Comrade Pagan Amum: What Happen after the Expiration of the Revitalized Agreement (R-ARCSS) in South Sudan? – The Way Forward

Concept Paper on the End of South Sudan Current Transition: Proposed Way Forward

By Pagan Amum Okiech, Real SPLM/SPLA

Introduction:

Monday, 25 July 2022 (PW) — As the Revitalized Agreement for the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) nears the end of its life, with little progress having been made in its implementation, spirited discussions have broken out among South Sudanese in the country and in diaspora, including on social media platforms, about what could or should follow? This concept note is a contribution to those ongoing discussions. It should, however, be noted that the concept note is not only intended to promote this debate but more pointedly to offer practical solutions and define feasible pathways for going forward, drawing on lessons learnt from the short history of South Sudan in self-governance since the signing of the CPA in 2005. This concept note is also the outcome of broad consultations with South people from various communities and groups.

The concept paper attempts to address the main reasons for the poor implementation of the R-ARCSS and goes to propose possible pathways going forward by doing the following:

1. Pinpointing the main reasons for the poor implementation of R-ARCSS and the disappointing performance of R-TGONU;
2. Identifying the flaws, weaknesses and loopholes in the R-ARCSS leading to its failure;
3. Exploring the prospects of governance in South Sudan beyond R-ARCSS come February 2023;
4. Addressing the enigmatic question of survival prospects of South Sudan with or without Kiir and Machar: would it be a viable state or collapse into oblivion? and lastly
5. Proposing options for the way forward.

As per the R-ARCSS, this current transition comes to an end in February 2023. At its inception, the assumption was that by the end of the transition, total peace would have been restored in the country, the internally displaced people resettled, the refugees returned home, and the ‘permanent’ constitution developed and adopted, culminating in the conduct of elections to usher the country to normal governance. However, it is now glaringly clear and generally accepted that based on the poor status of implementation of the Agreement, the prerequisites for the conduct of free, fair and credible elections at the end of the transition, as envisaged, do not exist, therefore there could be no credible elections before R-ARCSS lapses in February 2023. Any elections conducted without these prerequisites would be no more than a farce and probably a recipe for deepening the governance crisis rather than curing the malady. That is why the emerging debate on what will likely follow, or what should ideally happen, after the expiry of R-ARCSS has gained currency. Sadly, the institutions formally charged with the implementation of the Agreement or its monitoring and evaluation, including the guarantors, have largely maintained a studious silence on this serious matter.

What is even more worrying, too many people, is the emerging information about plans for a possible extension of the R-ARCSS transition and the life of R-TGONU, not-withstanding the glaring failure of the Agreement and the disappointing performance of R-TGONU. The idea of extension is being floated with the justification that too few provisions of the Agreement have been implemented thus far; that indeed, many critical provisions of R-ARCSS have not been implemented, hence the need for more time for their implementation! Strangely and perplexingly, the advocates of unconditional extension have not bothered to tell the people of South Sudan why most of these critical articles of the Agreement have not been implemented in the first place, and why they could be implemented if given yet another extension? Would an extended R-ARCSS transition fare any better this time round, if its implementation is undertaken by the same characters who have presided over the transitions since 2015, first with ARCSS, and now with R-ARCSS?

Advocates of unconditional extension try to explain away the disappointingly low implementation status of R-ARCSS and the glaring failure of R-TGONU on account of financial constraints as a result of lack of support from donors, and on the COVID 19 pandemic. This is most disingenuous. Over the same period of time, R-TGONU has obtained loans, made forward sale of oil to 2027, entered into numerous contracts for the construction of roads, and thermal power generation plants, and purchased large fleets of luxury V8 Landcruisers; it is even building a Presidential palace that will rival state houses in the region and beyond, among others, all these transactions to the tune of billions of dollars. It is certainly absurd to cite lack of money as a reason for R-TGONU’s failure to implement R-ARCSS, when such colossal amounts of money can be squandered on non-essentials rather than on the most important tasks: implementing the Agreement and nursing the return of peace to the country!

Before trying to figure out the likely course of events beyond February 2023, it will be important to first examine the key reasons for the dismal performance of the R-ARCSS and the failure of R-TGONU to implement the Agreement? The idea here is to enable the wider populace of South Sudan to draw lessons from this experience so as to inform the debate and the design of a new governance dispensation beyond February 2023.

1. Main reasons for the poor implementation of R-ARCSS and the Disappointing Performance of R-TGONU

Looking back at how South Sudan has fared in the field of governance, economy, security, service delivery, diplomacy and international relations among others, including the country’s participation in international and regional organizations, it is not difficult to surmise the main reasons for the poor status of implementation of R-ARCSS and the failure of R-TGONU to deliver. These reasons are intertwined yet clearly discernible, and they are:

1. Foremost among them is a lack of political will, particularly on the part of SPLM/IG (Incumbent Government) and to a lesser extent, on the part of IO and other groups. Close to four years since the signing of R-ARCSS, many extensions of pre-transition and transition periods, countless commitments and re-commitments to implement the Agreement in good faith, in the letter in spirit, the parties have failed to deliver peace, security and stability, law and order, basic social services and virtually everything that a government is established to provide. Much worse, the key characters, President Kiir and VP Riek Machar, who have held the reigns of power since 2015 refuse to admit failure; instead they continue to ask for an extension after extension.

By the stipulations of R-ARCSS, President Kiir enjoys over 60% weight in Government. If he were keen to implement the Agreement, he could have done so alone, even if this means overriding the objections of the other parties to the Agreement. How, given the letter and spirit of the Agreement, one may ask?

It is true that R-ARCSS provides for collegial decision making in government so President Kiir would need bring along the other parties to R-TGONU when it comes to decision making. However, when consensus fails, when disagreements cannot be broken and push comes to shove, it is the numbers that the R-ARCSS recognizes. As a matter of fact, and record, President Kiir has used this weight extensively in making decisions unilaterally during the transitional period. Unfortunately, these unilateral decisions were made not to advance the cause of peace or implementation of the Agreement but to undermine the other ‘partners’ to R-ARCSS and, sometimes, even as an affront to the Agreement and the Constitution.

• Poor design of the Agreement in Chapters I and II, which in essence, were ARCSS re-engineered to allay the fears of President Kiir in his (23) point reservations expressed in Juba in August 2015. Unfortunately, while bending backwards to allay the fears of President Kiir, the designers of R-ARCSS, the successor agreement to ARCSS, fatally injured the new agreement thus rendering the supposedly ‘revitalized’ agreement (R-ARCSS) largely unimplementable. President Kiir, by his own mouth now admits that R-ARCSS is unimplementable and puts the fault on ‘designers’ of the Agreement. It is this poor design that compounded the original sin of R-ARCSS: failure to address the root causes of the conflict including the refusal to figure out why ARCSS was not implemented to begin with!

• Lack of specificity of the stipulations: Many of the terms in the Agreement are not clearly defined or spelt out. Hence parties are left to interpret them as they want; for example, ‘unification’ of forces. To IG, it is to absorb IO or rebel forces into the ranks of SSPDF as happened after the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, whereas to IO, it is the coming together of two forces, SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO, which will predominantly be a formation of two tribes anyway. Secondly, ‘Incumbent Government’ was the designation given to a signatory party (SPLM/IG) to the Agreement without defining the period of that incumbency and what designation will be given to that party when the period of incumbency has expired. The result has been the creation, not only on paper but in the mind of the people, even if at the subconscious level, of two concurrent governments: Incumbent Government and R-TGONU. Since then the Incumbent Government which was already established by the time the Agreement was signed, has always trumped R-TGONU and for all practical purposes, it has been, and is, ‘the Government’. There are other such internal contradictions in R-ARCSS which were avoidable but whether by oversight or by design, they were left to stand in the final text of R-ARCSS.

• There has been a lack of robust follow-up from the guarantors, IGAD and to a lesser extent from the African Union, the Troika and the United Nations. Once the R-ARCSS was signed, the mediators, guarantors and other third parties largely left the signatory parties to sort out matters, including disagreements and disputes, by themselves! These third parties who were instrumental in moving the warring parties to negotiate and cajoled them to sign the Agreement retreated from being proactive and chose to limit their role to making appeals instead of maintaining pressure and robust engagement. President Kiir’s Incumbent Government interprets this as disinterest on the part of third parties, and hence a license for it (IG) not to honour the terms of the Agreement. Disinterest also manifested itself in the fact that there were no sanctions for blatant violations of the stipulations of the R-ARCSS and worst still, whenever such violations happened, both sides or all parties apportioned blame instead of only blaming the violator. This was music in the ears of a violator which mostly, was the Incumbent Government, as they have been responsible for the largest number of verified violations.

• Weakness of all the opposition groups which IG took advantage of, to violate the Agreement and misgovern with impunity. The R-ARCSS gave SPLM/IG over 60 per cent weight in Government visas viz the other parties combined. The (numerical) weakness of the ‘opposition’ is made more biting by the disarray in their ranks, especially the main ‘opposition’ group, the SPLM/IO. IG has also been deliberately dismantling IO through buying off its cadres, both political and military, despite the fact that both of them (SPLM/IO and SPLM/IG) are supposed to be partners in the same unity Government. Unfortunately, the guarantors just turned a blind eye to this act that fundamentally undermined the building of trust necessary for joint implementation of the Agreement. As for the other groups, many are briefcase parties and ineffective partners.

For all practical purposes, therefore, the Incumbent Government is left to govern the country alone, the way it chooses. Tragically, IG chose to use this enviable position to operate outside the law and the constitution most of the time and has done so with impunity, thus, deepening the country’s crises of governance rather than alleviating and resolving them.

• Though most parties, groups and people in general proclaim loudly that the crisis of governance in the country is political and therefore needs a political solution, rarely has this been translated into practice. Indeed the contrary has been the norm! For example. the power-sharing formula of both ARCSS and R-ARCSS were wittingly or unwittingly, constructed to glorify and reward violence: he who has the biggest force, the heaviest weapons, and does not shy away from using these indiscriminately, is given the most weight in negotiations and in power sharing. As a result, the gun culture and the use of force to extract concessions or push through one’s interest will have become an entrenched culture in the country!

• Finally and most importantly, President Kiir fears that successful implementation of any agreement will expose him to prosecution in the Hybrid Court provided for in both ARCSS and R-ARCSS, hence his determination to stonewall successful implementation of the R-ARCSS, especially the establishment of the Hybrid Court. Why? Because there is every reason to believe that President Kiir will be among the people to be prosecuted for crimes committed during the course of the conflict in South Sudan since 2013. The Obasanjo report of the African Union (AU), multiple human rights reports, the UNMISS report on the J1 dogfights as well as subsequent events, all point in the direction that President Kiir has been complicit in orchestrating all or most of those events. So Kiir’s fears are not only real but also well founded. To stave off the prospect of prosecution the President has chosen to hold the country hostage by clinging onto power and using the office of President to frustrate implementation of agreements. To address President Kiir’s reluctance to exit power peacefully, his fears should be addressed including by offering him amnesty and security guarantees.

So, what is the way forward? How do we get out of this apparent logjam and cycles of failed transitions?

1. The Expiry of R-ARCSS and R-TGONU – Another Crisis or an Opportunity?

February 2023 will spell the end of R-ARCSS and the tenure of R-TGONU, with little having been accomplished in over four years of transition. The danger of a constitutional crisis ensuing as a result of the failure of R-ARCSS to deliver is real. However, the failure of R-ARCSS and RTGONU, while presenting a situation pregnant with danger, also challenges South Sudanese to turn the crisis into an opportunity for crafting a new political dispensation and making a fresh start at building peace, to paraphrase many South Sudanese activists and academics!

As stated earlier, there is consensus that holding free, fair and credible elections to usher in a transition to legitimate, democratic governance and consolidation of peace in the country between now and February 2023, is not possible! It is also public knowledge that President Kiir (IG) is planning for another extension, by coercing other signatories to the Agreement, bribing Parliament to achieve that end or through running sham elections under conditions that can only deliver the results he desires and is in his favour. This should be roundly rejected by South Sudanese and others who believe that free, fair, and credible elections is the ultimate mechanism for returning just, durable and sustainable peace to the country. Parliament should join in the rejection of such a scheme. Why?

R-ARCSS and its predecessor ARCSS, were both to be fully implemented and overseen by President Kiir and VP Machar, main protagonists, and partners to the Agreement. The duo have failed to do this; they have failed to deliver peace, stability and even the very modicum of security to South Sudan over all these years, despite multiple peace agreements, numerous transitions and extensions, and countless commitments and re-commitments. What more transitions and extensions would make a difference when both of them are unable and unwilling to cooperate for the sake of peace in the country leave alone being interested to implement any agreement in letter and spirit? President Festus Mogae, former President of Botswana and former Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission of ARCSS once famously quipped, in characterising the relations between President Kiir and VP Machar, that “the mere sight of each other is sufficient to provoke war.” So, it would not matter how many extensions are made, or how many transitions are instituted, as long as the duo remain at the helm, they will continue to be incompatible and South Sudan and its people will continue to suffer! The only instances where the duo have demonstrated the ability and willingness to cooperate are when it comes to self-preservation at the expense of justice and peace in the country!

Having underscored the fact that the design, content, structures, and composition of R-TGONU have a bearing on the non-implementation of the agreement, it is the attitude and behaviour of the two leaders that have worsened the situation and rendered the transition a failure. The persistent political and personal animosities between Kiir and Machar created a dysfunctional administration that failed to deliver anything meaningful. Therefore, the transition must be allowed to expire on its due date and no suggestions for renewal, in its present form should be entertained! However, a platform needs to be created and some mechanism devised to craft the governance arrangements beyond February 2023. This platform should involve South Sudanese from all walks of life, assisted by friends and other people of goodwill.

1. Can South Sudan survive without Kiir and Machar?

Most South Sudanese as well as some foreign friends and partners of South Sudan in regional and international circles freely do admit that President Kiir has failed to provide the required leadership at a critical point in the life of South Sudan, that he has done a poor job of governing the country. Dr. Riek Machar who has been his second in command for most of this time is equally rated as being no better. Unfortunately, some of these same friends and regional neighbours of South Sudan invariably aver that bad as Kiir is, more so as failed as he has done, his sudden departure will still make South Sudan descend into chaos because they don’t see somebody who can step in to hold this fragile country together. As a result, some would still want him to stay on and that the country may be better off with him at the helm! This is a mistaken and unfortunate thinking, probably inspired by the belief that not having ‘an heir apparent’ in succession politics in the country is the problem. To many South Sudanese however, the question as to whether the country can survive without Kiir, and Machar is a non-issue. South Sudan will continue long after Kiir and Machar are gone. Indeed, the belief is that South Sudan without Kiir and Machar at the helm can only be a better place since the rivalry between them has been and continue to bedevil the country. Instead, the question to ask is: has President Kiir, and Dr. Riek Machar for that matter, been a blessing or curse to South Sudan since its independence from Sudan in July 2011?

First and foremost, there is general consensus amongst most South Sudanese that Kiir and Machar have failed the test of good, responsible and responsive leadership for the simple reason that the duo only care about their personal interests, not for the people of South Sudan or the country itself. Secondly, South Sudanese believe that even if Kiir and Machar were to disappear from the face of the earth today, that will not mean the end of the country! South Sudan is more than Kiir and Machar. The obsession with Kiir and Machar is simply a manifestation of the ‘Heir Apparent’ phenomenon as observed or experienced in other contexts. And it is not a universally applicable principle or practice of leadership succession!

Thirdly, while it is true that R-ARCSS has failed to get implemented partly because of fatal design flaws in the Agreement itself, President Kiir was a key party to that flawed design and must carry his part of the blame. Similarly, Dr. Machar walked into a bad agreement knowingly in the belief that signing onto a bad agreement will buy him freedom from IGAD-imposed confinement, which is his own cross to stoically carry. Fourthly, with over 60% weight in Government coupled with ‘rule through decrees’ President Kiir has implemented his own version of R-ARCSS without the consent or acquiescence of the other parties while ignoring or indeed blocking implementation of R-ARCSS itself, particularly its critical provisions. He has consistently done that whenever he wishes and when it suits him, R-ARCSS and the Constitution notwithstanding, and got away with it.

Fifthly, the R-ARCSS itself addresses the issue of succession in the event of Kiir vacating office through resignation or being incapacitated and therefore unable to discharge the duties of the office of President. There should, therefore, be no uncertainty or vacuum created as a result of President Kiir vacating that office. The issue of chaos ensuing in the event President Kiir vacates office suddenly is a non-issue too! Chaos is already there! Stopping the chaos is a matter that the people of South Sudan need to address with a sense of urgency!

Given the above, South Sudan without Kiir and Machar will, at long last, have the opportunity and space to rid itself of the ills that rivalry between the two has visited on the country. The going will not be easy. Indeed, given the sorry state of the country, the task will be herculean, but then solace can be taken in that there will be no obstruction from above to do what is right!

1. The way forward:

After the expiry of the R-ARCSS in February 2023, South Sudan will still need and must have a government to run the affairs of the country, and undertake minimal reforms necessary to usher the country to free fair and credible elections. All the institutions of the State as a sovereign country must be made to function while the people of South Sudan craft a new political dispensation. In that interim, a caretaker government of technocrats or a hybrid one should replace the defunct R-TGONU created by the failed R-ARCSS.

In the recent past, over a period of four years, broad national consultations were undertaken under the umbrella of the National Dialogue Conference. Several events were organized where people deliberated and consulted widely in the three greater regions of Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile and Equatoria. Conclusions of the National Dialogue Conference are a culmination of the various regional consultations with clear recommendations for the way forward.

The mechanism and process of the National Dialogue Conference were constituted, commissioned, financed, facilitated, and shepherded by President Kiir himself. The results of that historic process must be evoked and utilized. The Conference, echoing earlier proposals from many people, resolved that for South Sudan to get out of its present quagmire, a new Government of Technocrats should replace the current R-TGONU. That new government will take the country to free, fair, and credible elections.

• What needs to be done:

In order to take the country through free, fair and credible elections to stable and democratic governance the following will need to be accepted or assumed and done:

1. Accept that R-ARCS has failed to deliver and bring about peace in South Sudan, therefore it should be allowed to lapse;
2. Accept that relevant parts of R-ARCSS like Constitutional Review Process, Hybrid Court, Chapters 3 – 6 will be retained and used, with modifications as necessary; and
3. That with the expiry of R-ARCSS, the following Governance bodies enshrined in the Agreement also expire:
   1. The Presidency,
   1. The R-TGONU Executive Cabinet,
   1. The Governors,
   1. The R-TNLA,
   1. Council of States, and
   1. The State Legislatures.
4. That the role of IGAD, AU, Troika and the UN would be to facilitate South Sudanese stakeholders in crafting a new political and governance dispensation and to support the interim arrangements post-February 2023.

• The New Interim Arrangements

The new interim arrangements should be based on a paradigm shift from the formation of transitional governments by political parties and parties to the conflict, to using the administrative set up of the three Greater Regions, the Ten States, or the number of Counties as they stood on the day of independence, in 2011, as the criteria for apportioning of representation and the portfolios. This is as much to avoid the haggling over portfolios between the political parties, which hampered the prompt formation of the R-TGONU and rendered it dysfunctional.

• Reconstitution of the governance structure

It is proposed as follows:

1. A Supreme Council to be established, composed of three members, one from each of the Greater regions of Bahr el Ghazal, Equatoria, and Upper Nile representing the Head of State with rotational chairmanship;
2. Nominated members of a Transitional National Legislature with equal numbers, as may be agreed at any relevant platform, from all the (10) States plus 2 from Abyei, for example (90/100 + 2) or [(79 x 2) + 2] members, i.e 9/10 from each of the ten states and 2 from Abyei; and 12 or 24 women, either four or eight from each of the Greater Bahr El Ghazal, Greater Equatoria and Greater Upper Nile regions, plus  (1) from Abyei;
3. State Legislatures of (20) members 14 men and 6 women,
4. An Executive (Cabinet) of 19 members: 4 men and 2 women each from Greater Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile regions (18); and one Chair, who could be from any of the Regions.

• The Executive:

Thereafter, two possible options that are viable, realistic and practical are proposed hereunder and they are:

Option One: New transition with a Caretaker Government of Technocrats with minimum mandate and program, and a duration of no more than 18 months. Apart from keeping the day-to-day affairs of State running, the Caretaker Administration shall accomplish in particular, the following:

1. Ensure the conduct of free, fair and credible elections
2. Undertake minimal constitutional reforms necessary for the conduct of those elections;
3. Together with others (partners, AU and UN) undertake the uncompleted tasks in Chapter II (Security Arrangements) leading to the re-structuring and reforms of this critical sector, in order to create a stable and enabling environment for the conduct of elections. DDR shall be used as the mechanism in this re-structuring process. The purpose is to set up the nucleus of a professional, competent, apolitical security sector that reflects the character of South Sudan;
4. Endeavour to arrest the rampant intra- and inter-community violence through enforcement of law and order, the administration of justice and undertake a program of reconciliation and healing;
5. Enforce financial discipline in the management of the economy in order to deliver and restore a semblance of economic sanity and well-being, and provide basic services to the people of South Sudan;
6. Initiate a comprehensive civil service reform through timely payment of salaries, meritocracy and reactivation of pension schemes and programs; and
7. Work to improve the image of the country regionally and internationally.
8. State Governments: Non-partisan and technocratic Governor and a Deputy to be appointed in each State together with five State Cabinet Ministers of which two must be women.

Option Two: New transition with Caretaker Hybrid Government of Technocrats and other political or eminent personalities, with maximum Mandate and Program. Its tenure will be for a period of 3 – 5 years to be determined by All Stakeholders Conference/ Round-table. Besides running the normal, day-to-day affairs of state, the Caretaker Hybrid Government shall accomplish the following Priority Programs:

1. Security Sector re-structuring, reform and transformation in order to come up with security agencies that are professional, a-political, non-partisan and reflect the character of South Sudan – multi-ethnic, equal representation of states or regions) and equitable balance of counties/ ethnicities/ nationalities;
2. Restore law and order and the rule of law across the country; (disarmament, gun control, etc);
3. Undertake and complete the ‘permanent’ constitution-making process (what type and model of federalism, number of federal states and their administrative units; fiscal federalism, amendment procedures, among others;
4. Undertake comprehensive civil service reforms through restoring meritocracy, pension schemes and right-sizing the civil service workforce;
5. Embark on a robust economic transformation of the country;
6. Embark on a robust program of fighting corruption, retrieving the stolen money and prosecuting the culprits;
7. Revise and renegotiate all the trade and loan agreements since 2005/2011; 
8. Undertake critical infrastructure development (river, roads and bridges, power and energy, housing, at both national and state levels;
9. Embark on aggressive food production (by encouraging both mechanized agriculture, better animal husbandry, and fisheries as well as encouraging and facilitating the small-scale peasant farmers.
10. Address the issues of rampant inter- and intra- communal conflicts, disputes and violence over land, boundaries, competition over resources, grazing, water, et cetera;
11. Improve the image of the country both regionally and internationally, and live up to regional and international obligations;
12. Conduct free, fair and credible elections, with the support of the United Nations and the African Union.
13. State Governments: Non-partisan and technocratic Governor and a Deputy to be appointed in each State together with five State Cabinet Ministers of which two must be women.

• Conditions for participation in Caretaker Governments:
• Any individual participating in the Caretaker government shall be ineligible for elective office at the end of the transition.
• Every person participating in the leadership (President, cabinet, speakers of both Houses, (constitutional office holders or anybody in that category), shall be given a handshake (one time off payment) or a pension.

• Interim Security Protection

While the Security Sector is being restructured and reformed, there will be a need for some initial external protection. For example, resurrecting the Regional Protection Force the idea of which was mooted after the crisis of July, 2016. Such a force will provide necessary security services to the Caretaker Government and assist it in reorganizing and training the nucleus of professional, efficient and competent national security organizations. With the existing UNMISS contingent on the ground, the alternative could be to change or amend its mandate to provide that protection.

In this connection, the South Sudanese parties and stakeholders should request IGAD/AU to use their good offices with the UN Security Council to enable this, as well as to provide other necessary support for the process, financed from the UN General Budget.

The Author, Pagan Amum Okiech, is a former SPLM SG, and the party leader For/ Real SPLM; he can be reached via his email address: Email: okiechpagan@gmail.com or Tel: +1 (303) 332 8217

The opinion expressed here is solely the view of the writer. The veracity of any claim made is the responsibility of the author, not the PaanLuel Wël Media (PW) website. If you want to submit an opinion article, commentary, or news analysis, please email it to the editor: info@paanluelwel.com or paanluel2011@gmail.com. PaanLuel Wël Media (PW) website does reserve the right to edit or reject material before publication. Please include your full name, a short biography, email address, city, and the country you are writing from.