The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) was playing by the rulebook when it received the presidential nomination papers of Walter Mongare alias Nyambane. But no sooner did candidate Jimi Wanjigi of the Safina Party show up than Mongare’s papers were quickly rescinded.

The commission, which is mandated to oversee the forthcoming general election, has been in the spotlight and under intense scrutiny from Kenyans and the world since bungling the 2017 presidential election.

The electoral commission’s credibility and trustworthiness have remained wanting, to say the least; the body does not inspire confidence and, indeed, few Kenyans trust it. Even less believe it will midwife the forthcoming presidential election successfully, a bad place for the IEBC to be.

The results of the two 2017 presidential elections are still shrouded in controversy and mystery largely because of the commission’s ineptitude, but the less said about the 2017 general election, which is still fresh in the minds of some, the better.

Fast forward to 2022 and the commission is again in the spotlight; with only 55 days remaining, the IEBC’s credibility and modus operandi are under scrutiny. How it delivers the general election will tell whether any lessons have been learned, especially concerning the presidential election, which, if not handled with the utmost transparency, may result in ugly scenes.

That the IEBC would still be in the grip of shadowy mandarins seeking to influence, in particular, the outcome of the results of the presidential election would be nothing new; the history of electoral bodies in this country, whether pre- or post- the 2010 constitution, is replete with cases of external interference. The Jimi Wanjigi-IEBC saga is a clear indication that the IEBC has yet to rid itself of its penchant for bad behaviour. This is a bad omen.

On receiving the papers of the Safina Party’s candidate, the IEBC chairman and presidential election returning officer Wafula Chebukati prevaricated, seeming to interpret the law when on 6 June 2013 he told Wanjigi, who appeared before him, that he did not possess a university degree.

That the IEBC would still be in the grip of shadowy mandarins seeking to influence, in particular, the outcome of the results of the presidential election would be nothing new.

The matter of what is a degree and what constitutes a university education had already been interpreted by the High Court as law, as illustrated below, a law that the IEBC has been using for the last nine years. In 2013, Justices Isaac Lenaola and E.K.O. Ogola ably demonstrated the application of the said legal statutes and gave an interpretation of the 2010 constitution and the election act, insofar as possession of a university degree is concerned.

In the case of Janet Ndago Mbete vs IEBC and Hassan Joho Petition No. 116 of 2013, the commission cleared the 3rd respondent (Hassan Joho) based on the completion letter from the university and defended the position in court as proof that the 3rd respondent had indeed received a university education. It therefore boggles the mind when Chebukati purports to say that both Jimi Wanjigi and Walter Mongare (an afterthought) do not possess university degrees.

In fact, in recognising and applying the law properly, the commission had indeed accepted and cleared Mongare’s presidential candidacy based on university letters that showed that he had completed his studies. This it did by communicating and confirming that he had met all the statutory requirements. So, why did Chebukati annul his earlier decision, which clearly came as an afterthought?

The revocation of Mongare’s clearance by Chebukati followed in the wake of Wanjigi’s complaint to the IEBC that he was being discriminated against. Is it not the case that once a candidate has been cleared by the returning officer Chebukati has no powers to quash the nomination unless through a judicial process?

Ten days after the March 4 general election, on 15 March 2013, High Court judge Isaac Lenaola in his substantive ruling quoted from the Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th Edition, which defines a degree as; “a title conferred on a graduate of a school, college, or university either after the completion of required studies or in honour of special achievements.” The judge also quoted from the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition, which defines a degree as; “an academic rank conferred by a college or university after examination and or after completion of a course, or conferred as an honour.”

Summing up his argument, Judge Lenaola said, “I am therefore in agreement with the 3rd respondent that a degree is not a physical connotation, but a process whose pinnacle is the graduation. Indeed, the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 10th Edition defines a graduate as one who has ‘successfully completed a degree’ and a graduand as ‘person who is about to receive an academic degree’. It is therefore clear to me that, the graduation ceremony cannot be used as measure to determine whether one had a degree or not. In my view what matters is that a person has attended school, undertaken the studies envisaged and has passed all the requisite exams for the conferment of the degree. Having found as above, I am satisfied that the 3rd respondent holds the qualifications envisaged by Section 22 (2) of the Elections Act.”

The revocation of Mongare’s clearance by Chebukati followed in the wake of Wanjigi’s complaint to the IEBC that he was being discriminated against.

In a related ruling delivered before the 4 March 2013 elections, on 13 February 2013, Judge E.K.O Ogola made very much the same argument as Judge Lenaola in the case of Mable Muruli vs the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.

“The issue for this court is then to determine whether or not after a person has successfully gone through the process leading to acquisition of a degree, he is qualified under section 22 (2) of the Act even when no physical certificate has been conferred. In my judgement, the respondent that is the (IEBC) has made very superficial interpretation of section 22 (2) of the Election Act. In my view, a certificate is merely a confirmation of what is already in existence. The petitioner (Mabel Muruli) has successfully completed the course programme. That programme has been acknowledged by the Commission of Higher Education (. . .) and the respondent has no option but to admit the petitioner to the relevant candidacy.”

Judge Ogola in his wisdom also said that, “there are many circumstances where people have been admitted to employment or to further study course on the basis of what they have proved to have achieved even when the graduation and certification is yet to take place. For the respondent to flagrantly disregard this peculiar position is to arrogantly violate the rights of the petitioner and it is the duty of this court to restore the same.”

As far as the Election Act goes this law has never been appealed, hence it is binding to both the respondents and the IEBC. Chebukati, therefore, cannot purport to change the law on a whim, otherwise he will be operating outside of the law.

Jimi Wanjigi’s case, like many other complainants’ cases, went before the IEBC’s Dispute Tribunal Committee at Milimani Courts. However, on 17 June 2022 the Tribunal upheld the earlier decision and did not clear him to run for the country’s top seat.

In our previous article, we highlighted the key challenges facing Kenya’s electoral integrity that are posed by the increased digitisation of election systems and the electioneering process. From cybersecurity risks to harms occasioned by human conduct on social networking platforms, there are various factors that could undermine the credibility of elections in the digital age. In this article, we review some of the measures adopted to mitigate the potential for such harms in the context of the upcoming elections.

Since the 2017 general election, there have been numerous changes to the legal framework applicable to the use of technology in different contexts. Some notable changes within the context of elections are the enactment of the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act, 2018 (CMCA) as well as the Data Protection Act, 2019 (DPA), and the operationalisation of the Data Commissioner’s office. The effect of these changes is already being felt—the Data Commissioner was recently called into action following numerous complaints by citizens that they were registered as members of political parties without their knowledge or consent. In response, the Data Commissioner consulted with the Office of the Registrar of Political Parties and directed it to establish an opt-out mechanism that has since been implemented. However, a recent report authored for the Mozilla Foundation chronicled the practice of disinformation for hire; the use of social media influencers by political actors to spread false or misleading content on their opponents is common despite the provisions of the CMCA criminalising such conduct. This suggests that the existing measures taken may be insufficient.

Recalling some of the major challenges Kenya faced in the 2017 general election, we outline the key developments that have since taken place and highlight their potential impact on the integrity of the election administration system and the practice of electioneering online.

Integrity of the election administration system 

The Elections Act mandates the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) to establish and maintain an electronic system for voter registration and identification and the transmission of results. Further, the Elections (Technology) Regulations outline how the IEBC is required to administer this system and the safeguards that they are required to put in place. They set out the principles that ought to guide the IEBC in data handling and storage. In 2017, the IEBC’s administration of the election system came under the microscope due to a series of unfortunate events, pointing, at best, to ineptitude.

During the 2017 election cycle, the IEBC debuted the Kenya Integrated Management System (KIEMS), billing it as a solution to the credibility issues that had previously plagued electoral processes. KIEMS uses electronic voter identification and transmission of tabulated results through mobile devices stationed at each polling centre. The server support and underlying IT for KIEMS was provided by French-based firm, OT-Morpho (later, IDEMIA). According to the then opposition, IDEMIA was contracted under dubious conditions and, from the start, was part of a fraudulent scheme to subvert the election process. Despite assurances from the IEBC on the credibility of its system, several occurrences cast significant doubts over the elections. For one, a week prior to the elections, the IEBC’s ICT manager in charge of the KIEMS—Chris Msando—was found murdered shortly after appearing on a news segment assuring Kenyans of the integrity of KIEMS and his centrality to the security of the system. To date, the circumstances of his death are not clear, and no one has been charged.

Secondly, during the elections, the transmission of results was hampered by poor connectivity, with approximately 11,155 polling stations out of the total 40,883 lacking sufficient network coverage. At some point, the tallying of results was briefly interrupted. All these factors were relied on by the petitioners in the 2017 presidential election petition, and this led to the Supreme Court calling into question the integrity of the servers used to facilitate the transmission and storage of the election results. Perhaps the most notable occurrence in the discussions on OT-Morpho’s involvement in the election was the IEBC indicating that it was unable to provide access to the election servers due to the time difference between Kenya and France. In its eventual judgment, the Supreme Court found that there were several irregularities plaguing the electronic transmission system and this contributed to its decision to annul the election. After the nullification of the elections, one of the IEBC’s commissioners fled the country, the CEO was terminated and, citing a lack of faith in the chairman, three other commissioners resigned. These positions, including that of the late Chris Msando, have since been filled. It is notable that the chairperson remains in office, despite the debacles of 2017.

Reeling from the events of the 2017 election, the IEBC conducted a post-election evaluation exercise in 2019 to inform its strategic approach to the 2022 elections. This process not only informed the legislative amendments that the IEBC has recently supported in parliament such as the Election (Amendment) Bill, 2021, but also the preparation of the IEBC’s ICT capacity. Based on the evaluation, the IEBC has acquired a primary and secondary data centre in Kenya and has put in place a Joint Technical Committee with the Communications Authority to map out the network coverage challenges.

However, there are significant challenges facing the IEBC. While the IEBC has moved away from IDEMIA, its procurement of Smartmatic International Holding B.V. is currently being challenged by one of the other contenders for the contract, Risk Africa Innovatis. This is not the first time Risk Africa Innovatis has challenged the IEBC’s procurement of a biometric service provider. In 2017, it challenged the procurement of IDEMIA on similar bases as its current challenge of Smartmatic’s award. Among these challenges, is that Smartmatic International Holding B.V. has been adversely mentioned in the Philippines, Venezuela, Uganda, Nigeria, and the USA over its credibility. While Risk Africa Innovatis is a Kenyan-owned company, Smartmatic is a multinational initially incorporated in the US by several Venezuelan nationals. In several elections it administered in Venezuela, the Philippines, and the United States, Smartmatic faced controversy over the integrity of its systems as well as its links to the Venezuelan government (in particular, alleged pay-outs to high-ranking government officials). For example, in Venezuela, independent election monitors concluded that it was likely that electronic election fraud had been committed in the 2004 presidential recall referendum administered by Smartmatic. Following adverse media coverage, Smartmatic undertook an internal restructuring that obfuscated its true ownership using what the US State Department described as a “web of holding companies in the Netherlands and Barbados”. Interestingly, Smartmatic supplied the biometric voting machines for Uganda’s recent 2021 elections, not exactly a ringing endorsement.

Smartmatic International Holding B.V. has been adversely mentioned in the Philippines, Venezuela, Uganda, Nigeria, and the USA over its credibility.

Beyond this, the IEBC’s procurement process seems to be off to a rocky start. For one, the delay in procuring Smartmatic’s services means that Kenyans may not get an opportunity to scrutinise the register of voters despite being legally entitled to do so. Further, the IEBC is also facing a legal challenge in respect of its procurement of Inform P Lykos Holdings for the printing of ballot papers. The Public Procurement Review Board nullified both awards to Inform P Lykos and Smartmatic but its decision has since been challenged at the High Court. The IEBC proceeded to sign contracts with both, citing the urgency of the election and the absence of an injunction from the High Court preventing it from contracting the two entities during the pendency of the appeal.  When one considers that there are five years between election cycles, it is staggering that the IEBC would find itself in this position.

Certain of the broader issues facing the elections administration system have since been addressed by several legislative developments, principally the enactment of the DPA and the operationalisation of the Data Commissioner’s office. Supplementing the Elections (Technology) Regulations, the DPA and its accompanying regulations layer onto the IEBC’s obligations with respect to data collection, handling, and storage. These obligations have further been clarified by the Data Commissioner in a recently issued Guidance Note for Electoral Purposes. For example, the IEBC’s collection of voter registration information must be based on consent, and it must implement data protection mechanisms within the design of its systems. To ensure this is done, the Data Commissioner advises that a Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) should be conducted by the IEBC and other election stakeholders such as the Registrar of Political Parties, who handle voter data, ahead of the elections.

For clarity a DPIA is required where personal data processing operations are likely to pose a risk to the rights of data subjects (in this case, voters). It guides risk mitigation efforts which should be undertaken by the person collecting and processing personal data, or whether such collection and processing should happen in the first place. A failure to conduct a DPIA resulted in the High Court’s recent revocation of the roll out of the Huduma Cards under the National Integrated Identity Management System. If the IEBC fails to conduct a DPIA, it is likely that this failure will feature either in the resulting election petitions or in court action prior to the elections. With respect to the storage of personal data, the general regulations issued under the DPA specify that the IEBC’s processing of personal data should be through a server located in Kenya, or the IEBC should at least maintain a copy of the server locally. This seems to be a nod to 2017 Supreme Court Judgement annulling the presidential election, which took issue with the unavailability of the IEBC’s servers.

In 2018, the CMCA was also enacted to provide for computer system-related offences such as unauthorised access or hacking. The CMCA established a National Computer and Cybercrimes Coordination Committee (referred to as NC4) which is tasked with coordinating the state’s response to cybercrime. Recently, the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government, who sits on the NC4, designated various parts of the country’s telecommunications infrastructure (including data centres and systems used to manage elections) as critical infrastructure under the CMCA. With this designation, the telecommunications infrastructure will benefit from enhanced security and scrutiny from the NC4, and any attempts to infiltrate or damage such infrastructure would attract criminal penalties under the CMCA. While this designation was linked to recent attacks on telecommunication masts and power grid, its link to the upcoming election is clear—the IEBC relies on telecommunication service providers to transmit results to its cloud servers. If compromised, the outcome of the election may be adversely impacted.

Electioneering on social media

The same measures that were adopted to bolster the integrity of the election administration system also serve to safeguard against the harms occasioned by the conduct of political actors on social media. In 2017, several media outlets reported that the now infamous Cambridge Analytica—a self-proclaimed political consultancy firm—was active in Kenya, offering services to various parties. According to Cambridge Analytica, its service offering included profiling online audiences based on regular demographics (for example age and gender) as well as personality. For the purposes of this profiling, personality is discerned from the audiences’ conduct on social media—the content which they consume, the individuals they interact with and other data points. Once audiences were profiled, political actors would be able to differentiate the messaging used based on the type of audience being targeted (in other words, to conduct microtargeting). Often, this messaging would include false or misleading information. To facilitate microtargeting, Cambridge Analytica would require large amounts of personal data. In the aftermath of the 2016 US elections, it was revealed that Cambridge Analytica harvested the personal data of millions of people through Facebook. Based on reports of its involvement in Kenya’s election, it is not clear whether Cambridge Analytica facilitated microtargeting or simply designed campaign communications strategy. However, what is clear is that it harvested Kenyans’ personal data through surveys.

This seems to be a nod to 2017 Supreme Court Judgement annulling the presidential election, which took issue with the unavailability of the IEBC’s servers.

Since the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Kenya has enacted the DPA and CMCA that are ostensibly expected to reduce the likelihood of microtargeting and other forms of harmful social media activity in the context of the elections. The access to and use of personal data is central to political campaigning in the digital age. Prior to the enactment of the DPA, this practice was largely unregulated. Political actors were able to obtain voters’ personal data from the publicly available voters’ register and the party member list that is available to parties through the ORPP. Their activities in processing this data for purposes of generating targeted messaging were also largely unsupervised. Save for the guidelines jointly issued by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission and the Communications Authority on bulk messaging and social media communications (NCIC-CA Guidelines), political actors were basically free to determine how to craft their messaging and target audiences. While the NCIC-CA Guidelines brought in a measure of transparency by requiring the source of political messaging to be disclosed within the body of the message, this is limited to communications disseminated through licenced telecommunications service providers.

The provisions of the DPA would serve to limit potential for microtargeting campaigns by raising the barriers to accessing personal data and increasing the scrutiny over political actors’ handling of personal data. For example, under the regulations issued under the DPA, entities involved in electioneering are required to register with the Data Commissioner, whether or not they qualify for an exemption. Further, the electorate whose data is being collected would be able to exercise rights against political actors and these entities such as requiring them to delete their personal data or refrain from processing it in the first place. Without the ability to freely collect and process personal data, and with the threat of legal action against them, it is arguable that political actors would be less likely to engage in these practices in the coming elections. However, this would largely depend on the role played by the Data Commissioner. For example, one would expect the Data Commissioner to spring into action in light of a recent acknowledgment by the IEBC that illegal transfers of voters were undertaken on its electronic voter register.

Aside from being reliant on the proactivity of the Data Commissioner, the efficacy of the data protection law framework in relation to microtargeting campaigns is limited by provisions of election laws. While the collection of personal data by the IEBC or ORPP is initially based on consent, once collected, these entities’ subsequent processing operations are provided for in statute and as such are not subject to further consent or the exercise of certain rights by the electorate. For example, the publication of the voter register cannot be stopped by a data subject due to its provision in law. One may only be able to request minimisation of unnecessary data such as contact information. Once published, this voter register would be accessible to political actors who may use the information gathered to engage in microtargeting.

In relation to the nature of campaign messaging shared through social media, the CMCA criminalises the spread of misleading or false content. This is in addition to the criminalisation of hate speech already contained in the National Cohesion and Integration Act. To date, the provisions of the CMCA relating to the spread of misleading or false content have only been invoked in politically charged contexts and in a seemingly selective manner. For example, while a blogger was charged with this offence under the CMCA for spreading alarming information regarding COVID-19, a Member of Parliament was not charged for what was effectively the same offence. Despite this law being in place for nearly three years, it has not been implemented in instances where researchers have identified specific social media accounts that are engaged in disinformation-for-hire campaigns.

Once published, this voter register would be accessible to political actors who may use the information gathered to engage in microtargeting.

Aside from this, there are other shortcomings with this approach. For one, the use of criminal sanctions to limit the types of speech people engage in is generally discouraged due to the risk posed to the freedom of expression that is crucial in healthy democracies. Further, the nature of online speech is often incompatible with traditional law enforcement mechanisms and, therefore, detecting and prosecuting such offences is bound to be difficult. The state may find itself responding disproportionately to situations where harmful content is being spread online, such as by shutting down internet access. Instead of criminalising certain speech, a few democracies have recently turned to codes of conduct that govern the conduct of political actors online. The most notable of these is the Election Pledge developed by the Transatlantic Commission on Election Integrity. Recognising that healthy political engagement online is primarily driven by political actors, the Election Pledge attempts to have these actors publicly and voluntarily commit to above board conduct such as avoiding the spread of mis-and disinformation, avoiding the spread of hate speech, and using personal data appropriately.

The nature of online speech is often incompatible with traditional law enforcement mechanisms and, therefore, detecting and prosecuting such offences is bound to be difficult.

All in all, a number of steps have been taken that in principle should improve the legal framework applicable to elections as they are conducted in the digital age. However, fundamental concerns remain with regard to the procurement of the IEBC’s ICT procurement and its internal capability. At its core, the conduct of the IEBC and political actors involved in the electoral process will determine the credibility of the process. The IEBC has not yet discharged its mandate of establishing in the public mind how it will avoid the debacles of 2017.  Aside from this, the steps taken to safeguard the electorate from practices such as microtargeting seem limited by the provisions of election laws and the proactivity of sector regulators such as the Data Commissioner and the Communications Authority will play a significant role in setting the tone for political actors. In our next article, we will shine a spotlight on the IEBC and consider its readiness to conduct this election in a transparent, credible and lawful manner.

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This article was authored in collaboration with the Kofi Annan Foundation whose electoral integrity programme is supported by the United Nations Democracy Fund.

On 3 May 2022, Al-Shabaab stormed and temporarily seized the African Union military base in the village of El-Baraf in Somalia’s Middle Shabelle region where Burundian forces serving under the AU mission were stationed. The attack is the first by the group since the transition from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to the African Union’s new Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).

On 31 March 2022, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to authorize the African Union’s new Transitional Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) with a mandate to fight Al-Shabaab after 15 years of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM.) This followed the 8 March 2022 authorization of ATMIS by the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC).

While there have been some changes to the mandate of ATMIS, mainly at the margins, the mission will face the same challenges and suffer a similar fate to AMISOM’s when its mandate ends in December 2024 unless three things happen.

First, the Somalia government must resolve its persistent governance issues, including providing services in the regions liberated from Al-Shabaab by ATMIS troops. Secondly, donor countries must provide ATMIS with sustainable and predictable funding, force multipliers, and force enablers. Third, the Troop Contributing Countries must pursue a unified agenda and refrain from interfering with Somalia’s internal affairs.

Conflict in Somalia

The collapse of Somalia’s government in 1991 spurred multiple regional and multilateral efforts to resolve the country’s security and political crisis. Regional countries hosted peace conferences or intervened militarily—unilaterally and via the African Union (AU). The African peacekeeping mission was initially to be deployed for six months to support the transitional government formed after the 2005 peace agreement.

Uganda was the first country to deploy in March 2007 with some 1,650 Ugandan troops. But Al-Shabaab’s attacks on Kampala in July 2010 prompted the deployment of additional forces from Uganda and Burundi.

By mid-2013, AMISOM forces had grown to nearly 18,000 personnel, primarily from Uganda, Burundi, and Kenya, with smaller contingents from Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria. The troops were spread across Somalia, dividing the country into four sectors: Mogadishu Sector 1, led by Uganda; Kismayo Sector 2, led by Kenya; Baidoa Sector 3, led by Ethiopia; and the town of Beledweyne Sector 4, led by Burundi. The deployment of the troops did not deter Al-Shabaab from conducting attacks inside Somalia and sometimes targeting AMISOM troops.

Military operations

AMISOM conducted operations against Al-Shabaab, taking over territory and the group’s sources of revenue. Between February and May 2011, AMISOM launched multiple offensives against Al-Shabaab’s strongholds throughout Mogadishu. By early 2011, AMISOM had gained control of 13 of the capital’s 16 districts, including key revenue sources such as the Bakara market. On 28 September 2012, during Operation Sledgehammer, the Somali National Army and Kenyan naval, air, and ground forces launched a surprise attack on Kismayo, capturing the city and the lucrative port of Kismayo with little resistance from by Al-Shabaab. Operation Eagle commenced in March 2014 and was followed by a second wave of expansion under Operation Indian Ocean in August 2014.

AMISOM conducted operations against Al-Shabaab, taking over territory and the group’s sources of revenue.

These operations drove Al-Shabaab forces out of more than 20 towns across 10 districts in south-central Somalia—an estimated 68 per cent of the strategic locations Al-Shabaab had controlled in 2014.

The operation cut off the group from crucial supply routes and removed Al-Shabaab from its remaining coastal strongholds, including the port of Barawe, the group’s administrative headquarters 100 kilometres south of the capital Mogadishu. Other liberated towns included Tayeeglow, Bulomarer, and Kurtunwaarey.

Delayed elections

While liberating these towns from Al Shabaab was critical, the tension between the president and the prime minister, and the conflict between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States has delayed the elections, diverted attention, resources, and political capital from the provision of services. Somalia conducts its elections indirectly; clan leaders select delegates to electoral colleges, who then choose the parliamentarians to fill the seats of the Lower House. Federal Member State assemblies elect Upper House parliamentarians, and the two houses elect the president who appoints the prime minister.

On 25 July 2020, parliament passed a vote against Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Ali Kheire, accusing him of failing to turn the tide against insecurity and failing to provide a plan for universal suffrage. As required by the constitution, the president appointed a new prime minister on 18 September 2020 and on 24 September parliament unanimously approved the appointment of the new prime minister, Mohamed Hussein Roble. The honeymoon between the president and the prime minister did not last long. On 27 December 2021, the president suspended the prime minister over corruption allegations. The prime minister refused to resign, leading to tension on the streets of Mogadishu between their supporters, with security agencies and clan militias taking sides.

There has always been antagonism between the Federal Member States and Mogadishu, but it has grown sharper since President Mohammed Farmajo came to power in 2017. The tension between Mogadishu and the Federal Member States revolves around delineating power and resource sharing. However, elections require cooperation between the two levels of government. Due to the lack of cooperation, the November 2020 parliamentary election and the February 2021 presidential election were postponed.

On 12 April 2021, President Farmajo signed the bill passed by the Lower House extending his term and that of the parliament by two years. When Farmajo was elected, there was an understanding that the 2020 election would apply the principle of universal suffrage.

The president’s actions have inflamed the country’s already fragile political and security situation. It galvanized the opposition, fractured the security agencies, widened the rift between the federal governments of Jubaland and Puntland, and ignited a bitter power struggle between the president and the prime minister. 

The electoral impasse was resolved on 9 January 2022, after leaders struck a deal to complete parliamentary elections by 25 February 2022.

Troop Contributing Countries

Kenya and Ethiopia have been the two central countries in Somalia’s crisis. They have hosted peace conferences or undertaken military intervention both unilaterally and via the African Union (AU). Some of the outcomes of their actions have been inimical to Somalia’s long-term stability.

Kenya and Ethiopia had a united goal regarding Somalia until Kenya sent its military to Somalia in November 2011. Central to their divergence was Jubaland and who controls it. Jubaland is the centre of gravity in Somalia; it is the breadbasket of the country and the location of the port of Kismayo, giving significant leverage to whoever controls it.

Since coming to power in 2017, President Farmajo has prioritized bringing Jubaland under Mogadishu’s control. But he has faced resistance from Ahmed Mohamed Madobe, the current president of Jubaland. While Ethiopia was always wary of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia, Abiy Ahmed’s accession to power in Ethiopia in April 2018 dramatically shifted Ethiopia’s Somalia policy. Abiy wanted to mend Ethiopia’s relations with regional countries.

When Farmajo was elected, there was an understanding that the 2020 election would apply the principle of universal suffrage.

Kenya-Ethiopia differences played out ahead of the 7 August 2019 Jubaland presidential polls. Tensions escalated between Madobe and Kenya on one side, and Ethiopia and Somalia on the other, with Kenya supporting Madobe while Ethiopia allied itself with Somalia’s President Farmajo in pushing for Madobe’s ouster. Madobe won the election but Mogadishu refused to accept the results.

Following the Jubaland elections, the Leader of the Majority in the National Assembly, Adan Duale—who had been the Kenyan Minister for Defence when Kenya intervened in Somalia—and Yusuf Haji attended Madobe’s inauguration. The plane carrying the Kenyan government delegation flew directly to Kismayo, the capital of Jubaland, against a directive by the Federal Government of Somalia that all international flights pass through Mogadishu.

Under President Farmajo, Kenya and Somalia’s diplomatic relations have witnessed episodes of disagreement where both countries have expelled each other’s ambassadors in protest.

Financing

Sustainable and predictable funding has been a constant issue throughout the lifetime of Somalia’s peacekeeping mission. Since 2004, the European Union (EU) African Peace Facility (AFP) has been the primary funding stream for the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), including peacekeeping missions. Since 2007, the EU has provided nearly €2.3 billion to AMISOM.

In January 2016, the EU cut AMISOM peacekeeper stipends by 20%, reducing each soldier’s payment from US$ 1,028 to US$822 per soldier per month. As a result, some troops have gone for months without pay.

The move led to protests by troops from contributing countries. In December 2016, Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza threatened to withdraw Burundian troops from AMISOM. In 2015 the EU suspended all its aid to Burundi after violence broke out, prompted by President Nkurunziza’s bid to seek a third term in office, contrary to the 2000 Arusha Accord.

There has always been antagonism between the Federal Member States and Mogadishu, but it has grown sharper since President Mohammed Farmajo came to power in 2017.

Burundi has more than 5,000 troops in Somalia. Uganda, which has 5 000 troops, also threatened to pull its troops out of Somalia in protest. Burundi was not the only country to protest the cuts; Uganda and Kenya also protested the drop in funding.

The Africa Peace Facility transitioned into to the European Peace Facility (EPF) on 1 July 2021, enabling the EU to bypass the AU and directly pay for regional and national military initiatives. For the first time, Brussels will finance lethal equipment for African armies, a move that has implications for ATMIS stability and predictability of funding.

The framing of the Somalia situation as pure counterterrorism has made military force the inevitable solution. However, this approach has failed to defeat Al-Shabaab and turn around Somalia’s fortunes. Instead, it has led to a stalemate. Decades into the conflict—it will be almost two decades by the time the term of ATMIS comes to an end—Al-Shabaab has become the face of Somalia’s crisis.

ATMIS provides an opportunity to examine the current Somalia crisis through a civil war lens. Civil wars end through a negotiated settlement. Political negotiations with Al-Shabaab are a more sustainable means of resolving the decades-long Somalia crisis.