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Why African Coups Have Nothing To Do With Democracy

11 min read.

Framing coups in juxtaposition with electoral democracies is not only simplistic but is also distractive in the sense that it reduces coups to just a mode of government, argues Yusuf Senrunkuma.

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Why African Coups Have Nothing To Do With Democracy

As coups reappear on the African continent, there is a growing body of commentary that has problematically sought to juxtapose them with electoral democracy.  So, the question is being asked whether coups do or do not signal an end to democracy—and thus a return of the scary opposite, authoritarianism. Most prominently, the BBC, which officially never publishes opinions, ran a curious opinion piece, “Coups in Africa: why they don’t spell an end to democracy” by Nic Cheeseman and Leonard Mbulle-Nziege. As indicated in the title, the piece aggressively connects coups to authoritarianism and discusses coups as a competitor or threat to democracy. The piece is meant to reassure readers that despite the cheers and celebration for the coups, electoral democracies are still in vogue on this dimly lit continent. A more nuanced, and more empirically useful piece appeared in The New York Times: “Five African Countries. Six Coups. Why Now?” Although the NYT analysis does not directly focus on the drills and labours of democracy, it employs the same dialectic, debating coups against democracy.

Before discussing the ahistoricism and related theoretical limitations internal to these analyses, my contention is that framing coups in juxtaposition with electoral democracies is not only simplistic but is also distractive in the sense that it reduces coups to just a mode of government—problematically viewing them as a highway to authoritarianism.  In truth, coups are much more than a mode of government or a means to power. More theoretical-historically, coups in Africa are a colonial question related to the modern state, and the throes and turns that bog this “post-colonial” construction. Coups constitute a part of those events that have come to define the search for the soul of the independent African state. Phrased differently, if independence concerned itself with uplifting the formerly colonised—in all spheres of human development such as education, health, income, access to food and water, access to capital, civil liberties and dignity of Africans—these dreams have been defined and continue to undergo different political processes in different moments in the life of the postcolonial state.

What is historically accurate is that the soul and promise of independence is above any form of government (democratic, authoritative, cultural-hereditary); rather, it is constitutive of different political events. Therefore, these coup-vs-democracy analyses are not only ahistorical and theoretically handicapped, they also ought to be seen as absolute neo-colonialist distortions. They blur the histories and political economies, regimes of power and pillage in which major global political shifts continue to shape the African continent, especially in the context of what Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni has called coloniality, or “postcolonial neo-colonised Africa”, as Gayatri Spivak terms it.

Coups constitute a part of those events that have come to define the search for the soul of the independent African state.

What is normally confusing to observers is that coups display a deeply contradictory form of agency on the part of the African actors—the military coup leaders—who tend to be viewed as selfish power grabbers. That is half the analysis. In fact, it is the smaller analysis. In truth, while actors appear to be responding to or may claim actually visible local grievances (specifically, the emptiness of independence), they are at the same time, sadly, responding to, and are inspired and riding on shifts in political regimes in Europe and North America (from where, also, coup execution resources come). The shifts in European-North American politics which influence local events on the continent often relate to the ways in which African resources continue to be pillaged. This essay is an effort to make visible these historical, local-international shifts, and their interactions with the soul of the African.

Africa since independence

One can actually draw a periodised graph reflecting shifts in African politics and the ways in which leaderships have changed since independence in the 1950s and 1960s to the present.  These shifts in local African politics were responses to seismic shifts, to superior forces in neo-colonial politics. Oftentimes, these shifts have little to do with the men who emerge as new leaders in Africa, except through a little positioning and sheer luck. It could be anybody. This is not to say that African actors are deprived of all agency. Not at all.  African actors, especially ordinary folks, have continued to exercise agency in seeking to find meaning in their independent nation states. But often, they are crushed or exploited by superior international players who are quick to influence and conscript publics through both violent and technocratized means. The table below captures the different phases in both global and African politics, and the ways in which they respond to each other.

Period Intl./colonial contestations Local events/leaderships
1955-1965 Independence Anti-colonial leaders
1965-1975 Neo-colonial posturing Coup leaders
1980-1990 Cold War/Proxy wars Liberation wars
1990-2010 USSR collapses, USA rises, Capitalism Electoral democracies
2010-2020 R2P, Human Rights movements, ICC Street Protests/Arab Spring
2020 — Africom; rise of China, Russia, Turkey Coups return


Note:
Of course, there are, and will always be overlaps. But the table captures the most prominent political orders of every decade. Congolese politician Denis Sassou Nguesso is the living embodiment of these overlaps, having participated in most of these different phases (led coups, liberation wars, and currently wins elections).

***

Independence saw anti-colonial leaders naturally emerge as presidents and prime ministers: Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana; Patrice Lumumba in Congo-Kinshasa; Milton Obote in Uganda; Julius Nyerere in Tanzania; Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya; Aden Adde in Somalia; Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia; Agostinho Neto in Angola; etc. Discussing the myth of the postcolonial world, Puerto Rican sociologist, Ramon Grosfoguel has noted, “The heterogeneous and multiple global structures put in place over a period of 450 years did not evaporate with the juridical-political decolonization of the periphery.” Indeed, with African independence, colonialists had only strategically withdrawn, but were too impatient to return. As Africa’s leaders sought to consolidate the promise of independence, the “former” colonisers jostled for ways of continued access to resources in the so-called formerly colonised places: coups came to define the African continent.

In addition to assassinations, such as, more prominently, that of Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba in 1961 (in which Americans and Belgians supported Mobutu Sese Seko), coups were the more prominent feature of the new wave of colonial tinkering starting in the early 1960s and running through the 1980s. Nkrumah is overthrown in 1966.  Mali’s Modibo Keita in 1968.  Uganda’s Milton Obote in 1971.  Fulbert Youlou of Congo-Brazzaville in 1963, and his successor, Alphonse Massamba-Débat, five years later. In Somalia, Siad Barre’s coup takes place in 1969. Nigeria’s Tafawa Balewa is couped in 1966 by Yakubu Gowon.  In Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana overthrows Gregory Kayibanda in 1973.  Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie is overthrown by the Derg in 1974, while Muamar Gaddafi’s coup happens in 1969.

With African independence, colonialists had only strategically withdrawn, but were too impatient to return.

Throughout this period, many promising leaders that had emerged from the colonial struggle would be either assassinated, blackmailed or simply couped out of office. It is important to note that while these coups were the product of local grievances, they were largely masterminded by former colonisers jostling for access to resources. (In West Africa, to this day, France has sustained its grip on 14 countries using its central bank, its currency, and its military.) With the culture of coups introduced, one coup led to another, and more leaders sought to portray themselves as the most compliant with the demands of their former colonisers.

Then came the Cold War, as superpowers wrestled each other, again over our resources. Proxy guerrilla wars gave us the next crop of leaders (1980-90s). Africa became the battleground for “liberation wars”, with contending groups, aligned to a superpower, seeking to overthrow the dictator that had come to power through a coup. Foreign-supported Ugandans fought against nationalist leader Idi Amin, and later Obote II, ushering in Yoweri Museveni. President Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) fought Juvenal Habyarimana. In Somalia, several groups emerged to fight against Mohammed Siad Barre during the Somali civil war between 1980 and 1991. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, Laurent Désiré Kabila fought and overthrew Mobutu Sese Seko. One major driving thread was that rebel-liberators had to have the support of a superpower, or a subsidiary, which often gave them access to weapons, cash, and other resources including public relations for the purposes of legitimacy.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, we entered an era of democratic elections alongside structural adjustment programmes. Former guerrilla leaders quickly started chanting multiparty politics, and surviving coup-presidents quickly mutated into capitalist-democrats. They promulgated constitutions, and also periodically held elections.  But their actual hold on power was not through elections; rather, it was bedrocked on giving former colonisers unlimited access to resources.  (These were technocratized, expert-driven pillage schemes executed through regimes of banking, tax avoidance by multinational corporations, and monopolies—all of them superintended by the new colonial administrators, the World Bank and the IMF.) These leaders include Yoweri Museveni of Uganda, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Joseph Kabila of DRC, Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Ethiopia’s Meles Zenawi, etc.

Throughout the 1990s and 2010s, former rebels and earlier coup leaders—now democrats and incumbents—organised and won one election after another. In truth, the ways in which an election unfolded did not matter; what mattered was the holding of an election itself, which translated into legitimacy for loans and grants. During this time, with one single power dominating the world, and already granted access to resources across Africa, there was a phase of relative political stability, with leaders enjoying long spells in office.  It did not matter who was in charge of the country or which policies they implemented, as long as they implemented free market economics, which in effect allow Europe and North America unrestricted access to resources.

It is important to note that while these coups were a product of local grievances, they were largely masterminded by former colonisers jostling for access to resources.

Then came the era of human rights movements and discourses—especially within the context of 9/11, the birth of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect doctrines. Emboldened by one of the doctrines of R2P, which is protection against human rights and other violations (with potential for intervention), street protests as a legitimate means of political negotiation were born.  Indeed, it is the 2010-2020 decade that gave us, among other things, the Arab Spring. Ironically, the uprisings in Arab Africa and the Middle East continue to be read as “struggles for democracy” or are viewed as “manifestations of democracy”. (There are tons of papers and media commentary with keywords “Arab Spring” and “democracy” in their headlines.) They were not agitations for democracy. With the exception of one country, Libya, the others—Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria—have continuously held elections, a major defining marker of a democratic dispensation (and on the basis of which the WB and the IMF view a government as legitimate and thus deserving of loans and grants). But as the victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda Movement in Tunisia demonstrated, these were historical struggles for independence, with formerly colonised peoples still dreaming of being governed on their own local-cultural terms, and ironically seeking to escape the oppressive and exploitative character of the democratic order preached by the world’s “new intellectuals of empire’” in academia and mass media.

Presently, human rights discourses have not necessarily become obsolete, but they have lost their salience and their urgency. They have been overtaken by events. There is dullness around them, especially in black Africa, where current governments freely give foreign banks and Western monopoly capital all the access they need.  But at the same time, our democracy-practicing former rebels have found smarter ways of preventing protests from taking place while some communities simply lack the intellectual and material resources to pull off successful protests.

There is a new phase in international European colonial positioning: On the one hand, there is United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) established in 2007 and launched in 2008. Coming on the heels of 9/11, Africom was pitched as a tool to coordinate military relations with African countries.  But in reality—as all US bases actually do—Africom pursues and protects American political and economic interests. In an enriching conversation with Democracy Now, political anthropologist Samar Al-Bulushi noted that Africom,

. . . now has approximately 29 known military facilities in 15 states across the continent. And many of the countries . . . that have experienced coups or coup attempts are key allies of the U.S. in the war on terror, and many of the leaders of these coups have received training from the U.S. military.

To fully appreciate the new phase emerging on the continent that favours coups, one has to consider the other side of this conversation—the other seemingly competing powers.  China, Russia and Turkey have continued to rise in power and stature and are viewed as destabilising long established (American-European) patterns of resource exploitation on the African continent. Indeed, the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States has been well documented. With the ideological orientation of the soldiers trained by Africom, and the security-related grants they are privileged to receive (easier than anything else, be it education or health, as Al-Bulushi noted in the same interview), it is arguable that more than a decade later, these officers are seeking to take over power, securitizing entire countries, confident to emerge as the legitimate buffer between their ideological and military benefactors and the Chinese and Russian competition. Worth noting is that over and above the push-and-pull between these new superpowers, long-staying leaders have become an embarrassment to their benefactors in Europe and North America—particularly with regard to their human rights records—while at the same time they are easily winning elections and constitutionally amending constitutions. Once they are deposed, Europe and America are hard-pressed to condemn the coups. It is no wonder then that coups are receiving general acceptance in our so-called international community.

The problem with democracy discourses

I started this article with the assertion that coups have nothing to do with democracy, and nor does democracy have anything to do with coups. But coups point to the revolving life-cycle of foreign and local interests, and the quest for meaning in Africa. Democratic or un-democratic (whatever those terms mean), African countries remain the same: exploited, their economies dominated by Western bankers (and African banks are the most profitable across the world), exporters of raw materials (and not because they are unable to add value), with heavily impoverished populations and a youth problem, etc. From Nigeria to South Africa, Zambia to Ghana, Kenya or Uganda, with regular elections and chants of democracy, these countries remain the same with regards to most growth indices. Strangely, a so-called non-democratic autocracy, Libya under Muammar Gaddafi was classed as most advanced on the UN Human Development Index, above South Africa.

In their BBC opinion piece of 8 February 2022, Cheeseman and Mbulle-Nziege express worry but are also confident in the resilience of democracy. Thus, they are quick to pour water on the cheers that welcomed coups in some of the places where they took place. They are armed with figures and surveys that they endlessly regurgitate, discussing inexistent things such as economic growth and human rights. While running their surveys, they never include the work of anthropologists to appreciate the quality of civil publics in Africa, and nor do they include the work of historians and political economists dealing with broader theoretical questions relating to notions such as “problem spaces” and local-international connections.

The ways in which an election unfolded did not matter, but what mattered was the holding of an election itself.

The NYT analysis on the other hand, points to the excitement around coups, but notes that the grievances run deep, springing mostly from the economy and continued colonial control.  Focused on understanding why coups are back, the NYT underlines, “insecurity, bad governance, and frustrated youth”. Reporting on pro-coup voices in downtown Ouagadougou, the NYT notes that they were “inspired by the way the junta in neighboring Mali had stood up to France, the increasingly unpopular former colonial power”. Quoting an ordinary person—a customer at a cellphone market in Ouagadougou called Anatole Compaore, who had welcomed the coup, the NYT reported him as saying, “Whoever takes power now, he needs to follow the example of Mali—reject France, and start to take our own decisions,” echoing the anti-colonial sentiments that run deep in most West African states still under direct French control, which also include Togo, Senegal, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire.

Quick to dismiss any grounds upon which coups could be welcomed, Cheeseman and Mbulle-Nziege simplistically and directly connect coups to authoritarianism, arguing that authoritarian regimes do not deliver economic growth. They write, that “despite growing frustration with the way that multiparty politics is performing [link in original], on average democracies generate higher economic growth and do a better job of providing public services, according to a study at the US’s Cornell University.” Without problematizing the ways in which democracies generate higher economic growth (than non-electoral regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Libya under Gaddafi, or the United Arab Emirates), it is curious scholarship that directly connects non-electoral leaderships to autocracies incapable of delivering civil liberties and freedoms. Perhaps noticing this anomaly, Cheeseman and Mbulle-Nziege add, “The poor performance of authoritarian forms of government on African soil . . . helps to explain why the support for democracy is high,” perhaps to create the dichotomy that authoritarian governments elsewhere have performed better. But how does one generate firm understanding through such ahistorical and untheoretical analyses?

It becomes clear that democracy discourses in the present “problem space” of African politics ought to be understood as not necessarily obsolete but overtaken by events ironically emanating from Europe and North America, and their contestations. Africans remain colonised. New problem spaces require that we ask questions that are specific to the discursive context. Clearly, coups are back because of the nature of the new phase we are in in the life of the neo-colonised postcolonial state.

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Yusuf Serunkuma is a columnist in Uganda’s newspapers, scholar and a playwright. In 2014, Fountain Publishers published his first play, The Snake Farmers which was received with critical acclaim in Uganda, Kenya and Rwanda. He is also a scholar and researcher who teaches political economy and history.

Politics

Somalia’s Electoral Impasse

Somalia’s prospects for holding an election based on universal suffrage remain a distant dream because of the fundamental flaws of its political system and a political class bent on retaining power at all costs.

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Somalia’s Electoral Impasse

Voting in elections is a civic duty that is vital to democracy. While elections have an intrinsic value (citizens’ choice of their leaders), they also have an instrumental value—building, nurturing, and consolidating democratic governance, transparency, peace, and political stability. In a free and fair election, each valid ballot cast registers a political position. Therefore, informed voters count. But elections are only part of the institutional fabric of a democracy, and a democracy is only as good as its institutions, collectively. Credible election abhors violence, which inhibits the voters’ right to freedom of choice in peace and in line with their conscience. It craves politicians and electoral umpires to ensure peaceful campaigns. Hence, hindering electorates from exercising their franchise negates popular government.

Somalia’s experience of leadership transitions between 1990 and 2022 is a mixed bag. The elections were warfare-like, often mired in widespread corruption, tension, violence, and delaying tactics. Somalia’s electoral calendar has been repeatedly shifted and elections delayed. The prospects for holding an election based on universal suffrage remain a distant dream. Delegates chosen by their respective clan elders vote in members of parliament on the basis of the 4.5 power-sharing formula by which they elect the 275 members of the Lower House (House of People) while the assemblies of the Federal Member States (FMS) elect the 54 Senators of the Upper House. The two houses jointly elect the president. As such, clan elders and FMSs retain considerable power under this system and have long resisted reforms to the electoral law.

Somalia is once again at a crossroads due to the ever-recurring political disagreement over the electoral process. Prime Minister Roble and President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmajo have long been at loggerheads over the long-delayed elections, raising fears that their squabbling could trigger violence.

Election debacle

Somalia’s general elections were to begin in late 2020 but were postponed due to disagreements between the Federal Government and the Federal Member States. While all parties agreed to the indirect election model in September 2020, they nonetheless disagreed on how the model would be implemented. Two Federal Member States, Puntland and Jubaland, have argued that indirect elections cannot be implemented until new conditions are met. These conditions include direct supervision by International partners, replacement of the key election officials, and formation of the national transitional committee that will organize the election. On the other hand, President Farmajo and the presidents of the FMSs of Hirshabelle, Galmudug, and South-West maintain that all parties should implement the September 2020 electoral model without conditions.

On 21 February 2020, President Farmajo signed the electoral bill into law. But the electoral bill has drawn criticism as some important provisions, such as the definition of constituencies, the allocation of seats to constituencies, and the modalities for electing the lawmakers for the breakaway region of Somaliland, were not included in the legislation. Suddenly, on 27 June 2020, the National Independent Electoral Commission of Somalia (NIEC) told parliament that it needed 13 more months to organise one person, one vote national elections. Many, including some of the FMSs and opposition groups saw this as an attempt to extend President Farmajo’s mandate. It was a recipe for political instability.

Somalia is once again at a crossroads due to the ever-recurring political disagreement over the electoral process.

The political crisis flared up when the country missed a second deadline for the legislative and presidential elections planned before the end of the incumbent government’s term of office in February 2021. This was a significant setback for the agreement reached on 17 September  2020 between the Federal Government and FMSs.

Tensions escalated on 12 April 2021 when Somalia’s Lower House of Parliament voted a controversial law extending the president’s term for another two years and allowing the government to prepare for one person, one vote elections. The parliament’s move only added fuel to the already explosive political crisis. It triggered an armed confrontation in Mogadishu where the Somalia National Army attacked units supporting different political leaders. The fighting resulted in death, injury, and the displacement of populations.

The extension of the president’s mandate was short-lived however. In May 2021, the parliament reversed the decision to extend the presidential term limit, averting outright violence. The Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament retracted the extension under intense domestic and international pressure, paving the way for negotiations amongst the Somali leaders. On 27 May 2021, Somali political leaders agreed on the way forward and gave the responsibility of organising the indirect elections to the National Consultative Council (NCC) made up of the prime ministers and the FMS leaders.

In early January 2022, the prime minister convened a national consultative meeting, a forum established to bridge the electoral differences consisting of representatives from the Federal Government and the FMSs. The forum concluded with a 9 January  statement announcing a revised electoral timetable under which the outstanding elections would be held between 15 January and 25 February 2022, with all parties agreeing to conclude all elections by 25 February 2022.

A tortoise’s journey towards elections 

Somalia’s legislative body has two chambers: the Lower House (House of the People) and the Senate (Upper House). While members of the Lower House are supposed to be elected directly by the people, members of the Senate are elected by the regional parliaments. The ongoing 2021-2022 election mirrors the 2016 exercise but has expanded the number of delegates involved in electing members of the Lower House from 51 to 101 delegates.

The election of the 54 members of the Upper House had been completed By July 2021. Moreover, more than 150 of the 275 members of the Lower House have so far been elected. The election of the remaining members was expected to be completed by 25 February 2022.

The Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament retracted the extension under intense domestic and international pressure.

However, in both chambers the majority were elected to the seats through a voter suppression tactic known locally as Mallis: two candidates compete for a seat but one of them is a fake rival candidate who either garners few votes or withdraws from the race.

The Federal Government has been accused of meddling in state elections to swing the votes in its favour. Frequent skirmishes have broken out in several parts of Somalia between federal and local security forces and between clans with contrasting loyalties and interests.

Power struggle, intimidation and corruption

There is growing political tension between President Farmajo and Prime Minister Roble. The recent conflict between them has caused a gridlock in the Somali government’s operations. The strain between them was caused by Prime Minister Roble sacking the head of the National Security Intelligence Agency (NISA), the reshuffle of Cabinet Ministers who are close allies of the president, and the replacement of seven members of the Electoral Dispute Resolution Committee by the prime minister (who accused them of favouritism). The president, sensing a declaration of war by the premier, issued a decree rescinding the prime minister’s decisions. Farmajo attempted to suspend the powers of the prime minister, citing insubordination and making allegations of corruption and land-grabbing. The prime minister remains defiant and accuses Farmajo of carrying out “a coup against the government”. President Farmajo questioned the prime minister’s intransigence and tendency to act on his own.

Opposition leaders have also accused President Farmajo of coercion and gerrymandering elections. They claim that the deployment of special federal forces and paramilitary units in certain regions is aimed at hastening the election process using state violence and intimidation to install a handpicked individual. Jubaland MPs and officials in Kismayo hailing from the Gedo region expressed their frustration, citing interference by federal government security forces in their regional election.

In both chambers, the majority were elected to the seats through a voter suppression tactic known locally as Mallis.

All stakeholders, including the Federal Government and Federal Member States, endorsed candidates who are their allies. These include failed politicians linked to the plunder of public coffers, military and intelligence officials and ex-warlords implicated in human rights abuses, corruption, and murder. On the other hand, Federal Member States’ leaders have bypassed the process by orchestrating the illegal selection of dubious “MPs” to serve their political agenda.

The election process has involved widespread corruption, nepotism, and political violence. The NCC is accused of rigging the elections for the Upper House. Almost all FMS presidents have appointed most of their allies as senators without free and fair competition. Similarly, the NCC has installed its political allies in the Lower House.

The 4.5 power-sharing model

The 4.5 power-sharing formula may have provided some semblance of inclusivity. However, many Somalis believe that 4.5 does not meet their aspirations for greater democracy, inclusivity, and accountability, as it encourages appointment based on clan identity rather than competence. In addition, it does not guarantee that all clans and sub-clans within those clan families are represented in elective positions. The model has also served to further institutionalize the exclusion of women and the youth while wealthy elites continue to dominate the election process.

Role of external actors

A large injection of political finance by external actors may well influence the eventual choice of president, as has happened in the previous two presidential elections. While the most oversized purse does not automatically decide the presidential winner in Somalia, a strong anti-incumbency or tendency towards rotation of power might play a role.

Gulf rivalries have seen Qatar and the United Arab Emirates become increasingly involved in providing political elites with campaign support in order to secure access to oil, port, and airport development projects.

Kenya and Ethiopia have several reasons to take what is happening in Somalia seriously. Ethiopia has been one of the most influential actors in Somalia and, since the election of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed in 2018, has taken a much stronger position in support of President Farmajo, including supporting the Federal Government’s interventions in regional elections (Ethiopia intervened in both South-West and Jubaland).

Challenges ahead

Challenges persist in achieving substantive progress in Somalia’s democratic transition. Firstly, a fair electoral process and outcome are central to political power contestation and periodic change of government. Somalia’s electoral commission both at the federal and state level should be beyond reproach. Its credibility and independence depend on how it is constituted and appointed. The presidents and leaders of the Federal Member States should not have full control over the comings and goings at the electoral commission.

Many Somalis believe that 4.5 does not meet their aspirations for greater democracy.

Secondly, the politicisation of the institutions of the state, especially those charged with the legal and exclusive use of force such as the military, NISA and the police, both at federal and state level, is detrimental to the health of Somalia’s political systems. These critical institutions need to serve the Somali state and not the political elite. The security forces should be apolitical; as discussed previously, Somalia’s security forces have been used as the ruling party’s attack dog to intimidate, arrest and harass the opposition, ultimately skewing the election in favour of the ruling party.

Thirdly, the critical barriers to resolving Somalia’s constitutional disputes are its fragile judiciary, the weak rule of law, and lack of a reliable mechanism of checks and balances. A potential transitional path lies in strengthening the judiciary by ensuring its independence and improving its competence. More specifically, a robust judiciary framework with a clear and transparent institution of judicial review in statutory law and practice is needed.

This 2020/22 electoral cycle has demonstrated a fundamental weakness of democratic politics in a flawed democracy—the superficial and instrumentalist practice of democracy without the intrinsic belief in the value system that democracy entails. As such, the elections in Somalia have not moved the country’s democratic needle forward. Instead, they have highlighted the fundamental flaws of a political system and a political class bent on retaining power at all costs.

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Politics

The Genocidal War on Tigray and the Future of Ethiopia

For any negotiations to succeed, the international community should refrain from deciding on the future of Ethiopia and attempting to salvage an irredeemable genocidal regime.

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The Genocidal War on Tigray and the Future of Ethiopia

With its irreconcilable fundamental contradictions, Ethiopia lies behind the veil of nostalgic glorification of its unceremonious past. It is not an overstatement that countries like Ethiopia, obsessed with ultra-nationalist pride, live in past glories but are desperate about the future. Such political entities have little hope in their shared future and invariably look for a pretext to commit atrocities against their people and to launch aggression for the sole purpose of either creating a monolithic national image to the liking of the political elites or using the crisis as a unifying factor and to sustain the lifeline of the state.

After almost 23 years of attempts to transition from a unitarist empire to a federal democratic republic, Abiy Ahmed’s appointment as prime minister in 2018 has consolidated Ethiopia’s formation defects and accelerated the course of the country towards inevitable disintegration.

Abiy Ahmed’s government waged a premeditated genocidal war on Tigray using as pretext the holding of successful elections and the establishment of a legitimate government in Tigray. Ironically, the same government has indefinitely postponed the 2020 election and unconditionally extended its term with the support of a far-right political elite that has perfected the art of midwifing dictatorship and is hell-bent on returning Ethiopia to its imperial past.

A year of genocidal war on Tigray

More than a year into the genocidal war on Tigray by the Ethiopian and Eritrean joint defence forces, Amhara’s forces, and with the participation of foreign powers, the people of Tigray are completely under siege. And despite diplomatic engagements, international calls, and condemnations of Ethiopian and Eritrean officials, and the Amhara regional government, no meaningful, targeted actions have been taken to end the war on Tigray and ensure the withdrawal of Eritrean troops and Amhara militia. And nor has any meaningful action been taken to pursue a peaceful resolution to the political crisis and allow unhindered humanitarian access to avert famine in Tigray.

The international community’s response has not only been lacking coherent and concrete actions, but it has also demonstrated divergent interests. At the beginning of the war, its reaction was to recognize the narrative of the Abiy regime that the incursion was a law enforcement operation. Throughout the duration of the war, and despite calls for unhindered humanitarian access and the protection of human rights, the approach has been to blame all the parties to the conflict without any regard for their level of participation and level of accountability; at times it has been tantamount to blaming the dead for dying.

Reinventing peace 

Following the rout of the Abiy regime and its allied forces in most parts of Tigray, including Mekelle on 28 June 2021, and the subsequent deepening of defensive strategic depth by the Tigray Defense Forces, coupled with the formation of an alliance with the Oromia Liberation Army and allied forces, the tone and sense of urgency of the regional and international players have dramatically escalated. The coordinated reaction, including by institutions that have been silent throughout the war, leads to suspicions that there are attempts to save the empire and the regime against the spirit of the constitution. Strikingly, while extending complete and unconditional legitimacy to the other parties to the war on Tigray, they have been reluctant to correctly address the government of Tigray by its proper nomenclature.

In an attempt to salvage the state, the international community, the United Nations Security Council, and the African Union Peace and the Security Council, in reaffirming their strong commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, and unity of Ethiopia, have shown more regard for the interests of the significant players than for the aspirations of the Ethiopian people embodied in the Constitution. In procedure and substance, the future of Ethiopia should be addressed primarily within the framework of the constitution. The far-right Ethiopianists’ camp that the prime minister associates himself with are convinced that the Ethiopia they want to see cannot be built on a democratic order. Unsurprisingly, they are convinced that they are best served by a dictatorial regime that provides an unchallenged environment better suited for imposing their values. It is not a coincidence that they blindly supported the Haile Selassie imperial order, the Derg dictatorial regime and now the Abiy genocidal regime. In a nutshell, from the modus operandi of the political elite in power that has consistently viewed the installing of a democratic order as an existential threat to its survival, the prospect of holding up Ethiopia as a democratic republic would require a generous optimism. And yet the convening of an all-inclusive dialogue could regulate the constitutional state succession, with the constitution providing the rules of engagement.

No meaningful, targeted actions have been taken to end the war on Tigray and ensure the withdrawal of Eritrean troops and Amhara militia.

Equally, while the US and the European Union have declined to recognize the election process, the communiqué of the first meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council on 8 November 2021 reinvented the strategic mistake made by the UNSC in its Resolution 2216 on the civil war in Yemen. Notably, the reiteration against any attempt aimed at unconstitutional change of government in concurrence with the African Union’s unconditional recognition of the sham election and the ‘‘new government’’ reinforces the utter bias of the African Union in salvaging the Abiy regime under the guise of the Obasanjo-led negotiation process. In this regard, if the AU-led process is to make any meaningful contribution, the policy organs of the AU should start by recognizing the parties to the conflict equally, leaving the legitimacy question to the domestic stakeholders, and limiting their levels of engagement until a legitimate government is established through an all-inclusive transitional arrangement.

Incentivizing unacceptable behaviour 

It is public knowledge that one of the reasons for the war waged on Tigray, the arbitrary arrests and undue harassment of credible political party leaders and non-convening of elections in three regional states were an attempt to obtain legitimacy by force. In a statement on 30 September 2020, the government of Tigray made it clear that decisions and laws passed by the Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, the House of People’s Representatives, and the House of Federations after the expiry of their mandate are null and void. Therefore, since the convening of an election presupposes having a constitutional mandate, the established government lacks constitutional and political legitimacy since the election was held by a regime without authority.

For any negotiations to succeed, the international community should refrain from deciding on the future of Ethiopia and attempting to salvage an irredeemable genocidal regime. Instead, it should give equal recognition to the parties to the conflict, leave the legitimacy question to the domestic stakeholders, and limit its levels of engagement until a legitimate government is established through an all-inclusive transitional arrangement.

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Politics

Europe at War: Normal Service Has Resumed

After an eight-decade hiatus, Europe is again at war, and as with all European conflicts past, the invasion of Ukraine is about business; when capitalists want something, they find an excuse to start a war in order to get it.

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Europe at War: Normal Service Has Resumed

Nobody should really be surprised by the conflict taking place inside the Republic of Ukraine. In their long modern history, Europeans have been at war, or in preparation for war, or recovering from one, longer than they have been at peace.

Western Europe has been the key driver of conflicts at home and globally for the last three centuries. European armies have war graves in just about every country on every continent.

The only surprise is that they have been able to keep their warlike behaviour in check for the last seventy-seven years (if we exclude the fighting that followed the 1990 break-up of Yugoslavia), since the end of their 1939-1945 war that they spread to much of the rest of the world.

And even that peace was only because they managed, for once, to come to an agreement about the thing that drives their conflicts: money.

Ambassador Martin Kimani, Kenya’s permanent representative to the United Nations did an important thing when he asserted the idea that Africans can also have an opinion on world events, drawing on the lived African historical experience.

In his February speech to the Security Council, while criticizing the then anticipated Russian military entry into Ukrainian territory, Ambassador Kimani urged Russian leaders to follow the example set by Africa’s post-colonial leaders and simply accept post-empire borders as they are. He also urged them to put their faith in international diplomacy, in order to resolve such disputes.

Deep down, these words will sound strange to European ears on all sides of the Ukraine dispute. The historical record shows that this is simply not how these people do business, and certainly not the white powers of Western Europe (which birthed other white powers like the United States and Canada). For them, war is the norm, and when they say “peace”, they mean their successful imposition of conditions to their liking on the side they have defeated.

Ambassador Kimani urged Russian leaders to follow the example set by Africa’s post-colonial leaders and simply accept post-empire borders as they are.

The conflict now located in Ukraine has been brewing for quite some time. It is an expression of a wider tension between the continuing ambitions of Western countries and economic masters against the interests of Russia in the various forms it has taken before, during and after becoming the world’s first, biggest and most powerful non-capitalist state.

There has never been a period of actual good relations between Russia and the Western European powers in over one hundred years. And places like Ukraine are where this has often played out. The great plains of Europe, lying between Russia proper and the powers of the West, made up of shifting, weaker states, have always been a buffer zone.

In the first phase, this was the fight between the German and Russian empires during the 1914-1918 war, which led to both the collapse of the Russian monarchy, and the dissolution of the German Empire.

The second phase was between 1920 and 1939, when various combinations of Western European powers sponsored rebellions, small wars and sabotage in an attempt to dislodge the communist-led Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) regime that had eventually taken over the Russian state following the collapse of the monarchy there.

This was only briefly suspended by the rise of fascism to state power in Spain, Italy and Germany, setting the conditions for the 1939-1945 war.

But this was in fact a war against Germany’s attempt to re-establish an empire to replace the one taken from it under the terms of the treaty ending the 1914-1918 war, much as it was dressed up as a war against the fascism of Hitler’s Germany. During that war, the capitalist Western powers were embarrassed to have had to make an anti-Hitler alliance with the very Soviet Union they had been trying to undermine militarily not a few years earlier.

There has never been a period of actual good relations between Russia and the Western European powers in over one hundred years.

The end of that war gave rise to the third phase, between 1946 and 1991, when the effort to remove the communists (whose reach had now expanded to control parts of central Europe) resumed and became an all-consuming fixation of Western statecraft. Now led by the United States, it re-oriented all Western political, diplomatic and military thinking to see the Soviet Union, and its satellites state, as the principal enemy.

It is in this phase, known as the Cold War, that institutions like the US-dominated military alliance known as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO: 1947), the well-known American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA: 1947) in the West, and the rival Soviet-led Warsaw Pact (Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance: 1955) in Eastern Europe, were formed. This phase officially came to an end with the collapse and dissolution of the USSR in 1991. The Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1991 while, conversely, NATO has just kept on going.

Originally made up of 15 member states by 1955, and committed to mutual defence for fifty years, NATO has never properly explained why then it continues to exist. There are a number of contradictions. The Cold War itself did not last 50 years, and the NATO side won anyway, yet it has gone on to include fifteen new members, thus doubling its membership. What is more, the bulk of these new member states are former territories of the Warsaw Pact, with membership being offered to even more, such as Ukraine, which used to be part of the Soviet Union proper. In other words, NATO became twice as big as its original size after the reason for its creation no longer existed.

This brings us to the fifth phase running from 1991 to Russia’s February invasion of Ukraine, which is a whole story in itself.

Russia’s unease with this expansion—expressed in a number of failed diplomatic initiatives, with Ukraine increasingly at the epicentre—was never really taken seriously. The immediate trigger begins with a 2014 coup in Ukraine that brings a pro-West government to power. There followed a series of measures against the Russian ethnic minority of Ukraine, as well as proscriptions against the symbols and legacy (both good and bad) Russia had left in Ukraine during the communist era. In particular, there was the public rehabilitation of the legacies of fascist organizations that had collaborated with Hitler’s forces during the German invasions of the 1940s, and the public tolerance of new fascist organisations. It is one issue to wonder why anyone should find it desirable to join a political identity with such a record. It is another issue to also question why such politics should be even permissible in a society claiming to be civilized.

How this invasion ends will be the start, and then the nature, of the sixth phase.

Africans are not obliged to take sides. But there is a human obligation to share knowledge and experience, as Ambassador Kimani has done. And any call for the avoidance of armed conflict is a good thing.

More than once in the last century, Europeans have dragged us into their conflicts in a bout of global racism.

Therefore, scenes of Africans being discriminated against on the Ukraine-Poland border as they tried—like many other peoples in Ukraine—to flee the looming conflict, should have been expected.

European culture is racist, and it did not become racist when it arrived in the Americas, Asia and Africa; it was its racism that took it there in the first place. What is more, Europeans actually began their racism among themselves.

Eastern Europe is Slavic country.  “Slavic” is how the Eurasian people described themselves, as a concept of praise. However, these people had been conquered in the 9th Century (in other words, in yet another inter-European war), and had been reduced to what would now be called slavery.

So, Western European history ascribed a different meaning to the name. “Slavonic” was turned to mean “captive” in Latin.  “Slav” is where the word “slave” in Western European languages comes from.

European racism—now directed at mainly non-white people—may be less expressive and performative at home as compared to the settler spaces it created overseas, because it is less directly in the presence of black people, and it is also more secure and confident in itself at home. But it is always there; it is just a matter of opportunity and circumstance (such as a border).

The Nazi Germany era was in many ways a condensed form of the already 400-year white supremacist project that had seen white Europeans forcibly settle themselves in the Americas from the arctic to the Antarctic, Australia, New Zealand, and all of southern Africa. In all cases, these incursions (that Hitler called “lebensraum”, literally, “space for living in”, when he applied them to Eastern Europe) began with genocides, and were sustained on them.

European culture is racist, and it did not become racist when it arrived in the Americas, Asia and Africa.

Being hemmed in militarily, Hitler’s Germany found it necessary to massively mobilize its population. It did this by appealing to their racism by victimizing a significant minority in an acute intensification of perhaps the longest standing racial prejudice in European public life; vilifying people of Jewish descent, as well as picking on its neighbours.

Underneath the usual romanticisation of the conflicts among Europeans lies the story of coal and iron. Until perhaps the 1960s, the Alsace-Lorraine region, which lies where the lands of France and Germany meet, held the largest known deposits of iron ore in the Western world. Together with the abundant supplies of the coal in the neighbouring regions, this created the opportunity for the bulk production of perhaps the most significant material to industrialization—steel.

On top of the already mentioned 1914-1918 British-German war that led to Germany’s loss of its entire global empire as well as territory closer to home, and the 1939-1945 British-French-American-Russian war against Germany, Italy, and Japan, which left Europe militarily split in half for the following four decades, there had already been the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 which had ended with German occupation of France. All these were essentially conflicts over the Alsace–Lorraine region.

It was the site of the beginnings of a reversal of fortunes for Germany in its big gamble to also invade the Soviet Union in 1941. This gave rise to the heroic politics of the Americans leading the massive landings on the shores of Western Europe in a race for Berlin, the German capital. The real panic was to try and capture Germany before the Russians advancing from the East did. Perhaps they feared that Russia would reclaim those territories it conceded to Germany as part of the process of pulling out of the 1914-1918 war in which the then new communist regime had felt it had no side.

Underneath the usual romanticisation of the conflicts among Europeans lies the story of coal and iron.

This is why from the day of the German defeat in 1945, up until its reunification in 1990, all the countries that had fought Hitler’s armies had their armies in the ridiculous situation of each controlling a cramped sector of Germany’s capital Berlin, while Berlin as a whole was itself deep inside Soviet-controlled territory (because the Soviet Union’s Red Army had overrun German territory before the Western armies got there).

Russia has always been governed by a cultural tension between its actual Asiatic roots, and an underlying tendency to embrace a more western European identity. This “Westernizer tendency” (as it is known) played a role in taking the monarchy to the degree of crisis the Russian Empire had. In trying to become more like the more industrialised powers to the west, Imperial Russia had become financially indebted to them.

The socialist revolution under the communist party put an end to this, and in so doing saved the Russian state from collapse.

All foreign investments as well as locally owned private concerns were nationalized. Furthermore, key elements of Slavic culture, such as language, were synthetized into education and science in a way that allowed for the rapid progress of the spread of education and technological knowledge. This enabled the country to make a rapid leap forward technologically, and become an industrial and military power by the middle of the last century.

The political leaders were also adept at keeping the country’s enemies at bay through military and diplomatic manoeuvring. The coming to power of the Russian communists in October 1917 only intensified this, because under the Russian monarchy, Russia had been in alliance with the big powers of the West (France and Britain), in fighting Germany in the 1914-1918 war. It was of great use partly because, being to the east of Germany, Russia formed a whole other front. Those powers were very annoyed when Russia’s new rulers pulled out of the conflict.

Russia has always been governed by a cultural tension between its actual Asiatic roots, and an underlying tendency to embrace a more western European identity.

From that moment, the fight was no longer over the respective profit-seeking factions of several empire states seeking to grab valuable territory and markets for themselves. It became a fight between all such factions collectively on the one side, versus a huge country taken over by a political party that was opposed to private profit-making to begin with, on the other.

But with this loss of a crucial ally in the ongoing war, three things were at stake for the powers to the west. Germany, which had only really united as one nation in the 1871 war (minus Austria; that would be organized later by Hitler), now had more opportunities and room to manoeuvre in the conduct of the war. There was the immediate possibility of Germany taking over all the installations and resources that the Russian forces had left scattered all over the eastern front from Finland, Siberia to the central European plains.

Second, the substantial aforementioned economic and war debts that the economic powers to the west had over broke imperial Russia were now under threat of not been honoured.

Finally, the prospect of the communist party finally taking power, especially in a major country, raised the prospect of communism (by this time a movement with nearly eighty years of struggle behind it) gaining popularity in all the major capitals of Europe. For (mainly Western European) capitalist governments, this would be a political disaster.

Germany lost the war anyway. And, as said, the big powers to the west immediately turned their attention to supporting a combination of Russian forces trying to remove the communists from power in a growing Russian civil war between 1920 and 1922. Eventually, after deploying a few military expeditions, and even engineering a couple of coup attempts, they gave up and went home. But they were to continue sponsoring Russian exile groups in sporadic incursions and attacks on the growing communist state for many years after, until 1939 when Britain and the United States, principally, needed to make an about-turn and form an alliance with the very same Soviet Union they had been undermining, against Hitler.

It paid off well; the record shows that Nazi Germany’s decisive defeat took place on the Eastern front, at great human and material cost to the Soviet Union. Russian losses to Nazi Germany exceeded 26 million people, including 10 million soldiers.

Therefore, beyond the earlier historic rivalries, by 1945 significant countries of Western Europe were collectively hostile to the Soviet Union, the culmination of a process that had begun shortly after the communist takeover of power in 1917, but which also predated it.

Indeed, as soon as the ’39-’45 hostilities ended in Europe with the capture of Berlin, the Western powers immediately reverted to a stance of armed hostility towards the Soviet Union. It is said that one legendary American General called Patton had to be removed from command because he was calling for an immediate attack on the Soviet forces in Germany, followed by the invasion of Moscow. This stance has effectively continued even after the demise of communist rule in Russia. The old game of lusting after the territories of the Balkans and beyond has resumed.

This then, is the Russian experience of Western powers, right from the start of the last century, whether as the Russian Empire, the communist state, or as the Russian Federation.

After being besieged by Western debt, what began as a free-for-all among the competing ambitious ruling classes of the various European empires developed into a quasi-unity of those ruling classes in a joint attempt to prevent the spread of communism among the ordinary people. Once that was achieved, they all went back to trying to have economic advantage over the weaker parts Europe. These were the 1990s wars over the re-division of the Baltic states, and their seduction into the Western debt-based economic system.

Whether democratic or not, any Russian head of state would do well to understand NATO’s interest in Eastern European countries now bordering Russia in this context. President Vladimir Putin, whatever one may think of him, certainly holds a sense of this history.

The old game of lusting after the territories of the Balkans and beyond has resumed.

Russia fears it may be seen as the next prize; the very name “Ukraine” literally means “border” or “frontier” in some Slavic languages. The only new development is that wealthy Russians probably also harbour the same ambitions, and wish to expand their own place in the Russian economy.

All this tells us Africans four critical things.

First, that these wars are about business: making money, or seizing territory to make money from it later. When capitalists want something, they find an excuse to start a war in order to get it.  These recurrent conflicts were only suspended for the last eighty years with the creation of a trade mechanism that enabled interested European countries to access resources for their domestic industries without having to also physically control the territory. This mechanism began life as the European Coal and Steel Commission, later renamed the European Economic Commission, and then renamed again the European Commission. Today, it is known as the European Union.

To Europeans, fighting is normal. And they are very good at it, on the whole. They manufacture their own weapons, and make money out of that, too. War, for the European, is a relatively sustainable activity.

Even modest-sized European cities will have a monument (if not whole cemeteries) to the dead of more than one war. There are about 68,000 war memorials in the UK alone, and 3,000 war cemeteries in France.

Tiny Belgium holds about 800 military cemeteries for the 1914-1918, and the 1939-1945 wars alone. It is why military-style language (e.g. “to pull a flanker”, and “to steal a march”, in common English) peppers a lot of casual Western speech. It is why most Western armed forces retain standing divisions trained to be quickly transported far abroad, and to fight in terrain very unlike their home territories. Europeans (and white America) are warmongers. That is the historical and contemporary record, quite contrary to the political propaganda they produce in their media and education systems.

The second lesson is that among white powers (of which the Russian state is one) there is never any real principle involved. Millions died fighting “Nazis”, only for the politicians that sent them to their deaths to recruit those very same Nazi leaders into their own programmes.

When capitalists want something, they find an excuse to start a war in order to get it.

For example, one Arthur L. Rudolph was a German Nazi-era scientist brought to the United States in 1945 for his rocket-making expertise. He has even been honoured by the United States National Aeronautic and Space Agency (NASA). He is considered to be the “father” of the Saturn V rocket upon which the Apollo moon-landing programme depended.

More directly, one Adolf Heusinger, a German general who served as chairman of the NATO Military Committee from 1961 to 1964, had in an earlier life been a colonel in Hitler’s General Staff, and had been directly involved in planning the invasion of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union also grabbed from defeated Germany as many Nazi scientists as it could lay its hands on. But their case was handled more like a reparative abduction than the offer of an entirely new comfortable life.

Today’s enemy may become tomorrow’s friend, and today’s friend was the enemy yesterday. It is just their culture of politics, war and diplomacy. Get involved at your own risk.

Third, that when these giants fight, they do so on an industrial scale. Their conflicts often spill across other borders and territories. Their weaponry brings mass death, and their logistical and human resource needs often suck in people who have very little to do with the actual cause of the conflict. In Africa, it is only Ethiopia that has come anywhere near this scale of war-making.

Today’s Democratic Republic of Congo was plundered for the rubber and copper needed to make tires and bullet casings for the 1914-1918 war. The Lumumba-led independence government fell victim to the Cold War rivalry over Congo’s uranium deposits as part of the America vs. Soviet Union nuclear arms race.

Hundreds of thousands of black Africans faced off and killed each other as loyal soldiers of the German and British armies fighting for German Tanganyika and British Uganda and Kenya, respectively.

Ukrainians, like all peoples everywhere, matter. That is why its real independence from either power is important to the rest of the world. For the Western powers, it would be nice to have Ukraine, but Russia as a whole, is the real prize.

Whatever one may wish to now call it, Ukraine is a place of wealth and potential profit. It is the second largest country in Europe by area, holding significant reserves of uranium, titanium, manganese, iron, mercury and coal.

It is a world leader in the production and export of a whole range of agricultural products (corn, potatoes, rye, wheat and eggs, all of which are central to the processed food industry).

In Africa, it is only Ethiopia that has come anywhere near this scale of war-making.

Ukraine is also a country with a significant body of advanced industrial knowledge.

And as with the Alsace-Lorraine, and the earlier wars to dislodge the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from power, this is about Western corporations (and Russian oligarchs) looking to increase their wealth.

This is not an African story, but it is certainly beginning to look like one. In the history of the conflicts of the modern world, certain zones stand out as having suffered from the accident of being located where strategic resources were to be found. Before the DRC, there was Western Europe and the Middle East. With lots of minerals and fertile land, all that is missing in Ukraine is a population too weak, too poor, and too divided to think and speak for itself. War, autocratic government, and CIA-sponsored “good governance” workshops have been known to supply those.

Therefore, Ambassador Kimani’s advice notwithstanding, Africans are better off staying away from all this, just as Ukraine would have been wiser to stay out of the Russia-NATO rivalries.

While the white powers were not fighting in Ukraine, they were still promoting fighting somewhere else. Now that they have also kicked off in Europe, it means their unusual break of eight decades of peace is finally over. “Normal service has resumed”.

Europe is at war with Europe, in Europe, once again.

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