While the address echoed some elements of truth on the current state of affairs in the country, it also made several bold claims which do not reflect the realities at home. A close review of official reports and independent data shows that many of the assertions she presented are either misleading, exaggerated, or outright false.
Claim 1: “The implementation of the Peace Agreement is about 60% executed and … relative peace has been attained.”
The latest report of the Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), covering April–June 2025, makes no mention of 60% implementation. Instead, the executive summary notes that implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) has “faced severe setbacks”, with progress largely stalled and the risk of renewed conflict increasing.
Key provisions — including the permanent ceasefire, transitional security arrangements, judicial reforms, legislative reforms, and the constitutional process — are described as either stalled or recording no progress at all. RJMEC even warns of a potential relapse into conflict unless urgent measures are taken to restore trust, release detainees, and properly fund institutions mandated under the Agreement.
Verdict: False. Implementation is far below 60%, and peace remains fragile.
Claim 2: “Many South Sudanese have returned … and the diaspora are rebuilding their lives and contributing to national development.”
It is true that refugee returns have increased. According to a UNHCR report published on 11th September 2025, more than 9,300 South Sudanese refugees returned from Kakuma and Kalobeyei (Kenya) between June and September 2025, with daily arrivals peaking at 220 in August.
However, conditions at home remain extremely difficult. Many returnees struggle with insecurity, lack of services, and food shortages. Some have even opted to return to camps in neighbouring countries after finding their home areas unlivable. Meanwhile, while diaspora remittances (estimated at $86 million annually) do provide household income, they fall short of driving broad-based national development.
Verdict: Partly true. Refugees are returning, but the narrative of smooth reintegration and major contributions to national development is overstated.
Claim 3: “South Sudan has made progress in agricultural transformation … some states are now self-sufficient in food production, reducing poverty and achieving SDG1 and SDG2.”
This statement sharply contrasts with food security data. The Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) for April–July 2025 reported that 7.7 million people (57% of the population) faced high levels of acute food insecurity, including 2.3 million acutely malnourished children and 1.2 million malnourished pregnant or lactating women. At least 83,000 people, including 39,000 recent returnees from Sudan, were projected to experience catastrophic levels of hunger in Pibor, Malakal, and other hotspots.
There is no evidence of states becoming food-self-sufficient or of significant poverty reduction.
Verdict: Misleading. Far from achieving food security goals, South Sudan remains in a severe hunger crisis.
Claim 4: “Security sector reform is progressing well … relative peace has been attained across the country.”
While Phase I of training and graduation of unified forces was completed, deployment has been minimal, and Phase II has stalled. The 2025 second quarterly report from RJMEC shows that clashes between the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the SPLA-IO continued through 2025, especially in Upper Nile, Jonglei, and Central and Eastern Equatoria.
The Vice President also tied Dr Riek Machar’s detention to the White Army attack in Nasir. However, fighting did not stop there. The most recent incident was in Greater Kapoeta, where five government soldiers were killed.
Verdict: False. Security arrangements are incomplete, violence continues, and peace is far from consolidated.
Claim 5: “The government is considering resumption of the Tumaini Peace Initiative.”
This statement is contradicted by senior government officials. In July 2025, Gen. Kuol Manyang Juuk, head of the government’s delegation to the Kenya-led peace process, declared that the Tumaini Initiative was “dead and has no case.” He accused holdout groups of trying to reinvent the wheel of the already-signed Revitalized Peace Agreement.
Verdict: False. The Tumaini Initiative is not being revived.
Conclusion
In summary, the Vice President’s UNGA speech painted an overly optimistic picture of South Sudan’s progress on peace, stability, food security, and national development. In reality, implementation of the peace deal is faltering, food insecurity is worsening, insecurity persists across multiple states, and the Tumaini Initiative is defunct.
Her remarks appear to downplay the country’s ongoing crises at a time when both citizens and the international community are calling for urgent and genuine action to prevent relapse into full-scale conflict.
