Politics
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Somaliland’s Elections in Limbo
12 min read.Disagreement over plans to reshuffle Somaliland’s licensed political parties and the sequencing of elections has put the electoral calendar into question. Once again, squabbling and tactical manoeuvring by the country’s political elites threaten to undermine Somaliland’s hard-earned reputation as a beacon of democratic hope in the bleak political context of the Horn of Africa. Without serious attempts at consensus-building, these developments could place Somaliland on a trajectory leading to severe political crisis.
The Commitment to Timely Elections unravels
Its remarkable successes notwithstanding, Somaliland’s democratisation process has been marred by recurrent delay and resultant disputes since its inception more than 20 years ago. Until just a few weeks ago, it looked as though for the first time, Somaliland would be holding its presidential election – due in November 2022 – on time. Following on from the successful and widely praised local council and parliamentary elections of May 2021, the government of President Muse Bihi had consistently confirmed its readiness to hold the polls on schedule. Allocations for the election expenses were made in the 2022 national budget, and the National Electoral Commission (NEC) was tasked with setting up a timeline. The government reiterated its commitment to the international donor community in Nairobi and in return secured financial support for the election.
However, prospects of a timely election were thrown into disarray in late December 2021, when the Somaliland Government started to change course by calling for the “opening of political parties”.
Background: Three Party Limit and derailed Party Licensing Cycle
Article 9 of the Somaliland Constitution limits the number of political parties to three. Arguably, this limits the freedom of association and the political space within the country. But based on historical experience of the first post-independence elections, this limitation is intended to prevent a proliferation of political parties along (sub)clan lines and to ensure that each of the three pursues a wide national base.
According to the original political parties law which governed the local council elections of 2002, three political parties were to be licensed out of so-called “political associations” contesting local council elections every five years. In 2011, a review of Law 14 – which governs the formation and selection of political parties – granted the three political parties a license of ten rather than five years. The logic behind the change was to provide more continuity and to give the three political parties the opportunity to compete in two presidential elections during the decade for which they would be licensed. However, the law did not factor in the recurrent delays in Somaliland’s electoral timetable: To date, the parties (Kulimye, Waddani and UCID), licensed in December 2012, only contested one presidential election in late 2017 (delayed from 2015). The next presidential election is due in November 2022, and the next local council elections are not due until 2026, but the licenses of the current parties expire on 26 December 2022.
A Party Election?
In 2021, the current administration proposed fresh amendments to Law 14 of 2011. These were designed to enable a direct election — not to elect candidates into offices, but only to determine the three political parties to be registered for a ten year period following expiry of the current licenses. The changes also included a clause that was detrimental to the opposition: Existing political parties would become “transitional” and would therefore be barred from competing in any presidential, parliamentary or local council election once the process of registering new political associations and parties was initiated. In effect, the revised version of the law would have “neutralised” the three existing political parties in May 2022.
Parliament passed the proposed amendments in 2021, but the government later changed course. It vetoed the amended law in a letter dated 20 July 2021, but only received by the (newly elected) Parliament on 21 August 2021. The President’s main objection was that the election period for the political parties would have been in conflict with the timeline of the constitutionally mandated presidential election. He requested Parliament to address this conflict between the Constitution and Law 14/2021.
However, sections of the government and some members of Parliament (MPs) continued to push for the implementation of the amended law, arguing that the President failed to reject the bill within the required 21 day period and that it had therefore become law. The call for the application of this controversial version of Law 14 infuriated the opposition parties, who saw their chance to contest in the presidential election thrown in doubt.
Wrangling over the legality of the 2021 amendments of Law 14 continued in the courts. The Supreme Court, in its ruling of 16 January 2022, affirmed the legality of the original Law 14 of 2011. However, the court endorsed one clause from the amended Law 14 of 2021 to enable the direct election of new political parties. Tensions were somewhat eased by the ruling. The leaders of the opposition felt that the court ruling favoured them because it did not accept the key proposed government amendment to Law 14/2011 that would have relegated the political parties to a “transitional” status at the onset of a fresh registration process. Although the court did not explicitly rule on the legality of the supposedly adopted new Law 14 of 2021, the confirmation of Law 14 of 2011 in principle gives the political parties – especially the opposition – a “new lease of life” to compete in the forthcoming presidential election.
Presidential or Political Parties Election first?
Law 14 of 2011 stipulates that the registration process for new political parties begins six months before the polling date[i]. The latter would be on 26 November 2022, one month before the expiration of the parties’ licenses on 26 December 2022[ii]. This would place the two elections in short sequence, starting with the presidential election on 13 November, theoretically followed by the political parties elections 13 days later, on 26 November 2022[iii].
However, statements by the Ministry of Information leave no doubt that the intention remains to select new political parties ahead of (not after) the presidential election, and to let the three newly elected national parties compete in it. The announcement of a new “Political Associations Registration Committee” by President Bihi at the end of January underlines that the government continues to pursue a swift “opening” of the political parties. The technical timelines of this process would inevitably lead to the postponement of the presidential poll.
In effect, this implies that the issue is not only a matter of sequence. Local commentators, legal and electoral experts strongly believe that only one electoral process is technically possible by November 2022.[iv] Prioritizing one election therefore automatically means pushing the second election beyond its constitutional (in the case of the presidential election) or legal (in the case of the parties election) timeline, leading to political crisis.
Meanwhile, the continuing confusion effectively prevents the electoral commission from mobilising the required funds, updating the voter register and preparing a technical process on time. Therefore the lack of clarity and the disagreement on the way forward jeopardizes the chances of realizing one or even both processes by November 2022.
Underlying Realpolitik
For all sides, but especially for the ruling party Kulmiye and the larger opposition party Waddani, the issue at stake concerns vital political and clan interests. The government’s sudden move to initiate the registration of new political associations has been attributed to recent changes in Somaliland’s domestic political dynamics.[v] Among these is Kulmiye’s unexpectedly poor performance in the combined elections of May 2021[vi], which local observers saw as an indication of voters’ rejection of government policies and performance as well as deepening rifts within the clan coalition carrying the current government[vii]. The situation was exacerbated when Kulmiye narrowly lost the highly contested election of the new Speaker of Parliament, effectively handing control over this key institution to the opposition. Both events are perceived to have led to a less favourable political atmosphere for the ruling party and its chances in the presidential election[viii] – a prospect that has obviously excited the opposition[ix].
Against the background of their disappointment during the 2017 presidential election and in light of their performance in 2021, there is a strong belief among Waddani supporters that their candidate would be able to defeat the incumbent President Bihi in 2022. Therefore, the interpretation among Waddani supporters is that the push for the opening of political parties is a scheme to deny the Waddani candidate any chance of contesting and winning the Presidency[x]. Whether these assumptions are true or not, it is safe to assume that a delay in the election would produce particularly strong opposition to a government term extension from Waddani quarters, raising the spectre of violent confrontation, particularly if the government resorts to physical intimidation to counter protests instead of exercising political tolerance and self-restraint.
The circumstances are particularly sensitive on account of the underlying clan constellation and the assumed formula of “power sharing through rotation” – a concept that does not align easily with electoral democracy. At the centre are the three major Issaq sub-clans: Habar Awal, Habar Je’lo, and Habar Younis, whose capacity to work together and accommodate each other has been essential to securing Somaliland’s long-term stability. The election of Ahmed Silanyo as President in 2010 was seen as a political accommodation of the Haber Je’lo, who believed that their “turn” to hold the highest office of the land had arrived. Similarly, there is an expectation of a Habar Younis to be elected in 2022 (as there was in 2017). Waddani party is the primary political vehicle of the Habar Younis. A second failure of the party/clan to win the Presidency – especially if based on a procedural manoeuvre and a suspected manipulation of the process – would put Somaliland’s democracy under severe stress.
Scenarios
Several scenarios are on the horizon. In the first, the government continues to pursue the process of opening political parties immediately, with the intention to hold the contest over the licensing of political parties before the presidential election. The resources to cover the process are available and it is expected to kick off officially in May 2022. While President Bihi has already appointed the Political Party Registration Committee (RAC) to oversee the vetting of political associations, they are yet to be confirmed by parliament.
In this scenario, the government would hold the political parties’ election before November 2022, capitalising on strong public support for opening the political parties. This would likely split and weaken the opposition parties who would not be able to challenge the popular demand. Following the election, government would likely seek to reach an agreement with the emerging parties on a new election date and an extension of its term based on a technical timeline developed by the NEC. This scenario entails two distinct risks: Either the Guurti, the Upper House of Parliament, endorses a “technical” extension pitting the ruling party Kulmiye against either weakened or entirely new, unfunded and largely unprepared contestants; or, the Guurti – as in the past – affords the President a generous extension by e.g. two more years in office and once again jeopardizes the electoral cycle.
The second scenario is that the process falters and the government does not succeed in its bid to hold the political parties contest before November 2022 due to strong challenges from the opposition and other interested stakeholders. The opposition would likely accuse government of circumventing the election bodies, i.e. the RAC and the National Electoral Commission (NEC), and manipulating their mechanisms to achieve a certain outcome of the process. The opposition and some political aspirants are already referring to the new members of RAC as “partisan”, since four of the seven proposed commissioners are members Kulmiye party. Protracted political deadlock would drag the process out and would “necessitate” an extension of the government’s term by the Guurti. Under these circumstances, the Guurti would adopt such an extension without a prior consensus between the stakeholders. If unmitigated, this would return Somaliland to political crisis comparable to the ones that engulfed the country from 2008 to 2010 and between 2015 and 2017, the two two-year spells that followed the respective term expiries of President Rayale and President Silanyo. Except that in this case, the licenses of the current political parties would expire on 26 December 2022. Without remedy, this would throw the country into a severe and unprecedented constitutional crisis. In the absence of these legally recognized bodies, it would no longer be clear who the legitimate stakeholders for consensus building to resolve this crisis would be. This could further encourage the opposition leaders to threaten establishment of a parallel government in defiance, as other opposition parties have done before.
In the third possible scenario, the party election process falters. However, the government and parties reach a consensus to extend both the term of government and the licenses of the political parties, e.g. for a period of two years. The government term extension would have to be adopted by the Guurti, the parties extension would require an amendment of Law 14 by the parliament. In this scenario, extension of the parties’ licenses would lead the opposition to accept the extension of the government’s term more easily[xi]. In fact, some argue that this could even be a preferred outcome of the crisis for some opposition leaders, as it would be more likely to make Muse Bihi a one-term president and would buy the opposition time and opportunity to build momentum. Early indications are that forging such a “deal” would not be an easy undertaking. The opposition parties’ right to stand in the (delayed) presidential election would certainly be a key point of contention. Needless to say, political actors outside the current trio of existing parties who are preparing to register new associations would passionately oppose such a scenario, since it would deny them the chance to enter the political playing field.
The fourth scenario would be a return to the presidential election timeline as mandated by the constitution. This would require swift consensus between the political parties and the government to postpone the “opening” up of political associations and to extend the licenses of the current parties through yet another amendment of Law 14. Presidential elections would take place – only between the existing political parties – on 13 November 2022. Like the third scenario, such a move would dash the hopes of aspiring political associations and a large section of the public which was generated by the government’s earlier signals towards the opening the party registration process.
Technically, there would also be the (remote) possibility of holding the two processes together, i.e. electing a new President and the future political parties on the same day. However, this option is widely thought to risk serious confusion. Aspiring new political associations would complain of being cut out of the presidential competition, and having nothing to fundraise or build momentum around until the next scheduled elections in 2026. Theoretically, the election could also lead to a “President without party”.
There does not seem to be final clarity on whether the presidential contest will be between the old or new political parties, despite signals towards the opening of political associations. This question will guide whether Somaliland heads into scenario 1 (new parties) or scenarios 3, 4 or 5 (old parties). The prevailing public sentiment and the visible political indications suggest that the country is in scenario 1. However, delays caused by the foreseeable confrontations over the RAC and its process have a strong potential to push it towards scenario 2. Scenarios 3 and 4 would depend on consensus building between the existing political parties and are unlikely to materialise in the absence of significant changes in Somaliland’s political dynamics and landscape. Scenario 5 is a remote possibility.
Reform the Party System?
Since the adoption of the constitution in 2002, calls for reforms to deal with the restriction of political parties have been constant. Today some MPs believe the on-going debate could be an opportunity for broad discussions on the restriction of political parties, and to come up with an enduring solution that prevents the problem from resurfacing every 10 years[xii]. Indeed, there is need to re-think the political party system beyond the immediate challenge. Political observers tend to view the restriction of political parties as undemocratic and in contradiction to the constitutional right to freedom of association[xiii]. What was once conceived as a temporary measure to secure the gradual development of Somaliland’s democracy has in reality allowed three entities to form an oligopoly that controls the political space.
Moreover, it is increasingly clear that the three-party-limit has failed to achieve its stated intention, namely to promote political parties with a broad national base. Instead, all three have strong and identifiable clan allegiances. Political actors tied together in identity-based segments rather than policy-based units are hardly fit to pursue national interests. More so as the political parties as well as the Registration Committee have been overly focussed on the rights and registration of the parties as entities, whilst showing little to no regard to the democratic duties that come with these, especially in a context where only three parties are allowed to compete. As a result, the parties have de facto been owned by a handful of leaders with very little concern for democratic practices within their own structures.
Neither the 2002 nor the 2012 elections of political parties (through local council elections) produced democratic and inclusive political parties with a broad national base as intended by the constitution. Rather than evaluating and rectifying these challenges, Somaliland is now in the midst of repeating the same exercise, expecting a different outcome. In fact, if anything, detaching the political parties election from an actual contest for offices (as in the local elections) is likely to reinforce the problem.
Therefore, regardless of how the current standoff plays out, it will be important for Somaliland to “re-invent” itself in this area. Political parties have been vital to the consensus-based state-building process in Somaliland. They must continue to play this role without holding the country’s political space “hostage” in the long term.
Conclusion
The best hope of overcoming the current electoral preparation challenge and the seemingly perpetual cycle of electoral delays and crisis would be through a return to consensus politics, the remedy to which Somaliland has traditionally turned in moments of fierce political contestation. Somaliland’s political leaders should cooperate to reach a political compromise at the negotiation table. However slim, the opportunity to set a consensual electoral timeline and stage peaceful elections still exists, and should be pursued at all costs.
Somaliland rightly earned praise from both domestic and international observers for holding peaceful and transparent parliamentary and local council elections on 31 May 2021[xiv]. At the time, the international community[xv] and the people of Somaliland commended the President and his administration for organizing the long overdue polls and financing 70%[xvi] of the election operation.
If Somaliland’s political elites were to capitalize on these successes by forging a political consensus on the key challenges to holding the two processes, they would spare the country the grim prospect of acute political tension and possibly even violent confrontation. They would also capitalize on the unique opportunities of the recent spike in international interest in Somaliland and reinforce its distinct political trajectory from Somalia at a time when the latter is still struggling to stage even indirect elections a year after President Farmajo’s electoral term expired. And, last not least, President Bihi would continue to demonstrate the kind of leadership he provided after the opposition’s strong performance in the 2021 elections, allowing Somaliland’s democratic process to continue to thrive. Without doubt, the world is craving for such “rare good news in the troubled Horn of Africa”.[xvii]
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This article was published in collaboration with Hbs Horn of Africa.
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[ii] According to an MP with legal background, in a press conference held in Hargeisa in January 2022.
[iii] The registration process would begin on 26 May 2022.,
[iv] Phone interview with a member of NEC, Hargeisa, 18 January 2022. According to Local commentators and legal expert on local satellite TVs analysing the court ruling on Jan 16, 2022
[v] Suleiman Ibrahim Hashi, local political analyst, MMTV Somali on 12 January 2022. See: https://youtu.be/-Esa4v_VImc
[vi] International Crisis Group (ICG), 2021: Building on Somaliland’s Successful Elections. Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°174. Nairobi/Brussels, 12 August 2021. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somaliland/b174-building…
[vii] Informal discussion with media people, Hargeisa, 13 December 2021.
[viii] Informal discussion with media people, Hargeisa, 13 December 2021.
[ix] Informal discussion with media people, Hargeisa, 13 December 2021.
[x] Informal discussion a Waddani youth supporter. Hargeisa, 11 January 2022.
[xi] Phone conservation with former MP. Hargeisa, 16 December 2021.
[xii] See e.g. https://qarannews.com/daawoshir-jaraaid-xasaasiya-oo-uu-qabtay-xildhiba…
[xiii] Michael Walls (et. al.) 2021: Limited International Election Observation Mission Somaliland House of Representatives and local council elections, 31 May 2021, DPU Consultancy Report. October 2021. See: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/development/sites/bartlett_development/f…
[xiv] ICG 2021.
[xv] https://hornobserver.com/articles/1039/EU-commends-Somalilands-recently…
[xvi] Academy for Peace and Development and Institute of Public Policy (APD-IPP) (2021): A Vote for Change: Somaliland’s Two Decades Old Electoral Democracy, May 2021. https://apd-ipp.com/2021/05/24/a-vote-for-change-somalilands-two-decades-old-electoral-democracy/
[xvii] ICG 2021.
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Politics
The Wagalla Massacre: What Really Happened
It has been exactly 38 years since the Wagalla massacre. The victims have refused to stay quiet and until the government takes concrete steps to provide redress, it will be hard for the victims and their families to move on.
On 11 January 1985, the Principal State Counsel, Moijo Ole Keiwua, wrote on behalf of the Attorney General to Ibrahim Khamis Adan and Alinoor Yussuf Mohamed Hussein through their lawyers, Munikah and Company Advocates, asking them, by the rules of civil procedures, to supply specific information about the deaths of their fathers. The information requested included the dates and times when the deceased persons were killed; whether they were killed by the Kenya Army personnel, the Kenya Police or 1982 Air Force personnel; and the names of the specific officers responsible for the deaths of the deceased.
Khamis Adan Mumin, Ibrahim’s father, worked for Wajir County Council until his death. Yussuf Mohamed Hussein was a civil servant in the Ministry of Health. The two were among 55 or so employees of various government agencies who disappeared from work in early February 1984, never to be seen again. Their employers reported them as having deserted their duties, and their families could not access their terminal benefits.
The question of who killed these two men and others was raised in parliament by the former Member of Parliament for Wajir West, the late Ahmed Khalif Mohamed, on 21 March 1984. During a debate on then President Moi’s speech at the opening of that parliamentary session, Khalif accused the security forces of killing hundreds in Wajir District. The government forces, he said, had placed more than 4,000 people in a concentration camp, over 300 had been immediately executed, and over 600 were confirmed missing.
Khalif directly accused the Provincial Commissioner for Northeastern Province, Benson Kaaria, and the Somalia government of collusion in the murders. Kaaria had claimed, as reported by the Standard on 9 November 1980, that he would eliminate all Somali-speaking people in the country unless they exposed the Shifta who had killed a District Officer. Khalif’s accusations were met with utmost hostility by the entire parliament. Mwai Kibaki, Kenneth Matiba, A.Y. Boru and Samuel Ng’eny demanded substantiation. Charles Muthura accused Khalif of irrelevance in his contribution to the presidential speech, while Parmenas Munyasia jestingly demanded to know the names of those who had threatened to wipe out the Somalis. Khalif was cornered into dropping the Somalia claim but stood his ground on the mass killings of Somalis in Wajir. In a bid to substantiate his claim, the late MP tabled the list of victims of the massacre and their photographs in parliament on 28 March 1984. Many were civil servants, including Noor Haji, the former Senator from Wajir, who had been killed in the military operation.
During a debate on then President Moi’s speech at the opening of that parliamentary session, Khalif accused the security forces of killing hundreds in Wajir District.
The question of just what happened at the Wagalla Airstrip between 10 and 14 February 1984 was partially answered by the late Justus Ole Tipis in a ministerial statement about the military operation, read on the floor of parliament on the night of 12 April 1984, and reported in the Nation of 13 April 1984. Ole Tipis revealed that the security situation in Wajir was politically motivated and that leaders were involved in divisive strategies that were planned based on ethnic considerations. He claimed that the government decided to carry out its operations against the Degodia community to provide security to a neighbouring clan. Ole Tipis gave an accurate account of the processes but avoided mentioning the resulting genocide.
The Wajir District Security Committee and the Provincial Securities Committee were convened by an order from the National Security Council. The meeting took place on 8 February 1984 at the Wajir District Commissioner’s office. The District Commissioner himself was conveniently replaced by a District Officer, M.M. Tiema. According to the signatures in the visitor’s book at the DC’s office, and eyewitness reports, this meeting was attended by J.S. Mathenge, Permanent Secretary Office of the President; B.A. Kiplagat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; David Mwiraria, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs; John Gituma, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting; Brigadier J.R. Kibwana, Department of Defence; B.N. Macharia of the Treasury; Z.J.M. Kamencu, Deputy Secretary in the Office of the President; J.P. Gitui, D.C.O. Police Headquarters; J.K. Kaguthi and J.P. Mwagovya of the Office of the President; C.M. Aswani, Provincial Police Officer, North Eastern Province; Lt. Col. H.F.K. Muhindi of 7 Kenya Rifles; J.K. Kinyanjui, Director of Land Adjudication Nairobi; and finally Benson N. Kaaria, Provincial Commissioner, Northeastern Province. The meeting resolved to carry out an operation to disarm the Degodia and force them to provide the names of the bandits who were committing crimes in the district.
According to the statement by Ole Tipis, once the operation was authorized, it began in earnest on 10 February at 0400 hours and involved the Police, the Administration Police, and the Army. The operation covered Elben, Dambas, Butelehu, Eldas, Griftu and Bulla Jogoo. According to the government statement, most of these areas had been swept by 11 February. When the army surrounded Bulla Jogoo, they ordered the residents to vacate their homes. According to Ole Tipis, the residents refused to comply with the order. The military then forcibly removed 381 male members of the Degodia clan from their homes and took them to the Wagalla Airstrip, nine miles West of Wajir Town. Ole Tipis admitted that those held were interrogated for three days, and a scuffle erupted when the District Commissioner, accompanied by the OCPD (Officer Commanding Police Division), entered the airstrip. Some of the crowds started to escape while others shouted at government officers. In the confusion, 29 people died of gunshot wounds or were trampled to death, while 28 others were killed when the army met with resistance during the operations, according to the ministerial statement.
The official story narrated in the government statement closely mirrors what happened, save that the government minimized callousness of the operation. The operation covered the entire Wajir District, including Tarbaj, Leheley, Wajir-Bor and Khorof Harar. The target community was the Degodia but it is believed several Somalis of other extraction were caught up in cases of mistaken identity. The operation targeted male members of the clan above 12 years of age. Still, women were raped, houses were burnt, and property was looted in every locality where the operation took place.
The military then forcibly removed male members of the Degodia clan from their homes and took them to the Wagalla Airstrip, nine miles West of Wajir Town.
The men rounded up were subjected to torture to force them to confess to owning a rifle. Some died of their wounds before they reached the Wagalla Airstrip. Those who got to the airstrip were sorted by sub-clan, and up to 30 members of the Jebrail sub-clan were burnt alive in an orgy of unprecedented violence. Their clothes were piled up on top of them, petrol or some other highly flammable chemical was poured on the clothes, and a bonfire whose fuel was human flesh was lit. The other detainees watched as their colleagues were roasted alive. The rest of the men were forced to strip naked and told to squat in the hot sun – those who resisted were shot. The late Ahmed Khalif reported that the detainees were held at the airstrip for five days, that they were denied food and water, and that during this period, those who tried to pray were shot. In those five days, more than 1,000 people either starved to death, were shot for questioning the orders of the armed forces, or died at the hands of gangs that were allowed into the airstrip at night to carry out revenge attacks against those against whom they held a grudge.
On the fifth day, the remaining men bolted, breaking through the barbed wire fence and running for their lives. The military opened fire, and hundreds were shot — many in the back — and killed. The stampede helped most escape into the bush, where they received help from nomads. It was an escape that should have happened in the first couple of days before so many were murdered, but the Degodia people would have been wiped off the map without it. The military found itself amid thousands of dead and injured men. The plan had gone awry: men had escaped and told others what happened. The army attempted a massive cover-up that involved piling the dead and injured into lorries and dumping them in the bushes. Many bodies were also disposed of by fire and acid. Mohamed Ibrahim Elmi, Catholic nun Analena Toneli, businessman Noor Abdille and others saved many people who had been ferried into various parts of Wajir district and abandoned by the armed forces. That is how the Wagalla Massacre took place. The survivors’ stories are almost unbelievable.
One survivor says that he had never stepped into Wajir town before 9 February 1984. He had decided to visit his father there and they were both picked up by the military the night he arrived. He found himself at Wagalla naked, hungry, and thirsty, watching as life ebbed out of his father. Another survivor woke up in a pile of bodies in a depression in a bush; next to him was a 16-year-old cousin’s corpse — just an innocent boy shot in the back of the head. One survivor escaped in the stampede naked and found a young girl herding goats who helped him cover his shame with her scarf.
The army attempted a massive cover-up that involved piling the dead and injured into lorries and dumping them in the bushes.
It has been exactly 38 years since the Wagalla massacre. In all these years the victims have refused to stay quiet, the dead are bursting out of their graves and giving clues to those who wish to resolve the massacre. The available evidence is sufficient to recreate what happened at Wagalla. It is possible to give State Council Moijo Ole Keiwua the specific information he requested, to allow Ibrahim and Alinoor to bring to justice those who killed their fathers, Yussuf Mohamed Hussein and Khamis Adan Mumin, along with 3,000 others —the figure given in the UN report — on 10, 11, 12, 13, or 14 February 1984 by a combined contingent of security officers from the Kenya Army, the ‘82 Air Force, the Kenya Police and the Administration Police. (The larger casualty figures were also mentioned to the author by Ahmed Khalif while he was still alive). The officers who took part in this massacre received an order from their superiors who met at the Wajir District Commissioner’s Office on 8 February 1984. The sons of the deceased could not give information of this kind in 1984. However, the same information can now be adduced in a court of law in the light of the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report and recommendations.
One of the most intriguing stories about the Wagalla Massacre was how it was planned and implemented. The target community was collected from three districts and detained at the Wagalla Airstrip.
My uncle, Abdullahi Jehow, who left Wajir District in 1965 when the Kenya Army killed his family’s herd of 200 camels, had established himself in Madogashe in Garissa District. On the morning of 9 February 1984, he was at Jalaqo, about 30 miles from Modogashe on the road to Garissa, in a shallow well with other men, busy filling troughs with water for his livestock, when a column of army vehicles arrived.
The soldiers asked them to which Somali clan they belonged, and they innocently replied that they were Degodia. They were arrested, taken to the Habaswein police post overnight and driven to the Wagalla Airstrip the following day where they witnessed the atrocities first-hand. Today in his late 80s, Uncle Abdullahi has had a very long life, but he avoids Wajir like the plague. He has lived in Isiolo, Garissa, and Tana River, but nobody has been able to convince him to go back to Wajir.
The stories told of the Wagalla Massacre demonstrate a broader conspiracy to commit genocide. Wagalla was never about the immediate security concerns in Wajir District. It had nothing to do with the low-level conflict between Somali clans; such conflicts have been simmering since time immemorial and have never resulted in genocide.
Wagalla was a classic extermination of a people; the implementation of a policy that began at independence that was aimed at clearing the inhabitants out of their land and pushing them off the map of Kenya. It was a policy set by Jomo Kenyatta and inherited by Daniel Moi. It is a policy practiced by low-level government officials and the Provincial Administration as can be gleaned from official documents and public pronouncements.
One survivor escaped in the stampede naked and found a young girl herding goats who helped him cover his shame with her scarf.
The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission Report recommends reparations for the victims of the Wagalla massacre and other mass killings in the country. The report also recommends actions against the perpetrators of these heinous crimes, which includes banning them from public office. The report however was ignored by the government and parliament failed to adopt it. The Government Printer gazetted only parts of the report leaving out the sections relating to the massacres and killings, Volume 2A and 2B. In a bid to sidestep the broad redress mechanism proposed by the TJRC, on 26 March 2015 the president issued a bold apology and announced the establishment of a KSh10 billion Restorative Justice Fund of which only KSh3.6 billion was budgeted for in the subsequent year, 2016/2017. The Attorney General failed to initiate guidelines for victims to make claims against this fund until 2018. The beneficiaries of this fund are not aware of these guidelines as no public participation and awareness was conducted. The lethargy in implementing the TJRC report seems to emanate from the system’s determination to protect its own. Many of the perpetrators named in the TJRC Report are still serving in the boards of public institutions. Until the government takes concrete steps to provide redress for the victims of the Wagalla massacre and other crimes against humanity reported in the TJRC Report, it will be hard for the victims and their families to move on.
Moijo Ole Keiwua rose to become President of the East African Court of Justice and Judge of the Court of Appeal. He succumbed to cancer in 2011. Ibrahim Khamis Adan recently retired from the government after a long career in the diplomatic service including a stint as deputy ambassador. The writer is not aware of the whereabouts of Alinoor Yussuf Mohamed Hussein. Abdullahi Jehow is at an advanced age and lives in Tana River County; he will probably never again set foot in Wajir. The TJRC interviewed most of the persons named in connection with the Wagalla massacre, including its own Chairman, Benjamin Kiplagat. None of them accepted liability and their standard defence was, “I do not remember.”
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Abdi Sheikh is the author of “Blood on the Runway: The Wagalla Massacre” of 1984. A version of this article first appeared at www.kenyaimagine.com
Politics
Drought Management in ASAL Areas: Enhancing Resilience or Fostering Vulnerability?
Rather that jumping from project to project in search of a short-term response, there is a need to embrace practical and proactive long-term solutions to the challenges of recurring drought in the ASALs.
Kenya’s arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs) occupy 80 per cent of the country’s landmass and are inhabited by nearly ten million people who rely on livestock rearing and seasonal small-scale farming for their livelihoods. ASALs are known for the variable environmental conditions that result in periodic drought, floods, animal disease outbreaks, and social instability due to conflict and historical marginalisation.
In the 1970s, ASALs experienced periods of prolonged drought nearly every four years, with the government and donor agencies developing various programmes through international and local NGOs to address the crises. The focus was on humanitarian aid to enhance food security through food relief aid to vulnerable populations. But due to the temporality and inefficiency of food aid, these agencies promoted farming as an alternative to livestock production and as a means of ensuring food security.
In Isiolo County, irrigation schemes were introduced along the Waso River and in other small centres such as Malka Daka and Rapsu. However, the projects failed largely due to flooding, and also because pastoralists re-invested the proceeds from farming in livestock and abandoned farming altogether.
Irrigation scheme at Rapsu
Humanitarian interventions and the food security approach were dropped in favour of livestock development projects in the 1990s. These involved the development of water infrastructure such as boreholes and water pans, the establishment of grazing blocks and the implementation of livestock restocking programmes following periods of severe drought.
Between 1990 and 2000, the Arid Lands Resource Management Projects (ALRMP) emerged as the scaffold for the management and development of the drylands. The projects ranged from water infrastructure development and rehabilitation, to early warning bulletins, contingency planning, range re-seeding, livestock feeds, and vaccination.
The National Drought Management Authority (NDMA) took over from Arid Lands Development Projects in 2005. The NDMA’s focus is predominantly on the early warning bulletin, drought intervention, contingency policies, and capacity building. Although the NDMA is not oriented towards development projects, key policies such as Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) form a significant segment of the NDMA’s work.
Drought Response Program in Isiolo
Between 2009 and 2019, social protection programmes based on cash transfers—such as the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP) and livestock insurance—made their appearance. The HSNP was initially implemented in Marsabit, Mandera, Turkana, and Wajir. In 2019, the programme was upscaled to include four other pastoral counties: Isiolo, Samburu, Garissa and Tana River.
In 2010, Kenya became the first African country to implement KLIP, an index-based livestock insurance programme where the government purchases the policy on behalf of the beneficiary and disburses the pay-out as a safety net to cushion against drought events. The government first piloted the programme in Marsabit County and by 2016 had expanded the scheme to Isiolo, Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Kajiado, Turkana, Tana River and Samburu counties.
The paradigm shifted from livestock development to enhancing “resilience” through programmes such as the Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme (DRSLP), the Regional Pastoral Livelihoods Resilience Project (RPLRP) and the Resilience and Economic Growth in Arid Lands (REGAL-AG) project. “Resilience” projects aimed to accelerate economic growth by promoting the development of livestock market facilities and regulatory frameworks, developing the capacities of individual and community enterprises and promoting investments in livestock value chains in five pastoral counties (Marsabit, Isiolo, Garissa, Wajir and Turkana).
Finally, the Kenya Climate-Smart Agriculture Project (KCSAP, 2017-2026) has recently taken the lead. The implementation of KCSAP in ASAL counties enmeshes improving water systems (boreholes), livelihood support, contingency emergency response, and value addition in agriculture.
Cattle watering at Dogogicha borehole (Range water infrastructure development project)
In the period between 1970 and 2020, massive investments were made to mitigate the effects of drought in Kenya’s ASALs. What I have presented here is simply a snapshot of the billion-dollar investments made in drought management. Although some of these projects have contributed to improving the resilience of pastoralist communities, others have increased their vulnerability and inequality because of the manner in which droughts and related catastrophes are handled. Following the severe drought that affected the entire Horn of Africa, including Kenya, in 2011 a policy framework was developed to end drought emergencies. But can these continuous policy shifts and the massive investments in drought management end drought emergencies in Kenya?
End drought emergencies by 2022?
Ending Drought Emergencies (EDE) is a policy framework developed to strengthen drought management institutions and infrastructure. It emerged from the regional drought and disaster resilience summit held in Nairobi by IGAD member states and regional actors. The conference aimed to respond to the drought cataclysm that had affected the entire region resulting in an estimated US$12.1 billion in drought-related losses between 2008 and 2011.
Although some of these projects have contributed to improving the resilience of pastoralist communities, others have increased their vulnerability and inequality.
In Kenya, EDE is a distinct part of the Vision 2030 sector plan for drought risk management with the stated aim of ending drought emergencies by 2022 (MTP III). EDE aims to prioritise inclusive economic growth and reduce poverty by integrating various pillars of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Regional Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative (IDIRSI). However, in September 2021, Kenya’s President Uhuru Kenyatta declared the ongoing drought a national disaster and called for local and international interventions.
Is Kenya’s roadmap for ending drought emergencies realistic? Can Kenya achieve its vision of ending drought emergencies by 2022? The same development visions and plans that aim to integrate ASAL areas into the broader economic transformation continue to push pastoralism to the periphery. Mobility is central to how pastoralists exploit variable range resources. However, insecurity, restricted park and conservancy enclosures, and mega-development infrastructures impede pastoral mobility, fostering vulnerability among the pastoralist communities rather than enhancing their resilience.
Which way forward
Despite the massive investments in humanitarian aid, pastoral development projects, resilience building and “climate-smart” approaches to drought mitigation, pastoralists remain susceptible to shocks and stresses brought on by droughts. There are remarkable discrepancies between the value of the investments made and the results achieved in attempting to end the drought emergency.
The same development visions and plans that aim to integrate ASAL areas into the broader economic transformation continue to push pastoralism to the periphery.
Both failures and successes are evident, but there is an urgent need to close the gap between the levels of investments in drought management and the impact on vulnerability and resilience. As one research participant commented, “stop subsidising failures” and instead focus on supporting the existing institutions and infrastructures that have been put in place to counter drought events. One example is the livestock market facilities and abattoirs in the rangelands, which, according to some of my research respondents, have created “drought millionaires” but have had a limited impact on the lives of pastoralists. These failures are due to a lack of a sustainable and favourable framework. To foster resilience—the ability to withstand climatic shocks and bounce back better—there is a need for a collaborative effort by all the actors, including the state, Civil Society Organisations, international actors and the pastoralists themselves. In summary, three points are essential to reflect upon.
Recognising failures and successes
The government and humanitarian organisations have developed numerous drought management policies, programmes and projects. Handling drought emergencies requires a process of un-learning, learning, and re-learning by revisiting historical interventions and policies. This will help to uncover successes, the ramifications of drought responses, and the unintended structural conditions created by such interventions. Drought response must include considering other factors such as seasonal stress, access to resource infrastructures, and the population’s social-economic dynamics that influence how drought is perceived and managed—all these help in recognising and embracing drought as a management failure rather than as a cyclical absence of rain.
Pastoralism as a reliable profession
Pastoralists are “reliability” professionals acting in “real time” by galvanising different networks, solidarities and resources. Sometimes, reliability is generated by negotiated access to restricted areas such as parks and conservancy areas and through adaptive mobilities and collective solidarities in the form of a moral economy. Collective solidarities help pastoralists to deal with labour deficit, insecurity, and access to resources. Although these practices of collective solidarity are sometimes stratified between people with networks, wealth, and other resources, they remain central to how diverse livestock owners navigate dry periods. External projects that aim to enhance pastoral resilience must recognise the existence of reliable institutions that help pastoralists to manage precarious conditions such as drought. Recognising pastoralists as active managers of drought crises and real-time coordination between pastoralists, state and development NGOs will enhance reliability and adaptive containment of drought emergencies.
Proactive approach
Policies that deal with drought management—such as early warning and contingency planning—are sometimes linear, progressive, and reactive. In contrast, drought events are very much unpredictable and require considerable multiple knowledge and open-ended approaches.
To contain drought emergencies, there is a need to embrace the participatory, relational, and open-ended perspective. In the words of one of my research respondents, “there is a need to move from the ‘policy’ classroom to the ‘field’ classrooms”. For instance, livestock market infrastructure is in place in most parts of the rangelands, but unfortunately, some of it is derelict. Instead of jumping from project to project in search of a short-term response, there is a need to embrace practical and proactive long-term solutions. These could provide stability in the rangelands, especially during dry periods, to help pastoralists exploit unevenly distributed resources. One suggestion could be integrating pastoralists’ safety net and the moral economy with the social protection projects in pastoral areas.
There should be a “pause” moment to rethink and reflect on how to embrace the drought emergencies and build forward better by turning the drought crisis into an opportunity for sustainable and reliable livelihoods in the ASALs and beyond.
Politics
China, Oil and the South Sudan Resource Curse
South Sudan remains heavily reliant on oil revenues but the extraction of this resource has resulted in major environmental damage and great human suffering.
South Sudan is caught between a rock and a hard place, heavily dependent on the revenues generated by a resource whose extraction is having a negative impact on the country.
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) operates the Dar Petroleum Operating Company (DPOC) and Greater Petroleum Operating Company (GPOC) consortia that produce all of the country’s oil. CNPC started operating in Sudan in 1996, long before South Sudan became an independent state in 2011, without putting in place proper waste management systems and undertaking environmental audits.
While oil production generates over 90 per cent of the government’s budget, the issue of waste management and accountability has been a continuing challenge. Major environmental damage has been reported in the oil fields, jeopardising the lives of those who live in the oil producing states.
“They don’t care about waste management and environmental protection. They want it cheaper, and the agreements are opaque so I don’t know what they signed, in terms of service delivery and environmental care,” said an analyst who spoke on condition of anonymity.
The source also claimed that DPOC and GPOC are “sabotaging” the regulations developed by the Ministry of Petroleum to avoid their corporate social responsibilities towards the communities and the country. “They [DPOC and GPOC] don’t want the implementation of these policies and recently rejected a comprehensive environmental audit saying they are Western ideas, American ideas.”
In the 90s, aware of the impact that oil extraction would have on local communities, the Sudanese government took the draconian measure of ordering the Sudanese Army to evict the civilian population to make way for exploration and production.
“When South Sudan gained independence it was a new responsibility. The whole point of fighting was to do things differently from the old Sudan. The first thing would have been to change things, but the country couldn’t stop oil production. It was young and needed money to continue running its business, to provide basic services and continue with developmental projects,” said Dr Bior Kwer Bior, founding Executive Director for Nile Initiative for Health and Environment, a member of South Sudan’s Civil Society Coalition on Natural Resources.
Today, the decision to continue with oil production has come to haunt the country in terms of the impact on the environment and on the health of local populations.
“Whenever there’s oil extraction obviously there will be impact on the environment. Normally there are safeguards that are put in place to protect the environment. There should be a plan for protecting the environment, an accurate environmental management system, baseline assessment before you start production, and good ways of waste management,” noted Dr Kwer.
According to article 28 of the South Sudan Petroleum Act, contractors must submit an application to the Ministry of Petroleum for a permit to undertake exploratory drilling. The application must include an environmental and social impact assessment. Regarding transportation, treatment and storage, the Act requires that “detailed information on all relevant issues [. . .] including economic, technical, operational, safety related, commercial, local content, land use and environmental aspects of the project” be provided. The Act further clarifies that “The Ministry shall grant a license on the basis of an evaluation of the application, including the environmental and social impact assessment, and the technical competence, experience, history of compliance and ethical conduct and financial capacity of the applicant and the contractor, as well as safety related aspects.”
However, since its enactment in 2012, the provisions of the Act have not been fully implemented and the country continues to engage with the oil companies without proper environmental and social impact assessments having been undertaken.
Environmental impact
A report released by the Nile Initiative for Health and Environment, recorded that over 218 children were born with deformities as a result of oil pollution in the oil-producing states of Unity and Upper Nile.
The organization says it collected the data from the birth registries of the health facilities in Pariang, Unity State, and from media reports of cases in Upper Nile State. Its tally may undercount the true figure because of the absence of health facilities and road networks in the areas where oil fields are located.
Local populations lack awareness of the dangers of the chemicals and waste materials dumped on their doorsteps, which contaminate the water in the wells and ponds that are used by the communities.
“The topography of Pariang in Unity State is a low land. The water from the crude oil, the waste water, is dumped in local ponds, flows all the way to local streams and this is what is causing diseases,” Dr Kwer said. “As a consequence of oil production, waste is hazardously dumped in the areas, and the containers that used to contain the chemicals are in the hands of the communities being used for drinking water,” he continued.
The water discharged with minimal treatment contains toxins such as hydrocarbons that have had a negative impact on communities in the oil producing regions of Upper Nile State, Unity State, and the Ruweng Administrative Area, which by itself produces over 80 per cent of South Sudanese oil. “The impact is huge and negative, towards the communities, and the land, animals and the air. The processes were not satisfactory to us. First of all, the level of oil spills, in which pipe breaks spill crude oil into the soil [and] the containers of chemical materials which find their way to communities and are being used for domestic activities,” Charles Judo, Chairperson of the Civil Society Coalition on Natural Resources (CSCNR), said in an interview.
Judo observed that although oil production in South Sudan started on the wrong footing, “The government has now agreed to conduct an environmental audit, not only to assess the environment but the social impact of the oil activities. And as a member of the civil society I want to see in the future that all the processes are open and transparent to the public.”
Diplomatic impact
At its meeting in May 2021, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), renewed for another year the arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze imposed on South Sudan in 2018. The UNSC also extended for a further 13 months the mandate of the panel of experts tasked with overseeing those measures. The arms embargo prohibits the supply, sale or transfer of weapons, as well as the provision of technical assistance, training and other military assistance to the territory of South Sudan.
Having previously abstained, this time the Chinese government voted for the arms embargo. Economic analysts said that China’s vote was in retaliation against the decision taken by the government of South Sudan to put in place restrictive measures to improve accountability and transparency in the oil sector, in particular the undertaking of an environmental audit and the implementation of the human resource policies developed by the South Sudan Ministry of Petroleum.
The Chinese government had previously abstained but for the first time voted for the arms embargo.
“The Chinese companies recently have seen some line ministries as a threat, and there have been debates with the Ministry of Petroleum, saying they are not happy with the policies the government is trying to impose on the oil companies and that they should be treated exceptionally because they were supporting South Sudan even during the dark days,” said a source who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the matter. “They said the environmental audit is expensive. They want samples only taken in one area while others should be skipped.” It is deeply concerning that the Chinese want to dictate what the country should do with its resources.
Contribution by the civil society
The role of civil society is to amplify advocacy efforts and share information to ensure that accountability and transparency are priorities. “Issues to do with monitoring and evaluation of whatever is related to oil, starting from the signing of the contracts, starting [upstream] to downstream. Whatever agreements are about to be reached, civil society ensures there’s transparency,” Judo said.
Some of the concerns raised by citizens include lack of access to timely and reliable information. “The civil society should be empowered to create awareness about agreements reached by the government and other stakeholders, from exploration, production and selling. The role is to ensure the process is flexible and known to all the South Sudanese citizens,” Judo added.
It is deeply concerning that the Chinese want to dictate what the country should do with its resources.
The National Audit Chamber of South Sudan recently issued a report indicating that the 2 per cent share of net petroleum revenues have not been transferred to the oil producing states to finance service delivery and development projects as foreseen in the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 2013 and the Transitional Constitution 2011. The central government has instead reallocated the funds for other use.
“As civil society we are aware and concerned about all these issues. So far, we have been hearing about the processes of signing the agreements but we have never been involved, not only at the signing but also starting from the initial processes and negotiations. There was no transparency and we never had access to contracts to see and compare with other companies. We have never seen the contracts, but from the output, we are not happy about the agreements with the Chinese companies,” said Judo.
Community awareness
Outbreaks of unknown diseases, stillbirths, deformities in new-borns, miscarriages and infertility have been recorded among populations living in oil producing regions yet there is little awareness within these communities of the dangers they face.
The oil companies support development projects such as schools and hospitals but this is part of their corporate social responsibility and not enough. Communities in Pariang County in Unity State and in Paloich in Upper Nile State have held several demonstrations, accusing the oil companies of making empty promises. In August 2020, there was a demonstration over the lack of employment opportunities for local people that had been promised in the Memorandum of Understanding between the government and the oil companies. “They don’t keep their promises but only concede and don’t deliver. Communities need services to be provided to them and this remains key,” said a concerned citizen.
Resource curse
The reconstituted government of National Unity is tasked with the responsibility of reforming the sector and eventually joining the Extractive Industry and Transparency Initiative (EITI) to help the country control and manage well the revenues generated from its natural resources. In so doing, the needs of the communities living in and around the oil producing areas must be prioritised to ensure a do-no-harm approach. In particular, it is crucial that the issue of waste management is addressed as a matter of urgency. The government must also ensure that environmental audits are undertaken before production begins in new oil fields to avoid further environmental degradation.
Outbreaks of unknown diseases, stillbirths, deformities in new-borns, miscarriages and infertility have been recorded among populations living in oil producing regions.
There is also a need to establish accountability mechanisms to ensure that resources are used properly and that the communities in the oil producing regions receive their share of the oil revenues as stipulated in the law.
Further, the government and civil society organizations must educate the communities concerned about the benefits and the challenges that come with oil production activities in their regions, including how relocating to other regions can help them escape the health ordeals that they are currently facing.
It will not be easy to bring order to the sector, especially after more than three decades during which the oil companies explored and produced crude oil without proper government oversight. However, environmental degradation and human suffering must be put to an end as they negate the whole idea of producing oil to fuel development and render the resource a curse rather than a blessing for South Sudan.
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