

Wargame



Design

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March Rates at Night
Prussian Fusiliers at Jena
Wavre AAR
Why Change Bombardment?

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WE LIVE IN A STRANGE WORLD

Where all the united science tells us that we are about 11 years away from setting off an irreversible chain reaction way beyond human control that will probably be the end of our civilization as we know it. ... We live in a strange world. Where we think we can buy or build our way out of a crisis that has been created by buying and building things... —Greta Thunberg

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EDITORIAL

The “Paper Time Machine”

From the above meme, one might get the idea that a wargame designer merely needs to craft a paper version of the real machinery of war, piece by piece, and just map out the structure and function of an army.

Wargames as a whole evolved from a WWII operational environment, and work best with a continuous front mapedge to mapedge. Napoleonic armies, by contrast, operated in an environment more akin to naval fleets and task forces, with limited knowledge of enemy moves and intentions. This frontage problem gave Leaders a reason for inclusion. That is: to see that corps frontages extend no more than two miles.

The purpose of the Leadership rules is not to depict the physical movements of leaders during a battle—Leaders are only included for their impact on the shape of the front line, forcing players to keep the corps on a tight frontage; as well as allowing stacking and reorganization. In doing this the Leader doesn't mirror the exact movements of his real historical counterpart. You could envision the Leader counter as the spot where the HQ stands, while the general himself might be some distance away, putting out fires.

—Kevin Zucker

DESIGN QUESTION

Should You Include Bombarding Artillery in a Combined Arms Attack?

Vince Hughes, Aaron Tobul, Kevin Zucker

Is it considered Combined Arms if the target hex is bombarded immediately prior to the combat resolution and there is no artillery involved in the regular attack?

VH: We always play "No." The combined arms have to be in the standard attack. Becomes a bit easy otherwise... from TLNB Series Rules 11.2:

"The attacker may gain a +1 column shift in Combat if he has infantry, cavalry and artillery participating in the SAME attack" [my CAPS]. ... "Vedettes and artillery units that BOMBARDED this phase are DISREGARDED."

KZ: TLNB makes a hard and fast distinction between "bombardment" (fire at range, usually ricochet) and "regular combat" (close support). Increasing the range from 1 hex to 2 hexes cuts fire effectiveness in half.

Remember that adding cavalry to your attack forces the enemy to adopt a compact formation, which makes a good target for the guns. However including a single SP of arty bombarding into a CA (1/3 chance of a hit) would be making it too easy, as Vince has suggested.

A better House Rule might be to say that a stack with a Suppressed Marker on it is considered to be ducking cannon balls. But merely to have been fired on, and missed, perhaps that shouldn't count.

AT: Were they missed? Or did they open up their ranks to avoid taking casualties, making them easier prey for attacking cavalry or infantry? Sometimes I have a hard time figuring out what is happening within the hex. I'm happy to play it either way as long as we are consistent and I get to play.



KZ. My assumption is that they were not able to open up aisles in the ranks once they had formed square. Typically, in Pitched Battles, an attack would be prepared by bombardment, so those men might be able to remain in a less-dense formation until the cavalry appeared ready to charge. Then they would form square. It should take about 2-3 minutes for a bn. to form square.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infantry_square
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zYmTlBNfmb8>

From: **Infantry Tactics and Combat during the Napoleonic Wars, Part 2**

Whenever enemy cavalry was observed moving forward and preparing to attack, they started forming squares. Such movements of cavalry were already noticed at approx. 3 hexes. Charging cavalry could cover that distance in 6 minutes.

According to French regulations if the infantry was in line it should be able to form square in 100 seconds. If in attack column 30 sec. was enough. At Leipzig the Austrian 5th Jäger Battalion formed square at a run, delivered a volley, and awaited its fate with bayonets ready.

Square could be formed from column with full or half intervals. This was easier than from line. Average quality troops will form a hollow square in 2-3 min. Under fire the infantry will need 4-6 min. To form a square from 2 battalions took twice as long (8-12 min.). Those better trained and accustomed to battle needed less time. To form a square of equal faces took up to twice as long (12 up to 24 min. for a 2 bn. square).

VH: The Austrians and Russians were also known for forming massed dense squares rather than the famous hollow square. I've seen them referred to as battalion masse and solid squares. For less professional soldiers or less well-commanded ones, it was a much easier concept to perform on the battlefield.

March Rates at Night

I had trouble getting the French to Montmirail in a time close to history. I think the night turns and limited marching during night affects the ability to duplicate history. Lead elements of French cavalry engaged the Russians west of Montmirail at 9 am, Feb. 11th. Night turns take away valuable time that your units could be marching. Ricard's units moved out at 3 am Feb. 11th. In the game you have night hours limited to 2/3 movement points or 4/6 hexes on a road. Three night turns. Night pm has regular movement of 4/6 but covers more than 1 hour of time. This is why it's hard to duplicate historical movement. 5 hours and an infantry unit has only moved just a little over 1 mile! That is with perfect weather! The roads were muddy.



Ricard was general of division and his units would be represented by the Boudin and Clavel counters of VI Corps. These counters are located at W1032 hex just outside of Marchais at 9 am on the 11th for the Montmirail DOB scenario. If these units leave Champaubert at 3 am on the 11th, under the night turn rules, they cannot possibly reach W1032 by 9 am.

—Lee Loftiss

I would have to look into where Ricard actually was at 3 AM. If we assume he was in Champaubert (with Marmont), he would be facing a 4-hour hike from Champaubert to Montmirail (his destination).

Our night movement turns are constructed so that two hours out of every 3 Night hours is a distributed rest period, and then, movement for the remaining hour is halved. Night marches are halved to allow for units getting in each other's way in the darkness. So as to cover all the different battles, the rules allow average night marches. That night movement rate is an average over the course of the entire night. Starting at 3 AM, Ricard's men have already rested for six hours, but the way the game movement rates are constructed, you would have to start them moving at 9PM.

Nonetheless it is possible that a special rule might be needed for Ricard to make his march on time.

$$\begin{array}{r} 480 \text{ meters} \\ \times 54 \text{ road hexes to Marchais} \\ \hline 25,920 \text{ meters, } 25.92 \text{ km.} \end{array}$$

One person walking without any delay can make that in 5 hours.

March Rates

For daylight turns we figure the troops are marching for 55 minutes per hour, stepping 75 paces per minute (pas ordinaire) with a 5 minute halt. We use a 30" pace.

$$\begin{array}{r} 75 \times 30 = 2,250 \text{ in. or } 62.5 \text{ yards per} \\ \text{minute} \\ \times 55 \\ \hline 3437 \text{ yards per hour or } 6.54 \text{ hexes.} \end{array}$$

This can be increased to 85 to 90 paces per minute (route march)—up to a 20% increase

$$\begin{array}{r} 6.54 \text{ hexes} \\ \times 1.2 \\ \hline 7.857 \text{ hexes.} \end{array}$$

In the game 8 hexes is possible, so infantry units can go 92 steps per minute. But that is during daylight.

We distributed a 2-hr. rest into each Night turn. That way we do not need a special rule on enforced rest for each unit.

This means you need to include the entire night, all three turns, since Ricard's men rested from 9 PM to 3 AM. Then they marched like daylight for 5 hours. But 5 x 8 is only 40, not 54, so something doesn't add up.

I would have to look into whether Ricard was closer to Montmirail when he camped for the night. At the end of this article it is said that Ricard marched at "unheard of" speeds—perhaps even 100 paces per minute for over 5 hours (?)

Elting (p. 463) writes: "If the leading company marches rapidly, the rearmost companies will have to run; if the road leads through hilly country, the rear companies will be alternately running and half-stepping. The U.S. Army calls this the "accordion effect." Any minor obstacle—a trickle of water across the road, a narrow bridge, or a rutted section of roadbed—causes delay, and that delay increases progressively from front to rear."

We need to know where Ricard ACTUALLY WAS when he camped for the night. Either way, you cannot do even 40 hexes during three night and one 8 AM turn. Even without halving the march from 3 AM, and adding a 7 AM turn, the most they could cover is 40 hexes. To move 54 hexes would mean a march rate of 120 paces per minute, double time the whole way.

If you want to make a special rule for troops marching with Napoleon in person—some sources mention his presence with Ricard—allowing them to move at the full rate—4/6 during night, then he would have four turns of movement distributed as follows:

9-12 PM	1 hr (8 road hexes)
12-3 AM	1 hr (8 road hexes)
3-6 AM	1 hr (8 road hexes)
8 AM	1 hr (8 road hexes)

If you add a 7AM turn, they can make 40 road hexes; if you assume they arrived at 10 AM, then the distance is 48 hexes.

I'd like to hear from anyone who has checked the Correspondance de Napoléon Ier to see if there is any correspondence about Ricard on the evening of the 10th. I suspect that he was halfway to Montmirail when he camped at 9 PM.

Nafzger (p. 144) writes: "On 11 February ... The 1st Guard Division and the *2nd Brigade* of Ricard's 8th Division began their march, with the Guard Chasseurs leading the way, starting its march *one hour before dawn*. This column marched until **10 AM** when it arrived on the battlefield."

OSG SS Nr. 7, agrees:

10:00 AM—Chateau de Montmirail

The Emperor departed toward the crossroads at the head of the Old Guard cavalry under Guyot, the infantry under Friant—and *Boudin's Brigade* of Ricard's division. (p. 45)

The units you have near Marchais at 9am on the 11th of Feb are the same units involved in the battle at Champaubert on the 10th. When did the battle finally end at Champaubert and when did Napoleon, Ricard's division, the Old Guard, and 36 guns march to Marchais?

One hour before dawn would be 7 AM. Chandler p. 970 says they left at night. Another source says Nansouty and 2 cavalry divisions left at 7 pm Feb. 10th and Ricard's division left at 3 am on 11th. We have conflicting accounts.

We know now that Boudin didn't march 54 hexes (by 9 AM), but no more than 40 hexes (by 10 AM); and didn't reach Le Tremblay until 11 AM. Now the disparity between this account and the game is reduced by 2 hours. The account has Napoleon headed out from the Chateau of Montmirail at 10 AM.


You are not wrong in stating that Ricard's brigade cannot arrive from Champaubert at Montmirail within the limitations of the Night Movement rules and get there by 9 AM or even 10 AM. The Chateau of Montmirail is in W1041, about 40 or 41 hexes from Champaubert.

House Rule for troops Marching at Night with Napoleon— simply allow them to move at full MA (4/6) during the three Night Turns.

Where was Boudin at night? Our sources do not say. They should have been behind the Old Guard. I may have read that the Old Guard were sent toward Montmirail while the battle of Champaubert was still going on.



Etienne-Pierre-Sylvestre Ricard



GdB Jacques-Jean-Marie-Francois Boudin de Tromelin, in 1815 commanded a bde. in VI Corps

The above is not the general—for whom no portrait was available at press time—but his father.

From Weil

11 February Positions of the corps of Yorck and Sacken between 9 and 10 o'clock.

The response of Yorck to Blücher proves, however, that the commander of Ist Prussian Corps had recognized the seriousness of the situation; with his lack of constraint and his openness for ordinary language, he replied to the Field Marshal that if the Emperor continued his offensive movement, it would be impossible to effect a junction with Sacken. He added that, with no news from Sacken, ignoring the nature of the resolutions adopted by the general and not wanting to impose on his troops the fatigues of a night march, he decided to concentrate, the 11th, his body around Viffort and push his cavalry towards Montmirail.

But Sacken, who had received a direct duplicate of the order of Blücher had left La Ferté-sous-Jouarre at 9 o'clock at night, after destroying the bridge he had repaired. Without informing Yorck, who was modifying his movements on his own initiative, he had executed a night march in hopes to get ahead of the Emperor at Montmirail. Although he had marched all night, Sacken only got to Viels-Maisons at 9 o'clock in the morning, while the advanced guard already skirmished with the French on the side of the farm of La Bordé. Although he had his Cossacks report on events of the night, Sacken never the less continued to advance against the villages of the Thorn-au-Bois and Marchais-en-Brie, already occupied by the French outposts.

Yorck arrived with his main body at Viffort. He had learned not only that the Cossacks of Karpov had been dislodged from Montmirail, but that his vanguard had given the enemy positions to the side of Rozoy and Fontenelle-en-Brie. Taking an accurate account of the difficulties of a situation exacerbated by the destruction of the bridge of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre (that Sacken had burned to prevent a movement of Macdonald on his rear), Yorck tried one last time to divert Sacken from his projects, to prevent an engagement and to agree to an immediate retreat on Château-Thierry. He sent one of his officers, Major von

Schack, who joined Sacken in Viels-Maisons when the General was about to send his last orders. Convinced that he had before him a small corps and even though Schack had said the 1st Corps could only come in to line much later and without its artillery that could not follow them, Sacken persisted in his resolve.

Positions of the French troops

The Emperor arrived at Montmirail, proceeded to reconnoiter the field and noted with pleasure that the two enemy corps had not yet effected a junction. The cavalry of Nansouty, joined in the morning by horse grenadiers from Sézanne had already thrown back the Russian outposts beyond the farms of Chouteaux. The Emperor, to prevent the possible meeting of his two opponents, resolved to come and take position astride the two roads from Montmirail to Château-Thierry and from Montmirail to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. To stop the movement that he foresaw on his left, he immediately moved the Ricard Division in column of battalions in mass in front of Le Tremblay where it was to deploy. Ney was to establish the second line with his two divisions to the right and left of the village. The cavalry was deployed in support of the artillery, up to the farm of Grénaux, his left on the road, the right to the farm of Plénois. 500 men taken from the division of Ricard, extended the right of the cavalry to Bailly and occupied the woods of Plénois. The division of Friant, on the right covered by the cavalry of General de France, was in reserve in battalion column, at the crossroads of the two roads. The Michel Division, with Marshal Mortier, was in march on Montmirail.

I am speculating that Napoleon seeing that the 1st Old Guard division was not needed in the fight at Champaubert, had ordered them to reach the crossroads at Montmirail as quickly as possible. He ordered his uncommitted reserves to Montmirail—Nansouty, the Old Gde Div and one Bde of Ricard. Some sources have Ricard arriving only at Noon.

Who was in Ricard's division? All veterans of the 1813 campaign, they have been fighting and marching non-stop for almost a year, including in their numbers two regiments of Marins, and all of them were older and

stronger than the Marie Louises who made up the line units in other Corps. They are so good that they were assigned to march with the Old Guard. A Special Rule for them could be justified.

This night march of 10/11 February was an outlier. We couldn't allow everyone to go running around at top speed during the night. But for Ricard's 2nd brigade and the Guard, it would be okay to House Rule that they move more quickly during the night than everybody else.

Battle of Montmirail.

11AM: At 11 o'clock in the morning, the skirmishers engaged. Sacken, notwithstanding the entreaties of his generals who had begged to take a position north of the road from La Ferté and reconcile the front combat troops with those of Yorck and the road from Château-Thierry, on the contrary, held to deploying his troops south of the road and ordered the 6th Russian infantry corps (General Lieutenant Scherbatov) to move right on Marchais-en-Brie and to support the advanced troops. A battery of 36 pieces took position behind the ravine of Rut-Choisel, which covered the position of L'Épine-au-Bois, the center of Russian lines. Another battery stood at the center of the Russian line, north of L'Épine-aux-Bois. To the left of the main road north of La Haute-Épine, the cavalry of Vasilchikov and Karpov was to support a battery charged with holding under its fire the woods in front of the Plénois Farm and to seek to link its left with the Prussian cavalry of General von Jürgass. The IIIrd Infantry Corps (General Lieven) was in reserve behind the L'Épine-aux-Bois.

Sacken, deciding to take Marchais *that the French had come to occupy* and to debouch on Montmirail by the valley of Petit-Morin, entrusted the attack on the village to General Heidenreich, whom he had given four battalions from the Pskov, Vladimir, Tambov and Kostroma Regiments, two companies of eiger (jäger), the Cossack regiment of Lukovkin and six guns. This column, having on its left its battery, which had stopped at the edge of the ravine, on its right the Cossacks, marched briskly on Marchais, under the protection of Russian batteries to which the French artillery, too weak,

responded feebly, and managed to get beyond Courmont.

12 Noon: The Emperor, who was waiting for the entry in the line of Mortier, had planned with his right hand movement to cut communications between Sacken and Yorck and to engage the troops that he still had in reserve. General *Ricard*, who he had sent temporarily to be under the command of Ney, *was charged at noon, to move from Le Tremblay on Marchais*, while General Friant—made available by the arrival of Mortier—would occupy Le Tremblay, while the rest of the 1st Division of the Old Guard and Reserve Cavalry of Nansouty maneuvered on the left of the Russians.

"No undulation in terrain," General Ricard said in his report to Marmont, "was found on this part of the plateau between Le Tremblay and Marchais, which made the battle very long, very obstinate and very deadly. This point, which formed the extreme left of the French army, was used to pivot and masked the great movement that the Emperor was preparing with his right. They attacked and took the village up to five times; we had officers who fought hand to hand with Russian officers, but we could never maintain our hold there because of the enormous superiority of the enemy forces, that were continually reinforced with fresh troops, while *we successively engaged all of the bodies of my division*. Even the village of Tremblay was being compromised, when the Emperor, at my request, sent me a battalion of the Old Guard. Upon arrival, I tried a last effort which was no more successful than the others. *One of my brigade generals was wounded, the other dismounted*, all the chiefs killed or wounded, more than 60 officers were out of action and the ranks exhausted. However, this last movement was, like the others, remarkable for the spirit and intrepidity of the troops."

2PM: It was then nearly two o'clock. The Emperor, alarmed at the progress of the right of Sacken had ordered Marshal Ney, to the right covered by the cavalry of Nansouty and reinforced by a part of the Friant Division and seven squadrons of Guards of Honor of General de France, to move *just in front of La Meulière*, falling back against L'Épine-aux-Bois and to shake up the first two lines of Sacken. The Prince of Moskowa, taking advantage of the

terrain and enjoying the overextension of the front of Sacken who had weakened his left to strengthen the attack on Marchais, *stove in and broke the first line of the Russians*, forcing the Russian batteries to cease fire and forced Sacken to send to L'Épine-aux-Bois the corps, hitherto held in reserve, of Lieven, whose arrival momentarily restored the fight.

North of the road, the cavalry of Vasilchikov had managed to stop the progress of the horsemen of Nansouty and connect its left with the Prussian cavalry. But General Guyot, at that time sent by the Emperor, charged with four service squadrons of, debouching from La Haute-l'Épine and crushing the battalions who tried to cross the road to La Ferté, while General Friant took La Haute-l'Épine which Sacken had had the imprudence to strip. At this time, the Russian center was already shaken; but to the right, Marchais was still under the control of generals Bernodossov and Heidenreich.

Schack made Yorck aware of the reasons for which Sacken had continued to engage and the dispositions for he had taken. Foreseeing the unfavorable outcome from having a battle fought under such conditions, the commander of the 1st Corps had immediately turned back his heavy batteries that could not take the rutted roads and had returned with the brigade of Prince William of Prussia, to Château-Thierry. Always cautious and methodical, he was all the more so in assuring possession of this only line of retreat, he feared to see on one hand Macdonald coming silently behind him and on the other hand on his right, the French troops sorties from Soissons preventing crossing back to the right bank of the Marne. As for his other two brigades (Pirch II and Horn), they were directed from Viffort on Fontenelle. But the roads were so bumpy that the head of his column (Pirch Brigade) did not debouch at the level of Fontenelle until 3:30, where Ney made his movement and began his attack on L'Épine-aux-Bois and where the French cavalry, extending to his right, was trying to win the road to Château-Thierry. Katzler's cavalry had already deployed between Rozoy-Belleville and Fontenelle-en-Brie, and the cavalry reserve did the same between Fontenelle and Les Tourneux.

When Yorck arrived at Fontenelle, Sacken had engaged everyone he had and lost all La Haute-l'Épine. His left was in disarray; his shaken center still opposing with a desperate but

useless resistance. It was no longer to restore an irremediably compromised situation, but to disengage the Russian corps while there was still time. Orders were therefore given to the Pirch Brigade to take position at Les Tourneux; to the Horn Brigade to form to the right, from Les Tourneux to Fontenelle; to the artillery (12 pieces) to be placed in battery between these brigades. It was all the more urgent to act and act quickly as the heroic impassibility and unshakeable strength of the exposed Russian troops was to be completely exposed by the French.

While the left of Sacken, driven from their positions, were trying to reach Yorck, while the cavalry of General Guyot charged, the right continued to hold fast to Marchais and support the fight without worrying about what was going on with the rest of the battlefield.

To facilitate the retreat of the Russian troops that the French cavalry had handled roughly, ultimately to disengage the defenders of Marchais, who had been too slow to get the order to fall back, Yorck brought the brigade of Pirch ahead of Les Tourneux and prescribed it to stop and throw back if it could the division of Michel that Mortier had established on the side of Plénois. On his part, Napoleon decided to end the resistance of Marchais, sending to the division of Ricard a reinforcement of four battalions of the Guard led by Marshal Lefebvre and General Bertrand. "The debris of my division having an hour's rest, were united in a column;" said General Ricard, "everything went to the village to cries of: *Vive l'Empereur!* without firing a shot. The enemy was thrown out and tumbled into ravines and woods that were behind; killing a lot of people, we pursued with bayonets in the kidneys; taking over 500 to 600 prisoners."

General Ricard forgot to say that the Guards of Honor of General de France, debouching to the rear of the Russians had cut off their retreat and had stove in their squares. It is true as Scherbatov claims, on the contrary, in his *Journal* that the defenders of Marchais succeeded, for the most part, to emerge and owed their salvation to two squadrons of Akhtyrka Hussars who charged the Guards of Honor, stopped them and prevented them from worrying the retreating Russian squares. The Pirch Brigade was therefore unnecessarily dedicated to advancing from Les Tourneux to Plénois and Bailly to save Marchais. After a brisk

engagement, Michel's infantry, supported by some squadrons of Nansouty, flowed over the left of the Prussians, and drove them from the wood of Blanchet, despite the entry into the line of the Horn Brigade, throwing them back on Fontenelle. *The night ended the battle.*

The intervention of the Prussian brigades had nevertheless saved the remnants of Sacken and allowed the Russians to win the road from Château-Thierry; but this fight, however short it had been, had cost the 1st Corps 31 officers and 854 men that the 1st Brigade had to leave on the field. The Russians had lost in the day six flags, 13 cannons and 2,800 men, including 800 prisoners.

The French, whose losses amounted to 2,000 men, exhausted by the efforts of two consecutive battles and spent *by marches whose speed and difficulty were unheard of*, bivouacked at 8 o'clock at night on the conquered positions and renounced pursuit.

[For the French to march at "unheard of" speeds, a pace exceeding 92 or even 100 per minute, the "difficulty" meant three things: night march, mud, and after fighting on the previous day.—Ed.]

Afterword by Vince Hughes

Sacken skirmishing with French vedettes makes me wonder how many were actually ready to deploy into fully formed battalions. Effectively like a Road March entry, it's a bit by bit accumulation of force. But due to the arrival of the first faces in the division, they get credited with the earliest time they were seen.... Despite the rest still having some march ahead?

On timings: I don't believe a large body of men, in times with little street lighting in populated areas, let alone barren countryside, can march as fast as claimed AS A WHOLE. My experience as an MP and dealing with convoys and marching columns, I know just how slow military masses move in column. In mitigation of darkness: There was snow around. Snow lights up areas at night considerably, dependent on the moon's fullness. (Waning gibbous moon at 60% brightness—Ed).

COMING STORM

Prussian Fusiliers at Jena-Auerstadt

Hale Cullom

SET-UP ERRATUM: *On page 99 of the special study, under the OB for Korps Tauntzien, is Bila II's Brigade, which consists of Pelet's 14th Fusilier bn. and Valentini's Jagers. It's the right strength— 2-[3]-4. Change Bila II's set-up from hex 2747 to Closewitz (2947) and move the HQ Gde fusilier regiment to Cappellendorf (1452).*

In Jena-Auerstadt (*Coming Storm*), the Day of Battle OB puts a regiment of Prussian Fusiliers (2-[2]-4) in Closewitz (Hex 2947). Referring to the 1806 Special Study (Nr.5), this unit, marked "HQ Gde" seems to be an *ad hoc* group of two fusilier battalions, which were formed from the remnants of one of Prince Louis-Ferdinand's units, that Prince Hohelohe was using as a headquarters guard force.

According to Special Study Nr. 5, on the morning of 14 October, the Fusilier battalions were in Kappellendorf (Hex 1452) along with Prince Hohelohe's HQ and II Bn. of Saxon Inf. Rgt. Clemens, and they joined up with Ruchel when he arrived.

Did the Fusiliers move forward early that morning? Seems like an appropriate place for them to be. I have looked elsewhere, but have been able to find nothing about their movements. Have I mis-identified the component units of the Fusilier Regiment, or is the game OB in error?

We need to figure out which battalions comprised the headquarters guard. One of them was Pelet's. The answer may be found in the following text from OSG's *Special Study Nr. 5*:

9 A.M. Closewitz

The affair of light forces ended as the fog was lifting. Claparede's brigade took the Closewitz wood after a bitter struggle. The French followed-up Tauenzien's line to the top of the Dornberg hill.

Looking down from Tauenzien's hilltop position toward the advancing French, the land slopes off to the right and left. The small Ziskau wood covered the center of



Tauenzien's line; within it a stream flowed down to the right. The Isserstedter wood lay behind him and to the right.

In front of the Isserstedter wood, overlooking the Schnecke, was Rosen's Fusilier battalion; next to him, several squadrons of Saxon Hussars. In front of Lützeroda, Tauenzien deployed Bose's battery supported by the *Jäger* company of Werner; and next, the regiments of Cerrini, Rechten, Zweifel, and Herwarth. The **Fusiliers of Pelet** (who had been at Saalfeld), were in front of Closewitz. Into the **Closewitz woods** he sent Valentini's *Jäger* company to cover the left flank, with two companies of Pelet deployed as skirmishers. In second line were more Saxon Hussars and the Pr. August Regiment.

While Tauenzien's troops took up their positions, Division Gazan began to advance uphill from Cospeda. Gazan's 21st Light, leading the division engaged first, entering the Ziskau wood. There they encountered Cerrini's white-clad Saxons, easily distinguished moving from tree to tree, clinging tenaciously to cover. After a fierce struggle the three Saxon battalions were driven back through the line to their left rear, leaving a great gap. Turning to roll up the Prussian troops to their left, the 21st Light quickly drove Erichsen's fusiliers and Werner's *jaegers* out of Lutzeroda into the Isserstedter woods.

On the right flank, the French troops of the 17th Line, now low on ammunition and exhausted, pulled out of the fight, passing through the 34th Line Regiment which

moved up to replace them. Three battalions of Saxon grenadiers remained on the slope of the Dornberg. Suchet attacked them head on, supported by Gazan's right-hand regiment at their flank.

The Saxon grenadiers trying to obstruct the French advance were attacked by the 34th, a battalion of the 88th, and the 21st Light. ... A lot of prisoners and artillery pieces were taken, in particular the Tüllmann howitzer battery, which had succeeded in falling back under the protection of the hussars, only to get bogged down; the light cavalry abandoned it.

On the far right, Marshal Soult had ordered a halt for St. Hilaire's men to sort themselves out and rest after the climb up from Löbstedt and Zwätzen. Prussian light infantry in the densely wooded hills harassed them with small arms fire. While Lannes was pushing the Saxons off the Dornberg, St. Hilaire advanced into the Closewitz woods. Candras's Brigade (10th Light and 36th Line) led the attack. Behind them, Vare's Brigade (43rd and 55th) moved up in support. Candras, encountering Pelet's fusiliers deployed in the woods, drove the defenders back across a little brook. From there they pushed the remnants of the fusiliers, the Valentini company and the Herwarth Grenadiers out of the wood; the Saxons rallying to the left of the Zweifel Regiment. The French forged out of the woods to find the Metzsch and Hundt grenadier battalions of Cerrini's Saxon brigade, who had just started to reform their column, driving them back again into the mist.

[1] Hourtoulle, p. 42.

[2] They were driven back into the Isserstedt wood, where the defenders of Lutzeroda had already taken refuge. Petre, p. 132.

[3] Hourtoulle, p. 42. Twenty-two guns were captured between Krippendorf and Alt Gonna.

The account above seems to mostly jibe with the OB from the Study Appendix, pp. 99—104. See also page 40 and the discussion of events at 6 a.m.

Bila II's Brigade of Korps Tauentzien is identified as "in the vicinity of Closewitz" at p.

99, and sure enough, the text mentions light troops in Closewitz, with inf. Bdes along the Dornberg moving down to support the light troops with "von Bila on the left ... In the village of Closewitz stood the Pelet Battalion and Valentini's Jager Company." (p. 40).

Bila II's Brigade, says the OB, consisted of Pelet's Fusilier's (Nr. 14) and Valentini's Company of Jagers. (p. 99).

The Rosen battalion (detached from Bila II's Brigade, and assigned to Erichsen's according to the OB) "fronted the Isserstadt wood" (pp 40, 99, and 99 n.12).

That tallies with p. 41, where the 21st Lt. drives "Erichsen's fusiliers, and Werner's jaegers" out of the Isserstadt wood (p. 41). Referring again to the OB, besides Rosen's Fusiliers, (Nr. 7), Oberst Erichsen also has his own Erichsen's Fusiliers Nr. 10 (p. 99).

That seems to account for all of Tauentzien's fusiliers (Bns. 7, 10 and 14) which all started the campaign in Bila's brigade but by 14 October, Bns 7 and 10 had been assigned to von Erichsen.

I think the two battalions of Fusilers that make up the "Fusilier Rgt." in the Jena game (Hex 2947 in both Day of Battle and Approach to Battle scenarios) are Ruhle (Nr. 15) and Rabenau (Nr. 13). That's a 2 SP unit (1 SP being a battalion per Rule 1.42 vers. 7.33). As the OB says, they're Prince Hohenlohe's HQ Guard, so they should be, in both scenarios, in Kappellendorf (Hex 1452 with II Bn of Saxon Inf. Rgt. Clemens. (See OB at p. 104). Interestingly, the OB, in a footnote, identifies them as coming, like Pelet's Bn. (No. 14), from Prince Louis-Ferdinand's Advance Guard at Saalfield.

One last thing. On page 156 of the study, there's a schematic of the deployment of Korps Ruchel in front of Capellendorf. On the right, there are "3 Fus. Bns." Footnote 9 gives this as Bns Ruhe, Rabenau and Pelet, noting that in peacetime, these units made up "Pelet's Lower Silesian Fusiler Brigade."

Now it's possible that Pelet's Bn. (beginning the battle with Korps Tauntzien) might have made its way back to join Korps Ruchel in front of Cappellendorf along with the other two battalions, but I'd almost bet that the two battalions listed on page 104 of the OB as being in Cappellendorf joined Ruchel—and that the 3rd Battalion on page 156 is II Bn of Saxon Regiment Clemens, which, the OB says, started the

morning with Fusilier Bns 13 and 15 in Cappellendorf.

How did I figure out that the Fusilier unit in the game represents Ruhle and Rabenau and not Pelet and some other battalion?

1). **The counter.** The unit, "Fusiliers" a 2-[2]-4 regiment, says on the left for superior organization that it's "HQ Gde." That fits with the apparent duties of Ruhle's (Nr. 15) and Rabenau's (Nr. 13) battalions, which the OB in the study says, at p. 104, were in Kappellendorf (Hex 1452 with II Bn of Saxon Inf. Rgt. Clemens. (See OB at p. 104). That's right where the game puts Prince Hohenlohe.

2). **Pelet's Battalion.** The special study states that "[i]n the village of Closewitz stood the Pelet Battalion and Valentini's Jager Company." (p. 40). Consulting the OB, at p. 99, we find that Bila II's Brigade, of Korps Tauentzien's inculdes Pelet's Fusiliers (Nr. 14) and Valentini's Company of Jagers. (p. 99).

3). **If the Fusiliers aren't Ruhle and Rabenau, where are those 2 bns.?** Unless these two fusilier battalions are absorbed someplace else, I don't know where they appear in the game. They might be added to one of Ruchel's brigades—that's who they joined up with later, (see Special Study p. 156 and 156 n. 9).

4). **The possible movements of the units make the most sense this way.** It's possible that the regiment, in the form of Ruhle and Rabenau went forward early on the morning of the 14, and that upon their arrival, Tauentzien posted them in Closewitz. He'd no doubt have liked to have them there. But if they were there, how is it they got back to Cappellendorff later to join up with Ruchel, as page. 156 says they did? I mean, they could have, but it seems to me more likely that Ruchel arrived in Cappellendorff, found them there with no orders, and that Ruchel then took them under command.

5). **We don't find references to Ruhle and Rabenau in Closewitz,** but we do find references to Pelet and Valentini's Jaegers. (See Special Study, pp. 40, 41). It's possible, even

probable that Tauentzien detached Pelet and Valentini from Bila II and sent them into Closewitz. He knows that town needs to be occupied, and his Fusiliers are good for it, and Pelet (judging by record) seems capable.

6). **Conclusion.** For those reasons, and without more, I don't think it likely that the Fusilier regiment was in Closewitz. I think Hohenlohe left it (or the two battalions of which I think it's composed in game terms) when he went forward, and Ruchel adopted it when he arrived. I think the Closewitz unit is a detachment of Bila II's brigade.

7). **Evidence against my conclusion** is to be found, among other places, in the schematic of the deployment of Korps Ruchel in front of Capellendorf and Footnote 9, both to be found on p. 156. On the right of the schematic, there are "3 Fus. Bns." Footnote 9 gives this as Bns Ruhe, Rabenau and Pelet, noting that in peacetime, these units made up "Pelet's Lower Silesian Fusiler Brigade." (SS, p. 156, p. 156, n.9). It makes perfect sense that Pelet would be there, and if he is, it's powerful evidence that this unit was all together in the a.m., or got together, perhaps after some morning re-deployment of Ruhle and Rabenau (see point 4 above).

Alternatively, Pelet got back to Cappellendorf after Tauntzien's position came apart and joined up with his unit's two sister battalions and they all joined Ruchel. That makes some sense, Pelet seems to have been pretty good.

Finally, the third option there, is that the 3rd battalion discussed on p. 156 isn't Fusiliers, but is instead II Bn of Saxon Regiment Clemens which was, according to the OB, in Cappellendorf that morning. (p. 104). But I have no evidence for that, other than negative – they don't appear anyplace else.

I may be committing the lawyerly sin of jumping to too many conclusions based on pretty thin evidence, but I think I have a colorable case.

(See John Wladis' reply on page 24)

Wavre Day of Battle Scenario

Vince Hughes

I had occasion to play another battle of Wavre upon the tabletop, this time with Alan Theobald using the new OSG TLNB version of the battle. I'd never fought a battle of Wavre in any form of gaming in nearly 50 years as a wargamer. Come 2019, I play it twice—the OSG version that is being reported on today plus, with Darryl Sims earlier in the year using the *Jours de Gloire* version from their "The Empire's Last Victories: Ligny & Wavre" pack.

The TLNB version covers a much larger expanse of land than does JdG. In this scenario, the Prussian III corps under Thielmann are around the Dyle awaiting deployment to the various bridges and towns, whilst I & II corps (Ziethen & Pirch) are on map awaiting transition off the board (to score points). Each are equipped with a pre-set March Order which can ONLY get changed on the play of a certain card from the deck. Now, one has to be very careful here. The Game Series March Order rules are quite definite. Formations in MO have to march at the rate of the slowest unit and MUST use the quickest route in MP's to reach their destination. Successful exit brings 1VP per unit exited BEFORE the 6pm turn starts. That brings three things to light.

- The I & II corps must move at least 4MP's per turn (speed of infantry and foot artillery). This may lower if weather dictates slower artillery.
- The March route should be checked pre-game to ensure the quickest routes are being adhered to. I recommend this, because trestles for example cost an extra point to cross as do streams. What looks the shortest route may well not be. So count them up before the game starts.
- They will stick to these routes unless brought out of MO by card OR if becoming adjacent to an enemy unit.

It may sound rules lawyerish, but it's important the rules are stuck to here because failure to do so will either tip the balance of the scenario or spoil the game entirely. You'll find that the whole process leaves both sides with a good deal of decision making. These decisions will be split between—they know what they are meant to do, what they should do, what they can do and what they dare do.

The Prussian, if he gets the opportunity via an Alt Reinforcement card has to ponder whether he should detach units from the transiting corps to fight, or leave them marching for the VP's. The French player wondering whether it is best to let some or many Prussians exit, or risk stopping them and the associated exiting VP's but then having a horde of Prussians to fight.

The Prussian force is commanded by Bluecher who himself has to consider exit AFTER the 3pm turn otherwise the French garners a VP for each turn that he remains on the board. So 4pm-8pm and a possible 5VP's for the French if he decides to stay and conduct the battle. It's a difficult choice. Thielmann on his own will require a 50/50 die roll to command adequately. Even then, the extended area his corps will have to cover will leave many of his troops having to roll for Initiative movement. If he fails most or all of his Command rolls, the Prussians could be in dire straits. But is the decision to keep Bluecher on field worth the 5pts it would cost if he stayed at Wavre for all the available turns? It is the equivalent of giving up the village of Limal (wirth 5VP).


Other VP's, apart from unit casualties, demoralised formations and baggage lie in the four VP locations that reward the 'owner' with: 10VP for Wavre, 5VP for Limal(e) and 5VP for Chapelle St. Lambert and 4VP for the Prussian Supply Source at hex 6107 (note that the Source at 6117 has no value as VP for this scenario). I don't wish to give anything away for future players, but some of these locations have profound effects not just on the points themselves, but also how they affect on board issues due to ownership.

The French set up in process of entering the map. The player controlling these will quickly need to assess where to send troops for best results. Does he head north for Wavre and Prussian Supply? Does he swing west to undercut the Prussian position and head for Waterloo himself? Or maybe he should try a more southerly nibble at the Prussian positions and try to capture Limal and perhaps get into the rear areas? Lots to think about but in all honesty, not many troops to play with.

Both sides are a little precarious with the amount

of reduced units that begin the game in situ. It means that a Shock Combat may see a unit disappear completely and any that are lost in other combats cannot be recovered either. In the words of a big bargain supermarket slogan "When they're gone—They're GONE!"

This is what the set up looks like. Black circled area is Thielmann's III corps, the ones designated to hold off the French. All others will be attempting to march to Waterloo.



P1100313 photos by the author

Counters sledged up, Grouchy begins his press towards the river Dyle whilst Prussian red and blue corps, Ziethen I Corps and Pirch II Corps begin their SSR'd 'exit stage right'



P1100314



P1100315

First encounter occurs down at Limelette on the Dyle, way south of Wavre. Exelmans corps, in the guise of Chastel's brigade of cavalry attempt to force the bridge. Lutzow's mix of Uhlan, Dragoon's and Hussars manage to hold off the French Dragoons and send them packing back across the bridge. Unfortunately for Chastel, he rolled a dreaded '6' on the retreat check used when using a bridge to do so and the force was eliminated as they piled down the banks, were captured, killed and/or dispersed. Horrid start for Exelman's men.



P1100316

Eventually, the first of Ziethen's men finally reach the 'exit' hexes and begin the points scoring for the Prussians. The powerful batteries of Rentzell the first unit off.



P1100319

(next page) Most of the exiting troops are across the Dyle and indeed some have exited the board. However (red circles), the capable Pajol and his horsemen are harassing a thin Prussian cavalry screen on the far enemy left in an attempt to capture the Prussian Supply Source. In the middle, French infantry begin trying to force the bridge at Limelette where Exelmans failed. But Boerke's 9th infantry division are here and they consist of the 8th and 30th line regiments who continued to hold off French efforts.



P1100320



P1100321

Limelette continues to be attacked by the French and Vandamme would eventually be a casualty in the fighting. As the day draws on, the French are engaging all along the line of the Dyle. Bluecher has headed to Waterloo and its becoming a strain for Theilmann to command such a long drawn out line effectively.



P1100322



P1100323

As the fighting intensifies, Limal finally folds under the brave and continuous French assaults. Numerous attacks at Wavre though are still being repelled but only due to the wishes of the dice Gods at this stage! Dupeyroux's worn out brigade is rendered hors de combat, but more French units fill their place. Thielmann himself goes to the fiercest point of the fight.



P1100324



P1100325

As night falls (for real as well, see the lighting) Wavre is just about held but only down to the fortune of the cubes. Limal was safely invested as a crossing for the French, but as can be seen, the transiting corps to Waterloo had all made their way off board. To the west, Waterloo was turning into the final defeat for the emperor and finding its way to being arguably the most famous battle of all time.

Final positions



P1100326



We played the game and SSR's RAW with the following changes:

1. Variable Recovery Phase occurrences *
2. Variable Weather checks instances *
3. Variable Supply Check occurrences *
4. Cards 'Reinforcements Delayed' and 'Reinforcements Other Route' all removed.
5. Shock Combat - OPPONENT chooses which of your units loses a step *
6. Old Artillery rules.
7. Do not overlook the latest rule change:
24.32: Second Turn Bonus Cards: During the First Player's card Segment of Turn 2, each player draws a number of Bonus Cards specified for that battle (25.44), *plus the regular card (24.33)*.

The Prussians ended up as victors and by some margin in points 27-4.

But that is probably one of the most slanted points pictures I've seen in a TLNB battle. Quite frankly, a die roll different at Wavre, or a Shock combat less harsh could have changed the result here. For example, had the two die rolls on the attacks at Wavre favoured the French (and they should have as they had the CRT advantage here), they would have captured the town and changed the score to 17-14 (a 10VP swing). Had the French cavalry unit Chastel, not rolled a 6, the only number required for elimination when retreating over a bridge, then Exelmans corps would not have been demoralised, now reducing the score to 15-14. The Shock combat results that eliminated Dupeyroux and Hulot would have saved another 2pts making it 13-14. Finally, had the French Light cavalry had one more MP available, or in other words, somewhere in the game advanced a hex nearer, they could have entered Chapelle St Lambert in the last turn. That would have change the score now to 8-19! This is how close the margins were and the Prussians found that slice of fortune each time. Of course, different outcomes as they occurred during the game may well have changed Prussian play. For example, instead of 16 units exited, a bit of well

placed Road March could have saved more.

There was also the cards scoring to consider. The Prussians ended with a net of -2 and the French a net of -5. Perhaps this is the one weak point of the scenario. This is mainly due to the French only being allocated 1 Bonus card. I think that definitely needs changing and is the ONLY thing I would change in the scenario. Having one card means they HAVE to play what they draw, which is unfair. They lost for example, 3ts when an Alternate reinforcements card was drawn the last turn but one. For that, they got the single counter of Albert of the YG and he was entering miles to the south and of no use. Harsh to lose 3pts for that. It also meant they never get a chance of using a Tactics card on the battlefield as it will be used for Movement Rates in the card phase each time. Next time we play, we will allow the French 2 cards.

In summary, as written (less the bonus card issue), this was *surprisingly* one of the closest, if not the closest TLNB scenarios I've played. On set-up, it gives the appearance of a game that will be all about escaping with a few minor scuffles and perhaps not that engrossing. But in essence, there is a lot to think about and each decision will have its effect on what is a delicately balanced scenario. I didn't think I'd be writing this post game, but this is a top notch DoB scenario in the series and I encourage owners of the game to play it. The one proviso being that the players take note and enact all SSR's properly. Alan and I will be playing it again. We both want to see the outcome based on having some experience of the scenario pre-battle and where to maximise both sides efforts.

For other people that might consider it, have a good look at the SSR's on transiting, etc., and the inability of Commanders to take them out of this mode unless AND only with an Alt Reinforcement card. Add to that a pre-game check of the shortest march route off the board (as per March Order rules) and I promise you a stimulating game. Multiple plays will generate different results because of the amount of events, moves, cards and die-rolls that can affect the outcome. NLG continues to provide VFM.

* The 'variable' rules are marked with an asterisk. Below (next page) is how to implement them.

- **Best Unit Shock Combat:** In a change to the Series rules, the OPPONENT will

choose which step is removed from your stack in a Shock Combat 1R result.

- **Variable Weather Check:** Instead of a Weather check every 3 turns as per the scheduled checks shown on the TRC, one player rolls a die in the Weather segment of EVERY turn. If a 1 or 2 is rolled a weather check is conducted, otherwise, no effect.
- **Variable Supply Check:** Instead of Supply being checked by a player during a Weather turn, he should instead, during his Supply Segment of his Command Phase, roll a die. A roll of 1 or 2 results in that player having to check Supply this turn for his forces. This may occur whether or not the turn has a Weather check carried out.
- **Variable Recovery Segment:** Instead of Recovery being checked by a player during a Weather turn, he should instead, during his Recovery Segment of his Command Phase, roll a die. A roll of 1 or 2 results in that player having a Recovery Segment that turn. This may occur whether or not the turn has a Weather Check carried out.
- The 'Variable Checks' are purely an optional idea that have been used as a house-rule amongst our group for some time. With a 1 in 3 chance of each of them occurring, it means that on average, there will be the same amount of checks. However, that 'average' will be over the course of some games and may take some amount of scenarios to level out. The interesting side of it however is that players are not able to count the turns that for example, a marauding light cavalry unit in the enemy's rear can do so before requiring a Supply check. They may indeed have to carry out one the very next turn (they lost their verve for the task being behind enemy lines), or they may not get one for 4 or 5 turns? (a determined brigade out to cause havoc). With Recovery, there is no longer an advantage to losing a unit the turn before a scheduled Recovery turn, and thus not waiting three turns to be Recovered. Instead, there is no guarantee when it will happen. You may get two Recovery turns on the bounce followed by none for 4 or 5 turns. No gamey planning here!

Fusiliers at Jena from page 12

JOHN WLADIS REPLIES

John created the OrBat for OSG's Special Study Nr. 5 discussed on pages 10-12.

Only Pelet is at Closewitz. Rabenau & Ruhle remain at Capellendorf until Ruchel arrives & then they join his troops. Hopfner & Lettow-Vorbeck both say that Pelet was initially at Closewitz & then later at Capellendorf. Here is what Hopfner & Lettow-Vorbeck have to say about Pelet:

1. **(Vol 1, 1st Part) Hopfner 407-08** discussing Ruchel's advance from Kapellendorf states (my translation): *Die Fusilier-battalione Ruhle und Rabenau, die biser noch in Kapellendorf zuruckgeblieben ware, denen sich Fusilierbatallion Pelet, das mit frischer Munition versehen worden, angeschlossen hatte, formirten sch unter General Pelet vorwats des Dorfs zur Unterstutzung des Angriffs des rechten Flugels.*

The Fusilier battalions Ruhle and Rabenau, which had been left in Kapellendorf, to whom the Fusilier-battalion Pelet, armed with fresh ammunition, had joined, formed under General Pelet in advance of the village in support of the assault of the right wing.

2. 1 Lettow-Vorbeck 366:

Auf diesem Flügel hatten sich ferner angehängt die in Capellendorf verbleibtenen Fusilier-battallione Rabenau und Ruhle, ferner von Tauentzienschen Truppen das Fusilier-battallion Pelet. (On this wing were also attached the Fusilier battalions Rabenau and Ruhle, which had remained in Capellendorf, and also the Fusilier battallion Pelet from Tauentzien's troops.)

3. My commentary:

How does Pelet start the battle in front of Closewitz and then reappear somewhat later at Capellendorf? Hopfner and Lettow-Vorbeck do not say. Hopfner's reference to Pelet having fresh ammo may provide a clue. The fusilier battalions used a fusilier musket model 1787 of 68 caliber. The regular infantry carried a Potzdamer musket model 1740 of about 75 caliber. What this means is that the infantry's reserve ammo will not fit the fusilier musket. The fusiliers need special fusilier ammo.

Now suppose that Pelet's battalion is withdrawn from Closewitz because it's running low on ammo. I speculate that Pelet retired to join the other two fusilier battalions at Capellendorf. How does Pelet know there are other fusiliers in reserve at Capellendorf? Pelet had previously commanded those two battalions in the Light Infantry Brigade under Prince Louis. If the light infantry brigade trains (and the fusilier ammo resupply) were located at Capellendorf, Pelet would have wanted to know that even before the battle. Why does Pelet march his battalion back for resupply instead of having the ammo wagons brought forward? Maybe because the detritus of a disorganized army prevented or would delay bringing the wagons forward and an out-of-ammo fusilier battalion would be of no value on the battlefield.

New Bombardment Rules: Why Change What Works?

Kevin Zucker

TLNB Series Rules 7.33 changed the Bombardment process, adding the “Suppressed” result, Artillery Reaction Fire and Counter Battery Fire. The reason for this update was questioned by some: “Perhaps Bautzen should have been subject to SSR's rather than changing the series rules. Those rules had lasted for forty battles.”


The Bombardment Table and rules were first introduced in *Four Lost Battles*—an odds-based table rejected by the grognards as soon as it appeared. A new table devised in 2005 was carried over into *The Coming Storm*.

I always strongly suspected that the Bombardment Table was not as bloody as the actual effect would warrant. However, I lacked the tools to weigh this exactly and I preferred to lowball, thinking that this would balance out as long as the gun strengths on the two sides were about equal relative to the overall size of the force. For example, there seems to have been a rule of thumb to try and achieve one gun on the battlefield for every 1,000 infantrymen; this number eventually reached three per thousand for the conscript armies of 1813.

Another consideration is the increasing caliber of guns between 1796 and 1815. At first the guns were smaller and the original Bombardment sequence (without ARF) would have been about right for battles where 3-lbers predominated. (We probably will want to remove ARF from the 1796-1800 Sequence of Play.)

Each battle seems to have a peculiar quirk, some unique twist, and it is often just this that gives a battle its special character. At Bautzen the French outnumbered the Coalition by two to one in infantry, but the Coalition had the superiority of guns and cavalry, also by a factor of two to one. Cavalry superiority insured that there would be no effective pursuit, and hence the army would survive a lost battle; while artillery superiority cost the French twice as many men on the battlefield: 22,000 instead of 11,000. Bautzen stopped Napoleon’s train.

Our playtesting didn’t discover any problem in play balance, but when the Pittsburgh crew



tackled the Bautzen battle, the Coalition forces were overwhelmed. This brought a remark by Chris Moeller, “We were left to wonder what we could have done differently.”¹

We had come to the one battle where the reduced impact of artillery caused the outcome and the losses to skew too far from the historical result. This time we had the opportunity to actually measure the lack of effectiveness against a historical outcome. We found that the Bombardment Table produced only about half the losses it should. So ARF doubled their fire.

When designing the sequence of play for *Four Lost Battles*, I certainly had an eye on the *Campaigns of Napoleon* sequence of play, which includes artillery fire for both sides in every Player Turn. I noted that missing fire phase, but felt it would impact both players equally, and never anticipated a situation such as Bautzen.

With the rise of the internet I now had the tools to weigh the effect of bombardment based upon gunnery trials conducted during or right after the Napoleonic Wars, and to fix a hidden problem in the Bombardment Rules. How things went on from there was covered in *Wargame Design* a year ago. (Please see Vol. IV, Nr. 4, pages 14 and 20.)

We now had the higher casualties for the French at Bautzen, with artillery sending whole stacks back to their starting positions (by the old rules they would have been 3-1 or even 4-1 attacks in the combat phase). ARF showed a remarkable difference and made casualty levels much more realistic.

¹ YouTube <https://youtu.be/Nsrr8piy9pk?t=542>

This re-print article covering the original development was published in November of 2005.

(Old) Bombardment Tables

"Historically speaking, when a unit during Napoleonic battles suffered under bombardment, what was the most likely outcome? Did they hold positions and suffer losses, or were they more inclined to retreat?"

During the wars, the calibre and destructiveness of artillery increased several-fold. In the beginning, among the professional armies, retreating in the face of artillery fire was regarded as a sign of disgrace for that unit. But in the course of time, that attitude changed, and eventually the British allowed their units to lie down.

"Tying into this line of questioning, were bombardments typically long enough in duration for a unit to get hit, and then decide to pull back or was it a case of a short, violent bombardment followed up by an infantry advance?"

Large battles always began with a bombardment, and after the initial assault, as the initiative changed hands, another period of bombardment would typically ensue. These interludes could last upwards of half an hour. If you were the target, that would be the longest half-hour of your existence. Guns were not used as close support because of the possibility of hitting friendly forces. Either scenario you mentioned could occur. The first would be under the rubric of "bombardment," the second would involving adding the artillery strength into the attack.

The game includes divisional artillery units, about four or five artillery units per corps, sometimes more. The French army in this game has most of its artillery at divisional level. Previous iterations of the *NLB* system had the French artillery at corps level for the most part. The uneven quality of the infantry under his command led Napoleon to place artillery at divisional level.

French batteries had two ammunition wagons backing up each gun, one in each tier, plus what it carried with it.. In big battles it was not uncommon for guns to fire over 100 shots each.

The guns in these four battles each with them about 50 rounds. Each battery had two train companies to feed ammo forward to the guns. As one was depleted, it exchanged its place, then drew from the artillery supply train. Elting says "An artillery company operated in two sections: one (in modern terms, the 'firing battery') consisting of its guns and one caisson apiece, moved with the combat troops; the rest of the vehicles accompanied the artillery park."²

(N° 11) **Situation du 3^e corps à l'époque du 15 août 1813**

	Bataillons ou escadrons	Officiers	Troupes	CHEVAUX	
				de selle	de trait
8 ^e Division d'infanterie	15	266	8.364	147	64
9 ^e Division	10	276	6.043	88	53
10 ^e Division	8	250	5.436	110	8
11 ^e Division	11	267	6.768	96	85
39 ^e Division	9	138	5.692	83	99
Cavalerie légère (9 escadrons)	»	53	1.500	1.651	18
Artillerie	»	62	2.738	494	2.514
Gendarmerie	1	11	554	»	24
Génie	»	2	44	50	»
Equipages militaires	1	7	429	71	394
(Une partie de ce bataillon se trouvait détachée hors de l'arrondissement du corps d'armée)					
Totaux :	55	1.332	38.254	2.790	3.459
MATÉRIEL					
Canons de 12 à la Réserve					12
— de 6 dans chacune des divisions françaises			12 canons		48
— de 6 à la 39 ^e division					10
— de 6 à l'artillerie légère					8
Obusiers de 6 à la Réserve					4
— dans chacune des divisions françaises			4 canons		16
— à la 39 ^e division					2
— à l'artillerie légère					4
Total des bouches à feu					104
Avec					
475 caissons contenant les munitions de l'artillerie					
31 caissons contenant les outils, agrès etc. du génie					
155 caissons contenant le service des ambulances et des vivres, des divisions et du quartier général					

III Corps had more than four munition wagons per gun on 15 August—see table.³

Elting says, "When hostilities resumed in August, Napoleon had 1,300 cannon with 365,000 rounds of ammunition in its trains."⁴

² Swords Around a Throne, p. 259,

³ courtesy of Enrico Acerbi

⁴ Swords Around a Throne, p. 263

Bowden agrees, showing 1,262 guns with over 280 rounds per gun.⁵ Two hundred rounds per gun was considered enough for a major battle.

"Were whole brigades ever eliminated merely by artillery bombardment as can theoretically happen on the current bombardment table?"

Two whole divisions of Augereau's Corps were blown apart at Eylau (40%+ losses on a regiment-by-regiment basis, the average loss across the entire Corps being 50% which is PEU in game terms)... but that generally did not happen.

In general, a single medium-caliber gun could be expected to inflict 60-120 casualties for every hour it was in combat, assuming relatively close range (this data was taken from quite a few scholarly sources).

Forget about scholarly sources. One ball from a single cannon could knock down a whole file of troops if it got the right bounce. The French Surgeon Larrey reported what happened to the Guard standing on the lake ice at Eylau—dozens of men with the same wound (hip joint taken out).

For 1 SP of artillery (say a battery of 8 guns), this amounts to 480-960 men, so roughly the equivalent of 1 SP of infantry (1 SP equals 380-800 men).

At close range 1 SP of guns can pretty much eliminate 1 SP of Infantry in one hour, if the target is so kind as to stay in place. More than 30% of casualties in the Napoleonic period were caused by cannon.

II DEVELOPMENT OF THE TABLES

The Bombardment tables were derived from the Bombardment Tables in the Campaigns of Napoleon system, and if you compare the final version with the tables in *Sun of Austerlitz* you will see they are very similar.

We are walking a fine line with the bombardment tables. A slight tip either way and the effects are out of whack. The reason for the reduced strength of long-range bombardment is that in most cases not all guns in a battery were capable of ranged fire.

Several grognards wrote in to say they would prefer the bombardment table to be purely based on the number of factors firing, with modifiers for terrain, size of target, etc. Also, it was suggested (but never tried) to have bombardment results given in terms of a number of shifts to be applied in the upcoming combat phase (sort of what was done in *To the Green Fields Beyond*).

Nonetheless, the ability to destroy one unit in a stack, and thereby alter the odds against the remaining unit in the ensuing combat, makes bombarding artillery extremely powerful and does in effect provide a "shift."

One effect is to make French massed bombardment more difficult, but to boost divisional hitting power (since the artillery can stack more effectively with the infantry), which seemed perhaps a reasonably historical effect—the more so because the artillery soak-off tactic in the system had been criticized as unrealistic.

Some other rules were changed. Comparing with the other *NLB* games, there seemed to be two rules differences which contribute to reduce the effect of artillery: the original rule's halving of strength at two-hex range, and the blocking effect of friendly units. The first of these rules was taken out for those hankering after a closer resemblance to earlier games in the system, and more powerful artillery.

In terms of the size and power of batteries, the grand battery was going to fight at Dresden and hence missed all these battles. We have no grand batteries: these were not big general engagements like Borodino, Wagram and Waterloo. Creating a grand battery took a specially-skilled officer (only a few could handle the task), **and** you had to have a core of reserve artillery to start with. You could spend all day trying to assemble a grand battery by stripping guns from individual divisions. That just would not happen.

DENSITY

The original table as first published included density modifiers. However, a -1 Dice modifier on the table is about the equivalent probability change as one shift on the combat table (but at

⁵ Napoleon's Grande Armée of 1813, p.136.

extreme odds). The combination of the shift and the modifier together resulted in Density Modifiers that did nothing more than keep the results equal.

So the size of the target is not really that important. The results are the same. It was suggested that the table should be simpler, with no odds or density modifiers, as things seem to even out; but for really big stacks, who are almost invulnerable to artillery.

At 1-3 odds or higher the troop density has NO IMPACT on the losses taken (for the same number of guns attacking a target), given a target with counters of the same strength. BUT it is true that if you are firing against just one unit (of 2 or 4 or 6 or 8SP) the losses of the bigger stack will be higher, as there is only one unit that can be eliminated (so the losses would get proportionately bigger).

Since the game system is not using incremental losses, but an "all or nothing approach" is very difficult to design a proper system.

I do not think that an artillery battery should be so much less effective vs. targets with low numbers of SP's. But for vedettes (who should rightly be immune to elimination because of their mobility and open order formation) the units were in relatively "close order" and "easy" targets. The lateral precision of the guns was good, it was the correct range that was hard to get, especially with the unequal quality and weights of the powder charges and gun windage (the British and French were better at this).

Looking at the counter mix as a whole, the French forces comprised one-sixth of Artillery, 1/6 of Cavalry, and 4/6 of Infantry

Coalition: 1/5 of Artillery, 1/5 of Cavalry, 3/5 of Infantry.

Both sides have roughly similar proportions of cavalry, infantry, and artillery. And the mean strength of the units are also about the same. So no side will have the advantage if the tables are modified. The proportion of Artillery SPs vs. Infantry SPs is 1:3.5 for both sides.

NEW BOMBARDMENT TABLE

If you run your table from right to left, it is the same as the original published table, with the exception of the headings at the top of columns. Some people will perhaps be surprised by the revised artillery table: it now contains **no** density modifiers.

The grognards really like the new table with its strength-based columns much better than the odds-based one. Still it is true that a 12-strength point unit alone in a hex will be killed twice as fast as a stack of two 6-strength point ones. These very large units are rare—mainly low-quality Prussian Landwehr, and very brittle historically. Big units are penalized because when they are eliminated the player loses more combat factors.

When there is a target with more troops in the hex, sure they will lose more vs. artillery fire, but then they DO have more troops to lose in the hex also! Things will even out since there will be more concentrated fire on a few units if there is less troops on a hex, and diluted fire (albeit more effective) if there are lots of units in the same hex.

The stacking rules represent more command efficiency (leader in a hex) than the units occupying the same space. AND there is lots of empty space in a hex historically, but perhaps for untrained troops in big formations (like the large Prussian Landwehr brigades, that are more vulnerable to losses because if you get a 1E result, the whole unit goes).

DENSITY MODIFIERS

Bombardment was aimed fire. Since the guns always fired at a specific target within the hex, if the guns have a target it doesn't matter how many other battalions there may be. The stacking limits are set low enough so that the ratio of occupied ground is one-tenth the area of unoccupied ground.

However, there will unavoidably be some crowding-together of battalions in the larger stacks.

The other thing represented by 'density' is the fact that, with 23 or 24 battalions in the hex, your guns are much more likely to have a good target, whereas with only a few battalions in a hex they might not. So the term 'density' can be quite misleading. It is the 'density' of battalions that is a factor—and not the density of soldiers, which changes only when their formation changes (into square, for example).

Although that aspect of density is already accounted for in the Combined Arms rule, Combined Arms doesn't apply to bombardment. A density modifier would make sense for artillery that bombards a hex about to be charged. So we added that.