people commit crime, and who, on the basis of this knowledge, prescribes appropriate treatment, without concern for public opinion and without consent from the person so diagnosed." Additionally, positivism is compatible with "America's centralized control of the life of the citizen by a government bureaucracy indifferent to democratic public opinion."

There is now a consensus among researchers in multiple fields: psychology, pediatrics, public health and medicine, regarding explanations of violence, childhood development and normal social learning processes. But so long as the Wolfgang paradigm remains strong, criminologists are unlikely to consider conflicting information, even if other fields have already made theoretical advances. Because the goal of this paper and presentation is to contribute to improved research, it will be necessary to test some of Wolfgang and Ferracuti’s (1982) claims, and ultimately, the subculture of violence theory directly. Homicide researchers themselves (e.g. Block & Block, 1991, Zahn, 1991) have called attention to the problems of this tradition: the failure to account theoretically for the culture, to test the subculture of violence concept with attitude surveys that insure the victims of violence are not also the victims of racism, to add new variables such as the mass media, or to give historical perspective to the Philadelphia study and the subculture of violence. But there are still issues that can be revisited, such as, the focus on dyadic relationships, the role of the victim in aggression, interracial and stranger violence, the effects of motivation, i.e., instrumentality versus expressiveness, the role of the powerful in many types of aggression, and whether homicides are inevitably an urban phenomenon.
WOLFGANG’S CLAIMS — AND THE EVIDENCE

First, we examine Wolfgang’s 1967 (pp. 5, 16-17) view of blacks, secondly, Wolfgang’s claim that during the years 1948-1952 in Philadelphia “all homicides had been committed by representatives from the blue-collar, lower . . . class.” And thirdly, we look at the assertion that the police were courteous, and always showed respect for blacks’ constitutional rights (p 16).

Yet, in the same text (1967, p. 4), Wolfgang reveals why the statistics (and the police) are not reliable sources of information for middle-class murderers. Such killers were afforded "social protection," and were "regularly perceived by officialdom as having engaged in behavior alien to their past personality . . . and often excused by reason of insanity or some similar social sinecure of exoneration." Contrast this picture with Wolfgang’s (p.4) description of lower-class lives:

The slum delinquent gang member who slays in a fight, and the bar-room brawler who ends a drunken drama with death are officially indicted for homicides that appear to culminate lives dethroned of propriety and dignity, devoted to destruction of property and person. (We are not here arguing on behalf of the persons from our latter example as also being subject for social protection, although we would strongly maintain that social determinism needs as much judicial recognition as does psychic determinism relative to the 'not-guilty-by-reason-of' plea.)

Wolfgang’s (1958, 1967) use of arrest statistics depends largely on the trustworthiness of the Philadelphia police. The records, both historical and recent, of corruption and brutality by the Philadelphia police will be presented. Here, mention should be made of Frank Rizzo, who joined the police force in 1943, became police commissioner in 1967, and the mayor in 1972. “On August 3, 1979, the United States District Court, charged that Philadelphia Mayor Frank Rizzo and 18 high-ranking city and police officials either committed or condoned ‘widespread and severe’ acts of police brutality, including beatings and shootings of suspects.” Rizzo called what he did “law and order.” The Justice Department regarded Philadelphia as having “the most brutal [department] in the nation” (Sifakis, 1982, p. 617).

Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1982) assured us that attitude surveys would bear out their subculture of violence thesis. Many such surveys were reported by Cao, Adams, and Jensen (1997, p. 370): Erlanger (1974), Dixon and Lizotte (1987), and Ellison (1991) conducted tests of the subculture of violence as a value system. None found support for the thesis. The last three studies had specifically found whites to be far more likely than blacks to approve of violence.

Cao et al. (1997) used the General Social Survey (1983-1991), with a sample size of 3,218 people. They were asked whether or not they would approve of violence in response to offensive or defensive situations. Defensive situations drew approval of third-party stranger violence (e.g. “would you approve of a stranger who. . .?”) In this definitive study, white males expressed significantly more belief in violence within “defensive and retaliatory situations” than did black males. No significant racial differences were found for offensive situations. They concluded that being black did not predict violent values.

In 1972, social psychologist Blumenthal (in McConnell, 1974, p. 96), conducted a survey of almost 1400 American men that revealed in-depth attitudinal differences between blacks and
whites. She found that (predominantly white) men who identified with the "Wild West" concept of justice also approved of the settlement of conflicts with armed violence. And many American white males who said they were opposed to violence actually approved of police shooting blacks or students, whether the dissidents were involved in riots or merely in nonviolent protests.

As for altering oppressive or discriminatory social practices through protests, blacks were three times more likely than whites to say “some deaths” would be required. One conclusion about these results was that blacks were more willing to die for a cause - and whites more willing to have police kill them. Support for violence is based upon identification with the aggressors, whereas rejection of violence is based upon identification with the victims. Police violence, in the guise of curbing lawlessness, was perceived as “violence justified by the circumstances,” or as “nonviolent actions” by whites, who also perceived civil rights workers as committing “violence against the government.” Blumenthal (McConnell, 1974, p. 97) concluded that it was “easier for these men to change their definition of violence than . . . change their attitudes about its acceptability. . . .” (Additional surveys will be presented.)

The conclusions from the 1969 Baker and Ball, (Eds.) studies of the mass media had already indicated we could return to being as violent a nation as we had been historically. But they also predicted that this could be avoided. Wolfgang was in a position to disseminate the findings from two relevant reports - from history and from the mass media, since he was appointed co-director for all the research reports of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence. These reports include history and mass media: Violence in America: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (1969), Graham and Gurr, (Eds.) (1969) and Mass Media and Violence, Baker and Ball, (Eds.) (1969).

The violent history of America should make the on-going culture of violence a surprise to no one. Our 300-year battle with Indians to take their land, and our importation of slaves to work that land, both reflect an overriding concern for one's own economic well-being, a need to maintain the power status quo, and a tendency toward racial violence beyond all reason.

The following is based on Roger Brown’s chapter in Graham and Gurr, (Eds.) (1969).

**Historical evidence of white intra- and interracial violence among strangers**

(Here, the presentation will include slides which are a digest of America's history of violence. Violent acts are divided into two categories: positive and negative. "Positive" refers to organized, governmental or quasi-governmental group activity, such as wars, police use of force, and vigilante justice. "Negative" refers to criminal violence by individuals, as well as violence arising out of racial, ethnic and religious hostilities.)

The forms of violence found throughout our history most clearly reflect the fundamental problem of racial hatred, with whites as the aggressors and blacks as the victims (as the presentation will demonstrate). A few other points should be noted: Murder, particularly in certain areas, has been regarded as an insignificant offense, even “fashionable,” and one for which the offender rarely has received punishment. Lawlessness has occurred simultaneously with violent, extra-legal punishment, through groups organized or governed by the elite of a
community. Brown (in Graham & Gurr, 1969, p.76), concludes: We have resorted to violence so often we are a “trigger-happy” people. Further,

Violence is ostensibly rejected by us, as part of the American value system, but so great has been our involvement with both negative and positive violence over the long sweep of our history that violence has truly become a part of our unacknowledged (or underground) value structure. . . .We must take stock of what we have done rather than what we have said (Brown, p.76).

If we step back and take a broad survey of American mass media, then, in a sense, our predilection for violence is easy to explain, almost obvious.

What is shown on television has reinforced the worst tendencies of Americans — economic greed, and a meanness that comes from our failure to share what we have, and to forget how easy it was to acquire.

**Learning to be violent: The relationship between television and violence**

In contrast to the cycle of violence research, the television and aggression literature is full of a variety of designs, viewing stimuli, circumstances (cartoons, actual TV broadcasts, live models, naturalistic viewing, and single-exposure situations), and measures of aggression (punching Bobo dolls, interpersonal aggression in play groups or classrooms, analog measures, and measures of naturally occurring aggression (Widom, 1989).

Like Brown (1969) and other historians of violence, Bandura (1973, p.99) believed that the origins of aggression must be sought for both “free-lancers” and for professionals (e.g. police) authorized to use aggression for social control, and the military trained for mass destruction. The fact that the military teaches people to kill strangers, when shortly before they had deplored killing, has “more profound implications for aggression than the actions of assaultive individuals or youthful groups residing in dismal neighborhoods,” Bandura said (p. 99). In both cases, people are not born with preformed patterns of behavior; that must be learned. And learning the modeled behavior is more likely to create imitation in the absence of frustration, anger or deficit motives. Extreme deprivation is more likely to lead to passivity, addiction or other problems, than it is to aggression.

Historically, the children of white middle- and upper-classes could learn about violence first hand. Their communities and their parents, particularly in the South and on the frontier, taught their children by example. Children could also learn attitudes from these respected adults, including racial hostility, which could be modeled without the child having direct knowledge of minorities. Over time they would become desensitized to certain behaviors - interracial violence in particular. They could anticipate the absence of sanctions, which was equivalent to a reward, and a stimulus for behaving similarly.

Much the same processes occur when violence is learned through vicarious means. Soon after television emerged as “entertainment,” it became obvious that middle-class children, from
good families and good neighborhoods, could learn about complex forms of murder from the approximately 8,000 homicides that were modeled for them by television characters, by the time they finished elementary school (Eron, 1993). TV’s predominantly white models displayed justified violence, and were rarely punished. Lower status models displayed unjustified violence, for which they were punished. The end result was that children learned new behaviors, and became desensitized to the sterile violence they saw. Later, they were more likely to be indifferent to someone in need of help than they were to display prosocial behaviors.

One of the first things clarified in the early laboratory studies was that children could learn as well from an actor on television as from an actor presented live, in the laboratory. Further, Liebert’s 1973 analysis of more than 50 laboratory studies, involving over 10,000 children aged 3-19, revealed that the more aggression a young person saw on television, “regardless of age, sex, or social background, the more aggressive he is likely to be in his own attitudes and behavior.” Liebert (p. 68) continues:

The effects are not limited to youngsters who are in some way abnormal, but rather, were found for large numbers of perfectly normal children. It was not a boy’s home life, not his school performance, not his family background, but the amount of TV violence he viewed at age 9 which was the single [greatest] determinant of how aggressive he was 10 years later, at age 19.

Today there are retrospective studies of imprisoned felons who consciously imitated behaviors on television. There are laboratory and field studies. There are two-year, double blind, control group studies of the natural exposure of a community to television, and at least 20 longitudinal studies of birth cohorts in various regions. As summarized by Huesmann (2009, p. 7) these studies show that “early habitual exposure to media violence in middle-childhood predicts increased aggressiveness 1 year, 3 years, 10 years, 15 years and 22 years later in adulthood, even controlling for early aggressiveness.” Many of these studies now include measures of arrest for criminal violence. Paik and Comstock’s (1994, in Huesmann, p. 5) state-of-the-art meta analysis of 217 studies showed an average effects size ($r=.38, N=432$) that is “moderate to large, compared to other public health effects.” Though not all, most studies confirmed that the amount of television watched as a child was significantly related to all types of aggression later on, including criminal violence. Most researchers conclude that the mass media is one cause of violent crime. Eron (1993, p. 1), Chairman of the APA Commission on Violence and Youth, testified: “The scientific debate is over.” (Bandura said the same thing in 1973.)
REFERENCES


To the study of the future of capital punishment in America in this new century, our report is the story of a dog that will no longer bark: mass legal executions (MLEs) – that is, the execution of four or more persons for the same criminal incident – will probably not occur again. For many criminologists, the surprise will not be a future without mass legal executions, but a past with enough of them to warrant study. However, during the past roughly 450 years of European settlements in what is now the United States, roughly 10% of persons executed were subjects of mass legal execution. The first known legal execution – near the St. John River in Florida in 1565, of four men for mutiny – was a mass execution, 43 years before the first execution on the most extensive list of American executions.

For the next 300 years, perhaps one of every 4-6 persons executed was part of a mass execution. For the 100 years after that, the percentage fell to more like 3%, for an overall total in the 7-8% range. While all such numbers and percentages are estimates, we can be fairly confident that there have been no such mass legal executions since the last one reported, in 1960, and foresee none.

Over the centuries, the end of mass executions often presaged the eventual end of all executions for that particular offense. Mass executions for piracy gradually petered out, with just a handful between American independence and 1835, followed three decades later by the last lone execution of a pirate. The last mass execution for rape occurred in 1951, with all executions for rape ended by the Supreme Court a few decades later. And the last mass execution for felony-murder occurred in 1960; it is likely the last execution of a non-triggerman in a group robbery-related homicide occurred in 2008. Perhaps the best evidence against additional MLEs is that, following the terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, killing six and injuring over 1,000 in a near-successful attempt to kill thousands, none of the ten Muslim terrorists convicted was even initially sentenced to death.

There are a number of reasons for the decline. Fewer offenses constitute capital crimes, particularly those involving groups so that mass executions are a possibility, and some have ceased to be crimes at all, such as witchcraft, slave revolt, and Indian uprising. We no longer have troops in a position where they are likely to desert or mutiny in this country. Espionage is not really a capital offense now; it is only even potentially capital if done in wartime, and wars are no longer declared. By the end of the Civil War, aside from a few executions for military offenses and rape, about the only offenses for which mass executions occurred were murders, and even those are rare.

That first mass execution in what is now the United States typified about one-fifth of the mass executions that took place in the ensuing 300 years, but less than one-percent of mass executions since the end of the Civil War: military activities, such as desertion, mutiny, treason,
and espionage. In colonial and early constitutional days, mass executions were believed essential as a deterrent to others. For example, during the War of 1812, General Winfield Scott ordered that men be resentenced to death after an initial court martial showed leniency. More recently, there is less desertion, and that which occurs is less of a threat to our ability to wage war. In addition, the “civil” nature of the Wars of Independence and Southern Secession – plus the location of other wars on or near American territory (War of 1812 and the Mexican War) – were more apt to create military situations where capital military offenses were perceived by the authorities as warranting death. Fear of retaliation may have kept the number of such executions down, during both wars with Great Britain, the War Between the States, and, later, in the war against the Axis Powers. For example, of the two mass executions of Germans during World War II, one occurred in August 1942, before American troops had really engaged the Germans, and the other occurred after VE day.

Other mass executions that occurred before the 20th century ceased because the group crime ceased to occur. Whether the huge number of antebellum mass executions of Black slaves, and of a few free Blacks and a handful of Whites – overall accounting for almost half of the mass executions during that period – were for real or imagined slave revolts, the end of slavery ended those legal executions. The mass executions of Indians ended once their resistance to European conquest and colonization had finally ceased. Until then, Indian resistance was often treated not as war or self-defense, but as an Indian revolt or as a murder, especially if there had been peaceful relations with the tribes involved. From the American perspective, agreements meant hostilities were over and renewed fighting was criminal behavior, even if really reactive to settler misbehavior.

Another crime with mass executions from colonial days through 1835, was piracy – robbery on the high seas. Colonists in the 17th century were more apt to benefit from piracy rather than to suffer from it. Pirates spent their money here and brought some of the Navigation-Act violating imports to the colonies. So Americans were no more inclined to punish pirates than Somalis are now, until they were largely forced to by the British early in the 18th century, with legal changes even removing ordinary colonists from juries. When piracy was actively prosecuted as a crime – accounting for almost 10% of antebellum mass legal executions – it was frequently one subjecting the guilty to mass execution. There were several reasons for this, including the likelihood of mass arrests on the few occasions when any arrests occurred, and the democratic nature of the piratical trade, making all participants equally guilty unless they could really prove coercion, no easy matter. Massive consolidated international attacks on piracy from roughly 1715 to 1725 largely wiped it out, with sporadic executions during the rest of the century. A brief increase occurred during the Latin American independence movements, ending, for American purposes, with a mass execution of Hispanic pirates in 1835. After that, piracy was more an individual offense (robbery and murder) that happened to occur at sea, often committed by a crew member, with the last American execution in 1860.

During the 100 years between the Civil War and the Supreme Court's moratorium on all executions, almost all mass executions were for aggravated murder. Indeed, although a few executions officially involved a crime other than murder after 1865, we have thus far found only two mass executions that occurred without a single criminal homicide having been committed by at least one of the perpetrators. In some ways, the limitation of mass legal executions to
aggravated homicides between the Civil War and World War II is misleading. The extension of
due process and the curbs on what constituted a capital offense certainly and sharply curtailed the
number of mass legal executions. They were partially replaced, however, by mass illegal or
extralegal executions: killings by authorities of the state without due process of law, and state-,
or at least socially, sanctioned homicides without direct state action, including riots and
lynchings. There were also several incidents of private security forces or state militias being used
to suppress labor activities with massive casualties – informal mass executions for what labor
leaders might have considered a variant on slave revolt, just as such actions also supplemented

textual content
Selected Bibliography


Panel Session #6: Special Topic in Homicide Research – Recorder’s Notes

Panel Recorder: Sarah Ann Sacra, University of Central Florida


Chris Rasche: Did you get on this because the idea of the serial killer is supposedly a new phenomenon. Was looking for the first concept (1936) before academia.

Ned Levine: What is the relationship between the media creating the idea of a serial murderer and police being able to link murders together. Does the evolution of media/newspaper follow the trends of police? We want to have better linking techniques of linking serial murders which weren't back in the day, but today with confessions we see more, but back then, we didn't know there were as many that were known as most were found out a after the fact.

Barrie Ritter: Police believed serial murders couldn't link them because they couldn't link multiple jurisdiction murders so it was with the use of the media that a lot of the cases were linked.

Vance McLaughlin: NY denied the problem of serial murders in NY until a bad case of following blood trails. In order to not gain publicity.

Dallas Drake: What was the quality of the data, multiple newspapers that covered a single report? For some of the later ones/family had different stories. People confessing was typically only 1 story as it was in the state. What was the degree of newspaper coverage for these cases? Very small. Do you have any advice how to identify these cases? What to look for? I do not as no specific method of research was followed. A lot of times when people said they killed a person, they never gave last names. Did these reports have headlines or were just part of the text somewhere? Part of the text, not on front page.

Vanessa Leggit: Can potentially search NY newspaper databases by searching key terms to find the cases.

Beyond the Wolfgang Paradigm – Barrie & Jack Ritter
Audio recording started: 10:48 AM Saturday, June 07, 2014

Ned Levine: You're very right to be concerned about the lack of evidence when people make assumption about the culture of violence. Look at it more historically though. In 1920s and 30s, living in slums and children taken from families, whites were mainly positively affected. Crimes were perpetuated by policy implementation to tear down slums. Overall, there is a long argument on this that needs to be considered as well.
Chris Rasche: Look at the more recent revisions of Vold's 1958 book. This is a larger framework of Criminological theory. He framed a very different paradigm from bio and psych. There is a larger body of literature that goes way beyond. Barrie- The rest of the Wolfgang paradigm needs to be tested.

Dallas Drake: It really brings out the idea of group think; how do we break free from it? The whole idea is that everyone jumps of bandwagon of programs like Ceasefire so it raises questions about new ideas that challenge what we have created as a body of work. Barrie- look to other fields that do not do group think. They interweave empirical research with theory so there are consensus across fields that would further the knowledge.

Chris Rasche: ASC will do no policy statements because there cannot be agreement. Dominance of ideology in Criminological theory and policy, criminologists are driven more by ideology than theory.

Lin Huff-Corzine: There’s a difference between group think and working in groups. What we do know is that the work that is done by groups is usually more expert than if an individual is doing it alone. So we must make sure we understand the difference between the two.

The Dog that Stopped Barking: Mass Legal Executions in 21st Century America
Paul Blackman & Vance McLaughlin
Audio recording started: 11:09 AM Saturday, June 07, 2014

Jack Ritter: All types of executions, method of death was efficient, which scared me. Were the witch trials the only executions that included torture? Generally speaking, Americans almost never used burning and we never burned witched. Hung 19 of them and 1 was pressed because he refuse to plead. There were a few executions by burning which were slaves or wives who killed their husbands. When used for that, someone usually strangled her before she suffered.

Vanessa Leggit: Can you speak to more SLA and branch divisions? Those would not fit the definition of mass execution because there was no due trial. It was improper police procedure that lead to mass death. Had SLA, black panther killings, branch divisions which I believe were intention from the government. Earlier, there were times when trials appeared to be happening but actually not. The question is, what is due process?

Barrie Ritter: Vigilantism which is considered positive violence but law and order was already there but they just wanted to do it themselves. Paul- differences between state sanctioned homicide and socially sanctioned homicide.

Ned Levine: Are you looking at geographic and social factors that are associated? Are these mass execution occurring where they have more single executions? Paul- it is disproportionately happening in the South but there are only a few numbers of them. Predominantly and disproportionately racist and therefore mostly South. But there would be mass executions where there are a lot of gangs such as New York or Indians in the Est and military ones wherever the military is.
A Tale of Two Cities: 
Testing Ecological Theories of Police Shootings on a Small Scale

Amanda Farrell 
Anne Lee 
Old Dominion University

Several theoretical approaches have been employed to understand use of deadly force incidents. While there are noted discrepancies and limitations associated with the available data on officer involved shootings at the municipal, county, state and national levels (Alpert & Fridell, 1992; Burch, 2011; Fyfe, 1981, 2002; Geller & Scott, 1992; Sherman & Langworthy, 1979), it is important to address the theoretical applications and acknowledge that, should better and more reliable data on these incidents become available, theoretical testing may be more useful (and sophisticated) in these types of analyses. Social disorganization (Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 1997; Shaw, McKay, & Hayner, 1942) is a theory commonly applied to urban crime and its spatial concentration. The principles of this theoretical orientation, racial or ethnic heterogeneity, population mobility, and concentrated disadvantage, are seen throughout the literature on police shootings and use of force. However, it is more appropriate to combine this perspective with Black’s theory of law (1976) as it applies to the police (1980) and Klinger’s (1997) ecological theory of police behavior to provide a more comprehensive understanding of these incidents. Inspired by the existing literature’s suggestion of a spatial relationship between officer-involved shootings and violent crimes, this research examines this potential relationship comparatively across two very different cities, Norfolk and Virginia Beach, Virginia.

ECOLOGICAL THEORIES OF USE OF DEADLY FORCE

Black (1976, 1980) hypothesized that individuals vary in their abilities to apply and use the law, especially with regards to the amount and effectiveness of the law used; when specifically considering the police, use of force is akin to the application of law, which is in turn impacted by the quantity and quality of law available. Further, Black (1976) indicated that police would show increased aggression and punitiveness towards those who exist outside the dominant groups, particularly those who are poor, minorities and young, which strongly aligns with Bayley and Mendelsohn’s (1969) argument that increased aggression and punitiveness will be displayed in lower class and high crime neighborhoods, as well as with White’s (2002) conflict model of police use of force.

Smith (1986) used Black’s (1976) theory in the context of variables commonly associated with social disorganization, finding that there were significant racial differences in the
application of force. This suggests that there is an interaction between the individual and place in these incidents, as the use of force increases were seen in minority and racially heterogeneous areas. This perspective was supported by the findings of Sun, Payne and Wu (2008), who noted increases in coercive behaviors and interactions by police in poor neighborhoods. They suggested from a social disorganization perspective, the increased use of force may stem from the causal chain of increased disorganization leading to increased crime leading to increased calls for service and thereby resulting in increased police presence and interaction in disadvantaged communities. Yet, Sun, Payne and Wu (2008) also acknowledge that these results could simply indicate that minorities and the poor are subject to increased coercive police behavior, suggesting a conflict orientation.

Klinger (1997) notes that there is an interaction that occurs between the crime rate, the seriousness of an offense, and the vigor with which an officer responds, while also noting that use of force does not equate to vigor. Instead, Klinger (1997) indicates that officers in a given area perceive a normative amount of deviance for that particular area and only react to those transgressions that violate that perceived standard, thus formal police work decreases in areas with high rates of deviance. Terrill and Reisig (2003) suggest that Klinger’s ecological theory may support the use of neighborhood context as an explanatory factor for police use of force, but caution that Klinger’s work utilized police districts, which are much larger than neighborhoods, as the primary unit of analysis, thus making application and comparison of this theory at the neighborhood level problematic. However, there have been several other studies that suggest an ecological or geographic patterning of police behavior. Kania and Mackey (1977) and Fyfe (1980) both found significant correlations between measures of community violence and violence perpetrated by police. Much like Skolnick’s (1966) symbolic assailant, Terrill and Reisig (2003) found that police display an increased use of force in high crime areas, suggesting that problem places and increased perception of danger lead to the labeling of symbolic neighborhoods, similar to the identification of the symbolic assailant (Skolnick, 1966). This finding is also supported by Werthman and Piliavin’s (1967) concept of ecological contamination, where officers tend to associate neighborhoods with the rate at which they encounter potential suspects.

METHODOLOGY

The data utilized for this research was collected from several sources; the officer involved shooting data for this study were derived from a content analysis of newspaper articles from the Hampton Roads region of Virginia. This data was collected through keyword searches of the online archives of The Virginian Pilot, spanning the time period from April 1990 to September 2010. The archives were searched using the terms “police shoot*,” “police shot,” and “police kill.” These search terms were utilized to capture information about all lethal and non-lethal police-involved shootings in the Virginia Beach and Norfolk during this time period.

The data that is used in the construction of the violent crime variables is provided by the Norfolk and Virginia Beach Police Departments. The data from the police departments are comprised of crimes known to the police and the location where the crime occurred at the block level. The measure of violent crime includes the number of homicides, rapes, robberies,
aggravated assaults, for 2005 and 2010. The final source of data is from the US Census, which is
used to create several control variables included in the analyses.

Peterson and Krivo (2009a) describe the borders of neighborhoods as permeable, and as
being affected by the characteristics and events of by nearby communities. Considerable support
for the importance of studying spatial influences has been found in their work and in the work of
others (see Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003; Mears and Bhati, 2006; Peterson and Krivo, 2009a,
2009b). In light of these findings, spatial analysis will be used to further examine the relationship
in question, to do this the locations of violent crimes and officer-involved shootings are mapped
using Arc GIS, and aggregated to the census tract level.

DISCUSSION

It should be noted that this study is not considered to be a population of shooting
incidents, as there are several fatal and non-fatal incidents that have occurred within this region
of which the authors are aware that did not appear in the newspaper articles examined in this
study. It is likely that there is still a significant dark figure (Biderman & Reiss, 1967;
McCintock, 1970; Messner, 1984; Snortum & Berger, 1986) associated with police involved
shootings that will only be addressed by open access to police records, to include all instances
when officers discharge their weapons.

Further, these shooting incidents are not distributed evenly across Norfolk and Virginia
Beach or years. For the time period under examination Norfolk had 44 shooting incidents, while
Virginia Beach had 35 shooting incidents. Just as Terrill and Reisig (2003) adopted Skolnick’s
symbolic assailant (1966) to discuss symbolic neighborhoods, characterized by higher crime
rates and increased officer perceptions of danger, Norfolk may be a symbolic city a la Skolnick
(1966). This finding, however, must be used with caution under the same arguments that Terrill
and Reisig (2003) applied to Klinger’s (1997) analysis: where Klinger analyzed patrol districts,
which are larger than neighborhoods and may obscure support for the impact of neighborhood or
ecological context.

Preliminary findings indicate a significant positive relationship between violent crimes
and officer involved shooting incidents. Granted the final analyses produce similar results, these
findings relate to two areas of current policy considerations. First is community oriented policing
("About COPS: COPS History," 2009; Oliver, 2008), as it is meant to involve members of the
community in collaborative policing efforts, thus increasing social capital (Rosenfeld, Messner,
& Baumer, 2001; Salmi & Kivivuori, 2006; Triplett, Gainey, & Sun, 2003) and collective
efficacy (Sampson, 2009; Sampson et al., 1997; Xu, Fiedler, & Flaming, 2005). These actions
can lead to the reduction of the hallmarks of social disorganization (Bursik, 1988; Bursik &
Grasmick, 1993; Sampson & Groves, 1989; Taylor, 2001), thus these efforts may also have the
potential to reduce officer involved shootings in these neighborhoods. In turn, these findings may
also contribute to building empirical support for community oriented policing strategies, thus
adding to evidence based policing (Avdija, 2008; Bueermann, 2012; Lambert, 2012; Lum,
Koper, & Telep, 2011). Future research should seek to determine if these findings are replicated
in other areas and should seek to determine if there is a significant change in the number of
and/or spatial patterning of officer involved shootings in communities that have implemented various community oriented policing strategies.
REFERENCES


Introduction

The literature is replete with terms applied to the people left behind when someone they know, perhaps someone they love, has been murdered. Whether they are called co-victims (Armour, 2002), vicarious victims (Daigle, 2013), or survivors of homicide (Doerner & Lab, 2015), they include “…the family, friends, and/or significant others who have experienced the death of a loved one by homicide…” (Vessier-Batchen & Douglas (2006, p. 25). Govier & Verwoerd (2002) emphasize how a homicide affects not only family members and close associates, but also contributes to a sense of collective loss by increasing feelings of anxiety and insecurity. The authors cite the assassination of Martin Luther King and its impact on African-Americans as one example.

DeSoir (2012) takes the distinction even further with reference to secondary and tertiary victims, which are distinguished in terms of whether they were close associates with the victim (secondary) or if they were involved with the response to the homicide (tertiary). Among persons involved in the response to homicide, a sense of collective loss is also possible. First responders may experience effects similar to family members and intimates of homicide victims. One objective of the present research is to explore distributive aspects (Govier & Verwoerd, 2002) of victimization among one category of first responders, specifically focusing on line of duty deaths among law enforcement.

Whatever the official definition, homicide survivors may find themselves in a state of crisis. Even when the outcome is acceptance, the process of getting there can be a difficult one. Oftentimes, however these individuals have no chance to experience anticipatory grief, that is, the social psychological preparation family, friends, and significant others of those with long term illnesses go through prior to a loved one’s death. Instead, they normally enter the four stages of grieving (Kübler-Ross, 1969) with greater shock/denial and anger than if there had been time to anticipate their significant other’s death. Thus, it may take homicide survivors longer to process through the shock/denial, anger, feelings of isolation, and eventual acceptance/recovery that Kübler-Ross describes as taking an indirect route from stage to stage, then falling back to an earlier stage, and eventually ending in acceptance for most secondary victims.

Related to how the family and friends experience the grieving process following the homicide of their significant other is the lifestyle and social setting of both the direct victim and the survivor. Daigle (2013) asserts that factors influencing this process include the type of
homicide that occurred, e.g., homicides related to alcohol or drugs, domestic violence, gang activity, an isolated sudden event, mass or serial events.

In any case, according to the literature, e.g., Doerner & Lab (2015), most direct homicide victims are men under 40. In addition, Black men are overrepresented among homicide victims. Thus, women, especially Black women, are more likely to be the indirect victims or homicide survivors, who potentially must cope with their loss while also doing their best to help any children they may have cope with the loss. In addition to the emotional work, they may also suddenly become the lone adult responsible for child care and financial support of the family. A study by Freedy, Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky, & Tidwell (1994) found that over 70% of homicide survivors also experienced Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with the greatest percentages among family members.

**Research Directions**

The first element of our research will address characteristics of homicide survivors, and also how these characteristics may influence the coping/recovery process. Following past literature, information from police reports, and data provided by survivors directly and on websites, we will emphasize a number of their characteristics, including: age; gender; marital status; number of children; parents; number of siblings; employment status; participation/membership in church, civic, or volunteer organizations; victim/offender relationship; and arrest, conviction, and sentence information for offender(s) associated with the case.

Miller (2009) provides an overview of various individuals and entities that can assist the survivors in the coping/recovery process, which is more complex for those experiencing a sudden loss of a loved one due to homicide. To that end, survivors will be asked to provide information on sources of support following the homicide, including family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, and clergy or spiritual leaders. The criminal justice system can also provide support for survivors, although some studies find that the legal process causes more stress than comfort (Orth, 2002). Based on Horne (2003) we hope to assess the utilization of support from counselors, court advocates, and case management services, and also the perceived satisfaction of survivors who utilize the services of these entities.

Secondary and tertiary victimization among first responders highlights a number of key issues. The previous discussion of the distinction between secondary/tertiary victimization notwithstanding, first responders may experience distress during the course of their normal duties. A characteristic or attribute of the victim may remind a counselor, victim advocate, Paramedic/EMT, or law enforcement officer of an acquaintance, friend, significant other, or perhaps a child. For example, one of the authors of the present research was involved in a review of a number of solved homicide cases, many of them graphic in nature. In that instance, the case that stood out did so because the child of the author was the same age as the victim. The figurative line(s) between personal and professional life can become blurred, but the potential consequences are extremely important.

As a consequence, a second component of this research will focus on secondary and tertiary victimization among one category of first responders, specifically line of duty deaths
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(LODD) for law enforcement. There is an extensive literature on the culture of law enforcement, and one of the key themes of this research illuminates the extent to which the culture is a closed one. As a result, even if officer(s) are not acquainted with or close associates with a LODD, he or she may be classified as a survivor within a more narrow definition because it triggers an emotional response, in part based on shared identity (DeSoir, 2012). In this instance, Redmond’s (1989) estimate of survivors is likely understated.

Bettinger (2014) points out elements of this culture and its closed nature with his answer to the question of “Why so many police officers attend police funerals” by suggesting they (law enforcement) only “have their families and each other.” This example also hints at another element associated with the police culture, namely the reluctance of some officers to seek help in difficult times (e.g. stress, relationship/marital problems, alcohol use, etc.) because it can be viewed as a sign of weakness. A LODD no doubt tests attitudes and assumptions about policing and perhaps life itself. Failure to recognize these effects can have an impact on job performance, as well as professional and personal relationships (DeSoir, 2012).

For this component of the research, data on line of duty deaths will be compiled from a variety of sources, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation LEOKA, the Officer Down Memorial Page (ODMP), and the National Law Enforcement Officers Memorial Fund, as well as PoliceOne (www.PoliceOne.com). One point of emphasis will be to show the disparity between data sources in terms of content and detail. For example, in 2012 the LEOKA and ODMP estimates of line of duty deaths are 48 and 102, respectively, in part due to the former utilizing a more restrictive definition of qualifying incidents.

Information for the LODD component of the research will include: cause of death; position/rank; years of service; marital status; number of children; parents (living); siblings; department size; whether the department has experienced other LODD incidents; and information on services provided to survivors within and outside of the agency. This information will prove valuable in better understanding the effect of line of duty deaths on family members, fellow employees, and the community alike.
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Race, Sex, and Homicide Victimization Trends Over Time

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The Current Study

The current study presents trends in homicide victimization rates over time for White males, White females, Black males, and Black females. Data used are from the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS), a monitoring effort undertaken by the National Center for Health Statistics, a branch of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The WISQARS program available from the CDC was used to calculate homicide rates by year, method of death, and race of the victim. Data were restricted in the following manner. First, analyses were restricted to “violence-related injuries.” Second, analyses were restricted to “homicides and legal intervention.” Third, analyses were restricted to “homicide” (excluding “legal intervention”). Fourth, analyses were restricted to “White” or “Black” race (analyses conducted separately). Fifth, analyses were disaggregated by “male” or “female” (analyses conducted separately). Sixth, analyses were restricted to “firearm” or “non-firearm” (analyses conducted separately). Each calculation was separated by year to document trends over time. We first used the Fatal Injury Reports 1981-1998 and then the Fatal Injury Reports 1999-2010 before pooling them into a single file used to chart the trends between 1981 and 2010.

Results

Figure 1 presents the rate of homicide victimization for the total population for all homicides and disaggregated by firearm and non-firearm homicides between 1980 and 2010. Consistent with other presentations using UCR arrest data, there is a clear pattern of increase between the early 1980s a peak in 1993, and a steep and consistent decline thereafter.

Figure 1: Homicide Victimization Rate Trends by Weapon Type, per 100,000
These patterns, however, mask important differences between firearm and non-firearm homicides. The pattern is driven by the relatively high rate of firearm homicides. Less common than firearm homicides, the pattern for non-firearm homicides illustrates a pattern of relative stability between 1980 and 1990, followed by a steady decrease thereafter. These patterns indicate that the increase in violence occurring in the late-1980s was driven by an increase in rates of firearm homicides, while rates of non-firearm homicides remained relatively constant. The drop in homicides indicates a slightly different picture—one of decrease in both firearm and non-firearm homicides since the early 1990s—although the decrease has been greater in victimizations involving guns than in homicides not involving guns.

Figure 2 presents the trends in firearm homicide victimization by race and sex. Several patterns can be observed. Of considerable import, there are clear differences in homicide trends for White males, White females, Black males, and Black females. Regardless of year, Black males had substantially higher victimization rates than any other group and White females had the lowest homicide victimization rate. Interestingly, rates for Black females were similar to those of White males, indicating a greater risk for African Americans relative to Whites more generally. There are also considerable differences in the homicide victimization trends by race and sex. It is clear that the high rates of homicide victimizations of Black males, and the changes that occurred within this group, are driving patterns of lethal violence over time. Looking particularly at the period of increase between the early 1980s and mid-1990s, we also see relatively slight increases in homicide victimization for both Black females and White males, as well, although their increases are far less dramatic than those of Black males. It is important to note that the increase during this time was more dramatic for Black females than for White males. Looking at the period of decline between the mid-and late-1990s, we also see patterns of decrease for Black males, Black females, and White males. The most obvious declines were for Black males, followed by Black females, and then White males. Interestingly, trends in homicide victimization for White females show remarkable stability, with rates consistent and considerably below those of any other group. Since 1998, the patterns for all groups are ones of general stability.

Figure 2: Firearm Homicide Victimization Rate Trends by Race and Sex, per 100,000
Shifting focus slightly, Figure 3 presents the homicide victimization rate by age in 2010. While this figure does not present any information regarding trends, it presents information in homicide risk by race, sex, and age. Several patterns are again clear. First, rates of homicide victimization are relatively similar between the four groups early in life (ages 0 through 11 or so). The periods of adolescence and young adulthood, however, show considerable differences across groups. Rates for Black males, black females, and White males show an increase in homicide victimization rates beginning in the early teens. Beginning in the early teens, the rate of homicide victimization increases dramatically for Black males relative to other groups.

Patterns of risk for White males and Black females are similar to one another, while the risk for White females remains low. Equally important is the decrease in risk later in life. The risk for Black females and White males decreases relatively steadily until the mid-to-late-20s, with rates similar to those of White females by the early 40s. The risk for Black males increases quickly between the early teens and age 20, followed by a considerable decline until the early 50s. Risk of homicide victimization remains considerably higher than any other group, however, until Black males are in their 70s.

Discussion and Conclusions

Much research documented the swift rise in homicides from the mid-1980s to the early 1990s. Clearly this was driven by changes in homicides committed by firearms. Equally important, however, has been the considerable crime drop and stabilization during the past two decades. While scholars have begun to address this period, few studies have examined the intersection of race, gender, and age in patterns of homicide victimization.

The current study provided descriptive information on trends in firearm homicide victimization for four groups: white males, Black males, white females, and Black females. Several important findings were reported. First, consistent with decades of research, Black males have considerably higher rates of firearm homicide victimization than any other group, regardless of when this was examined over the 30 year period. Second, while Black males were disproportionately affected by the large increase in the firearm homicide victimization rate in the
mid-1980s to early-1990s, they have also been the primary beneficiaries of the drop and subsequent stabilization in this type of victimization occurring since that time. Third, although they have benefitted greatly from this drop, patterns examining the risk of homicide victimization by age illustrate considerably higher risk for Black males beginning in their early teens, and this risk remains elevated for decades thereafter. Fourth, although not nearly as pronounced as patterns for Black males, those for Black females illustrate similar patterns as those found for white males.

The findings reported here make clear the need for incorporating race, sex, and age into explanations for homicide victimization. Equally important is the need for temporally specific explanations as rates of homicide victimization vary considerably over time.
Panel Session 7: Victimization Considerations – Recorder’s Notes

Recorder: Kayla Ward, University of Central Florida

A Tale of Two Cities: Testing Ecological Theories of Police Shootings on a Small Scale
Amanda Farrell & Anne Lee

Vance McLaughlin: Government intervention maps, dispersions that explain where they take place online.
Ned Levine: Taking tourists into consideration using employment numbers.
Amanda: Norfolk has weird unemployment stats. Many people are paid under the table.
Ned: Max number of shootings per track?
Amanda: 4.
Ned: Use a logit model instead.
Anne: BLS was used a preliminary analysis. The logit model will be looked into.

Lin Huff-Corzine: Tourist measurement: Police staff increase and decrease.
Jay Corzine: Hotel records for room occupancy by day. Data may be difficult to obtain. Average.
Vanessa: Community based policing theory, if more successful less shootings? Look at other communities with CBP.
Amanda: Mentioned in program.
Mary Ritter: Instead of focusing on social disorganization look at Bandura for economic deprivation.
Amanda: Norfolk has checkered disadvantage.
Dallas Drake: Shot Spotter Data?
Amanda: Might have access.
Dallas: Use it for where shooting occurred.

Living Homicide Victims: Exploring the Effects of Homicide on Significant Others
Greg Weaver, Lin Huff-Corzine, Melissa Tetzlaff-Bemiller, and J. Amber Scherer

Amanda Farrell: The literature is narrow on impact. Qualitative work showed layered trauma experiences for cops. Dual cop couples.
Wendy Regoecki: Homicide Studies accepted a paper on significant others. It had multi city interviews about needs met/ needed.
Chris Dunn: Look at Becky Block’s study of homicide victims by proxy in Chicago.
Lin Huff-Corzine: Becky was supposed to be a part of the paper. However, we are familiar with the work. We want to encourage others to participate in this type of research as well.
Dallas Drake: Resiliency factors. What works well?

Lin Huff-Corzine: I’d like to know that as well. Because the police support, they might do better.

Greg Weaver: It depends on the available resources and how they’re used.

Dallas Drake: Connections within organization, aren’t they support structures? Some individuals have little support.

Ned Levine: Does NCVS ask if they know anyone who has been killed?

Lin Huff-Corzine: No, we wish that it did. They think it would be upsetting to the family.

Ned Levine: Are there surveys of law officers that have been asked that?

Greg Weaver: Some but with bad response rates.

Ned Levine: Look into ICPSR.

Lin Huff-Corzine: Everyone should look into doing this research. Looking into homicide survivor websites for content analysis and idea.

Lin Huff-Corzine: Unknown offenders can be upsetting as well as guilty parties not being convicted.

Wendy Regoezci: GSS includes known killed.

Race, Sex, and Homicide Victimization Trends Over Time
Terrance Taylor, Shytiera Gaston, and CheyOnna Sewell,

Kathleen Heidi: Is there any way to evaluate class? As we age, we should be moving out of the

Terrance Taylor: No, there is not. We could merge census data or look at other data. We would like to though.

Jay Corzine: Metro/non metro split.

Terrance Taylor: Access data maybe?

Jay Corzine: This may explain the variation.

Mary Ritter: Look at Rand’s study “Doing Crime” and VJS “Profile of Prison Inmates in England and Whales”.

Wendy Regoezci: They do collect victim data in public access so look into that.
## APPENDIX 1

### 2014 Homicide Research Working Group Annual Meeting Attendees

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