Some time back in May 2020, an incident occurred in Mombasa that stunned the nation. The Daily Nation reported a story of a Kisauni widow who was forced to boil stones to give her children false hope that she had some food for them. The story sent shockwaves across the country and ignited a conversation about the magnitude of the hunger plaguing Kenyan households.

The story of Peninah Kitsao is not an isolated incident. All over the country, ordinary Kenyans are struggling to put food on the table due to biting inflation that has seen commodity prices soar to nearly unaffordable levels. Failed rains and a drought of a severity never witnessed before in the history of the country, especially in northern Kenya, have worsened a dire situation.

Interventions by state and non-state actors have arguably not been enough as there have been reports from certain parts, such as Samburu, of people drinking dirty water and eating dog meat to survive. The country is essentially in a deep hole. Coupled with the drying up of the rivers and lakes that used to serve vulnerable communities, it is safe to say that the government and other agencies have had blind spots in dealing with the situation.

Route to Food Initiative’s graphic novel The Blind Spot, which is written and illustrated by Chief Nyamweya, should be read against the backdrop of some of these startling developments. The work of committed art is to expose the ills in society, not just by dropping popular catchphrases and revolutionary slogans, but by disturbing the conscience of the nation. Such works of art are expected to put us on track for what needs to be done to set things right.

That’s exactly what Nyamweya’s comic offering is all about.

Worrying policy gaps

The central issues of food security and the welfare of smallholder farmers shine throughout the slim graphic novel, bringing into sharp focus policy gaps and a lack of commitment from leaders to correct the mistakes of the past.

The visual narrative opens with a protest by Kajibora residents and farmers at the Kajibora County Hall. Chanting outside the county governor’s residence, the agitated crowd demands justice for one of their own, Karisa, who has committed suicide after auctioneers sell his land to recover an unpaid debt.

The protest also provides the space and opportunity for the residents and farmers to demand “lower prices on food, better quality food and enhanced protection of Kenya’s ecosystems [and] land reforms.” Demonstrations are not new in the country; with livelihoods threatened by forces beyond their control even as the national and county governments drag their feet to alleviate the suffering, it is inevitable that ordinary people would take such drastic measures.

The Mzee Maona-led Jembe Revolution calls on Governor Nyoni to deal with food insecurity as a human rights issue and to protect smallholder farmers from predatory multinationals. The corporations are often accused of exploitation through the introduction of harmful production methods and industrial processes that threaten biodiversity.

The fictionalised revolution echoes the vigorous pushback by various stakeholders, including farmers, politicians and ordinary Kenyans, who have questioned the government’s proposal to introduce genetically modified foods.

While those in support of the introduction of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the country have a valid argument that Kenya and the continent at large are dealing with a serious food crisis that needs never-before-tested solutions, those against them argue that farmers and consumers are likely to suffer. This is because there are growing fears that the multinationals that distribute GM seeds will have the monopoly to dictate to farmers which seeds to use, and the scenario is likely to deny them the agency to produce food on their own terms and according to their preferences.

Putting Western interests first

In other words, the prioritisation of Western interests, as it often emerges in Nyamweya’s narrative, where the governor is accused of focusing on “the large scale production of a few food crops and protecting the interests of big agribusiness”, is a reality that policymakers will have to contend with to effectively address the issue of food security in the country.

A DW documentary titled Africa, GMOs and Western Interests, which aired two months ago, revealed the hidden hand of philanthropists such as Bill Gates, through the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, in pushing for the introduction of GMOs in select African countries to benefit private businesses in the West. Therefore, when Kajibora farmers and residents, through their Chama cha Wakulima (CCW) party, wave a placard reading SAVE OUR SEEDS, they are not expressing a grievance coming from without but a genuine fear born out of the reality that, on the one hand, the forces of globalisation are unavoidable (food production systems and the overall supply chain can never only be local) and on the other, the reality of the weak political system that hardly prioritises the interests of its citizens, least of all smallholder farmers.

To give credit where it is due, President William Ruto’s introduction of the fertiliser subsidy is likely to be a game changer for a majority of farmers who are unable to afford the essential commodity. The subsidised fertiliser is retailing at KSh3,500 for a 50kg bag, down from KSh6,000. The use of technology for registration (farmers use their phones) will also help eliminate red tape and corruption and thus improve efficiency in distribution, which is key to the timely use of the fertiliser to boost yields.

The cries and anxieties of the Kajibora farmers take a dramatic twist following the death of Mzee Maona when CCW is wracked by fissures as various members pull in different directions. As is characteristic of Kenyan political parties not founded on a solid vision and ideology, the core issues—such as sustainable agriculture for the farmers—that define the party’s agenda become a footnote. Instead, the so-called ideological differences (a euphemism for selfish interests) erupt during the requiem mass for Maona when party members engage in a vicious fistfight before the bereaved mourners.

Enter the scions of Mzee Maona, Sifa and Yona—highly educated, exposed and polished but with contrastingly opposing views on how to reimagine the patriarch’s vision of putting the farmers’ agenda first—and the narrative is set for a fascinating climax.

What emerges from the troubled relationship between Sifa, a professor, and Yona, now an aspiring Kajibora governor, are the intra-generational tensions of how to approach the pressures and complicated issues that have become synonymous with modern living. This is especially true when it comes to championing the rights of ordinary people such as farmers.

As is characteristic of Kenyan political parties not founded on a solid vision and ideology, the core issues that defined the party’s agenda become a footnote.

Sifa is distrustful of the political process for fixing societal issues. She is an advocate of fighting for human rights from outside the political process since, in politics, you “promise the people paradise while only delivering paperwork”. While her worldview is sometimes abstract and detached and elitist, she deserves credit for not losing focus on the immediate priorities that should be urgently addressed to make life better for small-scale farmers.

Yona, on the other hand, styles himself as a pragmatist and realist who is in touch with what is happening on the ground but comes across as vain, selfish and arrogant. He is a perfect representative of Kenya’s political class for whom governance is about foreign investment, rather than the people. He says that “a key part [of his] job as governor will be to attract investment to Kajibora”. This includes doing the bidding of multinationals like Green Shots Corporation, which is accused of controlling the food prices and the supply chains that are vital to farmers and consumers.

The role of the youth

However, what is poignant in the clash between Mzee Maona’s two grandchildren is the involvement of the youth—whether for good or bad—in debating the issues of food security and fair agricultural policies. While their approaches are often different, there is a genuine concern and passion that, in real life, should be encouraged and even rewarded.

Statistics indicate that the average age of the Kenyan farmer is 61 years. A revival of the 4K Clubs that were the craze in the 1990s under the 8-4-4 education system has been mooted as a way to entice young people to return to the soil. These are noble interventions that are likely to boost agricultural output since the youthful population is not just energetic enough to take up the challenge but also because modern farming involves access to the right information which a tech-savvy generation can exploit in this digital age.

When Dalili, a member of the CCW and a former close ally of Mzee Maona, encourages Sifa to join them on the anniversary of Jembe Day commemorating the revolt of Kajibora farmers and residents, she is essentially signalling a new way of addressing food insecurity. She tells Sifa that “our youth need to see where it all started”. The statement is profound because it acknowledges both the complexity and enormity of the task of streamlining food systems and the urgent need to bring diverse groups of people on board.

More importantly, sustainable agriculture has the potential to create jobs for thousands of jobless youth unable to secure the increasingly elusive white-collar jobs. According to the November 2022 Agriculture Sector Survey, the industry “employs over 40 percent of the total population and more than 70 percent of the rural populace”. This is a significant figure that is likely to increase even more if the youth are given the incentive to join forces in the overall agricultural production process.

Missing voices 

Nyamweya’s only shortcoming is the exclusion of the voices of ordinary farmers from the entire narrative. As is characteristic of top-down policies, and unlike the bottom-up approach, there is a tendency to speak on behalf of the masses, to pretend to know what is best for them. A majority of the characters in the text speak of the “right” agricultural policies and approaches that need to be adopted to boost yields and food security. However, ironically, they behave like the multinationals that often impose their decisions on farmers without taking their views.

The approach is fraught with its own blind spots, not just because it is condescending to the farmers—those who are directly affected—but also because it poses the risk of aggravating an already bad situation. Talking about revolutions and uprisings is not enough to effectively transform the agricultural sector, even if the calls are to rid it of the cartels and the brokers present along the production chain.

Also, an erudite knowledge of the politics of food and the manipulation by multinationals cannot replace the basic principle that the farmer has to, first and foremost, speak for himself or herself. Does the farmer want to experiment with other seeds? Is the farmer only interested in the large-scale cultivation of staple foods? Is the farmer comfortable with the multinationals? What exactly is in the farmer’s mind? It is not always necessary that all foreign players that intervene in formulating agricultural policies have ulterior motives. One Acre Fund, an organisation founded by a non-Kenyan, has significantly helped smallholder farmers in western Kenya boost their farm output through the use of the right seeds and agricultural techniques and methods. I have seen this first-hand.

The statement is profound because it acknowledges both the complexity and enormity of the task of streamlining food systems and the urgent need to bring diverse groups of people on board.

However, despite the aforementioned shortcomings, Nyamweya’s artistic intervention cannot be downplayed. The issue of food security cannot be left to politicians and policymakers alone. This is not just because food is a basic need, but because a healthy and productive nation has the potential to improve the life expectancy and of children afflicted by malnutrition.

More importantly, a visual narrative approach is a welcome addition to a radical way of acknowledging the enormous capacity of art to surprise and reimagine how to deal with the existential anxieties of our time, such as food insecurity, climate change-induced drought and destruction of biodiversity. It is also a wake-up call to leaders, policymakers and other stakeholders that the conventional way of dealing with the challenges affecting farmers might have to change. Nyamweya’s book is a must-read for everyone who cares deeply about the future of our country and the coming generations.

Ethiopia has taken centre stage over the last four years, with a Nobel Peace Prize winning Prime Minister propelled to power by a four-year civil protest movement quickly leading the country into multiple internal war fronts. The last two years, in particular, have seen many begin to wonder if the Ethiopian state itself will survive the compounding conflicts, given that they are rooted in a tumultuous, contested, and violent past. The most recent and significant development in the tectonic shifts that have been breaking social and political ground in the country occurred on the 22nd of January 2023.

Three Oromo archbishops of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church announced the formation of an Oromo Orthodox Church Synod, with 26 patriarchs appointed to lead the synod across Oromia. In stark opposition to the new synod, a large number of Ethiopian Orthodox Church members, particularly those of an Amhara ethnic background, have been coming out in protest at the breaking up of the church, citing it as a violation beyond politics, and a breach of holy religious law.

The government, which has been supportive of the Oromo Synod has – in the manner in which it regularly responds to any expression of civil dissent – responded with state violence, shooting at protesters and, for a short while, shutting down the Internet and telecommunication services.

On the 13th of February, the Oromia Media Network reported that the new Synod is in the process of supporting the formation of synods of other national and ethnic identities, naming the Gambela, Gumuz, Sidama, Gurage, and Gamo as amongst those that will be forming their own Orthodox Church Synods in the near future.

Historical context

The Ethiopian Orthodox Church has existed since the 4th century and belongs to the broader body of Orthodox churches that include the Coptic, Syrian, and Armenian Orthodox churches, and the Syrian Orthodox Church of India. The liturgical language of the church is Ge’ez, a Semitic language originating from northern Ethiopia and Eritrea, with Amharic also being used in the church today. Orthodox believers make up approximately 30 per cent of Ethiopia’s population and Amharic, the language of the Amhara ethnic group who make up approximately 22 per cent of Ethiopia’s overall population, is the official working language of Ethiopia.

Language, and the social and political power that it comes with, is one of the reasons that supporters of the Oromo Orthodox Synod believe that this recent shift is necessary. Cultural marginalization has been the experience of the Oromo and other national and cultural groups in the country since the formation of the Ethiopian state in the 1800s, a formation that the Ethiopian Orthodox Church was instrumental in spearheading.

When Menelik II began his expeditions into the Oromia heartland with the intent of consolidating the new state of Ethiopia, the proponents of this project came across a people who lived, worked, and worshipped predominately in Afaan Oromo. In particular, they practiced Waaqeefatta, the monotheistic religion of the Oromo.

Cultural marginalization has been the experience of the Oromo and other national and cultural groups in the country since the formation of the Ethiopian state in the 1800s.

Even though the popular narrative is that Ethiopia was never colonized, one of the impacts that Menelik achieved with the support of the Showan Amhara conquerors who were armed by the West was the upheaval of Oromo religious, cultural and political practice. This was replaced by the church’s own religious beliefs, as they were considered the only way to effectively commune with God.

In Ethiopia, as in much of the world, religion has always had political undertones. Historical narratives recounting both Protestant Christianity and Islam being used by Oromos to counter the effects of cultural and political domination experienced through the combined efforts of the Orthodox Church and the Ethiopian state speak to these political undertones.

Is the split really unprecedented?

Politics pervades every aspect of life everywhere, and although we would like to think that spiritual matters are beyond politics, there is perhaps nothing as politically charged as the relationships religions have with people, with states, and with the desire for social change.

Schisms and splits that occur for political reasons are not a new phenomenon in the world of Orthodox Christianity. In the 17th century, a movement to establish religious uniformity between Greek and Russian Orthodox practice was met with resistance that eventually saw a split into “Old Believers” and the official Russian Orthodox Church.

The reason for the split was disagreement over the introduction into the Russian Orthodox Church of specific religious rituals that belong to the Greek Orthodox tradition. Although it began as a disagreement about religious protocol, it developed into a movement where different parts of Russian society began to voice dissent against the feudal order led by leaders in the church.

There are obvious and significant differences between the 17th-century Russian split and what Ethiopia is facing today, but in order to avoid viewing the split within the Ethiopian Orthodox Church as entirely unprecedented, we should see the formation of the Oromo Orthodox Synod in the larger context of movements that have taken place in the history of the church, whereby politics and faith have collided to create new institutions and communities.

Is this just about religion?

The formation of the Oromo Orthodox Synod has an impact on much more than just how people practice their faith. This event signals greater shifts that have been on the political horizon in Ethiopia for the last four years.

Opposition to the formation of the Oromo Orthodox Synod has been defined by language describing it as an affront to the church’s values of “oneness”; the full name of the church is the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, with the word “Tewahedo” meaning “to be made one” in the Amharic language.

The ideal of “oneness” or “unity” versus the reality has been at the heart of Ethiopia’s most critical political issues. The Ethiopian state has, in concert with the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, had a history of violently assimilating a deeply diverse people and, in the same breath, defining itself as a beacon of unity. What we must understand is that what might be a breach of oneness and unity for one people, is for another people an act of revolution and decolonization.

The solution to this crisis, in my opinion, is not for the formation of the Oromo or other prospective synods to be stopped. Instead, as I think is the solution to many of Ethiopia’s issues, people must be willing to hear stories from the other side of the political divide in order to better engage the social and political changes of the now, and of the future.

I think that this is just the beginning and that although separation, like all change, can cause confusion, grief, and uncertainty, it can sometimes be the boldest step we can take towards building a new social contract for togetherness, cohesion, and harmony.

Statehouse has all but turned into a house of religion since President William Ruto took office. I am all for the freedom of worship and have nothing against Christianity. But what happens when the president of a secular state whose citizens are of many faiths keeps quoting the Bible (sometimes inaccurately)? And what does this mean when it happens at a time of welfare reform when almost all state subsidies are being scrapped and taxes are being increased daily? Could there be a relationship between the president’s evangelising and the greater emphasis on individual responsibility in this neoliberal era?

The church has throughout history has been used to advance various political interests and Kenya is no different. Through the missionaries, the church essentially acted as a facilitator of colonialism, which was justified as the white man’s burden whose philosophy was underpinned by the three pillars of Christianity, commerce and civilization. Imposed by colonial military power, mission Christianity went on to become the dominant religion in the country, with numerous strands and manifestations. But to date, most Africans, even the most educated, refuse to acknowledge the colonial dimension of the missionaries’ enterprise. Perhaps it is this denial that has emboldened the neoliberal machine in using the evangelical movement to advance its own interests.

Christianity has grown at an impressive rate in the country since it was first introduced in the 19th century. From relatively insignificant numbers in the early 1900s, the Christian population in Kenya had grown to about 53 per cent of the population by 1962 at the time of independence, and to more than 80 per cent by the 2010s. Given that a significant proportion of citizens is affiliated to the Christian religion, it makes sense that the neoliberal machine would seek to interact with the church and align the church with its values. Drawing from David Harvey’s writings on how the way people experience space and time is influenced by the political economy of the time, Stephen Keating writes that for capitalist regimes to function, they need to bring individual behaviours under a semblance of uniformity (neoliberalism). As individuals internalize whatever social rules dominate that era, similar rules/ideologies manifest in their social institutions, including in churches. This is to say that, under a neoliberal world order, the church is likely to espouse neoliberal values.

Neoliberalism benefits from the church in that it finds an ally who can evangelize on its behalf among the proletariat, who are the most likely to reject neoliberal policies, thereby co-opting the segments of society who would object to their implementation by the social, economic and political elites. However, the injustices that neoliberalism perpetuates are everything that the scriptures ask us to reject and, therefore, the church should reject any attempts at co-option by a neoliberal government. Moreover, it is important to remember that according to the constitution, Kenya is a secular state. Historically, one of the constitution’s main functions has been to regulate the relationship between state and religion — either by establishing a dominant religion in the constitution or by not establishing one. Kenya’s current constitution, which was voted in by 69 per cent of voters, clearly establishes Kenya as a secular state.

This same constitution also provides for freedom of religious expression and some would argue that, in attending church services, the president is simply exercising his constitutional right. However, the president does not attend these church services in his personal capacity as a private citizen but does so as the head of state. His attendance is highly publicized including through his official social media platforms. His actions could therefore be construed to be state evangelism. This evangelism did not begin with Ruto’s entry into statehouse. While on the campaign trail Ruto often called upon God and positioned the electoral contest as a spiritual battle rather than a political contest. Ruto echoed the same sentiments at a service during an official visit to South Korea in late 2022, stating that “In the last election, it was not just about issues of politics, it was also a referendum between those who believe in God and those who believed in men. And those who believed in God won.” In addition to this narrative of the election being a “spiritual battle”, Ruto also presented his election as a win for the “hustler”, for the common man who had long suffered under former president Uhuru Kenyatta’s government that catered to the interests of the bourgeoisie.

One of the institutions that has been used to amplify Ruto’s rallying cry for a wider tax base is the church.

How are these two narratives related? In his 1976 paper, The Religion of the Poor: Escape or Creative Force, Harry Lefever invites us to consider an alternative explanation of the religious behaviour of the low-income demographic, deviating from the misconstrued perception of religion as the opium for the poor, an escape from the conditions that surround them, a perception frequently attributed to Marx without any regard for the words that precede this frequently cited dictum.  Instead, Lefever calls us to think of religion as a creative force, with religious expression in the masses arising out of a social dislocation that creates its own identity and values.

What Ruto managed to do was to co-opt religion as a protest function and combine it with bottom-up hustler economics, creating a political identity. This clearly worked in his favour and, fast-forward to six months after the election, he continues to evangelize as part of his political identity. Ruto’s evangelism, however, in typical neoliberal fashion, is that it ignores structural solutions to the country’s problems and instead calls for individual solutions such as through “prayer”. Ruto’s presidency began with a wave of highly noticeable structural adjustments. These structural adjustments are neoliberal policies that are often part of the conditionalities attached to aid from the Bretton Woods institutions. Under the International Monetary Fund directives, the president announced the scrapping of fuel and maize subsidies among other measures that include increased taxes. These measures come at a time when most Kenyans are grappling with the high cost of living, record inflation and multi-season drought.

One of the institutions that has been used to amplify Ruto’s rallying cry for a wider tax base is the church. During a service at Faith Evangelical Ministries in Karen, the president asked that people pray so that revenue collection may increase to 25 per cent of GDP. There can be no better example of the church being used to evangelize for the neoliberal state. It is also remarkable how similar Ruto’s calls for austerity to eliminate “the cancer of debt that is threatening to destabilise the economy” (that were made at an interdenominational service in Kirinyaga) are to the evangelical call for self-discipline. By making this statement in a church, Ruto manages to place the state’s debt within a spiritual frame, reducing it to a problem that can be solved simply through austerity and heavier taxation. But the existence of debt is central to neoliberalism, and the success of a neoliberal world order requires the existence of indebted subjects. Consequently, lending to the poor (the Global South) has become a highly lucrative industry for international financial institutions while the exploitative arrangements that accompany such credit are presented as inevitable or problematic yet necessary.

Yet the reality is that these arrangements only further impoverish millions and cast aside local development to “open up” the country to capital outflows to multinationals. This is the IMF’s and World Bank’s preferred way of doing business; making it easier for wealth extraction by foreign private entities. Moreover, the bailouts extended by these institutions only allow a country to pay its existing debt by contracting even more debt. If anything then, Ruto should call this out and use the scriptures to denounce these structural injustices. While Christian teaching does highlight the need for self-discipline and financial responsibility, it also denounces unjust systems (Isaiah 10:1-2; Amos 5:10-15). In addition to condemning injustice and those who make unjust laws, God also prescribes what justice is. In Isaiah 1:17, God says “Learn to do right; seek justice. Defend the oppressed. Take up the cause of the fatherless; plead the case of the widow.” In Isaiah 1:13, God calls out those who offer meaningless offerings and prayers saying, “Stop bringing meaningless offerings! Your incense is detestable to me. New Moons, Sabbaths and convocations — I cannot bear your worthless assemblies.”

The existence of debt is central to neoliberalism, and the success of a neoliberal world order requires the existence of indebted subjects.

Indeed then, God is telling us that he requires more than just prayers and worship services from us; he wants us to instead practice justice by taking up the causes of the oppressed, after which he invites us to settle the matter (Isaiah 1:18). Let Ruto then draw on these teachings and scriptures to denounce the unjust systems that have led Kenya to the precarious economic state it is in and while at it, advance theologies of economic and social justice. Neoliberalism as an ideology only hurts the majority, and those who misconstrue quotes from religious texts, while those continuing to push for declarations that hurt the so-called hustler are frauds. Let us not allow the gospel and the church to be used to consecrate neoliberal practices. The gospel is good news for the poor — and any affirmation of the gospel by religious and political actors while continuing to do nothing about the worsening economic conditions is bad theology that is devoid of praxis.