Low Homeownership in Germany
- A Quantitative Exploration*  

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Abstract
The homeownership rate in Germany is one of the lowest among advanced economies. To better understand this fact, we analyze the role of three specific policies which discourage homeownership in Germany: an extensive social housing sector with broad eligibility criteria, high transfer taxes when buying real estate, and no tax deductions for mortgage interest payments by owner-occupiers. We build a life-cycle model with uninsurable income and housing risks and endogenous homeownership in order to quantify the policy effects on homeownership and welfare. We find that all three policies have sizable effects on the homeownership rate. At the same time, household welfare would be reduced by moving to a policy regime with low transfer taxes, but it would improve in the absence of social housing, in particular when coupled with housing subsidies for low-income households.

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1 Introduction

Germany has one of the lowest homeownership rates of developed countries with only 44% of households owning their main residence in the year 2010.\footnote{According to data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey of the European Central Bank, this is the lowest homeownership rate in the Eurozone. Within the OECD, only Switzerland has a lower homeownership rate than Germany. At the opposite extreme is Spain which has the highest homeownership rate (83% in 2010) in the Eurozone. In comparison, the U.S. stands at 67% in 2010 (U.S. Census) and the U.K. at 71% in 2004 (Andrews and Caldera, 2011).} There are several potential reasons for this phenomenon: Aside from culture or preferences, German policies and institutions, both directly affecting the housing market or influencing the savings behavior of households, might differ in particular ways from those in other countries and may therefore be responsible for the observed gap in the homeownership rate.

In this paper we focus on the impact of a specific set of housing market policies which tilt incentives towards renting. In contrast to the U.S. and to several European countries with higher homeownership, Germany has a social housing sector with broad eligibility requirements, high transfer taxes on buying real estate and no mortgage interest rate tax deductions for owner-occupiers. We analyze to what extent these policies matter for Germany’s low homeownership rate. We further ask if these policies are beneficial for households, or if alternative housing policies could potentially improve the well-being of society.

Specifically, we quantitatively investigate how moving towards U.S.-style housing policies affects homeownership, wealth accumulation and welfare of households. We build a life-cycle model with stochastic ageing and uninsurable income and housing risks, in which households make decisions about consumption of goods and housing services, savings and homeownership. House prices and rents are determined in equilibrium and depend on a supply technology with diminishing returns in the construction sector. Households benefit from homeownership but are constrained by a down payment requirement for mortgages. Gains from homeownership come from the fact that the market rental rate includes a premium to cover the monitoring costs of commercial landlords.

Our quantitative model takes as inputs labor income dynamics, tax and transfer policies, and existing social housing policies in Germany. First, we non-parametrically estimate age-dependent household labor income processes from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Second, we estimate the progressive tax and transfer functions from the same data. Third, we set various housing policy parameters, such as social housing access and subsidies, house price and rental risk, real-estate transfer taxes, mortgage rates and down payment requirements, to represent the factual details of the existing environment. Finally, we calibrate the remaining parameters of the model to the German economy by matching the aggregate
homeownership rate, the social housing stock and the average wealth of households.

The model reproduces well the empirical life-cycle profiles of homeownership and household wealth accumulation. In addition, it mimics the distribution of homeownership by wealth and income. This gives us confidence to use the model as a tool for policy analysis and evaluation.

We implement three policy experiments that potentially foster homeownership. First, we consider a reduction of the real-estate transfer tax (RETT) from its current level of 5% to 0.33% which is the average level of this tax in the U.S. Second, we make mortgage interest payments fully tax deductible. Third, we eliminate the social housing sector. All policies are implemented in a fiscally neutral fashion by adjusting income taxes so as to balance the government budget.

We find that these policies go a long way in explaining the low homeownership rate in Germany. Each policy experiment has significant positive effects on the homeownership rate, with a combined effect leading to a counterfactual homeownership rate of 58%, which closes the gap to the U.S. by about two thirds. Higher homeownership does not only lead to a substitution of financial wealth by housing wealth, but it also increases average household net wealth by more than 11%.

At the same time we find diverging effects of these policy experiments in terms of household welfare. The reduction of the RETT reduces welfare for all newborn households. The reason is that this policy reform boosts housing demand which leads to an increase of house prices and rental rates in general equilibrium. Lower tax revenues further need to be offset by higher income tax rates. Both effects hurt renter and owner households simultaneously. We further look at the changes in welfare for newborn entrants in the economy differentiated by their initial labor income. The welfare losses of the RETT reduction are lowest for high-income entrants because these are more likely to become homeowners and to extract benefits from the tax cut.

The introduction of mortgage interest tax deductions brings about positive, albeit rather small long-term welfare gains which are on average 0.1% in terms of consumption equivalence and nearly zero for young households in the bottom two income deciles. Similar to the reduction of RETT, the welfare gains are diminished by an increase of house prices and rental rates in response to an increase in housing demand. Furthermore, along the transition path after this budget-neutral tax reform, most households (except the youngest) lose.

On the other hand, abolishing social housing brings about welfare gains of 0.2-0.3% in consumption equivalence to the average household, both in the long term and during the transition phase. Without social housing, the aggregate demand for housing services is lower which reduces house prices in equilibrium. This makes homeownership more affordable
and benefits in particular wealthier households whose homeownership rates increase most strongly. Furthermore, saving subsidies for social housing allows the government to cut income taxes which benefits all households. When differentiated by initial labor income, the biggest winners of this policy are entering households with high income. Welfare gains are still positive at the bottom end of the income distribution, even though the option of renting a social housing unit at a reduced rate is gone.

As the welfare gains of abolishing social housing are much smaller for low-income entrants than for their high-income counterparts, we further study the effect of direct housing subsidies to the poor to replace the current social housing policy. This policy is associated with average welfare gains of 0.9% in terms of benchmark consumption and much larger benefits for poor entrants into the economy. In essence, direct housing subsidies for low-income households provide a better insurance device than social housing which is itself risky (because access is rationed) and which is exclusive to renter households.

To our knowledge, this is the first quantitative macroeconomic model of the German housing market. Our analysis of introducing mortgage interest tax deductions in Germany is closely related to several U.S. studies. Building on earlier work of Gervais (2002) and Cho and Francis (2011), Sommer and Sullivan (2018) and Floetotto et al. (2016) analyze housing policies in models with endogenous house prices. Floetotto et al. (2016) find that homeownership rates are higher in the long-run with mortgage interest deductions but welfare is lower for most households. Sommer and Sullivan (2018) follow Chambers et al. (2009) and take into account the interaction of the deductibility of mortgage interest payments with the progressive tax system. They find that repealing mortgage deductions for owner-occupiers lead to higher homeownership and welfare. The difference between the two studies comes from a larger countervailing price effect which in part depends on how the supply side is modeled.

A further contribution of this paper is the analysis of the aggregate and distributional effects of real-estate transfer taxes and social housing. The existing macroeconomic literature on such policies is limited, partly due to fact that they do not matter much in the U.S. housing

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2See Davis and Van Nieuwerburgh (2015) and Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) for surveys of the macroeconomic housing literature which focuses mostly on the U.S.

3Government interventions in the mortgage market via bailout guarantees are analyzed by Jeske et al. (2013). Such policies are not relevant in the German context where down payment requirements are higher and foreclosure rates are low.

4The unsettled results of the quantitative macroeconomic literature are also reflected in the empirical study of Hilber and Turner (2014) who find that mortgage interest deductibility can have positive or negative effects on homeownership, depending on the elasticity of regional housing supply. See also Gruber et al. (2017) who utilize a quasi-experimental setup for Denmark. In their study, the deductibility of mortgage interest payments only has an effect on the intensive margin of house purchases.
Therefore, the modeling side of our paper can potentially be useful for quantitative housing market studies of other (European) countries where such policies play a prominent role. In a recent paper, Sieg and Yoon (2017) build a dynamic equilibrium model with uninsurable income risk to study social housing policies in New York City. Households can apply for different types of subsidized housing or freely rent at the market rate, but cannot become homeowners. They find that higher availability of public housing increases welfare for all renter households.

In the U.S., as in Germany, the age profile of homeownership rates increases steeply at younger ages and then flattens out, with mild decreases for retired households. Similar to our model, borrowing constraints are the main reason for lower homeownership rates of younger households in Fernandez-Villaverde and Krueger (2011) and Yang (2009). Higher homeownership late in life, in combination with collateral constraints, is also crucial to explain why many households do not dissave in retirement, as would be predicted by standard life-cycle models, see Nakajima and Telyukova (2011).

Finally, several studies examine the determinants of the homeownership rate using cross-country comparisons. In his analysis of the European household-level panel data, Hilber (2007) shows that there are significant crowding-out effects of public housing for homeownership across European regions. Cho (2012) utilizes a general equilibrium model and finds that mortgage markets play a dominant role in accounting for homeownership differences between the U.S. and South Korea. Kindermann and Kohls (2016) use a macroeconomic model based on distortions in the rental market to account for the negative relation between homeownership rates and wealth inequality across European countries, which is also documented in Kaas et al. (2019). Lastly, Grevenbrock (2018) builds on our model structure and examines the differences in co-residence decisions and homeownership rates in Germany and Italy.

The next section gives further details of housing policies in Germany and relates them to those in the U.S. Section 3 describes the model which is calibrated to data for Germany in Section 4. In Section 5 we conduct our counterfactual policy experiments. Welfare implications, transitional dynamics and an alternative targeted housing policy is discussed in

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5A larger empirical literature analyzes the effects of the RETT utilizing policy regime changes. For two recent studies, see Kopczuk and Munroe (2015) and Best and Kleven (2017). The latter finds large effects for the U.K.

6Halket and Vasudev (2014) show that higher mobility of younger households and house price risk are further important determinants of the age-homeownership profile. Bajari et al. (2013) and Li and Yao (2007) are interested in the effects of house prices changes on housing demand and welfare for households in different age groups.

7Other empirical cross-country studies are Chiuri and Jappelli (2003) and Bicakova and Sierminska (2008).
Section 6, and conclusions are provided in Section 7. The Appendix contains a detailed account of our data and computational work, further quantitative results, and a qualitative comparison of housing market policies for a broader set of countries.

2 Housing Policy in Germany

In this section we briefly describe the features of housing policies in Germany that are relevant for our quantitative model. To highlight the fact that these policies provide relatively low incentives for homeownership, we contrast them to their counterparts in the U.S., where the homeownership rate is much higher. In Appendix C we present a detailed qualitative comparison for a broader set of countries that provides anecdotal support for the relation between homeownership outcomes and the three housing market policies that we consider in this paper.\(^8\)

Social Housing

Germany, as well as other European countries, entered the postwar period with a severely damaged housing stock.\(^9\) The massive housing shortage in combination with reduced household assets and underdeveloped capital markets in West Germany led to extensive public policies to foster reconstruction. Out of the 5.2 million units that were built during the 1950s, about 63% received subsidized loans of which more than half went to the construction of social housing units. While access to subsidized housing is generally based on income, initially more than half of the households were eligible, while the income threshold in more recent times was just below median income (Kirchner, 2007). As the quality of social housing units is relatively high, there is demand even from households close to the income threshold (see Schier and Voigtländer, 2016). Households qualifying for social housing pay a “cost based” rent regulated by law.\(^{10}\) For a sample of large cities, a recent study (Deschermeier et al., 2015) estimates that the social housing rent is about 20% below the market rent for comparable units. In contrast to other European countries with notable social housing sectors (e.g. Italy, Spain or the UK), there are no options to buy a social housing unit for its occupants.

As social housing units are usually not built by the government and are financed by

\(^8\) Appendix C contains more details on these policies and provides further references. For surveys on the German residential housing market and how it compares to other countries, see Kirchner (2007) and Voigtländer (2009). See Olsen and Zabel (2015) for a survey of U.S. housing policies.

\(^9\) See Schulz (1994) for the details of the historic development summarized here.

\(^{10}\) After 2002 social housing came under the jurisdiction of the German states, and some states have replaced the cost rent by a less rigid regulation based on market prices.
subsidized loans, the duration of their social housing status is limited by the maturity of
the public loan. This, together with the fact that the number of approved subsidies for new
social housing has been gradually reduced, has led to rationing and a decline of the stock of
social housing from 19.4% in 1968 to 7.1% of all residential housing units in 2002 (Kirchner,
2007) and a further decline thereafter.

The U.S. also has a social housing sector, with currently about 1.8% of households
participating.11 In contrast to Germany, access to social housing is strictly limited to incomes
below 80% of the local median income. Social housing tenants pay on average 35% of the
total costs of a unit. While social housing has insurance effects as in Germany, it is unlikely
that there is a crowding-out effect on homeownership at higher income deciles.

**Taxation of Homeowners**

The tax systems, both in Germany and in the U.S., directly affect the gains from homeown-
ership. Germany treats owner-occupiers and landlord households asymmetrically in terms of
the deductibility of mortgage interest payments. While landlords (both private households
and firms) can deduct interest costs of mortgages from taxes, this is not possible for mort-
gages financing the residence of a homeowner. In comparison, households in the U.S. can
claim mortgage interest deductions for any real estate they own.

Germany has property taxes which are fairly small and generally lower than in the U.S.
Moreover, this tax is independent of tenure status and hence unlikely to have a strong effect
on the choice between owning versus renting. For this reason, we omit property taxes from
our analysis.

Germany has quite a low turnover rate for houses and apartments.12 One plausible
explanation for this fact are high transaction costs. Currently, average total transaction
costs are 13.7% of the purchase price, of which about five percentage points are accounted
for by real-estate transfer taxes (RETT), see Fritzsche and Vandrei (2019). Transaction costs
are much lower in the U.S. where many states have no RETT at all. The average RETT in
the U.S. is only about 0.33%.

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11For this and the following numbers, see the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/picture/about.html).
12Using data compiled by European Mortgage Federation (2016), Germany has a turnover rate which is
only about half of the 2004–2015 average for a sample of 14 Western European countries.
3 Model

In this section we describe the macroeconomic model of the housing market that we apply in the following sections for our quantitative experiments. We consider a small open economy in which the safe interest rate $r$ is exogenous. Time is discrete and the period length is interpreted as a year. We describe a stationary equilibrium in which all prices and distribution measures are constant over time.

3.1 Households

Demographics

Households live through a stochastic life cycle with five age groups $\tau = 1, \ldots, 5$. The first four groups cover the working life of the household head, and can be interpreted as 10-year age groups 25–34, 35–44, 45–54, 55–64, while $\tau = 5$ is the retirement group (ages 65+). Ignoring death before retirement, $\vartheta_\tau = 1/10$ is the yearly ageing probability for $\tau = 1, \ldots, 4$, and $\vartheta_5$ denotes the yearly death probability in retirement. To keep the mass of households constant and normalized to unity, every period a mass $\vartheta_5/(1 + 40\vartheta_5)$ of new households enters the economy into age group $\tau = 1$.

Labor Income

We model labor income at the household level to be composed of a component that is age-dependent, denoted $M_\tau$, and a residual stochastic component $\varepsilon_{i,\tau}$ where $i \in \{1, \ldots, 10\}$ is the decile of residual income:

$$\log y(\tau, i) = M_\tau + \varepsilon_{i,\tau}.$$  

The residual income decile $i$ follows a discrete Markov process with age-specific transition matrix $\Psi_\tau$. Residual income in decile $i$ is denoted by $\varepsilon_{i,\tau} \in E_\tau$.

Retired households receive non-stochastic pension income. That is, $\varepsilon_{i,5}$ is constant. We assume that the retiree’s pension decile $i$ is identical to the residual income decile in the year before retirement, which reflects that higher earnings lead to higher pension income.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{13}This is a simplification of Germany’s contribution-based pension system in which the pension depends on (capped) social-security contributions throughout the entire working lives of individuals. Proper modeling of such a system requires the inclusion of another state variable into the household problem.
Preferences

Households maximize expected lifetime utility with time discount factor $\beta$ and period utility

$$u(c, s; \tau, \mathbb{I}_{h>0}) = \frac{1}{1-\gamma} \left[ \frac{c}{n_{\tau}} \xi \right]^{\gamma} \left( \frac{\xi_{h>0}}{\xi} \frac{s}{n_{\tau}} \right)^{1-\gamma},$$

where $\gamma$ is the degree of relative risk aversion, $c$ is consumption of non-housing goods, $s$ is consumption of housing services, and $\xi$ ($1-\xi$ resp.) is the expenditure share for goods (housing services).\(^{14}\) We divide $c$ and $s$ by the household equivalence scale $n_{\tau}$, which depends on $\tau$ to reflect possible age-dependent variations in consumption and housing demand due to household size variations over the life cycle. The shift parameter $\xi_{h>0}$ equals one for all working-age households ($\tau \leq 4$), for all retired renters ($\mathbb{I}_{h>0} = 0$ and $\tau = 5$), but it may exceed one for retired homeowners ($\mathbb{I}_{h>0} = 1$ and $\tau = 5$). This feature reflects the idea that retired households may enjoy own housing more than rented housing, possibly because of an additional motive of leaving a housing bequest.\(^{15}\) We do not include explicit preferences for bequests, so that all bequests are accidental and are distributed randomly to households in the first two age groups $\tau = 1, 2$.

3.2 Assets

Housing

Housing assets are denoted by $h \in \mathcal{H} = [h_{\text{min}}, \infty)$ where $h_{\text{min}} > 0$ is a minimum house size constraint.\(^{16}\) Housing is traded at the end of the period at unit price $p$, and it can be owned by households or by real-estate firms. The latter are risk-neutral, perfectly competitive entities who rent out housing units at market rental rate $\bar{\rho}$. Both $p$ and $\bar{\rho}$ are endogenous variables determined in equilibrium.

If a household owns $h > 0$ housing units, it can enjoy housing services $s \leq h$ and rent out services $h - s \geq 0$ at the market rate $\bar{\rho}$.\(^{17}\) We consider such “landlord households” for

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\(^{14}\)This Cobb-Douglas specification does not allow for complementarity between housing and non-housing consumption as in, e.g., Li et al. (2016).

\(^{15}\)We experimented with an additive utility gain for retired households, which did not improve the fit of the model, however.

\(^{16}\)Housing has both a size and a quality dimension. Since our modeling abstracts from such multi-dimensionality, the housing measure should be understood to reflect both size and quality. As is common in the literature, we do not distinguish between houses and flats whose relative supply may matter for the overall homeownership rate. Indeed, Germany’s share of houses (42%) among all housing units is smaller than the EU average (58%), but it is higher than in Spain (34%) where the homeownership rate is much higher than in Germany. Moreover, the cross-country correlation between homeownership rates and the share of houses is virtually zero (based on Eurostat data for 2016, distribution of population by tenure status and by degree of urbanization).

\(^{17}\)This rules out that owner households rent additional space.
two reasons in our model: First, housing becomes a less illiquid durable consumption good when its owner can easily downsize in response to negative income realizations. Second, the differential tax treatment of owner-occupiers and landlords comes into play with this feature.

When a household buys or sells housing units, it needs to incur transaction costs which are fractions $t^b$ (buyer) and $t^s$ (seller) of the purchase price.

We introduce idiosyncratic house value risk, as well as private rental risk described below, which may play important roles both for the homeownership decision (e.g. Sinai and Souleles, 2005) and for the decision to move into social housing. Regarding housing investments, consider a household who holds $\tilde{h}'$ housing units at the end of a period. Towards the next period, the housing unit adjusts to

$$\log h' = \log(1 - \delta) + \log \tilde{h}' + \chi' ,$$

where $\chi' \sim \mathcal{N}(-\sigma^2/2, \sigma^2)$ denotes a house value shock and $\delta > 0$ is the annual depreciation rate.\(^{18}\) House value shocks have standard deviation $\sigma$ which reflects unit-specific variations of the value of a house.

**Financial Assets**

Households can save in a risk-free asset that pays the real interest rate $r$, and they can borrow using mortgage loans at rate $r^m$. Like the safe interest rate, the mortgage premium $r^m - r$ is exogenously fixed, reflecting monitoring and administrative costs of mortgage lenders which are constant per unit of borrowing.

Let $a'$ denote the choice of net financial assets of a household who holds $\tilde{h}'$ housing units. Mortgage borrowing is subject to the down payment constraint

$$a' \geq -(1 - \theta) p \tilde{h}' ,$$

where the down payment parameter $\theta$ may depend on the household’s age, and $p \tilde{h}'$ is the value of the housing unit owned by the household at the end of a period. We do not allow for default in our model which seems a reasonable abstraction given that mortgage defaults are rare events in Germany.\(^{19}\)

\(^{18}\)This formulation of idiosyncratic house price appreciation/depreciation is similar to Jeske et al. (2013). The trend depreciation is required in our model which includes a construction sector and no population growth. If a housing unit is already at the minimum size constraint $h_{min}$, we assume that its value falls to zero with probability $\delta$, so that $\delta$ is indeed equal to the aggregate depreciation rate.

\(^{19}\)The German Bundesbank estimates that the mortgage loss ratio is about 0.1% for 2004-2013 (see Bundesbank, 2014). While we do not have comparable data regarding defaults, the rate of mortgages in arrears compiled by Fitch Ratings indicates that Germany has quite a low rate (see FitchRatings (2016) and
### 3.3 Rental Markets and Social Housing

If a household does not own housing \((h = 0)\), it either rents housing services \(s\) in the private market or from a social housing provider.\(^{20}\) When renting a unit of size \(s\) in the private market, the household pays rent \(\rho s\), where \(\rho\) denotes the idiosyncratic risky market rent for the household. Over time, the market rent evolves according to the autoregressive process

\[
\log \rho' = (1 - \omega) \log \bar{\rho} + \omega \log \rho + \nu',
\]

where \(\omega \in (0, 1)\) measures the persistence of the idiosyncratic rent and \(\nu' \sim \mathcal{N}(-\frac{\sigma^2}{2(1+\omega^2)}, \sigma^2_{\rho'})\) is a rental rate shock where parameter \(\sigma_{\nu}\) controls the risk in the private rental market from the renter’s point of view. Therefore, market rents in the stationary equilibrium are log-normally distributed with parameters \(\mu_{\rho} = \bar{\rho} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2(1+\omega^2)}\) and \(\sigma^2_{\rho} = \frac{\sigma^2}{1-\omega^2}\) so that the mean market rent is equal to \(\bar{\rho}\).\(^{21}\) We assume that the owners of rental units can diversify rental risks so that they receive the average market rent \(\bar{\rho}\).

If a renter household is granted access to social housing, it may rent at a below-market rent \(\rho^s < \bar{\rho}\) which is a risk-free policy parameter. Therefore, social housing comes at the benefits of a reduced rent as well as rent certainty. However, social housing units cannot be rented in arbitrary size or quality which we capture by an upper size constraint on housing service consumption, \(s \leq \bar{s}\), where \(\bar{s}\) denotes the largest available social housing unit.

Access to social housing is available to households of working age and is granted according to a rationing scheme which depends on the household’s income \(y\) upon entry. Specifically, a renter household gains access to social housing with probability

\[
\pi_{\tau}(y) = \begin{cases} 
\pi & \text{if } y \leq \bar{y} \text{ and } \tau \leq 4, \\
0 & \text{else},
\end{cases}
\]

where \(\bar{y}\) is the income eligibility limit (a given policy parameter) and \(\pi\) is a uniform rationing probability (an endogenous variable in the model). Eligibility based on income reflects that access to social housing is targeted to low-income households. However, as discussed in Section 2, a household can possibly stay in a social housing unit for several years even when income goes up. Households lose access to social housing in subsequent periods due to the following events: (i) they may decide to become an owner; (ii) they may decide to rent in the market (for instance, if they prefer to consume \(s > \bar{s}\) or if the idiosyncratic market rent

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\(^{20}\)The choice of housing services \(s\), as opposed to housing units \(h\), is not constrained from below which reflects that arbitrarily small units (e.g. rooms of any size or quality) can be rented but not owned separately.

\(^{21}\)Newborn households or owner households who become renters draw the initial market rent from the same stationary distribution.
\(\rho\) is sufficiently low); (iii) they move out because of exogenous reasons (such as loss of social housing status or an exogenous relocation shock) which happens with probability \(\eta\).

### 3.4 Real-Estate Firms

In contrast to household landlords, real-estate firms need to pay monitoring costs \(c^m\) per unit of rented housing. This reflects the information asymmetry between a business owner and its renters and in turn implies an additional advantage of homeownership.\(^{22}\) Given that real-estate firms can diversify idiosyncratic house value risks and rental rate risks, their zero-profit condition implies the following relationship between the house price \(p\) and the rental rate \(\bar{\rho}\):\(^{23}\)

\[
(r + \delta)p = \bar{\rho} - c^m .
\]

(1)

Next to the regular housing units which are traded on the market, social housing units are also operated by real-estate firms who rent them out at below-market rate \(\rho^s\). A distinctive feature of Germany’s social housing sector is that social housing is operated by private firms who, in exchange for a subsidy to construction costs, are committed to rent control and access restrictions to low-income households for a pre-defined period (Kirchner, 2007). The commitment period of a social housing unit ends with probability \(\Phi\) in which case the unit becomes a regular housing unit that can be rented out at average market rate \(\bar{\rho}\). Operating social housing units also requires paying monitoring costs \(c^m\). Similar to (1), the zero-profit condition of real-estate firms is\(^{24}\)

\[
(r + \Phi + \delta)p^s = \rho^s - c^m + \Phi p ,
\]

(2)

where \(p^s\) is the market price of a social housing unit.

### 3.5 Housing Construction

There is a construction sector which produces regular and social housing units. Producing \(I\) regular and \(I^s\) social housing involves costs \(K(I + I^s)\), where \(K\) is an increasing and convex function. The convexity captures the scarcity of building land and possible capacity

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22 The informational advantage of landlord households can be related to the fact that they often live in close proximity to the rented unit.

23 The discounted income value per housing unit is \(V = \frac{1}{1+r}[\bar{\rho} - c^m + (1-\delta)V]\), i.e. next period a housing unit earns income \(\bar{\rho} - c^m\) and its value depreciates to \((1-\delta)V\). From \(V = p\) follows equation (1).

24 The discounted income value per social housing unit is \(V^s = \frac{1}{1+r}[\rho^s - c^m + (1-\Phi-\delta)V^s + \Phi V]\), i.e. next period the housing unit earns income \(\rho^s - c^m\), fraction \(1-\Phi\) retains social housing status and depreciates at rate \(\delta\) (continuation value \(V^s\)), and fraction \(\Phi\) becomes a regular housing unit with value \(V = p\) (see footnote 23). From \(V^s = p^s\) follows equation (2).
constraints in the inputs for housing construction in a reduced form (see Davis and Heathcote, 2005, for a more explicit formulation). Profit maximization of construction firms implies that

\[ p = K'(I + I^s) = p^s + \varsigma, \]  

where \( \varsigma \) is the government subsidy per unit of social housing construction.\(^{25}\)

Finally, let \( \bar{H} \) and \( \bar{H}^s \) denote the stocks of regular and social housing. The stock-flow relations in steady state are

\[ \delta(\bar{H} + \bar{H}^s) = I + I^s, \quad (\Phi + \delta)\bar{H}^s = I^s. \]  

The first equation says that the total housing stock is constant (depreciated housing equals construction). The second equation says that the stock of social housing is constant (social housing converted into regular housing or depreciated equals construction of social housing).

### 3.6 The Government

The government taxes households’ incomes and real-estate transactions, it pays pensions to retirees, and it subsidizes the construction of social housing. Any excess tax revenue is spent on public goods which do not affect the households’ decisions. For this reason, we leave these public goods unspecified.

We use the income tax function \( T_\tau(y^t) \) which we estimate separately for the different age groups \( \tau \). In line with German tax law, taxable income \( y^t \) includes labor, capital and rental income minus mortgage interest payments for those units that a landlord household rents out.

The government taxes the transfer of real estate by collecting a fraction \( \tilde{t}^b \) of the purchase price. That fraction is part of the overall buyer transaction cost, i.e. \( \tilde{t}^b \leq t^b \).

### 3.7 Value Functions and Household Decisions

The state vector of a household at the beginning of a period is \((\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h)\). The first three components, age \( \tau \), income decile \( i \) and the current rent level \( \rho \), are exogenous to the household’s problem. \( \sigma \in \{0, 1\} \) is an indicator for social housing access for a renter household. Financial and housing assets \( a \) and \( h \) are the outcomes of past savings decisions. Let \( V(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) \) be the household’s value function. The household chooses consumption

\(^{25}\)Unlike real-estate firms, construction firms make positive profits \( \Pi > 0 \). In a stationary equilibrium, these firms are traded at the end of each period at price \( \Pi/r \). Hence they are included in the riskless financial asset, i.e. they are owned by domestic or foreign households.
of goods \( c \) and housing services \( s \), financial assets \( a' \), housing assets \( \tilde{h}' \) for the next period, prior to the realization of depreciation and house value shocks, and social housing status \( \tilde{\sigma} \in \{0, 1\} \), conditional on access to social housing \( \sigma = 1 \), solving the recursive problem

\[
V(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) = \max_{c, s, a', \tilde{h}', \tilde{\sigma}} u(c, s; \tau, \mathbb{I}_{h>0}) + \beta \mathbb{E} V(\tau', i', \rho', \sigma', a' + b', h') ,
\]

subject to

\[
c + a' + p\tilde{h}' = y(\tau, i) + [1 + r\mathbb{I}_{a>0} + r^m\mathbb{I}_{a<0}]a + ph + \max(\tilde{\rho}(h - s), 0) - \tilde{\rho}s\mathbb{I}_{h=0}
\]

\[
- T_r(y') - \mathbb{I}_{h' \neq h}(tb\tilde{h}' + ts'ph) ,
\]

\[
\tilde{h}' \in \mathcal{H} \cup \{0\} , \ s \geq 0 , \ s \leq h \text{ if } h > 0 ,
\]

\[
a' \geq -p\tilde{h}'(1 - \theta) ,
\]

\[
\log \tilde{h}' = \log(1 - \delta) + \log \tilde{h}' + \chi' ,
\]

\[
\tilde{\sigma} \in \{0, 1\} , \text{ and } \tilde{\sigma} = 0 \text{ if } \sigma = 0 \text{ or if } s > \bar{s} ,
\]

\[
\tilde{\rho} = \begin{cases} 
\rho^s , & \text{if } \tilde{\sigma} = 1 , \\
\rho , & \text{otherwise} ,
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\log \rho' = \begin{cases} 
(1 - \omega) \log \tilde{\rho} + \omega \log \rho + \nu' , & \text{if } h = 0 , \\
\sim \mathcal{N}(\log \tilde{\rho} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2(1-\omega)}, \frac{\sigma^2}{1-\omega}) , & \text{otherwise} ,
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\sigma' = \begin{cases} 
1 , & \text{with prob. } \pi_r(y(\tau', i')) \text{ if } \tilde{\sigma} = 0 \text{ and } h' = 0 , \\
1 - \eta \text{ if } \tilde{\sigma} = 1 \text{ and } h' = 0 , & \text{with prob. } 1 - \eta \text{ if } \tilde{\sigma} = 1 \text{ and } h' = 0 , \\
0 , & \text{otherwise} ,
\end{cases}
\]

\[
y' = y(\tau, i) + r \max\{a, 0\} + \tilde{\rho} \max(0, h - s)
\]

\[
- r^m \min\{ \max\{-a, 0\}, \max[p(h - s)(1 - \theta), 0] \} ,
\]

\[
b' \sim B(.) \text{ with prob. } \pi' \text{ if } \tau \in \{1, 2\} , \text{ and } b' = 0 \text{ otherwise}.
\]

Equation (6) is the budget constraint which says that expenditures on consumption, financial and housing assets must be equal to labor (or pension) income \( y \), financial and housing assets plus interest (negative, if there is mortgage debt), rental income or rent payments, minus expenditures on taxes and transaction costs for buying and/or selling. (7) include constraints on housing units and the requirement that homeowners do not rent additional space. (8) is the borrowing constraint. Equation (9) says how the value of the housing unit \( \tilde{h}' \) changes to the next period due to depreciation and due to the house value shock \( \chi' \) at the beginning of the next period. (10) says that the household cannot live in social housing either if it has no access (\( \sigma = 0 \)) or if the household chooses to rent a unit above the size constraint (\( s > \bar{s} \)).
Equation (11) specifies the rent which equals the social housing rent conditional on $\tilde{\sigma} = 1$. Otherwise the household rents in the private market at idiosyncratic rent $\rho$. (12) says that the idiosyncratic market rent follows an AR(1) process over time (for a renter household) or is drawn from the stationary distribution (for an owner household). (13) says how the social housing status evolves over time: renter households ($h' = 0$) are permitted to enter social housing with probability $\pi_{\tau'}(y(\tau', i'))$. If they already live in social housing ($\tilde{\sigma} = 1$) and do not decide to become owners, they retain social housing status with probability $1 - \eta$. Taxable income is specified in (14): it includes labor or pension income, capital income, rental income with deductions for interest payments for mortgages on housing units that a landlord household rents out. Regarding the latter, we assume that the household can attribute up to the lendable fraction $(1 - \theta)$ of the value of rented housing $p(h - s)$ to the deductible mortgage. Lastly, (15) says that a household in the first or second age group receives random bequests $b'$ with probability $\pi'$ drawn from the bequest distribution $B(.)$.

The expectations operator in (5) is with respect to the realization of the house value shocks $\chi'$, rental rate shocks $\nu'$, social housing shocks as in (13), bequests (15), as well as income and ageing shocks.

The solution of this problem specifies policy functions for consumption $C(.)$, housing consumption $S(.)$, financial and housing assets taken to the next period, $A(.)$ and $H(.)$, and social housing status choice $\Sigma(.)$. These policy functions depend on the household’s state vector $(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h)$. For notational convenience, $H(.)$ denotes the housing assets $\tilde{h}'$ before depreciation and house value shocks occur at the beginning of the next period.

Simplifying notation, we denote the death event by $\tau' = 6$ in which case the continuation utility is $V(6, i', \rho', \sigma', a', h') = 0$. New households who enter age group $\tau = 1$ have value $V(1, i, \rho, 1, 0, 0)$ with probability $\pi_1(y(1, i))$ (access to social housing) or $V(1, i, \rho, 0, 0, 0)$ with probability $1 - \pi_1(y(1, i))$ (no access to social housing), where residual income decile $i$ is drawn uniformly from $\{1, \ldots, 10\}$ and the initial idiosyncratic market rent is drawn from $\log \rho \sim \mathcal{N}(\log \bar{\rho} - \frac{\sigma^2}{2(1-\omega^2)}, \frac{\sigma^2}{1-\omega^2})$.

### 3.8 Equilibrium

The equilibrium specifies value and policy functions for households, housing supply and market prices for housing and rental units, given government policy. The government fixes the social housing rent $\rho^s$, the income eligibility threshold $\bar{y}$, as well as the construction subsidy $\varsigma$. The rationing probability $\pi$, conditional on eligibility, adjusts in equilibrium such that all social housing units are occupied. Formally, a stationary equilibrium is described by the household value function $V(.)$ and policy functions for goods consumption $C(.)$, housing...
consumption $S(\cdot)$, financial and housing assets for the next period, $A(\cdot)$ and $H(\cdot)$, social housing $\Sigma(\cdot)$, as well as a stationary distribution $\mu$ of households over states $(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h)$, bequest distribution $B(\cdot)$, house prices $p, p^s$, rental rate $\bar{\rho}$, construction $I, I^s$, and housing stocks $\bar{H}$ and $\bar{H}^s$ for regular and social housing, and a social housing access probability $\pi$ for eligible households such that:

1. Value and policy functions, $V$ and $(C, S, A, H, \Sigma)$, solve the household’s problem as specified in (5)–(15).

2. Real-estate firms maximize profits which implies (1) and (2).

3. Construction firms maximize profits which implies (3).

4. Housing market equilibrium, i.e. all housing units are occupied:

$$\bar{H} + \bar{H}^s = \int S(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) \, d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) .$$

5. All social housing units are occupied:

$$\bar{H}^s = \int S(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) \mathbb{1}_{\bar{\sigma}(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h)=1} \, d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) .$$

6. $\mu$ is a stationary distribution, i.e. it is invariant regarding the exogenous stochastic processes for $\tau, i, \rho$ and $h$, the evolution of social housing status (13) and policy functions for $a$ and $\bar{h}$.

7. The distribution of bequests $B(\cdot)$ is identical to the distribution of $a' + p(1 - t^s)h'$ for households in age group $\tau = 5$.

8. Housing stocks $\bar{H}$ and $\bar{H}^s$ are stationary, conditions (4).

Given a stationary equilibrium, the stock of owner-occupied housing is

$$\bar{H}^{ho} = \int \min \left( H(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h), S(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) \right) \, d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) ,$$

We only consider equilibria where real-estate firms own a positive fraction of the housing stock. Depending on the parameterization, it is conceivable that all rented housing units are owned by landlord households in which case the price-to-rent ratio is too high for real-estate firms to be active in equilibrium. Given that firms (corporations and limited liability partnerships) own a significant fraction of the housing stock, this seems to be a reasonable restriction.
and the stock of rented housing owned by landlord households is

\[ \bar{H}^{hr} = \int \max \left( 0, H(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) - S(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) \right) d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h). \]

Adding the two gives the total housing stock owned by households,

\[ \bar{H}^{h} = \bar{H}^{ho} + \bar{H}^{hr} = \int H(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h). \]

The stock of regular housing owned by real-estate firms is the residual

\[ \bar{H}^{re} = \bar{H} - \bar{H}^{h}. \]

Government budget balance says that expenditures on public goods, pensions, and subsidies for social housing construction equal revenues from income taxes and real-estate transfer taxes:

\[ G + \int y(\tau, i) d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) + \varsigma I^s = \int T(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) + \tilde{t} b \int H(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) I_{H(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h) \neq h} d\mu(\tau, i, \rho, \sigma, a, h). \]

4 Calibration

We choose parameter values to match key features of the German economy. All income and wealth numbers are expressed in thousand euros at 2006 prices. Several parameters are calibrated outside the model, while others are calibrated such that the model matches selected data targets.

4.1 Externally Calibrated Parameters

Labor Income and Pensions

The labor income process is described by age-specific constants \( M_{\tau} \), deciles for residual income \( E_{\tau} \), as well as transition matrices \( \Psi_{\tau} \). We estimate these parameters using household labor income data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) for the years 1995–2015. The dynamics of residual labor income are estimated non-parametrically, using a similar strategy as in De Nardi et al. (2018). For details about this procedure see Appendix A.

Regarding pension income, we use a gross replacement rate (i.e. gross pension income
divided by pre-retirement earnings) for Germany of 42% (see OECD, 2011). To match this number, we first calculate average income across all working-age phases \( \tau = 1, 2, 3, 4 \) in each decile. We then set pension income to 42% of this value for each pension decile. The top and the bottom deciles are capped at 32,000 euros and 6,000 euros respectively, which are measures for the maximum and minimum annual pensions of the public retirement system (see Appendix A).

**Taxes and Bequests**

We specify the income tax function as \( T_\tau(y^t) = y^t - \lambda_\tau(y^t)^{1-\phi_\tau} \), where \( \lambda_\tau \) and \( \phi_\tau \) are age-specific parameters that capture the level and progressivity of the income tax system (see Feldstein, 1969 and more recently Heathcote et al., 2017). Age-dependence reflects possible factors not captured by the model, such as the number of children or labor market participants in the household. We estimate these functions based on all households except landlords, separately for all age groups \( \tau \), for which gross and net income information is available. For details and parameter estimates, see Appendix A.

**Further Parameters**

Table 1 shows the additional parameters that are calibrated externally. The first four rows refer to demographics. Household size is estimated from the SOEP sample, using the modified OECD equivalence scale. The choices for \( \vartheta_\tau \) reflect the average durations in working-age groups \( \tau = 1, \ldots, 4 \) and in retirement \( \tau = 5 \). Since there are twenty households in age groups \( \tau = 1, 2 \) per dying household, the probability to receive a random bequest is \( \pi^I = 1/20 \).

Regarding preference parameters, we choose a standard value for relative risk aversion, and we set the expenditure share for non-housing goods \( \zeta \) so that housing consumption equals 28.3% which is the housing share of consumption expenditures of German households in 2014 (see table Ü3.1 in Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016).

The real interest rate and the real mortgage rate are averages over the period 1991–2014.\(^{28}\) We set the down payment requirements to 20% of the housing value for all households below age 55 (cf. Figure 14 in Andrews et al., 2011, and Table 1 in Chiuri and Jappelli, 2003). We further impose that mortgages must be repaid in retirement. To avoid extreme mortgage adjustments at age transitions, we set the down payment requirement for the oldest working-age group to 60%.

---

\(^{27}\)Therefore, the households in the data sample cannot use the deductions due to homeownership that apply to landlord households.

\(^{28}\)The safe interest rate is the yield on 10-year government bonds, and the mortgage rate is the effective rate on 10-year fixed rate mortgages reported by the Bundesbank. Nominal rates are converted into real rates with CPI inflation.
Table 1: Externally calibrated parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Explanation/Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Household size</td>
<td>((n_1, \ldots, n_5))</td>
<td>(1.41,1.74,1.70,1.44,1.39) OECD equivalence scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ageing probabilities</td>
<td>(\vartheta_1, \vartheta_2, \vartheta_3, \vartheta_4)</td>
<td>0.1 10-year age groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death probability</td>
<td>(\vartheta_5)</td>
<td>0.05 20-year retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inheritance rate</td>
<td>(\pi^1)</td>
<td>0.05 Random bequests (\tau = 1, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk aversion</td>
<td>(\gamma)</td>
<td>2 Standard parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure share</td>
<td>(\zeta)</td>
<td>0.717 Consumption shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real interest rate</td>
<td>(r)</td>
<td>0.0255 Average 1991–2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real mortgage rate</td>
<td>(r^m)</td>
<td>0.0374 Average 1991–2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down payment req.</td>
<td>(\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3)</td>
<td>0.20 Chiuri and Jappelli (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Down payment req.</td>
<td>((\theta_4, \theta_5))</td>
<td>(0.60,1.0) No mortgage in retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transaction costs</td>
<td>((t_b, \tilde{t}_b, t^s))</td>
<td>(0.108,0.052,0.029) See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
<td>(\delta)</td>
<td>0.01 100-year housing lifespan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rent discount</td>
<td>(\rho^s/\rho)</td>
<td>0.80 Deschermeier et al. (2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social rent eligibility</td>
<td>(\bar{y})</td>
<td>37.8 See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transformation rate</td>
<td>(\Phi)</td>
<td>0.04 Schier and Voigtländer (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House value risk</td>
<td>(\sigma_X)</td>
<td>0.104 See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental rate persistence</td>
<td>(\mu_\rho)</td>
<td>0.404 See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rental rate volatility</td>
<td>(\sigma_\nu)</td>
<td>0.094 See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minimum house size</td>
<td>(h_{\text{min}})</td>
<td>80 See text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply elasticity</td>
<td>(\varphi)</td>
<td>2.34 Caldera and Johansson (2013)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To measure transaction costs, we attribute the real-estate transfer tax (which varies by German state) and solicitor fees to the buyer. Brokerage fees (which also vary by state), are attributed to both buyers and sellers, and we apply population weights to obtain the numbers for \(t_b, \tilde{t}_b\) and \(t^s\) in the table.

We normalize the price per unit of housing to \(p = 1\), and we set the depreciation rate such that the average life span of a housing unit is 100 years. Regarding social housing, we set the social rent at 20% below the market rent, that is we set \(\rho^s\) to equal 80 percent of the market rent \(\rho\) (see Section 2). We impose the social housing eligibility threshold to be median household labor income (37,800 euros) which is consistent with German regulation (see Kirchner, 2007) and with empirical evidence from the SOEP. Social housing units (whose private construction is subsidized) can be converted into regular private housing units (for rental or for sale) after a commitment period of 25 years (Schier and Voigtländer, 2016), which implies \(\Phi = 0.04\). We set the house value risk and rental rate risk parameters based on estimates from the SOEP. We recover these parameters using self-reported price changes of homeowners and market renters who do not change their property between time periods (see Appendix A for details).

For the construction technology we use \(K(I + I^s) = \frac{k_0}{1+\varphi}(I + I^s)^{1+\varphi}\) so that \(K'(I + I^s) = k_0(I + I^s)^{\varphi}\). Caldera and Johansson (2013, Table 2) estimate the long-run price elasticity
of new housing supply in Germany at 0.428 which leads to $\varphi = 2.34$. Parameter $k_0$ is set internally using the equilibrium conditions (3) and (4) to ensure the normalization $p = 1$.

We set the minimum house size to $h_{\text{min}} = 80,000$ which corresponds to a value just below the 10th percentile of the housing wealth distribution in the SOEP sample.

### 4.2 Internally Calibrated Parameters

Table 2 shows further parameters which are calibrated internally. Average household wealth identifies the discount factor $\beta$ to match the data target that we obtain from the SOEP sample. From the same data, we obtain homeownership rates for the total population as well as for retired households. These data targets identify the value of monitoring costs $c^m$ which implicitly controls the price-to-rent ratio, as well as the preference shift parameter $\xi_{h>0}$ for retired homeowner households. Note that the price-to-rent ratio in the benchmark model equals 18.3 which is close to the 2004–2008 average of 21.6 reported by the German Bundesbank.\(^{30}\)

To set the upper size constraint on social housing, we proceed as follows. First, we compute the empirical size distributions in square meters of market rental units and social housing rental units in the SOEP data. Then, we calculate the ratio between the 99th percentiles of both distributions and find that the size of the largest social housing units is 73.1% of the size of the largest market rental units. We then set $\bar{s}$ to match this value by computing the corresponding ratio from the equilibrium rental size distributions in the model. The construction subsidy for social housing $\varsigma$ is set to match the share of social housing in 2002, which is 7.1% (see Kirchner, 2007). Further, the exogenous exit probability $\eta$ is set internally to match the empirical move-in rate for households below the income eligibility limit $\bar{y}$. Note that the probability for social housing access $\pi$ adjusts endogenously.

### 4.3 Model Fit

Figure 1 shows the model-generated age profiles of homeownership, net wealth, housing and financial wealth. We target the homeownership rate of households in all age groups pooled

\(^{29}\)This compares to a much higher elasticity of 2.014 in the U.S. which is likely due to a more elastic supply of land (cf. Sommer and Sullivan, 2018, who estimate a price elasticity of 0.9, and Floetotto et al., 2016, who use the number 2.5). Therefore, if we used the U.S. value of the housing supply elasticity in our calibration, we would obtain smaller price responses in general equilibrium. In other words, our results would be closer to the partial equilibrium responses that we report below next to the general-equilibrium results.

\(^{30}\)See the series “in Germany (administrative districts)” available at https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/622520/f5d7100326201cea767f4959e574eeb8/mL/german-residential-property-market-data.pdf.
Table 2: Internally calibrated parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discount factor ( \beta )</td>
<td>0.9485</td>
<td>Avg wealth (thousand euros)</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>128.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring cost (%) ( c^m )</td>
<td>0.0189</td>
<td>Homeownership rate (%)</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility weight owner 65+ ( \xi_{h&gt;0}^5 )</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>Homeownership rate 65+ (%)</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social h. upper size ( s )</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>99th percentile ratio ( s/s )</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social h. constr. subsidy ( \varsigma )</td>
<td>0.1442</td>
<td>Social housing share</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social h. exogenous exit ( \eta )</td>
<td>0.0155</td>
<td>Social housing move-in rate</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
<td>0.0128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction cost ( k_0 )</td>
<td>0.2898</td>
<td>Normalization ( p = 1 )</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

together which is 42.2% as well as homeownership in retirement.\(^{31}\) The model captures rather well the increase of the homeownership rate during the first four age stages, as well as the slight decline in retirement.\(^{32}\)

Regarding wealth, our model generates hump-shaped patterns of net wealth and its components, although it overpredicts the accumulation of net wealth during working life and the decumulation in retirement. As the bottom left graph shows, this is due to retirees owning too small housing units in the model.

Our model generates a wealth Gini coefficient of around 0.5 which is too low compared to the one in our data (0.61). This is a well-known feature of incomplete-markets models using income processes estimated from household survey data (see De Nardi and Fella, 2017, for a recent survey). In Figure 10 in Appendix B we compare additional distributional measures by age group to the data. The comparison indicates that households at the lower end of the wealth distribution in the model tend to accumulate relatively more wealth than in the data, leading to the discrepancy in the inequality measure between the data and the model.

The top graphs in Figure 2 show that our model captures rather well the hump-shaped age profiles of average gross and net income over the life cycle. Note again that only the age profile of labor income is calibrated, whereas capital and rental incomes are endogenous, as are the tax deductions of landlord households. Indeed, the model generates an adequate share of landlords (7.9% in the model versus 11.5% in the data). Table 14 in Appendix B shows that the share of landlords in the model is rather well matched by age groups and wealth quintiles.

\(^{31}\)The corresponding dynamics between tenure states over time are also fairly well matched and are reported in Table 15 in Appendix B.

\(^{32}\)We evaluated the role of the tails of the age distribution in the stochastic life-cycle model for homeownership patterns. Specifically, we simulated the model for newborn households where we removed the lowest 10% and the highest 10% of actual lifetimes. As we show in Table 16 in Appendix B, both the age profile of the homeownership rate and the various wealth components are only slightly affected.
The bottom graphs in Figure 2 show that our model generates the variations of the homeownership rate by income and wealth deciles. Both in the data and in the model, the homeownership rate for the bottom four wealth deciles is below ten percent, and it is above 88 percent for the top three wealth deciles. In other words, the homeownership status varies most between the fifth and seventh wealth deciles. In Figure 9 in the Appendix we also look at the relation between homeownership and wealth for each age group separately. The overall patterns from the lower right part of Figure 2 still hold for individual age groups except for the youngest group. One reason for this could be that we do not allow for houses being bequeathed or gifted directly to the next generation.

Regarding income variation, the model accounts for a difference of 33 percentage points between homeownership rates in the top and bottom deciles which is somewhat smaller than in the data. Homeownership rates also increase with income for any of the four working-age groups separately (see Figure 8 in Appendix B), where the fit between the model and the data is better for the older than for the younger age groups.
5 Accounting for Low Homeownership

The good fit of our model to non-targeted moments, and in particular to the homeownership rate profiles by age, wealth and income, lends support for its use as a tool for counterfactual policy evaluation. In this section, we aim at quantifying the importance of different institutional factors for homeownership and wealth accumulation. To this end, we conduct a series of counterfactual experiments in our general equilibrium framework, where our focus is on steady-state comparisons. In particular, we explore the following four counterfactuals C1-C4 which move the German housing policies closer to those applied in the United States:

C1: The real-estate transfer tax (RETT) is set to a value comparable to the U.S., $\bar{t} = 0.33\%$.

C2: Mortgage interest payments are fully tax deductible.

C3: There is no social housing.

Figure 2: Model fit
C4: Full combination of C1-C3.

Throughout all experiments, we let the house price, the rental rate and housing construction adjust to clear the housing market. For counterfactuals C1 and C2, we further fix the share of households in social housing at the benchmark level, adjusting the social housing construction subsidy accordingly. The idea behind this adjustment is that we keep the stock of social housing largely unchanged in policy experiments C1 and C2. We further impose for all experiments revenue neutrality for the government. To achieve this, we increase/decrease the scale parameters of the tax functions $\lambda_T$ by the same proportion for all age groups to balance the government budget.$^{33}$ We then contrast our experiments with those in partial equilibrium where the house price and taxes do not adjust in order to understand the impact of the various policies on housing demand in isolation.

Homeownership Rates by Age

Figure 3 plots the age profiles of homeownership for our counterfactual experiments. As can be seen, the life-cycle profiles of homeownership rates lie higher for any individual counterfactual scenario than in the baseline economy. The effects are quite sizable for C1 (elimination of RETT) while being somewhat more moderate under C2 (mortgage interest deduction) or C3 (no social housing). This suggests that all channels contribute prominently to explaining low homeownership rates in Germany.

Quantitatively, the most important policy factor is the real-estate transfer tax (RETT). Our results suggest that cutting the RETT would shift the homeownership profile upwards by 6-14 percentage points across all working-age groups. The quantitative impact of RETT on housing transactions is largely consistent with empirical findings: Fritzsche and Vandrei (2019) use data on regional and time variation of the RETT in Germany to show that a one percentage point decrease of the RETT yields about 7% more transactions. In our model, 2.07% of households buy an owner-occupied housing unit each year, of which about 42% are current homeowners who move to a different house.$^{34}$ Under policy C1 (reducing the RETT), the share of households buying a house increases to 3.03% in general equilibrium (with price and tax adjustment) or to 2.99% (without tax adjustments). This suggests that for each percentage point decrease of RETT there are about 9% more transactions which is in line with the empirical estimate.$^{35}$ Halket and Vasudev (2014) perform a related

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$^{33}$See Heathcote et al. (2017) for a similar approach of adjusting the scaling parameter. We have implemented alternative ways of balancing the budget through proportional taxes and transfers. The results of experiments C1–C4 are not affected significantly.

$^{34}$In the data the number of transactions is lower by about one third. Most of this difference comes from a lower number of owners in the data moving to a new house (see 15 in Appendix B).

$^{35}$A potential reason for the slightly larger elasticity in our model could be that we consider all housing
counterfactual experiment for the U.S. by abolishing total transaction costs, and they find that the homeownership rate increases by three percentage points. The countervailing price effects in their case appear to be larger than in our model.

Without social housing, the life-cycle profile would shift upwards by five percentage points for the middle- and older-age groups and by a bit less for the youngest age group. Finally, our results suggest that making mortgage interest payments fully tax deductible has a positive 3-6 percentage points effect on homeownership for all working-age groups, but reduces homeownership slightly for retirees.\footnote{One might envision another policy change that introduces mortgage interest deductions together with the taxation of imputed rents. Such a policy shift is justifiable on the grounds that the tax base should include the additional (imputed) income generated from any mortgage whose interest is deductible. Quantitatively, this policy change leads to a dramatic decline of the homeownership rate relative to the benchmark, however.}

units, and that transactions of smaller units (apartments) are more sensitive to changes in transaction costs than transactions of single-family homes.
The combined effect is depicted in the bottom right panel of Figure 3. We find that homeownership rates would be as high as 53% in the second age group, and around 80% for the middle- and older-age groups if all policy channels were adjusted simultaneously. The overall homeownership rate under the combined scenario increases to 58%. That is, the homeownership gap between the U.S. and Germany is closed by about two thirds when all three German housing policies are set to U.S. levels.

**Homeownership, Wealth Accumulation and House Prices**

To shed more light on these findings, Table 3 reports a selection of aggregate statistics. Our results suggest that lower transaction costs or no social housing lead to more wealth accumulation in conjunction with higher homeownership. Mortgage interest deductibility also fosters housing investments, but higher indebtedness and less financial investments nearly offset the impact on total wealth. Under any policy change, households would invest a larger share of their portfolio in housing wealth, while assets invested in financial wealth decrease even in absolute terms.

Interestingly, although all three policies C1–C3 promote homeownership, they have quite distinct implications for house prices as well as for the price-to-rent ratio. The house price falls when social housing is abolished (C3), but the reverse is true when the RETT is cut (C1) or when mortgage interest can be deducted (C2). These results are intuitive: without the option of subsidized housing, overall demand for housing services goes down, so that house prices as well as the price-to-rent ratio fall; conversely, with a lower RETT, housing demand goes up –especially across lower-income households– which increases the price-to-rent ratio. Similarly, the effect of tax deductibility of mortgage interest raises the price-to-rent ratio and the house price, this time through a rising housing demand of middle-income households. Finally, in the combination of all counterfactuals (C4) the house price and the price-to-rent ratio are higher than at the benchmark level. Again this is induced by a surge of housing demand in the lower- and middle-income groups.

The adjustment of prices in general equilibrium is attenuated by the adjustment of income taxes. If taxes were fixed at the benchmark level, the cut of RETT would lead to an even stronger increase of housing demand which induces a larger increase of the house price, hence mitigating the policy impact (see Table 13 in Appendix B).

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This is consistent with the findings of Gervais (2002) and Floetotto et al. (2016) for U.S. calibrations.
### Table 3: Counterfactuals: General equilibrium and revenue neutrality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>RETT C1</th>
<th>Mort Ded C2</th>
<th>No Social H C3</th>
<th>Combination C4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 25-34 yrs</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 35-44 yrs</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 45-54 yrs</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
<td>77.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 55-64 yrs</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 65+ yrs</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>54.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wealth</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>139.0</td>
<td>131.2</td>
<td>133.0</td>
<td>142.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Housing</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>107.2</td>
<td>92.7</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>121.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Financial</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mortgage</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-6.0</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House price</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>1.008</td>
<td>0.997</td>
<td>1.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price-to-rent ratio</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.49</td>
<td>18.43</td>
<td>18.35</td>
<td>18.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationing prob $\pi$ (%)</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$Gov’t BC (per HH)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-\Delta$RETT Rev</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-\Delta$IncTax Rev</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.270</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.110</td>
<td>0.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$-\Delta$SocHous Subs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$Demand (in %)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>-0.18</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>-0.69</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.41</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All monetary values in thousand euros.

### Housing Demand

To better understand the impact of different policies on housing demand, we present in Table 4 the model implications under the scenario where the house price, and hence the rental rate, are fixed and where taxes do not adjust to balance the government budget. That is, we ignore the reaction of housing supply and tax policy to the different policy changes. A first observation is that the effect of the reduction of RETT on homeownership and wealth is a bit stronger than in the benchmark scenario: because the house price does not increase, it becomes even more attractive for households to invest in housing, both for their own
consumption as well as for investment purposes. For a similar reason, the introduction of mortgage interest deductibility has a larger effect on housing investment and wealth when prices are fixed. Indeed, under both C1 or C2, housing demand increases substantially for all income groups. Tax deductibility has a particularly strong impact on the demand of middle-income groups whose decision to take up a mortgage in order to finance a home is most responsive to the policy change.

Table 4: Counterfactuals: Partial equilibrium with fixed taxes and house prices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>RETT</th>
<th>Mort Ded</th>
<th>No Social H</th>
<th>Combination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>C4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 25-34 yrs</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 35-44 yrs</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 45-54 yrs</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>76.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 55-64 yrs</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>84.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 65+ yrs</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wealth</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>142.5</td>
<td>132.8</td>
<td>132.4</td>
<td>146.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Housing</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>111.8</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>124.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Financial</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Mortgage</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
<td>-9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House price</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price-to-rent ratio</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationing prob π (%)</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔGov’t BC (per HH)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.328</td>
<td>-0.066</td>
<td>+0.086</td>
<td>-0.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– ΔRETT Rev</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.265</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td>-0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– ΔIncTax Rev</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.084</td>
<td>-0.097</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– ΔSocHous Subs</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>-0.021</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔDemand (in %)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>-0.68</td>
<td>2.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Income Q1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>-1.12</td>
<td>3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Income Q2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3.65</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>-1.21</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Income Q3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.89</td>
<td>1.30</td>
<td>-0.95</td>
<td>2.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Income Q4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>0.82</td>
<td>-0.54</td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Income Q5</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All monetary values in thousand euros.

On the other hand, the effect of the removal of social housing is weaker when house prices and rents are fixed. Compared to the benchmark scenario, the homeownership rate increases to 46.2%, which is due to the fact that the option value of entering a subsidized
unit is gone. However, overall housing demand falls because both renters and homeowners want to live in smaller units than before. In general equilibrium, this decline in housing demand leads to a fall of house prices (and less housing construction) which pushes up the homeownership rate to 46.5%. Without this price decline, the increase of homeownership is slightly smaller.

Table 4 further presents the impact on the government budget in partial equilibrium (without price or tax adjustments). For instance, cutting the RETT imposes a cost on the government of 328 euros per household, while no subsidies to social housing implies a revenue increase of 86 euros per household. When price changes in general equilibrium are taken into account, these numbers change only little (see Table 13 in Appendix B).

**Homeownership Rates by Wealth Decile**

Differences in homeownership rates across European countries are largely accounted for by the bottom and middle deciles of the wealth distribution (see Kaas et al., 2019). In Figure 4 we show how the four counterfactual experiments affect the homeownership rate across deciles of the wealth distribution. None of the policy changes has a sizable effect on homeownership rates in the bottom three deciles of the wealth distribution, but quite significant effects for households in the middle deciles. In particular, the combined effect of all policy changes raises the homeownership rates in the middle deciles by more than 60 percentage points.

**Discussion**

Our analysis suggests that housing policies can play an important role for explaining the gap in the homeownership rates between Germany and the U.S. In Appendix C we survey housing policies for a broader set of countries and argue that differences in these policies are qualitatively consistent with the observed variation in homeownership rates.

Clearly, there are many other differences between countries that might affect homeownership rates. In what follows, we discuss the effects of differences with regard to income risk and house price risk between Germany and the U.S. That is, we take our benchmark calibration and change the idiosyncratic income process and the house value process, each of them in isolation. In both cases we assess the effects without equilibrium responses of prices and taxes.

For the first exercise, we estimate the labor income process and the tax schedule for the U.S. using PSID data and the parameters of the U.S. public pension system following the same procedure as for the German data (see Appendix A). We then re-scale the labor income levels to match the mean of the benchmark economy. Income risk in the U.S. is higher (the
standard deviation of labor income goes up by 22%) and pensions are lower. We find that the homeownership rate increases by about six percentage points to 48.3%, which is mostly uniform across age. Moreover, average total wealth increases substantially to 165,000 euros. The main reason for these changes is the upper cap on public pensions which is much lower in the U.S. (half of the German value). This leads to larger savings which are partly invested in housing.

Turning to house price risk, we estimate the U.S. parameters again from PSID data using the same procedure as for the German data (see Appendix A). The house value risk that we measure for the U.S. is slightly lower than the one in Germany. Using the U.S. measure in our benchmark model, we find that the overall homeownership rate increases to 46.9%. As risk is lower, more households prefer homeownership. Since we ignore adjustments in prices and taxes, the increases in the homeownership rates in both experiments should be
interpreted as upper bounds.

6 Welfare and Policy

In this section we (i) analyze the welfare consequences of the three housing policies we consider in the previous section, and, (ii) discuss an alternative housing market policy which is targeted to low-income households.

6.1 Welfare Implications of the Policy Reforms

We evaluate welfare in terms of percentage consumption equivalence to the benchmark economy of a newborn after drawing the first income realization. In this way, we can discuss the welfare consequences of the housing policies for households entering the economy in different segments of the income distribution. While the emphasis of our welfare analysis is on long-term outcomes (steady-state comparisons), we also examine the impact of policy changes for existing households along the transition path in order to identify the winners and losers of housing policy reforms.

In each of the four cases C1–C4, we look at several versions of the counterfactual economies. First, we compute the welfare results for the partial equilibrium with fixed prices and the same taxes as in the benchmark. Second, we allow for house prices and rents to adjust in equilibrium, keeping taxes fixed. Finally, we look at fiscally neutral versions of the experiments where prices and taxes adjust. The results are presented in Figure 5.

Reducing the RETT to U.S. levels (C1) without adjusting prices and taxes leads to an increase in welfare of around 1.1-2.0% across all entering income groups because households face lower transaction costs when buying or selling a home. When the house price and rents are allowed to increase in equilibrium, this positive effect is diminished by more than 50 percent. Once taxes adjust to account for the lost revenue, the welfare consequences from reducing the transfer tax become negative for newborn households in all income groups with average losses of around 0.5% in consumption equivalence terms.

The full deduction of mortgage interest payments (C2) has comparable welfare consequences to C1, although on a smaller scale. While the partial-equilibrium welfare effect is positive, it becomes virtually zero when price and income tax changes are taken into account. Indeed, a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation shows that the house price increase alone offsets the average gains from the tax subsidy.\footnote{In the model, mortgage deductibility costs the government 19 euros per household per year (cf. Table 3). At the same time, every year 1.17% of households are new homebuyers, buying a home which costs on average 202,000 euros before the policy change. As the house price increases by 0.8\%, the total extra}
Figure 5: Welfare effects by income decile for counterfactual experiments (in consumption equivalent variations)

households who enter the economy with lower incomes lose more (or gain less) than their richer counterparts. The explanation is that lower-income young households are less likely to become homeowners later in life and hence benefit less from the removal of RETT or from the introduction of mortgage interest tax deductions.

The welfare effects of abolishing social housing (C3) are quite different. The partial-equilibrium welfare impact is negative for almost all entering income groups, due to the loss of the option of a low and risk-free rent in social housing. Once the house price is allowed

expenditures of new homebuyers per year and per household are $0.008 \cdot 0.0117 \cdot 202,000 = 18.91$ euros.
to decrease in equilibrium, entrants in the top four income deciles start to benefit. Further, the reduction of income taxes due to the saved social housing subsidies make all newborn households winners of this policy with an average welfare gain of 0.3%. The gains are larger for households entering the economy in higher income deciles who are more likely to become homeowners (and thus to buy at a lower house price) and less likely to benefit from social housing subsidies.

The combination of all three policies (C4) decreases welfare when house prices and taxes are adjusted in equilibrium. Households entering the economy at the bottom end of the income distribution face a welfare loss comparable to a consumption decrease of about 2% while the richest entrants lose around 0.5%.

Welfare Effects During the Transition. The welfare analysis above applies to long-term situations where the economy has fully adjusted to a new stationary equilibrium. Policy experiments C1, C2 and C4 bring about a larger housing stock in steady state. The buildup of this housing stock may require a consumption sacrifice for the generations alive during the transition period. To measure the welfare impact on these households, we consider the transitional dynamics in response to the four policy experiments of interest. Note that there are peculiar differences between these experiments: While the tax policy changes (C1 and C2) are effective immediately, the elimination of the social-housing construction subsidy only slowly lowers the stock of social housing, as tenants can still live in their unit until it loses its social housing status. See Appendix D for a detailed description of the computational procedure.

In Figure 6 we show the dynamics of the homeownership rate following the policy change. The figure indicates quite a fast transition to the steady state for counterfactuals C1 and C2 and a much more gradual change for C3.\textsuperscript{38}

The welfare effects for households alive at the time of the policy change largely confirm our steady-state results. Table 5 shows that a large majority of households lose from C1 and C2 and most households gain from C3. Comparing different age groups, the results are more nuanced. While in C1 and C3 the different age groups (with the exception of retirees) are similarly affected, welfare losses associated with C2 accrue mostly to the older age groups, whereas the youngest households gain. The latter observation is in line with the steady-state results which showed positive (albeit small) welfare gains of an MID policy for future generations. Intuitively, younger (and unborn) households gain from the option of having lower mortgage costs in spite of the house price increase. On the other hand, older

\textsuperscript{38}Interestingly, in their analysis of a RETT policy reform in the U.K., Best and Kleven (2017) find a large positive and immediate response in the number of house transactions.
households alive at the time of the reform do not have large mortgages but need to pay higher income taxes (due to fiscal neutrality) or face higher rental costs (due to the house price increase).

Despite the welfare gains associated with the abolition of social housing (C3), the full reform package (C4) would bring about average welfare losses for all cohorts alive at the time of the policy change. However, the losses are still smaller (0.59%) on average than those for newborn households in the long-run stationary equilibrium (1.3%).

6.2 Targeted Housing Subsidy

Our results suggest that conventional policies of low transaction taxes and mortgage interest tax deductions would raise the homeownership rate in Germany, but would not bring about welfare gains for households, especially at the bottom end of the income distribution. On the other hand, abolishing social housing improves welfare for all newborns, with the largest welfare gains accruing to high-income households. The main reason for the negative effect of social housing is that households dislike higher house prices and market rents which, in turn, are due to a larger demand of households with access to subsidized units. Additionally, higher-income households pay a larger share of the extra income tax revenue required to finance the government’s construction subsidies. Regarding its role as a redistributive policy, an important drawback of social housing is that it is not exclusively targeted to the lowest income groups and that its access is rationed with a random lottery scheme.
Table 5: Welfare effects for the population alive at the time of the reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RETT C1</th>
<th>Mort Ded C2</th>
<th>No Social H C3</th>
<th>Combination C4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fraction of winners (%)</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>88.8</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 years</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>99.4</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 years</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54 years</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 years</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+ years</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>96.2</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average welfare effect† (%)</td>
<td>-0.56</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Fraction of households who benefit from the reform and average welfare effect for the population alive at the time of the reform. † In consumption equivalent variations.

Triggered by a recent sharp increase in rental rates and a housing shortage in metropolitan areas, there is currently a debate on how to reform social housing in Germany (see e.g. Breyer and Krebs, 2018). In the following we explore one of the proposals which replaces the current system of social housing in Germany by a housing subsidy for low-income households. In particular, we implement a policy which abolishes social housing (as in C3) in combination with targeted housing subsidies which are paid to all households (both owners and renters) in the lowest two income deciles, proportional to their (imputed) rental expenditures. The percentage rate of the subsidy is set so that government spending on this subsidy is equal to social housing spending in the benchmark.39

We look at a fiscally neutral version of the experiment with fully adjusted house prices. Detailed results are presented in Table 6 and welfare results are shown in Figure 7, again differentiated by the income decile of households upon entering the economy.

Providing housing subsidies to poor households instead of social housing leads to a homeownership rate of 46.1%. The increase relative to the benchmark is partly driven by a decline of the house price which is induced by lower housing demand from middle-income households. More housing transactions further bring about an increase of RETT revenues which allows the government to cut income taxes.

The policy delivers average welfare gains of around 0.9% in terms of consumption equivalence. Welfare gains are particularly large (1.5-1.8%) for households entering the economy in the lowest two deciles.

39Germany already operates a social program of housing subsidies (Wohngeld). The entitlement to the program depends on income and household size. In 2004, around 9% of German households benefited from the program; however, subsequently, recipients of social benefits (Hartz IV) were excluded from this program so that Wohngeld spending dropped by more than two thirds. This program enters implicitly in the estimated tax functions that we use in the model. In our policy experiment, we consider a substantial expansion of the existing housing subsidy programs.
Figure 7: Welfare effects by income decile

Table 6: Housing subsidy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Housing subsidy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>46.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 25-34 yrs</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 35-44 yrs</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 45-54 yrs</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 55-64 yrs</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 65+ yrs</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wealth</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>132.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Housing</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Financial</td>
<td>46.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Mortgage</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House price</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>0.998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price-to-rent ratio</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All monetary values in thousand euros.

While the price decrease of the policy is one reason for the welfare gain, housing subsidies also provide better insurance as they are given both to homeowners and to renters and are not subject to stochastic rationing.

Interestingly, targeted housing subsidies even benefit households who enter the economy in the upper deciles. These households would rather choose this policy than fully abolishing social housing without further redistribution (experiment C3), see the comparison of welfare
gains in Figures 5 and 7. Even though C3 brings about larger tax cuts and lower house prices, rich entrants also value the additional insurance of housing subsidies because of the income mobility they face.\textsuperscript{40}

7 Conclusions

In this paper, we examine the institutional reasons behind Germany’s low homeownership rate. For this purpose we build a quantitative macroeconomic model with overlapping generations who face uninsurable income and housing risks and who decide about consumption of goods and housing services and about savings in terms of liquid financial assets and illiquid housing wealth. Our model incorporates a social housing sector and specific tax policies which are also relevant features of housing markets in other European countries.

German tax policies which disadvantages homeowners, such as real-estate transfer taxes and an income tax law without mortgage interest deductions, explain a large fraction of the homeownership rate gap to countries like the U.S. where the homeownership rate is more than 20 percentage points higher. Changing these tax policies does not lead to welfare gains, however. This is because higher income taxes are required to balance the government budget and because the house price increases in response to stronger housing demand.

A further important determinant of low homeownership is the provision of social housing to households who are more likely to enter such housing units when they have low income but who may continue to pay a subsidized rent even when income goes up. Abolishing social housing not only raises the homeownership rate, but also brings about long-run welfare gains for all households entering the economy in different income deciles. Our results indicate that welfare gains are even larger, and especially more targeted towards lower-income households, when social housing is replaced by housing subsidies paid to lower-income households.

References


\textsuperscript{40}Our analysis ignores a potentially beneficial aspect of social housing coming from a reduction of social segregation across neighborhoods. Note, however, that subsidies can also be adapted to local rents to facilitate social mixing.


Appendix for Online Publication

Appendix A: Data

Data

The empirical facts about homeownership, income and wealth are derived from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). Detailed household wealth information is not collected every year. We use the wealth modules of the SOEP collected in the years 2002, 2007 and 2012. The data is restricted to households whose head is of age 25 or older. Household labor income of household heads of age below 65 is restricted to be positive. We also exclude business owners to be consistent with our quantitative model which does not feature entrepreneurship. The resulting pooled dataset consists of 24,595 households. Homeownership is defined as owning the primary household residence. Household net wealth is defined as the value of all real and financial assets net of liabilities.

The data used in the estimations of the household labor income processes and tax functions also come from the SOEP. We use all yearly waves between 1995 and 2014. The data restrictions are on the age of the household head (25-64 years) and household labor income (positive values). The derived sample consists of 130,686 observations. The income variables utilized in the estimation of the income tax functions are gross household and net household income. The data sample excludes landlord households since mortgage interest on rental units can be deducted (see the main text). The sample size for this estimation is 112,467 observations. All monetary values are CPI-deflated and are expressed in terms of 2006 euros.

Several counterfactual exercises in the paper rely on the use of U.S. data. We derive U.S. household labor income processes and tax functions using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data for the years 1995-2014 with the same restrictions and variables as in the German case.

Estimating Household Labor Income Processes

The household labor income processes are estimated non-parametrically following a strategy related to De Nardi et al. (2018).\footnote{They argue that non-parametric estimates of the labor earnings process have significant advantages over the more traditional approaches of estimating a parametric linear Markov process for the stochastic component of earnings and discretizing it. In particular, the non-parametric method performs better when used in quantitative work in terms of matching the life-cycle patterns of consumption and savings.} We construct first-order discrete Markov processes for
residual labor income directly from the SOEP data as inputs for each of the working-age groups in our economic environment. We refer to “household age” when we mean the age of the household head. The procedure can be summarized as follows. Working-age stages $\tau = 1, 2, 3, 4$ in the model correspond to 10-year age groups in the data, namely 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, and 55-64 years of age. For each of these age stages of the life cycle, we pose the following specification for household labor income:

$$
\log y_{j,t}^\tau = \alpha_0^\tau + \alpha_1^\tau D_t + \alpha_2^\tau a_{j,t}^\tau + \alpha_3^\tau (a_{j,t}^\tau)^2 + \varepsilon_{j,t}^\tau ,
$$

(16)

where $D_t$ is year-$t$ dummy variable and $a_{j,t}^\tau$ is the actual age of household $j$ in year $t$ within the age stage $\tau$. For instance, if $\tau = 1$, then the age of the households observed in this stage would be between 25 and 34. The term $\varepsilon_{j,t}^\tau$ reflects the stochastic component of household labor income. Several clarifications are in order. First, we control for time and age effects and extract the residual stochastic income which is used in the construction of the Markov chains describing labor income dynamics. Second, by estimating (16) for each age group $\tau$ separately, we allow these time and age effects to be different over the life cycle.

The estimated coefficients in regressions (16) are used to construct the age-specific deterministic income levels $M^\tau$. We use the estimated residuals from the four regressions (16) to construct the age-specific discrete Markov processes for income dynamics. For this purpose, we assume that $\varepsilon_{j,t}^\tau$ is i.i.d. distributed across households. Then, we pose that $\varepsilon_{j,t}^\tau$ follows a discrete Markov chain of order one with an age-dependent state space

$$
E^\tau = \{e_1^\tau, \ldots, e_I^\tau\} ,
$$

for $\tau = 1, \ldots, 4$ and an age-dependent transition matrix $\Psi^\tau_{i',i}$ of size $I \times I$. Note that the age-dependent state space is of constant size $I$ but the residual income realizations and the transition matrices are age-specific. In estimating these processes we proceed as follows:

1. We fix the number of bins, $I = \{1, \ldots, 10\}$. Each discrete level of residual income can be interpreted as a decile of the age-specific residual income distribution. For each age $\tau$, we sort the estimated $\varepsilon_{j,t}^\tau$ in ascending order and divide them in ten bins of equal size.

2. Each point in the state space $E^\tau$ is picked to be the mean in bin $i$ at age $\tau$.

3. The elements $\psi_{i,i'}^\tau$ of the transition matrix $\Psi^\tau_{i',i}$ are set to the observed average proportions of households in bin $i$ in year $t$ that are in bin $i'$ in year $t + 1$ for $t = 1995, \ldots, 2013$. 

42
The estimated values for the annual labor income deciles vary from 3,038 euros (lowest decile) to 81,185 euros (highest decile) for age 25-34 and from 5,058 euros (lowest decile) to 120,053 euros (highest decile) for age 45-54. The transition matrices are normalized to doubly stochastic matrices with the help of the Sinkhorn-Knopp algorithm (Sinkhorn, 1964). The estimated transition matrices exhibit significant persistence which increases with age.

In the additional counterfactual exercises, we use the U.S. income process estimated from the PSID data but normalized to the average labor income from the German benchmark case. According to our estimation, U.S. income risk is higher. While the standard deviation of working age income in Germany is 29,500, it is around 36,000 according to the normalized U.S. income process.

**Pension Income**

As mentioned in the main text, we set pension income at 42% of average earnings in the respective decile at which a household moves into retirement, and we apply caps at 32,000 euros and 6,000 euros. As a result we obtain the deciles of pension incomes shown in Table 7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>y(5,1)</th>
<th>y(5,2)</th>
<th>y(5,3)</th>
<th>y(5,4)</th>
<th>y(5,5)</th>
<th>y(5,6)</th>
<th>y(5,7)</th>
<th>y(5,8)</th>
<th>y(5,9)</th>
<th>y(5,10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>6,468</td>
<td>9,814</td>
<td>12,434</td>
<td>14,806</td>
<td>17,224</td>
<td>20,025</td>
<td>23,713</td>
<td>29,272</td>
<td>32,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the counterfactual exercise with U.S. social security, we set the replacement rate at 39% which is the gross replacement rate for men with average earnings (OECD) and apply caps based on the special minimum benefits at 30 years of coverage (lower bound) and the maximum social security benefits for worker retiring at full retirement age (upper bound) which we took from the Social Security Administration. Normalizing these by the same factor as labor income (see above) we obtain caps at 5,785 and 16,100.

---

42A doubly stochastic transition matrix delivers a uniform stationary distribution. The normalization is necessary as the income distribution is uniform across decile groups by construction.

43Precisely, contributions to the public retirement system are capped if income exceeds a threshold level. The upper limit is based on the assumption that a worker has paid these maximum contributions throughout the entire working life. The lower bound is based on basic old-age security (4,800 for singles and 8,800 for couples).
Estimating Tax Functions

The income tax function \( T_\tau(y) \) which describes the tax and transfer policies in place is specified as

\[
T_\tau(y) = y - \lambda_\tau y^{1-\phi_\tau},
\]

where \( T_\tau(y) \) are net taxes (i.e. income taxes and social security contributions net of public transfers) at taxable household income \( y \) for a household of age \( \tau \). This specification has a long tradition in economics and has been used by Benabou (2002), and more recently by Guner et al. (2014) and Heathcote et al. (2017) among others. The parameter \( \phi_\tau \) influences the progressivity of the tax and transfer system. When \( \phi_\tau > 0 \), marginal tax rates are always greater than average tax rates, which is the usual way to define a progressive tax system. On the other hand, if \( \phi_\tau = 0 \), then households in the economy face a flat tax rate \( 1 - \lambda_\tau \). Negative values of the parameter give rise to a regressive tax system. The parameter \( \lambda_\tau \), on the other hand, determines the net tax revenue and reflects the average level of taxation. Specification (17) implies that if the tax system is progressive, the average tax rate below income \( \lambda_\tau^{1/\phi_\tau} \) is negative, that is, households with such income receive net transfers from the government.

Tax function (17) implies the following relation between taxable income \( y \) and net income \( \tilde{y} \),

\[
\tilde{y} = \lambda_\tau y^{1-\phi_\tau}.
\]

We log this equation and estimate it via OLS for the pooled data sample, separately for each age group \( \tau \). The latter reflects the idea that household size, in particular the number of children, varies with age and hence implies different tax deductions which are not taken into account.

The results from the estimation are presented in Table 8. The fit of the regression model is reasonably good. The estimates for \( \phi_\tau \) indicate that the German tax and transfer system has a strong redistributive component.

In the additional counterfactual exercises, we use U.S. tax functions estimated from PSID data. The estimated U.S. tax schedules show a lower degree of redistribution as the age-specific progressivity parameters \( \phi_\tau \) for working age vary between 0.16 and 0.21. This is in line with the results of Heathcote et al. (2017). Their estimation exercise for the United States uses the same tax functional form and delivers a value of 0.181 for the progressivity parameter \( \phi \) (all ages pooled).
Table 8: Tax functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (τ)</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45-54</th>
<th>55-64</th>
<th>25-64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\lambda_\tau)</td>
<td>50.634***</td>
<td>58.405***</td>
<td>46.842***</td>
<td>20.329***</td>
<td>37.560***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.142)</td>
<td>(1.028)</td>
<td>(0.827)</td>
<td>(0.512)</td>
<td>(0.380)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\phi_\tau)</td>
<td>0.377***</td>
<td>0.385***</td>
<td>0.364***</td>
<td>0.293***</td>
<td>0.346***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.002)</td>
<td>(0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(R^2)</td>
<td>0.801</td>
<td>0.797</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>0.836</td>
<td>0.821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>23,023</td>
<td>37,420</td>
<td>32,342</td>
<td>19,682</td>
<td>112,467</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The delta method is used to compute the standard errors from the OLS estimation of the logged version of equation (18). Significance levels: * \(p < 0.1\), ** \(p < 0.05\), *** \(p < 0.01\).

Estimating House Value Risk

Housing in the model is subject to idiosyncratic house value shocks, \(\chi' \sim \mathcal{N}(-\sigma^2_\chi/2, \sigma^2_\chi)\). As in the model, we specify the empirical process for idiosyncratic house values as a random walk with drift. We estimate it using the wealth modules of the SOEP for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012. The empirical specification is

\[
\Delta \log(p_{i,t+5}) = \theta + \chi_{i,t},
\]

where \(\Delta \log(p_{i,t+5}) = \log(p_{i,t+5}) - \log(p_{i,t})\) is the log difference of the house price per square meter \(p_{i,t}\) reported by a homeowner \(i\) who stays homeowner of the same property from year \(t\) to year \(t+5\), where \(t = \{2002, 2007\}\). The estimated parameter of interest is the variance of the residuals, \(\text{Var}(\chi_{i,t})\). The estimated variance is based on five-year periods between observations. Therefore, in order to derive the implied annual standard deviation we divide this variance by five and take the squared root, \(\hat{\sigma}_\chi = \sqrt{\text{Var}(\chi_{i,t})/5}.44\)

We estimate the parameter \(\sigma_\chi\) restricting the data sample to working-age households, i.e. household heads are of age 25-54. We further restrict the sample by removing the highest and the lowest five percent of house price changes.

Table 9 presents the estimation results. Specification (1) estimates the raw standard deviation \(\sigma_\chi\) from equation (19). Furthermore, in specification (2) we control for differential

\[44\text{In the presence of serial correlation in the annual disturbances, this estimate is an upper bound of the annual standard deviation.}\]
Table 9: House value risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>(5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_\chi$</td>
<td>0.1083</td>
<td>0.1083</td>
<td>0.1073</td>
<td>0.1042</td>
<td>0.1040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time trends:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year $\times$ State</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year $\times$ State $\times$ House size</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income changes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>1,918</td>
<td>1,918</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are omitted because parameter estimates are highly significant in all cases.

time trends across the two periods (2002-2005 and 2007-2012). Specification (3) imposes differential time trends across the 16 German states. Specification (4) makes these trends also dependent on the size of the housing units. We group housing units in eight categories based on the size in squared meters, $\{0 − 50, 50 − 100, ..., 300+\}$. Finally, in specification (5), we control for the log changes in equivalent household labor income.\(^45\) The estimated standard deviation $\sigma_\chi$ is around 0.10-0.11. Based on these results, we set $\sigma_\chi = 0.104$ in the benchmark model.

We repeat this exercise using the same sample restrictions and truncations for the biannual PSID data samples for the years 1999-2013. The variable we utilize is the self-reported house value by the household head. The estimation results using year and state controls point to $\sigma_\chi = 0.09$. Therefore, the idiosyncratic house value risk in Germany and in the U.S. is of a similar magnitude.

**Estimating Rental Rate Risk**

Rental rates $\rho$ in the model evolve according to the autoregressive process

$$\log \rho' = (1 - \omega) \log \bar{\rho} + \omega \log \rho + \nu',$$  

\(^45\)Changes in household income can influence the self-reporting bias of house prices.
where $\nu \sim N\left(-\frac{\sigma^2}{2(1+\omega)}, \sigma^2_{\nu}\right)$. We estimate the two parameters $\omega$ and $\sigma_{\nu}$, using the yearly files of the SOEP (1995-2014). The basic estimation specification is an AR(1) process,

$$\log(\rho_{i,t+1}) = \omega \log(\rho_{i,t}) + u_{i,t},$$

(20)

where $\log(\rho_{i,t})$ is the log rental price per square meter for all market renters. If we specify $u_{i,t} = u_i + \nu_{i,t}$, the OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent even if $\nu_{i,t}$ are not serially correlated. This is because $\log(\rho_{i,t+1})$ is a function of $u_i$, and so is $\log(\rho_{i,t})$. The fixed-effects (FE) estimator is biased but consistent for $T \to \infty$ (see Nickell, 1981). To quickly explain the rationale behind the bias and its most popular solution (Arellano and Bond, 1991), look at a first-difference version of equation (20),

$$\log(\rho_{i,t+1}) - \log(\rho_{i,t}) = \omega(\log(\rho_{i,t}) - \log(\rho_{i,t-1})) + (\nu_{i,t} - \nu_{i,t-1}),$$

and observe that the OLS estimator which corresponds to the FE estimator of equation (20) is biased because $\log(\rho_{i,t})$ and $\nu_{i,t-1}$ are correlated. The Arellano-Bond GMM (A-B) estimator instruments the right-hand side variable with past values such as $\rho_{i,t-1}$ and further lags, which are correlated with $\log(\rho_{i,t}) - \log(\rho_{i,t-1})$, but not with $\nu_{i,t} - \nu_{i,t-1}$.

We restrict the data sample to market renters who stay in the same property between years $t$ and $t+1$ and are of working age. We again conduct the analysis for the top/bottom trimmed sample at 5%. The results of the three estimation techniques (OLS, FE and A-B) are reported in Table 10. In line with the results, we set the benchmark model parameters to $\omega = 0.404$ and $\sigma_{\nu} = 0.094$.

Table 10: Rental rate risk

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>OLS</th>
<th>FE</th>
<th>A-B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\omega$</td>
<td>0.9244</td>
<td>0.6421</td>
<td>0.4044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{\nu}$</td>
<td>0.1143</td>
<td>0.1091</td>
<td>0.0944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House size effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.8758</td>
<td>0.8868</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N$</td>
<td>29,027</td>
<td>29,027</td>
<td>29,027</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Standard errors are omitted because parameter estimates are highly significant in all cases. The Arellano-Bond system GMM estimator uses 3 lagged variables as instruments.
Empirical Facts on Homeownership and Wealth

Based on the wealth modules of the SOEP for the years 2002, 2007 and 2012, homeowners comprise around 44% of all households in Germany with household heads older than 24 years. Table 11 shows the age profiles of the homeownership rate, net wealth, gross housing wealth and financial wealth positions of households. The difference between the sum of gross housing wealth and financial wealth, and the net wealth position equals the average mortgage liability.

Table 11: Homeownership and wealth by age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group (τ)</th>
<th>25-34</th>
<th>35-44</th>
<th>45-54</th>
<th>55-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership rate (in %)</td>
<td>17.07</td>
<td>40.86</td>
<td>48.23</td>
<td>54.03</td>
<td>46.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net wealth (in thousand euros)</td>
<td>35.79</td>
<td>94.32</td>
<td>139.26</td>
<td>188.97</td>
<td>156.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross housing wealth (in thousand euros)</td>
<td>38.98</td>
<td>108.87</td>
<td>133.19</td>
<td>156.97</td>
<td>124.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial wealth (in thousand euros)</td>
<td>15.81</td>
<td>27.95</td>
<td>41.07</td>
<td>55.41</td>
<td>37.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 shows the homeownership rates by deciles of the household income and wealth distributions for working-age households.

Table 12: Homeownership rates by income and wealth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decile</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>18.73</td>
<td>22.27</td>
<td>28.11</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>34.74</td>
<td>42.94</td>
<td>48.99</td>
<td>55.38</td>
<td>65.41</td>
<td>70.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>9.82</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>2.68</td>
<td>6.46</td>
<td>13.04</td>
<td>41.19</td>
<td>69.20</td>
<td>87.27</td>
<td>92.97</td>
<td>94.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

46 In the model calibration procedure we target a homeownership rate of 42.2% which is the result of the age-specific homeownership rates aggregated according to the population shares of each age group in the model.
Appendix B: Further Results

Counterfactuals: General Equilibrium with Fixed Taxes

Table 13 presents results of the four policy experiments under the assumption that the government does not adjust taxes to restore budget balance. House prices and rents are fully flexible. If the RETT is cut or mortgage interest payments become tax deductible, the increase of the homeownership rate is weaker when taxes are fixed compared to the case where taxes are increased to balance the budget. This is because of a stronger effect on housing demand which increases the house price even further, hence mitigating the positive impact of the policy. When social housing is abolished, the homeownership rate increases slightly more compared to the case of revenue neutrality where the government cuts taxes. In the combined scenario we find that the increase of the homeownership rate is 1.5 percentage points smaller with fixed taxes than under revenue neutrality.
Table 13: Counterfactuals: General equilibrium with fixed taxes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>RETT</th>
<th>Mort Ded</th>
<th>No Social H</th>
<th>Combination</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C1</td>
<td>C2</td>
<td>C3</td>
<td>C4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 25-34 yrs</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 35-44 yrs</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>51.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 45-54 yrs</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>58.8</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 55-64 yrs</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>82.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- 65+ yrs</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>51.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wealth</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>139.2</td>
<td>131.3</td>
<td>132.9</td>
<td>143.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Housing</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>106.4</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>93.5</td>
<td>120.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Financial</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Mortgage</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-5.9</td>
<td>-5.4</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
<td>-9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House price</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>1.027</td>
<td>1.010</td>
<td>0.994</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Price-to-rent ratio</td>
<td>18.38</td>
<td>18.54</td>
<td>18.44</td>
<td>18.34</td>
<td>18.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rationing prob $\pi$ (%)</td>
<td>1.28</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$Gov’t BC (per HH)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.345</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>+0.087</td>
<td>-0.423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- $\Delta$RETT Rev</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.266</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>-0.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- $\Delta$IncTax Rev</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.072</td>
<td>-0.094</td>
<td>-0.024</td>
<td>-0.246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- $\Delta$SocHous Subs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
<td>-0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta$Demand (in %)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>-0.26</td>
<td>0.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-0.60</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>0.81</td>
<td>-0.50</td>
<td>0.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Income Q5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>1.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** All monetary values in thousand euros.

**Homeownership Rates by Age, Income and Wealth**

Figure 8 presents the model fit to the data in terms of age-specific homeownership rates by income deciles for each working-age group separately. The model captures well the level of homeownership for each age group. It also delivers increasing patterns of homeownership with income which are less pronounced for the younger age groups.

Figure 9 shows the model fit in terms of homeownership rates by wealth deciles for each working-age group separately. These patterns are captured well with the exception of the youngest age group where the model underestimates the homeownership for the lower
wealth deciles. As discussed in the main text, an explanation could be that there are no direct housing bequests or inter-vivo transfers to young households in the model.

Figure 8: Homeownership rate by income and age group
Figure 9: Homeownership rate by wealth and age group

Additional Statistics of the Wealth Distribution

Here we present the comparison between the model and the data in terms of selected age-specific percentiles of household net wealth and its components, gross housing wealth and net financial wealth. Figure 10 shows that the model generates adequate life-cycle wealth dispersion patterns relative to the data. The only caveat is that the model delivers too much financial wealth accumulation especially among young-age households.
Figure 10: Percentiles of net, housing and financial wealth by age group

Landlord Households

Our model has testable implications for household landlords. Table 14 compares the benchmark model’s share of landlords to the data. The model’s share is somewhat lower than in the data. Looking at the life cycle, the discrepancy between model and data diminishes with age. Regarding differences across the wealth distribution, we underestimate the fraction of
poor household landlords as well as the share of rich household landlords, while we match the fraction for households in the middle of the wealth distribution fairly well.

Table 14: Share of landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of landlords (%)</th>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By age

- 25-34 yrs            | 2.9   | 4.6  |
- 35-44 yrs            | 5.0   | 10.7 |
- 45-54 yrs            | 8.1   | 14.6 |
- 55-64 yrs            | 12.5  | 16.7 |
- 65+ yrs              | 11.3  | 11.3 |

By wealth quintile

- Wealth Q1            | 0.0   | 1.3  |
- Wealth Q2            | 0.1   | 1.4  |
- Wealth Q3            | 7.7   | 6.6  |
- Wealth Q4            | 11.1  | 13.4 |
- Wealth Q5            | 20.7  | 36.5 |

Dynamics of Tenure States

The left panel of Table 15 reports the annual transition rates between owning and renting. A homeowner becomes a renter with annual probability 0.54%. This number is slightly higher in the model (0.93%). Vice versa, a renter becomes a homeowner with annual probability 1.7% (2.1%) in the data (model).

The right panel of Table 15 shows the annual probability of homeowners changing their property while keeping their homeowner status. In the data, this probability is fairly low with 0.72%. The model implies that homeowners update the size/quality of their property more frequently than in the data. An explanation for the discrepancy might be that owners have no option to adjust the size or quality of their property in our model.
Table 15: Annual transition between tenure states (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition probabilities</th>
<th>Prob. to change main residence (owners)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td>Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O → R'</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R → O'</td>
<td>1.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: O: owner, R: renter

Tails of the Age Distribution

The stochastic life-cycle modeling implies that there is a distribution over individuals’ lifetimes in the model. We assess the role of the tails of this distribution by computing some aggregate statistics based on a smaller population sample that excludes individuals living either very short or very long. Specifically, we simulate a cohort of newborn agents and track their individual histories until death. Then we remove those agents that have experienced the 10% shortest lifetimes (30 years or less) and those that have experienced the 10% longest lifetimes (97 years or more). Table 16 compares a selection of aggregate statistics based on this restricted population sample without age tails to their respective benchmark values. While there are some small differences, these numbers suggest that aggregate results are not much affected by extreme ageing realizations.

Table 16: Effects of removing the tails of the age distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>No tails</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homeownership (%)</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 25-34 yrs</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 35-44 yrs</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 45-54 yrs</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 55-64 yrs</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– 65+ yrs</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>51.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total wealth</td>
<td>128.7</td>
<td>131.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Housing</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Financial</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Mortgage</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: In the “No tails” case the 10% lowest (≤ 30 years) and 10% highest (≥ 97 years) lifetimes of a simulated cohort of new entrants have been removed.
Appendix C: Housing Policies Across Countries

The quantitative policy analysis of our paper focuses on the features of the German housing market. In this appendix we provide an overview and qualitative assessment of housing policies for other developed countries with a long history of housing policies: France, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. We assess the likely impact of these policies on homeownership choices. As in our study of Germany, we focus on mortgage interest deductions (MID), transaction taxes (RETT) and costs, and social housing (SH). In addition, we also report direct subsidies to homeownership. We limit our summary of policies to the last two decades and put a lower emphasis on policies that were active only for a part of that time period. Many housing policies are likely to have long-lasting effects which we cannot adequately capture here.

Table 17 compares these housing policies across countries in a qualitative way based on our policy summaries which are detailed further below. We gauge how supportive a country’s policy is regarding homeownership, where “+” indicates the least supportive level and “+++” the most supportive level.

Intuitively, tax deductions and subsidies related to owning should have a clear direct effect on the propensity to become a homeowner. In the third and fourth columns we rank the support of MID and owner subsidies roughly based on the expenditures relative to GDP. The table indicates that higher homeownership rates are positively associated with more subsidies or more possibilities of deducting mortgage interest payments from taxes.

Columns five and six rank RETT rates and total transaction costs which also include notary fees and average costs of real estate agents. Homeownership rates tend to be higher if transaction costs are lower, with the exception of Spain.

The relation between homeownership and social housing is shown in the last column. Social housing is harder to evaluate as not only the share of households in social housing is important, but also how strict income eligibility criteria are and how they are enforced after moving in when income changes. Moreover, for three countries in our sample (Italy, Spain, and the U.K.) social housing provides a direct route to homeownership as the government provides large discounts when social housing tenants buy their current social housing unit. Our ranking takes all these factors in a qualitative way into account and shows a positive relation between the incentives for ownership associated with social housing and the homeownership rates.

In the following policy summary we start the description of each policy with Germany and the U.S. for easier reference in the main text.47

47Policies for the U.K. mainly refer to England and Wales which make up 89% of the population.
### Table 17: Cross-country comparison of policies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>HOR</th>
<th>MID</th>
<th>MID+Sub.</th>
<th>RETT</th>
<th>Trans.</th>
<th>SH</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+++</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+++</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:** HOR: Homeownership rate; MID: Mortgage interest deduction; Subs.: Subsidies to owner-occupiers; RETT: Real estate transfer tax; Trans.: Transaction costs including RETT; SH: Social housing. A higher number of + signs indicate policies more favorable for homeownership. Homeownership rates for Euro area countries are from the Household Finances and Consumption Survey for the year 2010, for the U.K. are for England and Wales from the 2010 census, and for the U.S. from the 2010 census.

### Mortgage Interest Deduction for Owner Occupiers (MID)

**Germany:** No MID, except for the years 1982-1986 (see Bach and Bartholmai, 1995). There exists an MID for landlords.

**United States:** The MID (for both owner occupiers and landlords) has existed since the turn of the 19th century (see Lowenstein, 2006), causing an estimated tax loss of 80 billion USD or 0.6% of GDP in 2009 (see Congressional Budget Office, 2009).

**France:** No MID.

**Italy:** Limited MID. Before 1993, each co-signer of a mortgage could deduct up to 3,500 euros from the interest payments; in 1993, this was reduced to 3,500 euros per year for each mortgage contract. Moreover, the reform eliminated the regressive feature of the MID (see Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2007). See also the paragraph on subsidies below.

**Spain:** Both MID and a tax credit on payments for the principal of a mortgage exist. The MID was enacted in 1979 with the introduction of the income tax (see Raya, 2012). During 1992-98 the upper threshold for MID was 6,000 euros plus 15% credit on the principal. After 1998, the total deduction, including the the tax credit was capped at 9,000 euros (see García-Vaquero and Martínez, 2005). There have been various policy changes after the financial crisis. Spending on on these policies was 2.3% of GDP in 1990 and 7.7 billion euros or 1.4% in 1999 (see European Central Bank (2003) and Martínez (2005)). The spending numbers include subsidies for house purchases for lower-income households, see the paragraph on subsidies below.
**United Kingdom:** Currently no MID, but there was a MID in place from 1969-2000. Over time, the treatment of mortgage interest was subject to considerable changes. “Before 1983, the interest on the first 730,000 GBP of a mortgage was deductible from taxable income. In April 1983, the MIRAS, (Mortgage Interest Relief at Source) scheme was introduced [where] a borrower paid the lender the interest less the tax relief, initially equal to the marginal tax rate. Moreover, until 1988 the 730,000 GBP limit applied on single mortgagers rather than the property, so married people could each receive relief on loans up to 730,000 GBP, including more than one on the same property” (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2007). The average spending on MIRAS in the 1980s was about 1% of GDP and about .5% in the 1990s.\(^{48}\) The total direct spending on housing policies was 0.6% of GDP in 2000 (European Central Bank, 2003).

**Subsidies to Home Buyers**

We list here subsidies to home buyers/owners other than mortgage interest deductions.

**Germany:** No subsidies after 2005. There have been various subsidies from the 1950s onwards. From 1987 until 1995 there was a capped and income dependent depreciation allowance for the duration of 8 years after purchase with additional deductions for children. From 1996-2005 this was replaced by a direct subsidy to home buyers for the duration of 8 years from the point of purchase. In 2000 -close to the peak of accumulated expenditures - the subsidy for that policy had a total volume of 6.7 billion euros or 0.3% of GDP (see Müller et al., 2002).

**United States:** Capital gains from primary residences are tax exempt and local/state property taxes for homes for personal use can be deducted from federal income taxes leading to an estimated revenue loss of 16 billion USD for each exemption or a combined loss of 0.2% of GDP (see Congressional Budget Office, 2009). As government sponsored entities provide a large share of mortgages that benefit from an implicit bailout guarantee and direct subsidies, home buyers gain from a lower interest rate (of an estimated 0.25 of a percentage point), see Jeske et al. (2013) and Congressional Budget Office (2001). A smaller subsidy is the “Assets for Independence” program which provides a down-payment subsidy for low-income households, with relatively low volume of government spending with 10.9 million USD in 2008, see Ergungor (2011) and also Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2013). In addition, there were temporary

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subsidies in the aftermath of the financial crisis, such as the “First-Time Homebuyer Credit” with a total volume of 14 billion in 2009 and the “Making Home Affordable” program (see Congressional Budget Office, 2009).

France: Since 1995 there have been zero interest rate loans for lower-income households which act as a down payment subsidy. In 2003 the expenditures totalled 780 million euros or .05% of GDP (see Gobillon and Le Blanc, 2008).

Italy: Direct spending on homeownership subsidies was 3.5 billion or 0.2% of GDP in 2008 (Dol and Haffner, 2010), 0.1% of GDP in 1998 and 0.3% of GDP in 1980 (see European Central Bank, 2003). Moreover, there have been indirect transfers due to buying SH units at a much reduced rate. Since 1993 about 200,000 dwellings or 4% of all houses of owner-occupiers have been acquired from the public housing sector. The average price discount is estimated to range between 64% to 86% of the market price (see Bianchi, 2014). Thus, the effect of these implicit subsidies is potentially large, especially as they offer a direct route from social housing to homeownership.

Spain: Large direct and implicit subsidies for building for low-income households “Vivienda de Proteccion Oficial”, with prices at much reduced rates. Social housing units for sale to lower-income households were sold as low as 50% of the market price in 2007. From 1978-1986 almost half of all housing starts were subsidized through this program (see Alberdi, 2014). For the total direct subsidy spending, see the paragraph on the MID above.

United Kingdom: Since 1980 there is the “Right to Buy” (RTB) program: Social housing tenants with at least three years tenure in their house gained a statutory right to buy their home at discounts ranging from 33% to 50% of the market price depending on their length of tenure. In addition, local authorities were required to make mortgages available to would-be purchasers. Total sales of SH dwellings were about 2 million units until 2017 or 55,000 units per year. Therefore, this policy opens up a direct transition from SH to homeownership. RTB was extended to tenants of housing associations with the “Right to acquire” program starting in 1997. For an overview of the development of housing policies in the U.K. see also Millins et al. (2006). Starting in 2013, the “Help to buy” program provides an interest-free loan up to 20% of the property value for 5 years if the property is newly built. The total volume of this subsidy is relatively low (less than 0.01% of GDP in 2017).
Transaction Taxes and Costs

The numbers given here are real estate transfer taxes (RETT) plus an estimate of average total brokerage fees plus an estimate of (legal) fees. For overviews see also Andrews et al. (2011), Kälin (2005) and Brown and Hepworth (2002).

**Germany:** 5.2%+7%+1.5%=13.7%. The RETT used to be 3.5% until 2006 for all of Germany and increased after 2006 when legislation was delegated to the states within Germany (see Fritzsche and Vandrei, 2019). The number given here is the average across German states. Notary fees are legally fixed in Germany. Real estate agent fees usually follow a commonly applied rule and split evenly between buyers and sellers.51

**United States:** 0.3%+6%+1%=8%. RETT is an average over US states. The current RETT numbers by state are compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures.52 Each state is weighted by the Census state population from 2010. For states in which there are tax schedules for different transaction prices only the lowest tax category is used. See also Kopczuk and Munroe (2015). For real estate commissions see Hendel et al. (2009). There are various fees which are usually not proportional to the house price and which can vary. We found example calculations ranging between 0.5%-1.5% and we took the intermediate value of 1%.

**France:** 5%+7%+1%=13%. RETT is 5% for used houses or for any land transactions between private individuals. New houses are subject to a registration tax of 0.7% (see Bérard and Trannoy, 2017 and Brown and Hepworth, 2002). In 2014 the tax system was changed, see Bérard and Trannoy (2017). For brokerage fees we use the number reported by a large French broker firm of 7% for a house worth 250,000 euros53. Delcoure et al. (2002) report an average number of 5% and remark that about half of the sales are directly done by the owner. Notary fees depend on value and are about 1% on average.54

**Italy:** 3%+6%+2%=11%. A buyer who is registered in the commune where they acquire a used property pays a reduced RETT of 3% if it is not a “luxury” property. Otherwise the


51 See e.g. Immobilienscout24, 2018, Available at: https://www.immobilienscout24.de/eigentuemer/lexikon/maklerprovision.html#hoehe-bundeslaender, Accessed on June 12, 2018.


RETT is 10%. It used to be common practice to underreport the sales price to lower the RETT payment (see Kälin, 2005 and Brown and Hepworth, 2002). Delcoure et al. (2002) report a real estate fee of 2-3% for each the buyer and the seller. The notary fee for a 200,000 euro property is 2% with a lower rate for more expensive houses (see Kälin, 2005).

Spain: 7%+5%+1.5%=13.5%. RETT for private residences is the reduced rate of 7% (see Kälin, 2005), regional variations apply. For the real-estate agent commission, see Delcoure et al. (2002). Notary fees vary, we used a medium value of 1.5%.

United Kingdom: 1%+2%+0%=3%. The RETT is progressive, the reported value is based on a property value of 250,000 GBP. Below 125,000 GBP the tax is zero. Private purchases of new residential homes are VAT exempt (see Brown and Hepworth, 2002) Delcoure et al. (2002) state a brokerage fee between 1-2% on average. Notary fees are fixed at GBP 750 (see Kälin, 2005).

Social Housing

Germany: Total spending on SH (mostly in form of subsidized loans for new SH construction) in 2001 was 3.2 billion euros or 0.1% of GDP (Pfeiffer et al. (2003)). The target population of SH is relatively broad and reaches up to median-income households. Eligibility is not strictly monitored after moving in. See also Section 2 of the paper for further details.

United States: Currently 1.8% of households in SH. Funding for SH in the U.S. comes in form of tax reductions for developers, “Low-income housing tax credit”, and an “accelerated depreciation” - each with an estimated volume of about 5 billion USD, support for public SH development (the “public housing program” with a volume of 11 billion USD) and a “project based voucher” program for SH units with a volume of 9 billion USD in 2009. The total estimated spending on SH is about 30 billion USD or 0.2% of GDP in 2009. SH is available to poor households (below 80% of the local median income) and income limits are strictly enforced.

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55The older study by Brown and Hepworth (2002) reports a smaller RETT of 4%.
56The firm DLA Piper reports notary fees between 0.5% up to 2.5%, see DLA Piper, 2018, Real Estate Investment in Spain available at: https://www.dlapiperrealworld.com/export/sites/real-world/guides/downloads/Spain-Investor-Guide.pdf, accessed on July 1, 2018. Kälin (2005) quotes numbers up to 3%.
57See HM Government in the United Kingdom, 2018, Stamp Duty Land Tax. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/stamp-duty-land-tax, accessed on December 1, 2018. See Kälin (2005) for more details and changes in the legislation. See also Besley et al. (2014) and Best and Kleven (2017) for economic analyses of the RETT in the U.K.
58For this and the following numbers on social housing in the U.S., see the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2018. Available at: https://www.huduser.gov/portal/datasets/picture/about.html, accessed on December 1, 2018.
France: 17.4% are currently in SH. The SH rent is cost based and is about 60% below the market rent. Access is income based and targeted to poor households. Yearly reassessment with rent increase if income has increased above a threshold. SH has steeply increased from the 1960 to the 2000s, see Le Blanc and Laferrière (2001) and Schaefer (2008).

Italy: Around 4-5% of households during 1995-2014 were in SH. The system is not very targeted, with a share of SH tenants that is relatively similar across income deciles. Discount of rent about 10% relative to hypothetical market rent (see Poggio and Boreiko (2017); Bianchi (2014), in contrast, reports a sizable rent discount for SH). Moreover, as reported above, SH units were sold to private individuals from 1993 onwards at a highly subsidized rate, implying a direct transition from SH to ownership.

Spain: Only 2% of households are in SH. There have been financial incentives of SH tenants to buy their SH unit in the past (see Alberdi, 2014).

United Kingdom: About 17% of households are currently in SH, down from 30% in the 1970s. SH rent is about 30% below market rent with large variations. Access is usually strongly targeted at needy households using a point-based system (see Pawson and Kintrea, 2002). There are strong incentives to become an owner for SH tenants since the “Right to buy” policy was introduced in 1980. That policy gives a discount up to 35% of the purchase price (see also Adam et al., 2015). Using social rents for comparable apartments we calculate the total implicit rent subsidy to be around 0.1% of GDP in 2017.\(^{59}\)

Other Housing Policies

Clearly, there are other policies that might be relevant for the homeownership decision. The most important ones are housing related taxation of capital gains and bequests of residences, taxes on imputed rents, property taxes, housing benefits, rent regulations and (regulatory) constraints for the provision of mortgages.

None of the countries mentioned here taxes imputed rents and all have similarly generous tax exemptions for capital gains from selling the primary residence (see European Central Bank (2003) and the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986). Property taxes are unlikely to have a strong effect on the choice between owning versus renting if taxation is uniform across

tenure states. Italy and the U.S. allow for a reduced property tax for (primary) residences for personal use (see Baldini and Poggio (2014) and Congressional Budget Office (2009)), which might affect the buy or rent margin. Turning to housing benefits, these can favor renting if benefits are high or if they set disincentives to save.

Rent controls have generally ambiguous effects since they affect both the supply and the demand of rental units. In particular, if rental price regulation is strict and housing supply is inelastic, the long run effects of rent regulation can lead to an advantage of owning.

Finally, stricter down payment requirements enforced through limits on the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) can lower the propensity to buy a home. Cross-country studies of mortgage constraints are severely limited by availability of micro data, however.
Appendix D: Computation of Transition Dynamics

While the computation of a transition path from one stationary equilibrium to another one follows standard practices in the literature, we find it useful to provide some details on the algorithm for our model. In particular, we describe the set of variables whose evolution along the transition path have to be guessed upon, and the set of equilibrium conditions that must be satisfied along the way in order to verify the guess. Importantly, the set of variables and equilibrium conditions differ across the various counterfactuals. For instance, social housing access and exit probabilities must be adjusted differently depending on whether the policy reform abolishes social housing or not.

Throughout all experiments, we assume that the economy is at its benchmark stationary equilibrium in period 0. Then, at time $t = 1$, the policy change occurs unexpectedly. We are interested in computing the transition path to the new stationary equilibrium. We employ the following algorithm:

1. Fix the number of transition periods $T$. We set $T = 251$ years and verify later that this value is large enough (see below).

2. Guess time paths for the following objects:

   (i) House price $\{p_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$

   (ii) Tax shifter $\{\lambda_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$

   (iii) The distribution of bequests $\{B_t(\cdot)\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$

   (iv) Social housing access probability $\{\pi_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$

   (v) Social housing investment $\{I_t^s\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ (only counterf. C1 and C2)

   (vi) Social housing exogenous exit probability $\{\eta_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$ (only counterf. C3 and C4)

Given these guesses, the transition path for the following variables can be backed out:

- The path of rental rates, $\{\tilde{p}_t\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$, is determined through the recursion $V_t = \frac{1}{1+r}[\tilde{p}_t - e^m + (1 - \delta)V_{t+1}]$, the discounted value per housing unit, and $V_t = p_t$.

- The path for investment, $\{I_t + I_t^s\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$, is implied by the first-order condition of construction firms, $p_{t+1} = K'(I_t + I_t^s)$.

- The path for the total housing stock, $\{H_t + H_t^s\}_{t=1}^{T-1}$, is determined by the following law of motion: $H_{t+1} + H_{t+1}^s = (1 - \delta)(H_t + H_t^s) + I_t + I_t^s$. 

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3. Setting all variables at time \( T \) to their respective values in the new stationary equilibrium, solve the sequence of household problems backwards from \( t = T - 1 \) to \( t = 1 \).

4. Starting from the benchmark stationary equilibrium distribution at \( t = 1 \), simulate the distribution forward from \( t = 1 \) to \( t = T - 1 \) using the optimal policy functions and the exogenous stochastic processes.

5. At each \( t \), check whether the following conditions are fulfilled:

   (i) All housing units are occupied (cf. condition 4 in our definition of a stationary equilibrium). If not, adjust the price \( p_t \).

   (ii) The government budget is balanced. If not, adjust the tax shifter \( \lambda_t \).

   (iii) The distribution of bequests must be identical to the distribution of estates left behind by dying households in the previous time period (cf. condition 7 in our definition of a stationary equilibrium). If not, adjust \( B_t(.) \).

   (iv) [ Only counterfactuals C1 and C2: ] The fraction of households living in social housing units must remain equal to the benchmark value of 7.1% (see calibration). If not, adjust the social housing access probability at \( t - 1 \), \( \pi_{t-1} \).

   (v) [ Only counterfactuals C1 and C2: ] Supply and demand for social housing units must coincide. If not, adjust social housing investment at \( t - 1 \), \( I_s^{t-1} \).

   (vi) [ Only counterfactuals C3 and C4: ] Supply and demand for social housing units must coincide, provided that after \( t \geq 1 \) the government does not invest in new social housing units anymore, \( I_s^t = 0 \) for all \( t \geq 1 \). If not, adjust the social housing access and exogenous exit probabilities. Specifically, if the supply exceeds the demand, raise \( \pi_{t-1} \) (or lower \( \eta_{t-1} \), but not below its benchmark value). If the demand exceeds the supply, raise \( \eta_{t-1} \) (or lower \( \pi_{t-1} \), but not below zero).

6. After updating the guessed time paths, return to step 2 if necessary (given some stopping rule). After convergence, check whether the time horizon \( T \) is long enough.

In practice, we use relaxation parameters to update guesses in order to improve convergence. Even though this shooting algorithm involves quite a few variables (including a distribution), we find that it converges relatively smoothly.
References for the Online Appendix


