



**Modern
Microeconomics**
Second Edition

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Contents

Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition

xiii
xv

PART ONE

THE BASIC TOOLS OF ANALYSIS

1	INTRODUCTION	3
I	Economic Models	3
II	Classification of Markets	4
III	The Concept of an 'Industry'	7
A.	The Importance of the Concept of an 'Industry'	7
B.	Criteria for the Classification of Firms into Industries	8
2	THEORY OF DEMAND	13
I	Theory of Consumer Behaviour	13
A.	The Cardinal Utility Theory	14
B.	The Indifference Curves Theory	17
C.	The Revealed Preference Hypothesis	28
D.	The Consumers' Surplus	32
E.	Some Applications of Indifference Curves Analysis	35
II	The Market Demand	44
A.	Derivation of the Market Demand	44
B.	Determinants of Demand	45
C.	Elasticities of Demand	46
D.	Market Demand, Total Revenue and Marginal Revenue	50
III	Recent Developments in the Theory of Market Demand	53
A.	The Pragmatic Approach to Demand Analysis	53
B.	Linear Expenditure Systems	58
IV	The Demand for the Product of a Firm	60
3	THEORY OF PRODUCTION	67
I	The Production Function for a Single Product	67
II	Laws of Production	76
A.	Laws of Returns to Scale	76
B.	The Law of Variable Proportions	82
III	Technological Progress and the Production Function	85
IV	Equilibrium of the Firm: Choice of Optimal Combination of Factors of Production	86
A.	Single Decision of the Firm	86
B.	Choice of Optimal Expansion Path	92

	<i>Contents</i>
V Derivation of Cost Functions from Production Functions	
A. Graphical Derivation of Cost Curves from the Production Function	95
B. Formal Derivation of Cost Curves from a Production Function	95
VI The Production Function of a Multiproduct Firm	97
A. The Production Possibility Curve of the Firm	99
B. The Isorevenue Curve of the Multiproduct Firm	99
C. Equilibrium of the Multiproduct Firm	102
4 THEORY OF COSTS	104
I General Notes	105
II The Traditional Theory of Cost	105
A. Short-Run Costs	106
B. Long-Run Costs: The 'Envelope Curve'	107
III Modern Theory of Costs	111
A. Short-Run Costs	114
B. Long-Run Costs: The 'L-Shaped' Scale Curve	115
IV Engineering Cost Curves	120
A. Short-Run Engineering Costs	122
B. Long-Run Engineering Costs	124
V The Analysis of Economies of Scale	125
A. Real Economies of Scale	126
B. Pecuniary Economies of Scale	128
VI Empirical Evidence on the Shape of Costs	137
A. Statistical Cost Studies	137
B. Studies Based on Questionnaires	138
C. Engineering Cost Studies	143
D. Statistical Production Functions	143
E. The 'Survivor Technique'	146
VII The Relevance of the Shape of Costs in Decision-making	146

PART TWO

THEORY OF THE FIRM

SECTION A: PERFECT COMPETITION, MONOPOLY, MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION

5 PERFECT COMPETITION	154
I Assumptions	154
II Short-Run Equilibrium	155
A. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Short Run	155
B. The Supply Curve of the Firm and the Industry	159
C. Short-Run Equilibrium of the Industry	160
III Long-Run Equilibrium	160
A. Equilibrium of the Firm in the Long Run	160
B. Equilibrium of the Industry in the Long Run	161
C. Optimal Resource Allocation	163
IV Dynamic Changes and Industry Equilibrium	164
A. Shift in the Market Demand	164
B. Predictions of the Perfect Competition Model when Costs Change	167
C. Effects of Imposition of a Tax	168

6	MONOPOLY	171
	I Definition	171
	II Demand and Revenue	171
	III Costs	174
	IV Equilibrium of the Monopolist	174
	A. Short-Run Equilibrium	174
	B. Long-Run Equilibrium	177
	V Predictions in Dynamic Changes	179
	A. Shift in the Market Demand	179
	B. An Increase in the Costs of the Monopolist	181
	C. Imposition of a Tax	182
	VI Comparison of Pure Competition and Monopoly	183
	VII The Multiplant Firm	186
	VIII Bilateral Monopoly	189
7	PRICE DISCRIMINATION	192
	I Assumptions	192
	II The Model	192
	III Effects of Price Discrimination	195
	IV Price Discrimination and Elasticity of Demand	198
	V Price Discrimination and the Existence of the Industry	199
	VI Government-Regulated Monopoly	200
8	MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION	202
	I Assumptions	203
	II Costs	203
	III Product Differentiation and the Demand Curve	204
	IV The Concepts of the 'Industry' and the 'Group'	204
	V Equilibrium of the Firm	205
	VI Critique	209
	VII Comparison with Pure Competition	212
SECTION B: CLASSICAL OLIGOPOLY		
9	NON-COLLUSIVE OLIGOPOLY	216
	I Cournot's Duopoly Model	216
	II Bertrand's Duopoly Model	225
	III Chamberlin's Oligopoly Model	228
	IV The 'Kinked-Demand' Model	230
	V Stackelberg's Duopoly Model	233
10	COLLUSIVE OLIGOPOLY	237
	I Cartels	237
	A. Cartels aiming at Joint Profit Maximisation	237
	B. Market-Sharing Cartels	242
	II Price Leadership	244
	A. The Model of the Low-Cost Price Leader	245
	B. The Model of the Dominant-Firm Price Leader	246
	C. Critique of the Traditional Price Leadership Models	247
	D. Barometric Price Leadership	248
	III The Basing-Point Price System	252
	A. The Single Basing-Point System	252
	B. Multiple Basing-Point System	253

SECTION C: AVERAGE-COST PRICING

11	A CRITIQUE OF THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF THE FIRM: THE MARGINALIST CONTROVERSY	
	I The Basic Assumptions of the Neoclassical Theory	256
	II The Hall and Hitch Report and the 'Full-Cost' Pricing Principle	256
	III Gordon's Attack on Marginalism	263
	IV In Defence of Marginalism	265
		267
12	A REPRESENTATIVE MODEL OF AVERAGE-COST PRICING	
	I Goals of the Firm	271
	II Demand and Cost Schedules	271
	III Price Determination: The 'Mark-Up' Rule	272
	IV Comparison with Pure Competition	273
	V Predictions of Average-Cost Pricing Theory in Changing Market Conditions	275
	VI Critique of Average-Cost Pricing	276
		277
	SECTION D: LIMIT-PRICING (or ENTRY-PREVENTING PRICING)	283
13	BAIN'S LIMIT-PRICING THEORY	284
	I Bain's Early Model	284
	II Barriers to New Competition	287
	A. Bain's Concepts of 'Competition' and 'Entry'	288
	B. Barriers to Entry	289
	III Summary of Bain's Empirical Findings	301
	IV Industry Equilibrium	301
	V Some Comments	304
14	RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF LIMIT-PRICING	305
	I The Model of Sylos-Labini	305
	II The Model of Franco Modigliani	313
	III The Model of Bhagwati	319
	IV The Model of Pashigian	320
	SECTION E: MANAGERIAL THEORIES OF THE FIRM	323
15	BAUMOL'S THEORY OF SALES REVENUE MAXIMISATION	325
	I Rationalisation of the Sales Maximisation Hypothesis	325
	II Interdependence and Oligopolistic Behaviour	326
	III Baumol's Static Models	327
	IV Baumol's Dynamic Model	342
	V Empirical Evidence	346
	VI Some Comments	348
16	MARRIS'S MODEL OF THE MANAGERIAL ENTERPRISE	352
	I Goals of the Firm	352
	II Constraints	354
	III The Model: Equilibrium of the Firm	356

IV	Maximum Rate of Growth and Profits	364
V	Comparison with Baumol's Model	366
VI	Comparison with a Profit Maximiser	367
VII	Critique of Marris's Model	368
17	O. WILLIAMSON'S MODEL OF MANAGERIAL DISCRETION	371
I	The Managerial Utility Function	371
II	Basic Relationships and Definitions	372
III	The Model	373
A.	A Simplified Model of Managerial Discretion	373
B.	The General Model of Managerial Discretion	376
IV	Implications of the Model	378
V	Comparative Static Properties	379
VI	Empirical Evidence	381
SECTION F: BEHAVIOURAL THEORY OF THE FIRM		
18	THE BEHAVIOURAL MODEL OF CYERT AND MARCH	386
I	The Firm as a Coalition of Groups with Conflicting Goals	386
II	The Process of Goal-Formation: the Concept of the 'Aspiration Level'	387
III	Goals of the Firm: Satisficing Behaviour	388
IV	Means for the Resolution of the Conflict	390
V	The Process of Decision-making	393
VI	Uncertainty and the Environment of the Firm	395
VII	A Simple Model of Behaviourism	396
VIII	A Comparison with the Traditional Theory	398
IX	Critique	400
SECTION G: THEORY OF GAMES LINEAR PROGRAMMING		
19	THEORY OF GAMES	404
I	Some Definitions	404
II	Two-Person Zero-Sum Game	406
A.	Certainty Model	406
B.	Uncertainty Model	408
III	Non-Zero-Sum Game	410
IV	The 'Prisoner's Dilemma': A Digression	412
20	LINEAR PROGRAMMING	414
I	General Notes	415
II	Statement of the Linear Programming Problem	416
III	Graphical Solution	416
A.	Graphical Determination of the Region of Feasible Solutions	416
B.	Graphical Determination of the Objective Function	420
C.	Determination of the Optimal Solution	420
IV	The Simplex Method	423
A.	The Iterative Procedure	424
V	The Dual Problem and Shadow Prices	434

PART THREE

FACTOR PRICING
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY
WELFARE ECONOMICS

21	PRICING OF FACTORS OF PRODUCTION AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION	
	Introductory Remarks	437
	I Factor Pricing	437
	A. Factor Pricing in Perfectly Competitive Markets	438
	1 The Demand for Labour in Perfectly Competitive Markets	438
	(i) Demand of a Firm for a Single Variable Factor	439
	(ii) Demand of a Firm for Several Variable Factors	439
	(iii) Market Demand for a Factor	444
	2 The Supply of Labour in Perfectly Competitive Markets	447
	(i) Supply of Labour by an Individual	447
	(ii) Market Supply of Labour	448
	3 The Determination of the Factor Price in Perfect Markets	450
	B. Factor Pricing in Imperfectly Competitive Markets	450
	Model A Monopolistic Power in the Product Market	451
	(a) Demand of the Firm for a Single Variable Factor	451
	(b) Demand of the Firm for a Variable Factor When Several Factors are Used	455
	(c) The Market Demand for and Supply of Labour	456
	Model B Monopsonistic Power in the Factor Market	458
	(a) The Monopsonist Uses a Single Variable Factor	458
	(b) The Monopsonist Uses Several Variable Factors	462
	Model C Bilateral Monopoly	463
	Model D Competitive Buyer-Firm versus Monopoly Union	465
II	Elasticity of Factor Substitution, Technological Progress and Income Distribution	468
	A. Elasticity of Input Substitution and the Shares of Factors of Production	468
	B. Technological Progress and Income Distribution	471
III	Some Additional Topics on Factor Pricing and Income Distribution	472
	A. The Price of Fixed Factors: Rents and Quasi Rents	472
	B. Non-homogeneous Factors and Wage Differentials	475
	C. The 'Adding Up' Problem: 'Product Exhaustion' Theorems	477
	1. Euler's 'Product Exhaustion' Theorem	478
	2. Clark-Wicksteed-Walras 'Product Exhaustion' Theo- rem	479
22	GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY	484
	A. Interdependence in the Economy	484
	B. The Walrasian System	486

C.	Existence, Uniqueness and Stability of an Equilibrium	489
D.	A Graphical Illustration of the Path to General Equilibrium	491
E.	A Graphical Treatment of the Two-Factor, Two-Commodity, Two-Consumer General Equilibrium System ($2 \times 2 \times 2$ Model)	495
	1. The Assumptions of the $2 \times 2 \times 2$ Model	496
	2. Static Properties of a General Equilibrium State	497
	(a) Equilibrium of Production	497
	(b) Equilibrium of Consumption	501
	(c) Simultaneous Equilibrium of Production and Consumption	503
	3. General Equilibrium and the Allocation of Resources	504
	4. Prices of Commodities and Factors	505
	5. Factor Ownership and Income Distribution	507
F.	Concluding Remarks	509
G.	Appendix to Chapter 22	510
	Section I Extension of the Simple General Equilibrium Model to Any Number of Households, Commodities and Factors of Production	510
	Section II Some Comments on the Existence, Stability and Uniqueness of General Equilibrium	515
	Section III Money and General Equilibrium	517
23	WELFARE ECONOMICS	524
A.	Criteria of Social Welfare	524
	1. Growth of GNP as a Welfare Criterion	524
	2. Bentham's Criterion	525
	3. A 'Cardinalist' Criterion	525
	4. The Pareto-Optimality Criterion	526
	5. The Kaldor-Hicks 'Compensation Criterion'	529
	6. The Bergson Criterion 'Social Welfare Function'	529
B.	Maximisation of Social Welfare	530
	1. Derivation of the Grand Utility Possibility Frontier	531
	2. Determination of the Welfare-Maximising State	533
C.	Determination of the Welfare-Maximising Output-Mix, Commodity Distribution and Resource Allocation	534
D.	Welfare Maximisation and Perfect Competition	536
E.	Critique and Extensions	538
	1. Extension to Many Factors, Products and Consumers	538
	2. Corner Solutions	538
	3. Existence of Community Indifference Curves	539
	4. Elastic Supply of Factors	540
	5. Joint and Intermediate Products	541
	6. Decreasing Returns to Scale	541
	7. Externalities in Production and Consumption	541
	8. Kinked Isoquants	545
	9. Convex Isoquants	545
	10. Increasing Returns to Scale	546
	11. Indivisibilities in the Production Processes	549
24	CONCLUDING REMARKS	551
	<i>Select Bibliography</i>	553
	<i>Subject Index</i>	571