Olony orders troops to ‘spare no lives’ in Jonglei offensive

JUBA – A senior South Sudanese military commander has instructed his forces to “spare no lives,” including the elderly, as they prepare for a major offensive in the volatile Jonglei state, remarks that have sparked immediate alarm among observers in a region with a long history of ethnically driven atrocities.

General Johnson Olony, the deputy army chief for disarmament and mobilization, issued the directive while addressing troops at a site geolocated by Sudans Post to Poktap, the administrative headquarters of Duk County in Jonglei State.

Olony, who also leads the “Agwelek Division”—the official designation for his thousands-strong militia—commands forces that have not yet been fully integrated into the national South Sudan People’s Defense Forces (SSPDF).

These units have been deployed to the frontline in Jonglei to crush an advancing force of the main armed opposition, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). The opposition forces, who commanders say are hoping to “march on Juba,” have made multiple territorial gains against the government in the past week.

“We are tired of the problems in Greater Upper Nile… Every year there is a coup. Every year there is a problem,” Olony told the assembled troops, referring to the cyclical violence between the Chollo, Dinka, and Nuer communities.

“But this time… this will mark the end of [the crisis in] Upper Nile,” he said. “When we arrive there, I don’t want you to spare an elderly person, or a chicken, or even a house… so that they don’t disturb us every year.”

Human rights groups have repeatedly warned that such inflammatory rhetoric by commanders in the Greater Upper Nile region often serves as a precursor to targeted killings, sexual violence, and the widespread looting of civilian property.

Olony, a controversial figure with a history of shifting alliances, was appointed to the senior army post by President Salva Kiir in January 2025.

His Agwelek forces, traditionally drawn from the Shilluk ethnic group, are currently operating alongside the national army, specifically to protect oil infrastructure near the Sudan border following a recent security agreement.

Despite the aggressive orders, Olony publicly acknowledged severe logistical shortages hindering his forces, including a lack of vehicles and basic kit such as boots. He issued an ultimatum to the military command in Juba, warning that his troops would not advance without adequate transport, and demanded at least 30 pickup trucks mounted with heavy guns.

“If the government fails to bring the vehicles, we will remain behind. If the forces who already have vehicles and guns go, we will stay here we will not go,” he said.

Describing the conflict as a cyclical war without clear reasons, the 52-year-old commander told his forces he was determined to force a conclusion to the fighting this year.

“We have even grown old in the SPLM. I was 19 years old when I joined the SPLM. Now I am 52 years old,” Olony said. “It is bullet after bullet, and the reason is unknown. But I will end it for good.”

Who is General Johnson Olony

Johnson Olony Thabo is a veteran South Sudanese commander from Upper Nile State whose military career mirrors the fragmentation of the country’s armed politics. He first rose to prominence as the leader of a group of fighters awaiting integration into the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) after independence. That integration never materialized, and tensions with the army eventually pushed him into rebellion.

Following clashes with government forces, Olony fled to South Kordofan in Sudan, where he aligned himself with the South Sudan Democratic Movement (SSDM) led by the late rebel commander George Athor. After Athor’s death in early 2012, Olony claimed leadership of the movement and soon entered negotiations with Juba.

In June 2013, into the lead up of South Sudan’s 2013-2018 civil war, he accepted a presidential amnesty from President Salva Kiir and was formally inducted into the military with the rank of major general.

Despite the amnesty, Olony’s fighters were never fully absorbed into the national army’s command structure, leaving them effectively autonomous. When civil war broke out in December 2013, Upper Nile became one of the most fiercely contested regions. Olony was wounded during fighting in Malakal in February 2014, when opposition forces from the SPLA-IO entered the city.

In 2015, Olony joined the SPLM-IO after his deputy, Major General Bwogo Olieu, was killed in an ambush outside Malakal by an ethnic militia allied with Kiir’s government. His forces established control over Malakal at various points, and later that year, it was reported that fighters under his command were involved in the forcible recruitment of children, allegations that were never publicly addressed by Olony.

Prior to his defection, tensions between Olony’s forces and the government escalated, prompting state officials to flee Malakal and further entrenching Olony’s power on the ground.

In May 2015, Olony formally declared his forces independent, announcing the creation of the Agwelek Forces. While he signaled willingness to cooperate with other opposition groups, including the SPLA-IO, the Agwelek remained a distinct entity, drawing largely from the Shilluk community. This ethnic base would shape both the group’s alliances and its conflicts.

The relationship between the Agwelek and the SPLA-IO was always uneasy. While tactical cooperation existed, the SPLA-IO’s core support base is largely Nuer, while the Agwelek positioned themselves as defenders of Shilluk interests along the Nile corridor. Splits within the Agwelek followed.

In August 2016, a faction led by Yohanis Okiech broke away, only to be ambushed by Olony’s forces in January 2017, leaving Okiech dead. Okiech was killed by Olony alongside former SPLA-IO commander Gabriel Gatwech Gai, popularly known as “Tang Ginye” who had declared allegiance to the National Democratic Movement (NDM) led by Lam Akol Ajawin.

From 2016 to 2018, Olony’s forces fought government troops across Upper Nile, losing strategic towns including Kodok which had served as the SPLA-IO headquarters in Upper Nile following the fall of Pagak. Following the signing of the revitalized peace agreement in 2018, Machar in 2020 proposed Olony as governor of Upper Nile, a move rejected by Kiir, reinforcing Olony’s ambiguous standing between government and opposition.

Kiir then appointed another person Abudhok Ayang upon SPLM-IO recommendation, but Olony rejected Anyang’s appointment as the governor instead of him and then grew hostile to the SPLA-IO.

The fractures deepened in June 2021, when Olony and General Simon Gatwech Dual broke with Machar in the northern town of Magenis, accusing him of abandoning the armed struggle by returning to Juba under a peace agreement that they say was not fully respected by President Kiir’s government.

The split produced the SPLA-IO Kitgwang faction, with Gatwech as leader and Olony as his deputy. That alliance soon collapsed. In January 2022, Gatwech and Olony signed a separate agreements with the government in Khartoum. The government however gain preferential treatment for his forces and triggering violent clashes within the Kitgwang faction.

Fighting erupted later that year in Magenis between forces loyal to Gatwech and those aligned with Olony. By August 2022, Gatwech had removed Olony from his position within the faction. Since then, Olony has pursued a slow and incomplete reintegration into the SSPDF, retaining command over the Agwelek forces until his recent appointment as deputy army chief for disarmament and mobilization.

His return to Juba in May 2023, his first since 2013, was portrayed by the government as a breakthrough for peace in Upper Nile. Olony arrived with 200 soldiers, pledging loyalty to President Kiir and calling on communities to embrace peace. Government officials declared Upper Nile “peaceful,” even as violence continued to simmer on the ground.

That violence intensified in late 2022 and again in mid-2023, when armed youth from Greater Jonglei crossed into Panyikang and Fashoda counties in Upper Nile. The incursions resulted in widespread displacement and killings, devastating Shilluk communities along the Nile.

Government officials in Juba later claimed that as many as 3,000 people were killed during those attacks, a figure that has not been independently verified but has become central to narratives of grievance within Agwelek ranks.

For Olony and many of his supporters, the killings in Upper Nile are cited as evidence of state failure and as justification for extreme measures. They argue that repeated negotiations have produced no lasting protection for their communities and that decisive force is the only way to break the cycle of violence.

It is against this backdrop that Olony’s recent orders must be understood. Addressing troops preparing for deployment, he framed the conflict as a recurring crisis rooted in Greater Upper Nile, arguing that coups (referring to gov’t narratives that conflicts are caused by Riek Machar, an ethnic Nuer), rebellions and communal fighting had gone unresolved for years. This time, he said, the problem would be ended decisively, even if that meant destroying entire communities.

Critics see the rhetoric as a call for collective punishment and ethnic targeting, warning that it lowers restraints on troops operating in an environment already primed for violence. Olony’s own history complicates the picture. His forces have been implicated in abuses in the past, and their partial integration into the national army blurs lines of accountability.

Olony has also acknowledged practical limits to his authority. In the same address in which he issued the “spare no lives” order, he complained of severe shortages, including a lack of vehicles and basic equipment. He warned that his troops would not advance without adequate transport, demanding dozens of pickup trucks mounted with heavy weapons. The ultimatum highlighted a familiar pattern in South Sudan’s wars: maximalist rhetoric paired with limited logistical capacity.

For the government, Olony remains both an asset and a liability. He commands fighters hardened by years of conflict and retains influence in Upper Nile. At the same time, his shifting alliances and militia’s autonomy undermine efforts to present the SSPDF as a unified national force governed by law.