But their activities, characterised by road ambushes, have raised concern in Jonglei State and across South Sudan about insecurity and the increasing influence of localised militia-style formations.
Their rise adds a new layer to Jonglei’s long history of youth mobilisation, community defence groups, and cycles of intercommunal violence. The government declared the group a “rebel movement” in October, yet the Bor community considers them an answer to a security gap the national and state governments have collectively failed to fill.
So, who are the Red Belt? Why and how have they emerged, and what do their activities mean for peace and security in Jonglei State and South Sudan in general?
Origins of the Red Belt
The Red Belt is a loosely organised, yet increasingly assertive, group of armed youth operating primarily in parts of Jonglei. Local sources suggest the group emerged in early 2025, coinciding with renewed tensions and sporadic violence across Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA).
Its membership appears drawn largely from local youth, including some ex-combatants and former participants in community defence initiatives or the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF).
The group’s leader, Leek Mamer Leek, also known as “90 Bullets,” explained the symbolism behind the name. According to him, the “Red Belt” represents a belt that secures the clothes of the people of Bor, which he says have been “falling” due to repeated attacks by armed groups from neighbouring areas.
“We are here to protect our people, to stop what is killing our mothers and fathers, abducting our children, and raiding our cattle,” Leek said in a video message. “Red Belt is just a belt—you cannot wear your trousers without a belt, and they will fall down. We are the belt for our people of Bor,” he said.
Leek insists the group does not intend to rebel against the government. “What happened in Bor on 27 September was a misunderstanding, not rebellion. There is a difference between being a rebel and having a disagreement with the government. We have no history of rebellion and never will,” he stated.
He also clarified that the group’s uniforms are for easy identification during operations against cattle raiders, and that they do not have military ranks like official forces.
Areas of operation and activities
The Red Belt operates primarily in rural payams of Bor County, including Jalle, Baidit, Makuach, Anyidi, and Kolyang, especially in border zones vulnerable to attacks, cattle raiding, and intercommunal clashes.
With limited government presence in these areas, youth groups like the Red Belt often step in to fill security voids or organise along clan or community lines. Their base is reportedly Bor town, the state capital.
Government and community response
The Red Belt’s emergence has provoked mixed reactions. Some local communities in Bor County view the group as a protective force, while others fear their presence exacerbates insecurity.
On 27 September 2025, the group allegedly ambushed a government convoy carrying ministers, including the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Minister of Culture, Youth and Sports, Minister of Information, and the Bor County Commissioner, returning from a wrestling match with Yirol East County. The incident escalated into clashes that left several people dead, underscoring the fragility of local peace despite broader reconciliation efforts.
At the national level, SSPDF Chief of Defence Forces Gen. Paul Nyang Majok issued an order on 12 October 2025, calling on Red Belt members to join the national army with their weapons.
The directive warned that those refusing to integrate would face forceful disarmament. SSPDF spokesperson Maj. Gen. Lul Ruai Koang later confirmed that the Red Belt would be treated like any other armed group opposing the government.
A week later, joint security forces carried out a disarmament operation in Bor town, recovering illegal weapons from civilians.
A complex picture
Community reactions remain divided. Some condemn the Red Belt, fearing that their activities restrict movement, provoke cycles of violence, and undermine state authority. Others, particularly in remote areas, see the group as a necessary form of self-defence in the absence of reliable security. This dual perception complicates government efforts to manage the situation and highlights persistent mistrust between civilians and security institutions.
Understanding the Red Belt’s origins, motivations, and operations is critical. Without coordinated and sustained peacebuilding, groups like the Red Belt risk becoming entrenched actors in Jonglei’s volatile security landscape—blurring the line between community defence and rebellion.
