Connect with us
close

Op-Eds

Hate Speech: Rwanda Must Not Fall Back Into the Pre-Genocide Trap

4 min read.

To avoid mimicking the situation prevailing in pre-genocide Rwanda, the country must develop an independent and efficient judicial system that is able to enforce sanctions against hate speech.

Published

on

Hate Speech: Rwanda Must Not Fall Back Into the Pre-Genocide Trap

During the years that preceded the genocide against the Tutsi, there was an increase in hate speech against people of Tutsi ethnicity and those who did not hold views similar to those of the government.

Members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a rebel group made up of Rwandan refugees that had launched an attack against the Rwandan army in the early 90s, were described in the media and by some government officials at the time as Inyangarwanda or enemies of state and as Abana b’inyenzi or children of cockroaches.

Rwandans of Tutsi ethnicity and members of the opposition not affiliated to the ruling party were repeatedly described as inyenzi, or cockroaches, as inzoka or snakes, and as ibyisto or spies. During the genocide these people were targeted, hunted down and killed.

After the genocide and the ensuing civil war that was ultimately won by the RPF, legislation that forbids the formation of political parties along ethnic lines and that punishes speech deemed hateful or promoting ethnic or racial division was passed. Moreover, over the decades, various high-ranking officials in Rwanda have been heard calling on the youth to actively participate on social media to neutralize, to refute and to fight against those who talk about things that are not relevant, that are not in line with Rwanda, or who share untrue stories that aim to spread the genocide ideology.

These measures have done nothing to counter hate speech, particularly against those who dare or are perceived to challenge the Rwandan government’s narrative or policies.

I know this because I have experienced it.

I returned to Rwanda from exile in the Netherlands in January 2010 intending to register my political party and run in the upcoming presidential election. On the day of my return to Rwanda, I visited the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre in Gisozi and gave a speech urging unity and reconciliation. I said that for Rwanda to experience true reconciliation, we need to recognise all crimes committed in Rwanda, including the genocide perpetrated against the Tutsi and the crimes against humanity committed against the Hutu. My opinion was based on United Nations Report S/1994/1405.

Just three months later, I was arrested and dragged into a politically motivated judicial process. The courts in Rwanda convicted me of “grossly minimizing the genocide” and  “conspiracy to harm the existing authority and the constitutional principles using terrorism, armed violence or any other type of violence”. I appealed to the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, which ruled that the Rwandan state had violated my right to a fair trial. In 2018, I was released early by presidential pardon, after eight years of detention, five of which I spent in solitary confinement.

Since my release, I have continued to advocate for the establishment of genuine democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law in Rwanda. My detractors have also been working hard on social media to turn the public against me and discourage me in my struggle by constantly using hate speech against me, describing me as a “genocide denier”, a “terrorist” and a “tropical nazi”. A TV Channel in Rwanda called My250TV has even gone as far as to openly state that “I should be arrested at least and killed at best”.

Three years ago, I flagged the use of hate speech against me to the agents of the Rwanda Investigation Bureau and was assured that the concerned individuals would be impressed upon to cease their actions. However, the campaign of hate against me continues unabated.

Since my release, I have continued to advocate for the establishment of genuine democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law in Rwanda.

As soon as I published an op-ed that argued that having the largest number of women in parliament is not enough to liberate women in Rwanda and that without political reforms Rwandans would continue to seek refuge abroad, Rwandan officials of ministerial and ambassadorial rank as well as members of parliament joined in the smear campaign against me and publicly stated on social media that I support a “genocidal ideology” and that my speech is inciting yet another genocide in Rwanda. Others have even gone as far as claiming on international platforms that I had escaped justice for acts of genocide.

Hate speech is not only deployed against me; It is deployed against anyone. No one is spared —Rwandan or foreigner—who dares or is perceived to challenge the Rwandan government’s narrative or policy. We are referred to as abanzi b’igihugu or enemies of the state, as ibigarasha or waste, as those who imbibed the genocide ideology with our mothers’ milk.

Hate speech is also used against Rwandan refugees who have not returned to Rwanda, their refusal to return constantly attributed to their guilty conscience because of the crimes of genocide they committed in Rwanda. Moreover, in the same way that members of the RPF were described as children of cockroaches when they were fighting to return to their motherland, the descendants of public officials of the regime overthrown by the RPF are today described as “children of genocidaires”—but only when they challenge or question the Rwandan government.

Freedom On The Net 2022 has also observed that social media accounts with government affiliations regularly harass individuals who post online comments considered critical of the government. It reports that the Rwandan government has mobilized social media users to counter the views of individuals deemed to be “enemies of the state”. This so-called “Twitter Army” has systematically attacked and discredited individuals and media outlets that criticize the government. It also explains that these social media users are rewarded for their attacks with appointments or nominations to jobs at government institutions and private companies that have ties to the ruling party.

It is, however, important to also highlight the use of hate speech against Rwandan authorities by some of their opponents who described them as abavantara or foreigners and Inyenzi or cockroaches.

This so-called “Twitter Army” has systematically attacked and discredited individuals and media outlets that criticize the government.

What the foregoing demonstrates is that Rwanda has yet to attain reconciliation. It also shows that the country’s elites are failing to engage in healthy debate on the real issues confronting Rwanda today in a manner that reflects mutual respect and Rwandaness. It also gives the impression that the priority in Rwanda is to silence dissenting voices and restrict the freedom of expression.

But it does not have to be this way.

To counter hate speech, Rwanda needs to develop an efficient judicial system, one that is independent and able to competently enforce sanctions against anyone who uses hate speech. To avoid mimicking the situation prevailing in pre-genocide Rwanda, senior officials calling on the youth to use social media to challenge Rwandan government opponents must be explicit in the manner in which the youth should go about doing this. It should be in a manner that eschews hate speech and that reflects Rwandan cultural values of dignity, unity or Rwandaness, and nobility, as highlighted in the Rwandan Cultural Values in National Development, a document published by the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission.

Support The Elephant.

The Elephant is helping to build a truly public platform, while producing consistent, quality investigations, opinions and analysis. The Elephant cannot survive and grow without your participation. Now, more than ever, it is vital for The Elephant to reach as many people as possible.

Your support helps protect The Elephant's independence and it means we can continue keeping the democratic space free, open and robust. Every contribution, however big or small, is so valuable for our collective future.

By

Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza is Rwandan politician, former political prisoner and the founder and chair of the Development and Liberty for All (DALFA-Umurinzi) political party, which is yet to be registered in Rwanda.

Op-Eds

Sweet Beauty

In Senegal, women’s bodies are weaponized as political objects in electoral battles.

Published

on

Sweet Beauty
Photo: Four women on the road between Dakar and Mbour. Image credit Carsten ten Brink via Flickr CC BY-NC-ND 2.0

On June 1, 2023, Senegalese courts finally ruled on the Sweet Beauty case, in which Adji Sarr, a young woman employed at the Sweet Beauty massage parlor, had accused Ousmane Sonko, a 2024 presidential elections candidate and the leader of the African Patriots for Work, Ethics and Fraternity political party (Pastef), of rape and making death threats against her in February of 2021.

Sonko was acquitted of the death threats, but the rape charges were requalified into that of corrupting the youth. He was sentenced to two years in prison and fined 600,000 CFA francs (1,000 USD). They also ordered him to pay 20 million CFA francs to Adji Sarr (33,000 USD). Ndèye Khady Ndiaye, the owner of Sweet Beauty, was sentenced to two years imprisonment for incitement to debauchery. They fined her 600,000 CFA francs as well, and ordered the closing of Sweet Beauty.

Following this verdict, violent unrest shook Senegal for days, resulting in people’s deaths, widespread sexual assault, and the ransacking of public and private property. According to official sources, more than 20 people died, 500 were arrested, and eight cases of sexual violence against women were reported, as well as numerous cases of missing persons.

Many, especially feminists, were troubled by the verdict, which they found ambiguous and confusing. Whichever way one looks at it, this verdict deals a significant blow to the fight for women’s rights in Senegal, particularly with regards to the gains that have been made towards criminalizing rape. In this case, rape was not ruled out, but was reclassified as a corruption of youth charge instead. However, the unhealthy nature of Ousmane Sonko’s sexual relationship with Adji Sarr has been established.

According to legal experts, the corruption of youth charge refers to an adult who imposes a form of moral constraint or psychological pressure on a young person under the age of 21. At the time of the incident, Adji Sarr was 19 and Ousmane Sonko was 46. Given Adji Sarr’s precarious social status, this verdict suggests that there was illicit sexual contact between the two, but Sarr was not raped by Sonko.

Rape is one of the most challenging crimes to prove, especially because in Senegal, a sexist legal system places the burden on survivors to prove they were raped. Those who believe in the word of survivors like Adji Sarr, conclude that Ousmane Sonko’s public profile and notoriety helped him win a favorable ruling from the judge who re-characterized a set of facts which would have resulted in  a crime punishable by ten years imprisonment.

However, Ndèye Khady Ndiaye’s criminal conviction shows that the massage parlor was not intended for licit activities. The massage parlor’s packages, such as the “body-body”, “happy ending” had sexual connotations. Some say that although this is not a morality trial, but it is suspect that a 46-year-old man and member of parliament who is aspiring to be president, would frequent—late at night and during a COVID-imposed curfew—a shady massage parlor where a socially and economically vulnerable 19-year-old woman was working in a profession that made her an easy sexual prey.

Rape is widespread and commonplace in Senegal, and the men accused are rarely convicted. The verdict on the Sweet Beauty case shows that Senegalese judicial authorities (who are predominantly men) seem reluctant to apply the recent law criminalizing rape. As a reminder, despite the decades-long struggle led by women’s associations to criminalize rape in Senegal, the courts previously considered rape a simple misdemeanor The law instituting its criminalization was only voted for in January 2020, after several cases of rape followed by murder that happened in the country in the previous years. The frequency of rape charges being reclassified as misdemeanors illustrates the reluctance of the courts to apply the recent law.

All the discussions and actions surrounding the trial and its verdict reveal many social realities in Senegal, not least the vulnerability of young girls in a patriarchal environment fortified by the exploitation of their vulnerability. The socio-economic fragility of young women like Adji Sarr, places them at the crossroads of several oppressions, at the heart of which are sexism, classism, and sexual exploitation. Deteriorating living standards also particularly weakens young people and women, who are doubly affected. The radicalization of political discourse and the closure of civic space contribute to silencing women. We are witnessing the advance of a self-centered male discourse in which the grievances of Senegalese women remain on the periphery and are not considered.

By using this private affair for political ends, both sides—the opposition and the ruling party—are united on one point: to undermine women’s voices and weaponize their bodies. Their instrumentalization of Sarr’s case accentuates their subordination in a misogynistic society. The entire country is caught between the whims of two powerful men. Furthermore, President Macky Sall’s silence on whether or not he intends to run for a third term disadvantages women and highlights their vulnerability. His silence has served as a pretext for politicizing a private affair between two Senegalese citizens. Adji Sarr’s body is thus tossed between the two leaders’ camps and used as a punching bag.

In recent weeks, national and international media has broadcasted a misogynistic show in which Senegalese men, including high-profile intellectuals, engage in a duel of words in the media, invisibilizing Adji Sarr and trivializing her rape. Many Senegalese people, including Ousmane Sonko, do not even know what constitutes rape. In the collective imagination, rape is just flirtation that goes too far.

By making fun of his victim’s physical appearance with abject remarks such as “If I had to rape, I would not rape someone who looks like a monkey who had a stroke,” Ousmane Sonko reveals how he considers sexual assault to be a form of flattery, a favor granted to any worthy woman. Beyond the animalistic caricature of her  and  the ableism of his words, Ousmane Sonko ignores that rape is neither romantic nor about sexual attraction. Rape is about power and control and has nothing to do with the victim’s appearance. Otherwise, babies and toddlers would not be sexually assaulted. An example of this is the current case of the 36 girls aged between six and 16 who have been sexually abused by a Koranic teacher near Touba.

Furthermore those who accuse Adji Sarr of being manipulative are being sexist and infantilizing. These allegations suggest that women cannot formulate accusations on their own. It reinforces sexist stereotypes and minimizes the voices of women who report sexual violence. This assumption also questions the value of the words of rape survivors. Every time a rape survivor comes forward, she must put in much physical and psychological effort. Just as there is no typical rapist, there is not a perfect survivor. Each survivor works through her trauma differently and remakes her life in her own way. Adji Raby Sarr is no exception. Nor is Mr. Sonko, even if he is known by the sobriquet “mu sell mi,” The Holy One.

Rape is a weapon of domination, and women are the first to pay the price. Over the course of the recent unrest, eight women were raped: three students at the Assane Seck University in Ziguinchor, and five others by hooded men who attacked the Columbia hotel bar in Diamniadio. Women’s bodies have been commodified and turned into public property to be plundered like the commodities stolen during demonstrations by looters; to be grabbed and consumed at will.

Senegalese women’s voices must free themselves from the grip of politicians craving power. The facts surrounding the Sweet Beauty case must be reported in their unforgiving truth, notwithstanding the assumptions, prejudices, preconceptions, and stereotypes that they embed. Their chronology leaves no doubt in the mind of a free thinker. Senegalese politicians exploited a private affair for their own political ends and to shield a political leader from having to answer for his actions. That the same affair was used by the other side to eliminate a political adversary is possible, especially given the country’s recent history. Politicians have undermined women’s voices and bodies by mixing politics and private affairs.

The reputation of the Senegalese state as an exceptional example of democracy in Africa is nothing but a mirage. It has been built to the detriment of women, women who have not been able to express the suffering they endure on a daily basis in a hypocritical society. We are witnessing the expression of Senegalese masculinity in perfect hegemony against a backdrop of the destruction and abuse of women.

This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site every week.

Continue Reading

Op-Eds

Divesting from Nigeria’s Crude Oil: The Indigenisation of Eco-Damage

As indigenous oil and gas firms take over from international oil companies, Nigeria’s coastal and marine ecosystems are experiencing extensive damage due to unsustainable practices and a lack of environmental commitments.

Published

on

By

Divesting from Nigeria's Crude Oil: The Indigenisation of Eco-Damage

In recent times, international oil companies IOCs) have started divesting from Nigerian crude oil and gas. They are in the process of selling off their assets and exploring alternative sources of revenue. This trend has been triggered by several factors top among them being the global energy transition. Other reasons can be attributed to an unfavourable regulatory framework, COVID-19, and security concerns around crude oil infrastructure in the country.

Since Nigeria is a fossil fuel-reliant economy, the impact of crude oil and gas divestment on the country is already having some negative ramifications. One of OPEC’s leading oil producers with oil reserves totalling 37 trillion barrels, Nigeria has since the beginning of the exercise in 2006 suffered more than £16.6 billion worth of divested assets. Moreover, steep competition from its regional counterparts has led to a reduction in the proportion of investment in the initial stages of oil and gas exploration and production that Nigeria would normally attract.

The woes occasioned by oil divestments from Nigeria are even more significant, with very dire consequences for the environment being reported. Despite the IOCs’ efforts to divest away from crude oil activities, host communities and watchdogs have decried worsening environmental conditions following the sales, caused mainly by the activities and operations of indigenous oil and gas firms. Moreover, while some of the oil assets have been divested, the sale of the oil infrastructure by the IOCs or the taking over of such holdings by indigenous players is lagging behind. This has been reported as being due to bureaucratic protocols, and the cloud of litigations hanging over the divestment processes.

Current divestment realities

Nigeria currently has five IOCs still operating in the country: Shell Producing Development Company (SPDC), Chevron, TotalEnergies, ExxonMobil and Eni. An analysis carried out by British research and consulting firm Wood Mackenzie indicates that divestments in Nigeria since 2020 amount to US$1.1 billion.

However, the IOCs are reported as wielding only a minority control (about 45 per cent) of Nigeria’s oil production assets, compared to the amount held by the operating indigenous companies (about 47 per cent). Most of the oil and gas assets that have been divested so far are onshore properties situated in shallow waters. In the past decade, a total of 26 oil mining licences have been divested by the IOCs in the Niger Basin area of Nigeria, with even more to be sold in the near future.

Shell intends to sell off approximately US$2.3 billion worth of oil and gas assets, while Eni’s divestment plan amounts to about US$5 billion, with ExxonMobil looking to offload US$15 billion of its assets. On the other hand, both TotalEnergies and Chevron plan to sell their shares in the current Oil Mining Lease (OML) 118 including the stakes held in OML 82, 85 and 88.

The waves of assets divestments by the IOCs have triggered a flurry of interest from indigenous oil companies like Seplat, the Aiteo group of companies, Eroton, Neconde, First E & P and various other local players. Within the last decade alone, Shell has sold off its shares in OMLs 4, 38 and 41 to Seplat, OML 29 to Aiteo, OML 42 to Neconde, OML 18 to SPV Eroton and OML 17 to Trans-Niger Oil and Gas (TNOG). Meanwhile, First E&P have acquired OMLs 83 and 85 from Chevron. Other local oil companies such as Sahara Energy, Oando and Conoil were recently reported as nearing some form of takeover of assets from the IOCs.

The waves of assets divestments by the IOCs have triggered a flurry of interest from indigenous oil companies.

The oil divestment efforts have been greatly encouraged by the Nigerian government as they have paved the way for further acquisition of oil assets by interested indigenous players. In the past few months, the government has succeeded in leading the bidding rounds for 57 marginal oilfields with approximately 130 firms being granted Petroleum Prospecting Licences (PPLs) to develop the fields.

Impact on climate change 

The sale of oil assets and infrastructure by the IOCs in Nigeria is in keeping with their obligation to ensure energy transition mainly as a result of campaigns from several quarters to further curb climate change. Evidence of this is seen in their various official corporate pledges to reduce their share of carbon emissions and eventually reach net zero by 2050. For instance, as stated in its 2020 Sustainability Report, Shell considers divestments to be a crucial aspect of its strategy to renew and enhance its portfolio, as it works towards its objective of becoming a net-zero emissions energy company. In addition, the company is exploring low and zero-carbon alternatives to reduce emissions from the fuel it offers to consumers.

Nonetheless, numerous indigenous communities in the region have decried the extensive damage inflicted on coastal and marine ecosystems due to oil divestments. Many of these communities have attributed much of the harm to the indigenous companies that currently possess a controlling stake in the oil assets. There is a lack of sustainability practices, environmental commitments and fewer reporting standards by the local oil and gas players especially in the Niger Delta area located in the south of the country.

For instance, in the Nembe region, where settlements tend to emerge from dense mangrove swamps, locals reported that an oil spill was left unattended for more than a month before measures were put in place to stop the leakage. Also, despite the clean-up operations that followed,  water in the region remains contaminated with the mangrove roots covered in a black film. As a result, fishermen are now bringing in only a negligible fraction of their prior catch. The situation has persisted since the Aiteo Group acquired Shell’s local oil licence in 2015. And although both Aiteo and Nigeria’s regulatory bodies have attributed the spill to sabotage, residents, local authorities, and environmental organisations in Nigeria have pointed to defective infrastructure as the underlying cause. Data from the Stakeholder Democracy Network indicates that Nigerian companies are responsible for 35 per cent more oil spills compared to international companies.

Also, following the acquisition of oil assets by Nigerian companies, there has been a significant rise in greenhouse gas emissions caused by gas flaring, which involves the combustion of surplus natural gas extracted during oil production. This is supported by data from the flare tracker and reports from the Environmental Defense Fund and the Stakeholder Democracy Network.

Some IOCs such as Shell, have recently boasted in their yearly stakeholders’ reports of their commitments and achievements in curtailing gas flaring. However, Capterio’s FlareIntel tracker reported that the Nigerian firm Heirs Holdings, which purchased the oil license, witnessed an over eightfold surge in flaring the year following the acquisition. In 2021, the flaring produced emissions equal to those of at least 18,000 cars.

Following the acquisition of oil assets by Nigerian companies, there has been a significant rise in greenhouse gas emissions caused by gas flaring.

The Stakeholder Democracy Network has gathered data indicating that Nigerian companies tend to flare a lot more gas per barrel of oil extracted than the IOCs. The report also disclosed that domestic firms flare over 10 times more gas per barrel of oil produced, and even if the two companies with the highest flaring are excluded, the local firms still flare nearly five times more.

Therefore, while divestment of IOCs from Nigerian crude oil and gas may appear to be positive for the environment, the indigenous oil and gas firms taking over the assets and infrastructure lack environmental credentials and are facing increasing criticism for their negative impact on the environment.

Continue Reading

Op-Eds

Dissecting the Finance Bill for the Fiscal Year 2022/2023

Historically, Kenya’s collections have always fallen below the budget and previous governments have heavily relied on loans to bridge the gaps. Currently, we have a projected budget of 3.66 trillion yet we are projecting to collect 2.89 trillion in revenue collections. We do not need to dig too deep to understand the crisis.

Published

on

Dear Mr President, Tax the Land Not the People

As we crawl towards the final leg of the fiscal year 2022/2023, the National Treasury tabled the Finance Bill, 2023 (the Bill) before the National Assembly on Thursday, 4 May 2023. The Bill proposes a raft of tax changes that are geared towards expanding the tax base and raising revenues to meet the government’s ambitious budget proposal of KES 3.6 trillion for the year 2023/2024. This is an 8% surge from the 2022/2023 fiscal budget.

Following Article 210 of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 and Section 35(2) of the Public Finance Management Act which requires public participation in all public finance matters, the budget estimates were laid bare to the public in a bid to garner their input through the National Assembly until May 20, 2023. In retrospect to the call for public participation, Kenyans on social media did not hold back in giving their opinions. Some felt that the new taxes being proposed for introduction were an attempt by the new regime to choke citizens with taxes while others felt that this year’s proposed fiscal budget was more inclined towards helping the low-income earners, “the hustlers”.

Generally, while they are all positive changes and have been welcomed with open arms, there are other changes that brought about a heated debate among the members of the public. In this month’s column, we ask for our readers, what really are these changes?

Exemption of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) from Value Added Tax (VAT)

The current regime has made it clear that it aims at spearheading the country to 100% LPG usage by 2025. Over the past years, LPG has been on the decline following the re-introduction of the 16% VAT on cooking gas and the high costs of crude globally due to the Russia-Ukraine war. Kenya re-introduced a VAT of 16% on LPG in July 2021, causing a further rise in prices but was later halved to 8%, after a public uproar.

This fiscal year’s Bill proposes to slash the 8% VAT applicable to LPG and make LPG exempt from VAT. In addition, the importation of LPG is proposed to be exempted from import declaration fees and railway development levies. This move will ensure LPG becomes more affordable, hence reducing the appetite for wood fuel which has led to illegal logging in the past years. For a government that seems very keen on joining the global community in the efforts to mitigate the deleterious effects of climate change, this proposal is a welcome move and offers an assurance that the war on global warming will be won by action and not mere lip service.

Taxation of Employee Stock Ownership Profits (ESOP) benefits for employees of start-ups pushed forward

In the proposed Bill, Taxation of ESOP benefits for employees whose income is below Ksh 100 million and who have been in existence for less than 5 years will be deferred and not taxed immediately. The option is exercised but will be taxed within 30 days of the earlier of the expiry of 5 years from the date the option was granted, the disposal of the shares by the employee, or the date the employee ceases to be an employee of the eligible start-up.

Currently, employees pay taxes, immediately on the gains accrued between the dates they became eligible when they exercised the share option.

The proposal follows remarks made by Kenya’s President, Dr. William Ruto, during the American Chamber of Commerce regional business summit earlier in March this year, where he had hinted at the change stating that he had received complaints over the imposition of benefit tax “even before the value realized”. The shift is part of the government’s plan to make Kenya an attractive business destination.

Kenya Revenue Authority’s (KRA) power to adjust excise duty rates for inflation slashed

The Bill proposes to repeal Section 10 of the Excise Duty Act which empowers KRA,with the approval of the Cabinet Secretary, to by notice in the Gazette adjust the specific rate of excise duty once every year to take inflation into account. This comes as a relief, especially to business owners, who have often accused KRA of being insensitive by their constant inflation adjustment despite Kenyans struggling to make ends meet and businesses grappling with global shocks.

Introduction of Digital Assets Tax targeting

Very keen to target anyone who owns a platform or facilitates the exchange or transfer of digital assets, digital asset tax is proposed at the rate of 3% and will be applicable to the income derived from the transfer or exchange of digital assets. The Finance Bill mandates that individuals involved in transactions of digital assets such as Non Fungible Tokens (NFTs) and cryptocurrencies pay taxes. The Bill defines digital assets as anything of value that is intangible and generated through cryptographic or other means.

This proposal comes despite the Central Bank of Kenya’s repeated warnings against crypto transactions by financial institutions and the general public.

On the flip side, Kenya is ranked number one in Africa, in peer-to-peer cryptocurrency transaction volumes, hence this might be a great source of revenue.

Payment of 20pc for tax appeal deposit

Last year , tax experts raised constitutional questions over a proposal requiring firms and individuals to deposit half of the tax demands by the Kenya Revenue Authority(KRA) before escalating the dispute from the appeals tribunal to the High Court when the Bill was introduced. However, former treasury cabinet secretary, Ukur Yatani, said the proposed changes were aimed at encouraging out-of-court settlements for faster resolution of cases so as to unlock billions of shillings tied in legal processes for years. However, the bill was shot down by Members of Parliament arguing that it would harm businesses.

This year the bill proposes to introduce a requirement under section 32(1) of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act for taxpayers who appeal the decision of the tribunal to deposit with the commissioner 20% of the disputed tax as security before filing an appeal at the High court. The Bill also proposes to introduce a new subsection under Section 32 of the Act that guarantees a credit of the security to the taxpayer by the commissioner within 30 days in instances where the hHgh Court decides in favor of the taxpayer.

While this proposal may be justified as an attempt to facilitate alternative dispute resolution mechanisms enshrined under Article 159 (2)(c) of the Constitution, it is clearly a manifest attempt to claw back the right to access to justice under Article 48 of the Kenyan Constitution. The proposal possibly makes it hard for taxpayers to get a fair hearing before the court when they feel aggrieved by KRA. Additionally,despite the assurance by KRA on the security of the deposit, there are likely to be significant delays, especially in tax refunds. This is because the commissioner has a history of delays, especially in tax refunds.

Digital Content Monetization Tax

The Value Added Tax was introduced in 2013 and a digital/electronic component was added in 2020. Another change was proposed-the VAT (Electronic, Internet, and Digital Marketplace supply) Regulations, 2023 in line with the current government’s plan to expand its tax base.

The 2023 regulations made it clear that the digital VAT will comprise of supplies made over the internet an electronic network, or any digital marketplace.

According to the proposal, content creators will have to pay 15% of their online earnings. It goes on to add that, digital content monetization means offering for payment entertainment, social, literal, artistic, educational or any other material electronically through any medium or channel

This includes advertisement on websites, social media platforms or similar networks by partnering with brands including endorsements from sellers such as brands.

This will ensure social media influencers are nabbed into the tax net hence addition of revenue collected.

Deduction of 3% deduction of one’s basic salary towards the National Housing Development Fund

This Bill in particular has caused a tiff between members of the public and the government. The Bill is proposing a 3% deduction of one’s basic salary towards the National Housing Development matched by another 3% from the employer. However, if one is not satisfied with the fund, there are two exit routes which are after 7 years or upon retirement whichever comes first.

A similar plan by the government to raise funds for the construction of Ksh 500,000 housing units annually was stopped in 2018 by the Employment and Labour Relations court. Employees were to contribute 1.5 percent of their earnings to the scheme. The court held that there was no public participation undertaken and that transparency in its implementation was guaranteed.

This Bill was proposed by the previous regime to achieve affordable housing, alongside Kenya Mortgage Refinancing Company and a host of tax incentives that enticed private developers to shift focus to low-income housing. That said, it mainly leans on a heavily packed backdrop whose main theme is a struggling economy that requires urgent intervention. So the question that has been lingering in everyone’s mind is: at this juncture, is saving for a house a priority? Should savings be made mandatory or should it be optional? And another thing, what if the next regime decided to do away with this fund, what happens to the taxpayer’s money?Where can they reclaim it?

Other notable changes were:

Changes in personal income tax rates

The proposal is to introduce a higher personal income tax rate of 35% on the income of individuals which is above KES 6,000,000 per year (KES 500,000 per month). The imposition of the 35% PAYE is expected to negatively impact those whose salaries are above Kes 500,000 per month due to the rates’ sudden spike from 5%.

Taxation of branches/permanent establishments

There is a proposed reduction of the non-resident corporate tax rate from 37.5% to 30% from January 2024. Related thereto, the Bill proposes to tax the repatriated profits of branch / permanent establishment. Repatriated profit is determined by assessing the profits of a branch for a year of income against the increase in the value of its assets.

Conclusion

Historically, Kenya’s collections have always fallen below the budget and previous governments have heavily relied on loans to bridge the gaps. Currently, we have a projected budget of 3.66 trillion yet we are projecting to collect 2.89 trillion in revenue collections. We do not need to dig too deep to understand the crisis. Delayed county remittances, civil servants’ salary delays, stalled infrastructure development as well as the obvious high cost of living are some of the glaring indicators. Therefore, it is advisable for the government to be keen not only on revenue collection but also on prioritizing expenditure.

This article was first published by The Platform.

Continue Reading

Trending