How the War in Ukraine Changed the Attitude of CIS Countries Toward Russia

“He spoke to him the way only he can” — with this phrase, Russian diplomats at various levels — up to deputy foreign ministers — used to describe, in private conversations, Vladimir Putin’s negotiating skills in dealings with CIS partners. I myself have heard this more than once from diplomats who have worked and continue to work in the Russian Foreign Ministry on relations with former Soviet republics and integration associations in the post-Soviet space — the CIS, EAEU, CSTO. This was all standard practice — before Russia sent its army into Ukraine.

Russia started the war, among other things, to stake out its sphere of influence. The result was exactly the opposite. Scandals of this scale had never erupted between Russia and Azerbaijan before, and this is the new reality: Moscow’s influence in the post-Soviet space has thinned. And the former Soviet republics now shape their policies with this erosion in mind.

The stream of bad news for Moscow from countries it once viewed from the position of a stronger partner is overwhelming. Sparks fly so often that it seems to be the rule rather than the exception.

Azerbaijan: Karabakh reclaimed, Moscow sidestepped

The current conflict between Moscow and Baku is the toughest stress test for both countries. Five years ago, such a level of tension between them was unimaginable — especially Azerbaijan’s reaction to the actions of Russian security forces against Azerbaijanis living in Russia.

There’s a vivid example from 2020. Russian leader Vladimir Putin, with a single phone call, stopped his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilham Aliyev, who was already preparing — in the fall of 2020 — to retake all of Karabakh from Armenia by force, with Turkey’s support. Their conversation took place after the Azerbaijani army captured Shusha, opening the road to Stepanakert (now Khankendi). Despite the relative ease of the operation, Azerbaijani security forces suddenly froze and did not advance further.

“There was a ‘tough’ talk... Russia made Azerbaijan ‘an offer he couldn’t refuse’,” — described RBC. The details never surfaced, but the facts spoke for themselves: Russian troops, in the form of a peacekeeping contingent, appeared for the first time in modern history on internationally recognized Azerbaijani territory.

After the start of the war in Ukraine, everything changed. Baku waited, and in the fall of 2023, without regard for anyone, carried out a swift military special operation and regained control over the remnants of Karabakh.

During the operation, Russian peacekeepers were killed — the last time this happened was in 2008 at the start of the war in Georgia, and the outcome for Tbilisi is well known. This time, Aliyev quickly apologized and the incident was hushed up. Soon after, the Russian peacekeeping contingent left Karabakh.

On the Ukrainian front, Baku acts on the principle “your enemy is not my problem.” Moscow can do nothing about it. Despite being in allied relations with Russia, Azerbaijan does what it deems necessary: helps Ukraine restore infrastructure, sends humanitarian aid, maintains political relations at the highest level.

The crash of an Azerbaijan Airlines plane, shot down by a Russian missile on December 25, 2024, sharply worsened relations between Russia and Baku. Confronted with Moscow’s inadequate behavior and not receiving an apology, Aliyev publicly declared that Russia was trying to cover up the incident. In February 2025, Azerbaijani authorities shut down the local branch of Rossotrudnichestvo. And Aliyev refused to fly to Moscow for the 80th anniversary of Victory Day.

Azerbaijan can afford to be tough even with the West: almost simultaneously with Rossotrudnichestvo, Baku dealt with the local USAID office. These opportunities did not come out of nowhere. The state’s iron grip on the country’s internal affairs makes Azerbaijan somewhat similar to Russia. There, too, propaganda can be cranked up to full blast if needed. The confidence that now no one, including Moscow, can dictate to Baku from above what to do was strengthened by the return of Karabakh. Heydar Aliyev, Ilham Aliyev’s father, began building Azerbaijani statehood; now the son has completed the process by regaining lost territories.

Special relations with Turkey and Russia’s weakening also played a role. The war has clearly exposed Moscow’s real capabilities. It’s no coincidence the Kremlin decided not to escalate the current conflict and sent a parliamentarian to Azerbaijan — formerly Putin’s aide-de-camp, now Emergency Situations Minister Alexander Kurenkov.

So there will be reconciliation. But the winner in the conflict between these two countries of very different weight will definitely not be Moscow.

Armenia: an outsider among two

The first alarm bell in Russian-Armenian relations rang in 2018. Nikol Pashinyan, who seized power from Serzh Sargsyan in the “Velvet Revolution,” immediately fell out of favor in Moscow. He promised not to pursue vendettas against political opponents, but did not keep his word: the first defendant in a criminal case was initially the then-Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Yuri Khachaturov, then Serzh Sargsyan and former president Robert Kocharyan, who openly spoke of his friendship with Vladimir Putin.

This angered Moscow. But until 2020, Armenia — a CSTO member and participant in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) — generally did not cross the Kremlin’s red lines. At Moscow’s request, it sent a mission to Syria and actively participated in all integration formats important to Russia.

In 2020, the Second Karabakh War broke out, ending in Armenia’s defeat. Neither Russia nor the CSTO came to the aid of their ally. But there was an argument: Karabakh was never recognized by anyone as part of Armenia, even though Nikol Pashinyan declared, that “Artsakh is Armenia. Period.”

The point of no return was passed in the fall of 2022. Then, fighting flared up again between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but this time Armenian territory came under fire. Armenia did not receive the support and assistance from the CSTO it had counted on. Russia called on both sides to cease fire, while, for example, France and the US condemned Azerbaijan’s aggression. Moscow did not come to Armenia’s aid during Baku’s special operation in Karabakh either, after which Armenia lost control over the region.

This spurred Yerevan’s pivot away from Moscow toward the West, and its foreign policy became increasingly independent. “The external security systems in which Armenia is involved are ineffective for protecting Armenia’s security and state interests,” Pashinyan declared. Armenians realized that relying solely on Moscow is shortsighted and even dangerous, and began moving closer to the West, India, and even hostile Turkey. Their relations have noticeably warmed; in June, Pashinyan visited Turkey and met with Recep Erdoğan — something that would have been hard to imagine just a few years ago. Armenia, despite Moscow’s angry reaction, signed and then ratified the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has issued an arrest warrant for Putin. Today, the republic is a full member of the ICC.

There have also been changes in an area extremely sensitive for Russia — military-technical cooperation. Armenia’s main partners in defense are now India and France, both supplying Yerevan with weapons and equipment. American and French military advisers now work in the Armenian Defense Ministry. There is no Russian adviser there. Yerevan has frozen its CSTO membership and rejected Russian border guards: first removing them from Zvartnots Airport, then from the Armenian-Azerbaijani and, finally, from the Armenian-Turkish border.

In parallel, Yerevan began moving closer to the EU. In March, it adopted the law “On the Beginning of the Process of Accession of the Republic of Armenia to the European Union.” In June, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas visited Yerevan and announced the allocation of €270 million to Armenia, in particular to support independent media and combat propaganda — primarily Russian — and hybrid threats. In 2024, Armenia banned the programs of Russian propagandist Vladimir Solovyov. Now Armenian authorities say, that it is necessary to completely ban the broadcast of Russian state channels.

A recent case is telling: the arrest of Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. He intervened in the conflict between the authorities and the church, stating that if politicians do not resolve the situation, “we will take matters into our own hands.” The businessman, closely tied to Moscow, was accused of calling for the seizure of power and arrested for two months.

At the same time, Armenia is heavily dependent on Russia economically, especially in the energy sector. Armenia remains a member of the EAEU and continues to benefit from it. But so far, Moscow has not resorted to economic pressure. The head of the Yerevan-based Caucasus Institute, Alexander Iskandaryan, explains this uncharacteristic behavior as follows: “Russia can easily punish Armenia economically: raise gas prices fivefold, close its market to agricultural products, and so on. But as soon as this happens, it will be like the liquidation of Nagorno-Karabakh, only in the economy, because after that [Russia] will have no levers of influence on Armenia at all.”

Apparently, Moscow is aware of these risks. Moreover, in such a case, public demand for moving away from Russia would grow. The process is already underway: according to research by the International Republican Institute (IRI), in 2018, 92% of Armenians considered relations with Russia good, and only 7% bad; by September 2024, the ratio was already 64 to 35%. Moreover, there is a high probability that in such a situation, the country that would come to Armenia’s aid would be… Turkey. In 2018, 98% of Armenians considered relations with Turkey bad, and only 1% good. In 2024, 72% still consider them bad, but 25% now call them good. The two countries have long discussed the need to open the border. Russians are no longer there.

While Moscow quarrels with Armenia and Azerbaijan, these two — seemingly bitter enemies — are holding bilateral talks on a long-term peace. Until recently, Russia claimed the role of main mediator, but for now, Baku and Yerevan have decided to do without it.

Moldova: infusions without influence

Moldova, along with Armenia and Azerbaijan, is another vivid example of a country exiting Moscow’s sphere of influence. The process began long before the war — after pro-Western forces took power in 2009. Since then, only pro-European parties have governed the country. But until February 24, 2022, they tried to balance things and did not break ties with Moscow.

The current president, Maia Sandu, came to power in 2020 on a platform of European integration, but also promised equal and mutually beneficial relations with Russia. Under similar slogans, in 2021, the parliamentary majority was won by Sandu’s Action and Solidarity party. Sandu met with Russian presidential administration deputy chief Dmitry Kozak (until recently, the Kremlin’s Moldova handler).

Before the war, Chisinau was visited by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Rudenko. Moldovan diplomats told me that during an informal dinner, he was asked directly: “Will Russia attack a neighboring country?” According to them, the answer was: “We’re going to bomb Kyiv?! How do you imagine that!” A week later, Russian missiles struck the Ukrainian capital.

After the war began, Moldova sided with Ukraine, cut ties with Moscow at all levels, and began to terminate agreements signed within the CIS. Now, Moldovan-Russian relations are relations without relations. The sides communicate mainly through public statements in which they rebuke each other for various reasons, sometimes summoning ambassadors to the Foreign Ministry to express dissatisfaction with each other’s unfriendly actions. A telling gesture — President Sandu has still not accepted the credentials of Russia’s new ambassador to Moldova, Oleg Ozerov, who arrived in the country last fall. The Ukrainian ambassador, who arrived later, presented his credentials to her at the beginning of the year.

Distancing from Russia is also happening in the economy. Chisinau does not buy gas directly from Gazprom, preferring to purchase fuel on the European market. It’s too early to talk about full energy independence, but achieving it is the goal of the Moldovan authorities, and Brussels is helping them.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, Moldova has made significant progress toward European integration. In the summer of 2022, the EU granted candidate status to both Moldova and Ukraine; at the end of 2023, Brussels decided to start accession talks with them. Now, a screening — an analysis of Moldova’s legislation for compliance with EU norms — is underway. This year, the EU raised its level of political relations with Moldova to the highest — annual bilateral summits, the first of which took place in Chisinau on July 4. The republic became the third post-Soviet country with which Brussels began working in this format after Russia (summits ended in 2014) and Ukraine. This is a success.

Moscow does not want to accept the loss of influence in Moldova and supports politicians and parties advocating cooperation with Russia. The most prominent conduit of Russian interests in Moldova is the fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor. A citizen of Moldova, Israel, and, more recently, Russia, Shor was sentenced by a Moldovan court to 15 years in prison for his role in a massive financial fraud — the 2014 embezzlement of $1 billion from three Moldovan banks he then controlled. To avoid prison, Shor fled to Israel in 2019, then moved to Moscow, from where he remotely coordinates the activities of his supporters and party network. Some of them last year united in Moscow in the Victory bloc. Shor deals in cryptocurrency, helps Russia circumvent sanctions, and during last year’s presidential election, his people organized vote buying of voters.

The Moldovan economy is not doing well — GDP grew by only 0.1% last year, gas and electricity prices have risen, and so has everything else. Discontent with the government is growing, and Moscow intends to take advantage of this. Recently, the Kremlin changed its Moldova handler. From Kozak, who, as IStories sources said, was reluctant to deal with Shor because of his toxicity, the portfolio passed to the head of the domestic policy bloc, Sergey Kiriyenko. His approach is extremely simple: stop being shy about interfering in the affairs of post-Soviet states. Shor announced that “Victory” will run in the September parliamentary elections, which will determine the configuration of power for the next four years (Moldova is a parliamentary republic). He promised to seek the creation of a Russia-Moldova union and Moldova’s accession to the CSTO, despite its neutral status.

The chances of winning on such a platform are slim. The majority of the population, including those dissatisfied with the current pro-European government, support European integration — this course is enshrined in the constitution. But surprises are possible, and Shor knows how to mobilize people for street protests. According to polls, his Victory bloc is polling above the parliamentary threshold. If, of course, it is allowed to run.

Moscow’s options are complicated by the lack of a common border with Moldova and Brussels’ full support for Chisinau. The war has accelerated Moldova’s movement away from Russia and toward the West. It’s hard to imagine what would have to happen for this to reverse. Moldovan authorities insist the country will join the EU by 2030.

Belarus: looking to the West

Alexander Lukashenko, who for years maneuvered between Russia and the West, fell into a trap five years ago. His re-election to a new presidential term sparked massive protests, which he crushed with great brutality. And the forced landing of a Ryanair plane in Minsk to detain opposition figure Roman Protasevich brought unprecedented sanctions upon Belarus.

The seasoned “batka” found himself in the tight embrace of the Kremlin. Room for maneuver disappeared, and Lukashenko could not wriggle out of complicity in Russia’s war with Ukraine. Belarusian territory became one of the staging grounds for the invasion. This further complicated Minsk’s relations with the EU and the US. Since 2022, Lukashenko’s main partner is Putin, and Russia is almost his only destination for foreign trips.

It seemed there was no way out of these embraces, but talks resumed on Belarus joining Russia. “Dependence has grown enormously in many areas. Belarusian air bases are used by Russia entirely at its own discretion,” says Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center expert Artem Shraibman. “Ninety percent of Belarus’s foreign trade goes either to Russia or through Russia. No one else is a sponsor, credit donor, or energy supplier, and at preferential prices. Here, dependence is close to total.”

Lukashenko has always tried to slow down integration with Russia, and over the past year has made attempts to break out of isolation. He is inviting the West to bargain, releasing political prisoners. Released from prison was Sergei Tikhanovsky, removed from the 2020 election, who served 5 of the 18 years handed down by the court. Maria Kolesnikova, jailed in September 2020, may also be released. Her release no longer seems unrealistic. Last year, Belarusian authorities allowed Maria’s father to visit her and demonstrated that she was alive and well. “Lukashenko is showing: there’s a deal to be made, I’m ready to talk about anything,” Shraibman observes.

The first result: on June 21, Minsk was visited by US presidential envoy for Ukraine Keith Kellogg — that’s when Tikhanovsky was released. Issues were also discussed regarding lifting sanctions on the country’s largest fertilizer producer, Belaruskali, as well as restoring air links with the republic (though this would require coordination with the EU).

Another notable step toward the West concerns Minsk’s migration policy, which caused quite a few problems for neighboring EU countries, notes Eastern Europe researcher Balázs Jarábik: “Belarus has restricted visa issuance and stopped facilitating access for refugees from the Middle East to EU border areas.”

Lukashenko is guided not only by geopolitical expediency, though that is his top priority. Belarusians have no desire to join Russia. Only about 4% of Belarusians want this, and this figure has not changed for many years. “Plus or minus a percent or so — even the war hasn’t affected this constant,” says independent Belarusian sociologist Andrei Vardomatsky. Belarus’ moves toward the West, to reduce dependence on Moscow, has only just begun. It will not be easy or quick, but nothing is impossible.

Central Asia: lying low

The Central Asian countries behave much more cautiously in their relations with Russia than Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. But over the past three years, there have been quite a few episodes of independence, multi-vector policies, and even toughness that Moscow finds unpleasant. If you put the puzzle pieces together, the picture is quite telling.

Not a single Central Asian country has condemned Russia’s actions against Ukraine, but Moscow has not received support from them either. Kyrgyzstan’s president Sadyr Japarov stated, that Bishkek should remain neutral in this war. In June 2022, Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, who in January 2022 retained power in part thanks to the deployment of CSTO troops in the country, at an economic forum in St. Petersburg, in Putin’s presence, called the DNR and LNR “quasi-state entities” and stressed that Astana does not intend to recognize them (at that time, Moscow had not yet incorporated them into Russia).

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (in 2005 and 2014) — not without Moscow’s help — forced the US to withdraw its troops. But neither they nor the other Central Asian countries, despite differences in regime severity, share Russia’s approach to the West as an enemy. Kazakhstan persistently seeks visa liberalization with the EU. Astana, while being a military ally of Russia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are CSTO members), recently signed a military cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom.

Another factor reducing Russia’s influence in the region is China’s interest. After the start of the war in Ukraine, the project for a railway from China bypassing Russia, through Central Asian countries, finally gained momentum. China is investing heavily in the region (Moscow, because of the war, has no time for this), and has replaced Russia as the main trading partner of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and is close to this with Tajikistan, while in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan this happened even before the war. China has even entered areas where Russia’s positions seemed unshakable: it will participate in building a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan. Since 2023, summits between China and Central Asia have begun.

Central Asian states are decisively cracking down on their citizens’ involvement in combat in Ukraine. Those who fight on Russia’s side receive prison sentences in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. In Kyrgyzstan, in a case over recruitment for the front, a staffer of the Russian House, Natalya Sekerina, was arrested.

While Russia rehabilitates Stalin and talks about the mythical “denazification” of Ukraine, Central Asian governments are carrying out de-Sovietization. In June, a 25-meter-high — the tallest in Central Asia — Lenin monument was dismantled in the Kyrgyz city of Osh. Lenin is also set to be removed in Bishkek. Soviet street names are also being changed in the country.

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What is happening now was unimaginable ten years ago: Russian influence in the post-Soviet space is shrinking, Alexander Iskandaryan notes. This, he says, is a fairly long-standing process, but now “Russia is turning into a very convenient narrative for a black-and-white picture that can be used in domestic politics.” The Ukraine issue has so eclipsed everything else in Russian foreign policy that, as Maxim Samorukov, an expert on Russia and Eurasia at the Carnegie Center, observes, “they attribute panacea-like properties to a possible victory there. It’s a rather illusory approach, but there is a certain logic to it.”