The ascension to power of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in Ethiopia in April 2018 and the overthrow of the long-serving Sudanese President Omar Hassan al Bashir in April 2019 were hugely positive developments in the Horn of Africa, a region bedevilled by incessant conflict since the end of the Cold War. In both countries, these developments came about through organized street protests despite the disproportionate level of violence by the state, further testament that the two countries had the vital ingredients necessary on their path to genuine and meaningful reform.

In the last three years, the transition in both countries has stalled. In Ethiopia’s case, the conflict between the federal government and the Tigray Defense Force (TDF) — slightly over a year old — threatens to tear the country apart. Human rights groups have documented egregious human rights violations by the federal government, the TDF, and allied militias.

In Sudan, the military orchestrated a coup against the civilian-led transitional government. Six weeks after his reinstatement following the coup, the Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigned, further jeopardizing the already fraught transition. In a televised address, Hamdok said the country was at a “dangerous turning point that threatens its whole survival”.

The derailed political transition in both countries has invited the inevitable question; what should the United States do? This question assumes punitive measures and, predictably, sanctions of some variety. However, there is limited empirical evidence that sanctions, as a diplomatic and political tool, effectively change states/actors’ behaviour.

Sudan 

Sudan was under United States sanctions for 20 years, across four administrations, until the sanctions were lifted on 29 June 2018 by the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). The country was removed from the State Sponsor of Terrorism (SSOT) list on 14 December 2020.

Sanctions were first imposed on Sudan in 12 August 1993, when the United States designated Sudan a State Sponsor of Terror, accusing the country of hosting high-level al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Abu Nidal Organization, Jamaat al-Islamiyya, and Egyptian Islamic Jihad, each classified as a terrorist organization.

The United States followed this designation with a comprehensive economic sanctions programme in line with Executive Order 13067 of 1997 and Executive Order 13412 (October 13, 2006).

This designation and these Executive Orders, among other things, prohibited US persons from engaging in Sudan-related transactions, blocked the property of the government of Sudan and imposed a licensing requirement for most exports of items controlled under the Commerce Control List (CCL), maintained by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).

Executive Order 13067 stated, “All property and interests in property of the Government of Sudan located in the US or within the control of a US person are blocked. This blocking includes individuals or entities that are owned or controlled by, or act on behalf of, the Government of Sudan anywhere in the world.”

On 26 April 2006, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13400, which increased the provisions of Executive Order 13067 and “blocked the property and interests in property of certain persons connected with the conflict in Darfur”. Four months later, President Bush signed Executive Order 13412, upholding the provisions of 13067, but lifting most sanctions on trade and investment in the regions of southern Sudan, southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile State, Abyei and Darfur provided these activities did not involve the government of Sudan. Transactions related to the petroleum industry – including in southern Sudan – were prohibited.

Somalia 

Somalia came into America’s crosshairs following the 9/11 attacks. Immediately after the attacks, President Bush signed Executive Order 13224 on 23 September 2001 to deal with the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States” by disrupting the “financial support network for terrorists and terrorist organizations”.

In 2008, the US government designated al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity as per Executive Order 13224. On 12 April 2010, President Obama signed Executive Order 13536, declaring a national emergency to deal with the threat posed by the deterioration of the security situation and the persistence of violence in Somalia, and acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia.

On 20 July 2012, the President issued Executive Order 13620 to take additional steps to deal with the national emergency declared in Executive Order 13536. The order addressed exports of charcoal from Somalia, which generate significant revenues for al-Shabaab; the misappropriation of Somali public assets; and specific acts of violence committed against civilians in Somalia.

The Executive Order was in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2036 of 22 February 2012 and Resolution 2002 of 29 July 2011. President Joe Biden extended the measures announced in Executive Order 13536 for a further year on 1 April 2021.

Effects of sanctions 

Sanctions, by their very nature, are blunt instruments. And while, in theory, their target is the state, their agencies, and individuals connected with them, or non-state groups, these entities seldom feel the pinch; on the contrary, it is the citizens who bear the full brunt.

In the case of Sudan, aside from the country’s leadership, the chief targets of the sanctions were government-funded agencies like Sudan’s Railway Corporation, the National Electricity Corporation, the Posts and Telegraphs Public Corporation, and the Sudan Cotton Company. These outfits were placed on the US Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list (SDN).

The order addressed exports of charcoal from Somalia, which generate significant revenues for al-Shabaab.

While institutions like the Railway Corporation could turn to Chinese and South African trains and spare parts, heavily mechanized health institutions requiring high-level, specialized training and knowhow suffered. For instance, the Radiation and Isotopes Centre Khartoum (RICK) – Sudan’s largest public cancer treatment centre – and the National Cancer Institute of the University of Gezira (NCI–UG) suffered under the crippling weight of 20 years of sanctions. Many of the cancer patients in Sudan had to rely on decrepit government facilities where the machines were not functioning well or had no drugs.

While there are exemptions regarding importing essential health equipment, obtaining such a license from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a nightmare owing to its Byzantine rules. Running afoul of the regulations attracts severe punishment. In 2014, the giant French Bank PNB Paribas entered into a record US$8.9 billion settlement with the Department of Justice for sanctions violations.

Such steep fines acted as a deterrent and the cost of compliance was in the end borne by the citizens. Banks, corporations, and other multinational/multilateral organizations avoided Sudan altogether rather than inadvertently risk attracting the wrath of the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) – the primary sanctions enforcer.

The case of the Omdurman Water Supply and Optimization Project is also illustrative. The Euro 24 million project was funded by the Dutch government and the international development banks of the Netherlands, Malaysia, and South Africa to provide water to more than 1.5 million people in North Omdurman. As part of the arrangements for the project, Al Manara Water Company was established to design, build, and run the 200,000-cubic meter-per-day water treatment plant for a period of ten years until the loan is repaid.

Five years after the plant began operations the management noticed that routes to transfer funds, whether to repay the development banks or procure spare parts, had been considerably tightened because of concerns about compliance with U.S. sanctions. Approximately six months after the PNB Paribas settlement, a UAE-based bank sent a closure request to Al Manara Water Company Ltd.

Following seasons of failed rains in Somalia and months of warnings, the UN declared famine in two regions of South Central Somalia on 20 July 2011. The famine led to the deaths of 258,000 people. Since the famine was primarily concentrated in the areas under al-Shabaab’s control, the US’s designation of al-Shabaab as a terrorist organization in 2008 had a chilling effect on many humanitarian groups afraid of being viewed as providing material support to the group.

Sanctions, by their very nature, are blunt instruments.

Fears of inadvertent diversion of resources to the militant group prompted the US to scale back its aid by nearly 88 per cent, from US$237 million in 2008 to only US$20 in 2011. As a result, many international aid organizations scaled back, and in some cases, ceased their humanitarian operations altogether.

Following an outcry from the aid groups, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) produced an expanded version of the standard OFAC license, which guaranteed that no NGO that contracts with USAID and operates in “good faith” would face prosecution if some of their materials ended up in the hands of al-Shabaab.

Past sanctions in the Horn of Africa consistently have failed to yield to expected results. Yet despite their limited effects, the ongoing conflict in Ethiopia has attracted sanctions. On 12 November 2021, OFAC designated four entities and two individuals under Executive Order 14046 for undermining the “stability and integrity” of the Ethiopian state. It is doubtful that this will change the trajectory of the conflict. On the contrary, Eritrea, a key actor in the Ethiopian war, had been under a raft of UN sanctions since 2009 that were only lifted in 2018.

With Sudan’s political transition off the rails and Ethiopia’s conflict looking protracted, there is a growing clamour for sanctions. However, those advocating for sanctions may need to reconsider their cost to the citizens.

Kenya recognises education as a fundamental human right that is vital for the attainment of national development goals. Article 53 (1) (b) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 states that every child has a right to free and compulsory primary education while Article 55 (a) requires the state to take measures, including implementing affirmative action programmes, to ensure that the youth have access to education and training. Under Article 56 (b), minorities and marginalized groups have a right to be provided with special opportunities in education.

To give effect to the Constitution, the Basic Education Act (No 14 of 2013) has been passed into law to regulate primary education and adult basic education in the country. The Children’s Act also acknowledges and protects every child’s right to education. In addition, Kenya has adopted various general and specific policies on education. The second Medium Term Plan of Vision 2030 (2013) and the Policy Framework for Education and Training (2012) are the most recent.

Kenya recognizes that education is key to empowering the most marginalized and vulnerable individuals in society and makes efforts on an affirmative basis to enable these individuals to exploit their capabilities alongside their Kenyan peers through primary, secondary, and tertiary education.

Outside the provisions of the constitution, the government has also recently made efforts to address the issue of access to education and concerns about the quality of education. The measures undertaken include the establishment of tuition waivers for secondary schools, curriculum reviews to optimize student learning, and public‐private partnerships that aim to increase individual and community participation in the education sector.

World Bank statistics show Kenya’s successes in improving education through free primary education and other programs, with the most recent data from 2018 showing a literacy rate of almost 82 per cent. This has risen significantly from 72.16 per cent in 2007 to 78.73 per cent in 2014. Yet, despite these efforts, the country is still beleaguered by challenges and is far from narrowing the equity gap in the education sector. This is partly due to the application of solutions that fail to adequately address the social, cultural, historical, and political realities of the communities in the different parts of the country.

For the longest time, northern Kenya has been associated with marginalization, most prominently in the education sector. Although the region occupies a crucial geographical position as a borderland, progress is hampered by regional insecurity and government neglect. Most recently, threats from Al-Shabaab have had an indelible effect on the region’s education sector, leaving it to fare among the worst in the country in terms of literacy levels, school enrolment, performance in national examinations, high school graduation rates, transition to university, and student-to-teacher ratios. According to a 2015 report by Uwezo – a citizen-led assessment of learning outcomes in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda,  8 per cent of adults in Kenya did not attend school. The regional contrast is stark: in northeastern Kenya 82 per cent of adults did not attend school while in central Kenya 0.1 per cent of adults (1 in 1,000) did not attend.

Historical overview 

With its mission of exploiting the country’s natural, human, and economic resources, the British colonial government recognized the agricultural potential of the Kenya highlands — which it referred to as the White Highlands — and encouraged the establishment of settlers in places like Kiambu and Nyeri.

The settlement of colonialists in the highlands propelled the region’s development. Infrastructural development, such as the building of the Kenya-Uganda railway, soon followed, easing the movement of people and goods to and from the region, followed by such social amenities as schools and hospitals, which remained concentrated in the highlands. The departure of the colonial administration left behind a system that perpetuated inequity and allowed central Kenya to stay ahead of other parts of the country.

As for northern Kenya, its geographical location—far away from the railway line— contributed to its isolation during Kenya’s peak years of development. The British government only set up a few essential facilities in the region, such as police stations, military bases, and administrative offices. The building of schools became the responsibility of the local communities. With few resources, the districts could not afford to build many schools, and the few that were built were below standard.

The departure of the colonial administration left behind a system that perpetuated inequity.

Formal education was introduced to the people of Kenya by European Christian missionaries who used it as an evangelical tool to spread Christianity. The missionaries dominated the provision and administration of education throughout the colonial period. This strategic decision greatly benefited other parts of Kenya and further isolated the northern parts of Kenya where the climatic conditions were harsh and which were predominantly Islamic territory. Most of the communities never accepted Christianity and received a limited benefit from the “education mission” undertaken by the missionaries. Kenya’s most prestigious high schools central and Rift Valley regions—like Mangu High School, Alliance High School and many others—started out as missionary schools.

Successive post-independence governments perpetuated the marginalization of the people of northeastern Kenya. For instance, President Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, imposed a state of emergency on the region in December 1963, which persisted for 28 years until it was lifted by his successor, President Moi, in 1991. In part, the state of emergency was a response to attempts by ethnic Somalis in the colonial Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya to secede from Kenya and join their fellow Somalis in the larger Somalia Republic.

The Kenyan government dubbed the 1963-67 conflict the “Shifta War.” During the conflict, the Kenyan forces treated the ethnic peoples in the region with brutality, leaving a lingering sense of suspicion, anger, and tension, to the extent that some communities still consider themselves not part of Kenya. This exacerbated the sense of mistrust, with other Kenyan communities fearing being posted to the region for administrative duties, teaching, or to provide government services.

Schools remained understaffed because of the low numbers of teachers, while most locals could not take up teaching due to the high entrance grades required to join the Teacher Training Colleges (TTCs).  Many high school graduates from the region have been scoring below average due to the poor learning conditions and the limited resources availed to the region by the central government.

After civil war broke out in Somalia in the early 1990s, the region’s security situation worsened as the conflict spilled over into Kenya.  The civil war in Somalia started as a clan-based conflict but Islamic fundamentalist groups such as al-Shabaab, Daesh and Takfiriyun—which are against Western education—soon emerged. The interim Federal Somalia Government has been unable to contain these groups, which started launching attacks in northern Kenya, taking a region that had been slowly catching up back to the dark ages.

Al-Shabaab terror attacks 

Northern Kenya has borne the brunt of al-Shabaab attacks. The group’s leaders have sought to establish a base in a region—one of the country’s poorest—where the ethnic Somali population has for years complained of mistreatment by the state. The insecurity hit the education sector hard since 2018 when al-Shabaab began attacking schools and killing teachers, many of whom started fleeing the region that year.

Most teachers hail from elsewhere in Kenya. Al-Shabaab, which seeks to create sectarian strife, has killed many public servants besides teachers, including engineers and security personnel. In 2015, it launched a string of attacks on non-local casual labourers at construction sites, forcing many of them to flee. The armed group also staged an attack that targeted the only university in the entire region, Garissa University College, killing 148 students. This led to the destabilization of the institution and created fear among students from other parts of the country. Laxity on the part of Kenyan security agencies has been witnessed; many police officers and soldiers detest being deployed in the northeast, where they face a greater danger of attack than in other parts of the country.

The British government only set up a few essential facilities in the region, such as police stations, military bases, and administrative offices.

The government posted a new regional commissioner who helped reduce the terror attacks. Mohamud Saleh led the region’s security forces between 2015 and 2018.  His approach centred on community intelligence gathering. He gave locals the confidence they needed to go to the police with information about what al-Shabaab was saying and doing. Saleh was transferred back to Nairobi in 2018. The terror attacks have been on the up, especially in Mandera. Due to scant trust between citizens and the security forces, officials deployed from Nairobi to the region since then have struggled to gather intelligence on al-Shabaab.

The death of education in northern Kenya

While an understandable step, the government’s decision in early 2020 to withdraw all non-local teachers played into al-Shabaab’s hands. First, it created widespread anger in northern Kenya since residents took it as a signal that Nairobi does not consider them fully Kenyan. While the al-Shabaab accuses locals of being too Kenyan, the government on the other hand views them as belonging to Somalia. Secondly, evacuating teaching staff from the northeast risks consigning the region’s youth to poverty, or worse, leading to an entire generation missing out on education, with dire consequences such as delinquent and criminal behaviour likely to follow.

The Teachers Service Commission (TSC), the national body responsible for teachers’ employment, has insisted that teachers not be posted to the northeastern region until their safety is assured. Local leaders and members of parliament have argued that the government’s mass transfer of teachers is an indication of the continued marginalization of the region’s people. The education sector in northern Kenya has been brought to its knees by al-Shabaab.

Turning the situation around 

To bring changes to the education sector in northern Kenya, we must first address the security situation. Corruption in Kenya’s security sector and failed or politicized intelligence-gathering lie at the root of the problem. Studies show that corruption fuels terrorism by undermining counter-terrorism measures and destroying police-community trust. Military force alone will not help to counter al-Shabaab’s activities in Mandera. The government should consider using committed intelligence officials who can blend into the local population and emerge with more accurate and timely intelligence to stop the group’s plans. The build-up of mistrust between the locals and Kenyan authorities has played into the hands of al-Shabaab.

Capacity building for civil society groups, community structures, local leaders, and the media could also help prevent violent extremism in northern Kenya. Human and material resources and training for all those involved in fighting al-Shabaab – such as elders and community leaders – are needed. Without the effective implementation of the local and community-level components of Kenya’s National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism, and in the absence of an extensive intelligence network, the country will struggle to combat terrorism.

The insecurity hit the education sector hard since 2018 when al-Shabaab began attacking schools and killing teachers.

Training local teachers to free the region from its dependence on a non-resident teaching workforce is an important step that needs to be prioritized for security-related disruptions to be avoided. The continued suspension of learning activities has long-term ramifications. Studies show that children who have never been to school can easily be manipulated and recruited into the ranks of violent extremist groups.

The government should also upgrade the current school infrastructure. Schools in the north have few learning materials and cannot be at par with schools elsewhere in the country. The current budgetary allocation by the Ministry of Education is low, and the shortfall is bridged by funding from developmental partners such as USAID and the World Bank.

The challenges of improving education and other aspects of life in northern Kenya are enormous as the neglect has been ongoing since Kenya’s founding. No one entity may be able to overturn the cumulative disadvantages of historical injustices, but collaboration among agencies is necessary. The Kenyan government must spearhead a coalition of stakeholders and willing partners to implement an action-based policy framework for change. Given the extent of the lag, future funding needs to account for missed opportunities in a fair manner and as such, elected representatives from the area should form a special caucus to lobby the government to increase the national government allocation. Finally, deliberate policies need to be enacted to move the region from the margins to the centre.

The development of the Indo-Pacific Concept has drawn global attention to South East Asia and the South China Sea. The concept is largely attributed to the leaders of Japan, the US, Australia and India who are also grouped together under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (The Quad). The idea straddles the region covered by the countries of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and includes some APEC countries.

The Indo-Pacific is geographically an extension of the Asia-Pacific concept. But rather than restricting itself to a vision of Asia that has Myanmar as its outer limit, it is an expanded vision that englobes both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, bringing the concept to the shores of Eastern Africa and to the island countries of the Indian Ocean.

Japan, Australia, India and the US have all unveiled their Indo-Pacific policies and strategies while the ASEAN countries announced their outlook for the Indo-Pacific in 2019, as did France. Germany announced its new policy for the Indo-Pacific in 2020 and the EU is working on an Indo-Pacific policy under its presidency. For its part, China has opposed the Indo-Pacific concept and prefers the Asia-Pacific idea. China sees the Indo-Pacific concept as an effort to counter its hegemony whereas most proponents of the Indo-Pacific concept seek a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) that includes freedom of navigation, trade, etc., in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

In effect, China’s attempts to counter the maritime claims of several ASEAN countries using the nine-dash line have provoked reaction. The nine-dash line has no legal basis as decided by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the case won by the Philippines in 2016. China’s intent to secure its interests at the cost of the claims of the ASEAN countries—and Japan—over the Senkaku Islands, has compelled them to develop more robust policies to confront China. Different countries approach this issue in different ways, while keeping in view their ability and interest to challenge China’s growing assertiveness.

Once the Indo-Pacific includes the Indian Ocean, particularly the Western Indian Ocean, then the impact on South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania, Kenya and Somalia—the five African countries that have a seaboard on the Indian Ocean—becomes evident.  The impact will also be felt by the countries at the mouth of the Red Sea: Eritrea, Sudan and Egypt and Djibouti. The Islands of Madagascar, Mauritius, the Comoros, Seychelles and the French Indian Ocean territories are important parts of this construct.

Formed in 1982, the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) is perhaps the oldest body dealing with countries within the region. Institutionalised since 1984 and headquartered in Mauritius, it links the Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles and Réunion (an overseas department and region of France). Observers on the IOC include China, India, the European Union, and the Organisation international de la francophonie (OIF). France has tremendous influence over the IOF. France also controls the island of Mayotte which did not obtain independence along with the Comoros.

Another regional arrangement is through the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) which was established in 1997 and which now has 22 members and 10 Dialogue Partners. The five African countries on the Indian Ocean littoral and the four island countries make up 40 per cent of the IORA membership that extends up to Australia. It has four ASEAN countries, (Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia), four SAARC members, (India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Bangladesh) and four from West Asia, (Yemen, UAE, Oman and Iran). Among the ten Dialogue Partners are China, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States of America. Most of these countries are important players in the Indo-Pacific construct today. Two Quad members—India and Australia—are members of IORA, while Japan and the US are Dialogue Partners.

Since 2012, when India assumed the IORA chair, there has been a growing determination to strengthen institutions and capacities within IORA. India revitalized IORA during its chairmanship and six Priority and two Focus Areas were identified to promote sustained growth and balanced development in the Indian Ocean Region. These included maritime security, trade facilitation, management of disaster risk, fisheries, the blue economy, women’s empowerment and academic and tourism exchanges. This was largely a functional agenda but the activities gave the members access to various powers that are active in the Indo-Pacific and in the Gulf of Aden. In 2017, South Africa took the helm for two years and the chair is now with the United Arab Emirates. It has been a long time since Africa lead IORA; the first term was with Mauritius in 1997-98 and then with Mozambique in 1999-2000. So far, neither Kenya nor Tanzania have chaired the IORA.

When piracy hit the West Indian Ocean region, the navies of several IORA member countries helped control the scourge but IORA played no role in the security arrangements. However, since January 2009, the Djibouti Code of Conduct (DCoC) has provided opportunities for 21 member countries to coordinate capacities to deal with piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean. A DCoC meeting in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in January 2017 revised the code, now known as the DCoC+ or the Jeddah Amendment. It builds on the 2009 version and encourages members to cooperate fully to repress transnational organised crime in the maritime domain, maritime terrorism, and IUU (illegal, unreported and unregulated) fishing. India joined the DCoC+ as an observer in 2020 as did the EU and the Eastern Africa Standby Force. The DCoC provides IORA with stronger security elements while the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) has been reached through the DCoC+.

When piracy hit the West Indian Ocean region, the navies of several IORA member countries helped control the scourge.

In developing their Indo-Pacific outlooks, Japan and France have sought to engage Africa directly.  French policy was broadly enunciated by President Macron in May 2018 in Sydney and seeks an inclusive Indo-Pacific in which France has a growing interest. The policy speaks of promoting democratic values, protecting shipping, dealing with regional crises, and notes the presence of French forces in Djibouti, the South Indian Ocean and the UAE—with none in Asia. Economic opportunities, including the blue economy, development cooperation, Science & Technology (S&T) networks, are all part of France’s new approach to Asia and its oceans.

Dealing with terrorism and radicalization are also important goals. What is missing are direct references to Africa even though the geographic base for France in the Indian Ocean is through its Island territories of Reunion and Mayotte as well as its base in Djibouti.  For France, the Indo-Pacific space is a geographic reality. France is present in the region via its overseas territories and 93 per cent of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is located in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The region is home to 1.5 million French people, as well as the 8,000 French soldiers that are stationed there.

Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) policy also covers the Indian Ocean up to its African shores. At TICAD7, the Yokohama Declaration saw Japan seek African support to protect the common good of the Indo-Pacific. While the West and North African countries had a lesser interest in the Indo-Pacific, the pro-Chinese countries ensured that they only took note of the FOIP in the Declaration, which emphasized maritime security:

“We stress the importance of promoting regional and international efforts related to maritime security, including piracy, illegal fishing and other maritime crimes, maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with the principles of international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 12 (UNCLOS). We also underscore the importance of strengthening maritime security and safety through international and regional cooperation, as reflected in 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy), in accordance with international maritime laws.”

Like France, the US and China, Japan too has a base in Djibouti, the focal point for much action around Indo-Pacific policies. While France and the USA have had longer-standing bases in Djibouti, the country has received greater attention due to piracy around the Gulf of Aden. Consequently, both Japan and China have established bases in Djibouti while India has access to all the bases in the country other than that of the Chinese. India also has agreements with the US and France to use their island assets and has engagements for security with Mauritius and Seychelles, and capacity building with Comoros, Madagascar and Mozambique. Kenya and Tanzania have used Indian military training teams to establish their military academies while Indian peacekeepers have operated in Somalia under the UN since the 1990s. India has also trained AMISOM contingents from Ethiopia and Uganda and has contributed to the AU’s fund for AMISOM.

Japan has been actively seeking to increase its investments in the Indian Ocean littoral and views the large projects in the Kenyan port of Mombasa and the port of Nacala in Mozambique as important and of strategic value. China is involved in the railways in Djibouti and Kenya, and the port in Djibouti but seems to have run into problems with Tanzania regarding the Bagamayo Port. A CSIS study showed that China was investing in 46 ports in Africa, four of which are on the Indian Ocean littoral—Durban, South Africa, Beira in Mozambique, Doraleh in Djibouti and Bagamayo in Tanzania. These are mostly categorized as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and some of them are strategic in nature while others are infrastructure and trade facilitators.

Japan has been actively seeking to increase its investments in the Indian Ocean littoral.

Thus, while China has a clear BRI concept of economic engagement with strategic overtones and is grasping the opportunities, the other countries which challenge its view are generating their Indo-Pacific outlooks and engaging them within their existing Africa programmes: Japan with TICAD, India with the India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), France with its Africa policy, and the EU with its EU-African Union summit process. The US also developed a new Africa Strategy under the Trump administration. What all these programmes lack is cogent coordinated economic action. The Asia Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is a joint India-Japan strategy that seeks to coordinate trilateral projects in conjunction with African partners.

Moreover, the need to address non-traditional security threats and to deal with Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)—as India has effectively done over the years in the region—is coming to the fore. Africa could benefit from divergent interests and capabilities but needs to be cautious in ensuring a level playing field for all its partners.