My grandfather lived to around 100 years old. He was a teenager during the First World War and as a young adult was hired as a casual labourer on a white colonial settler’s farm. One afternoon the labourers left the fields on that farm in Kiambu to the sound of a screaming man. As they approached the estate’s work buildings, they came upon a shocking sight. One of the African workers had been accused of theft and the British farm owner had ordered him stripped naked and tied onto the corrugated roof of one of the buildings. It was the hottest time of the day and the entire workforce, that included women and children, was forced to watch as the man moaned and screamed in pain as he literally roasted on the sizzling tin roof. The episode traumatised and outraged my grandfather. When the Mau Mau was formed, he was an eager early conscript.

Though he grimly told the stories from the dark days of the “State of Emergency” that was declared by the colonial governor in October 1952 to confront the Mau Mau rebellion against British colonial rule, he never regretted the choice he made despite the cost to himself individually and to his family.

The sheer military power of the British Empire was awesome but to my grandfather the most deadly and most insidious element of the imperial project were the missionaries. He enjoyed reading the Bible and particularly appreciated the man called Jesus of Nazareth, describing him as “mũndũ wa kĩhooto”—a man who appreciated manifest truth and who was courageous, humane and honest.

My grandfather was far more suspicious of the “men of the skirt”—the missionaries who brought Jesus’ message to the colony. These fellows, my grandfather observed, were very much unlike the man Jesus about whom they preached. They were willing to lie, denigrate local customs and traditions, sell out members of their congregation and were unwilling to debate the more ridiculous elements of the gospel they preached. Despite the military might of Empire and its power to manipulate people’s view of the world, my grandfather was always clear that, “One day the whites will go. This is not their place. . .”

****

Towards the end of February, the Russian regime of Vladimir Putin embarked on an invasion of its neighbour Ukraine. Since then the Russians have pummelled Ukrainian cities in a punitive military expedition that has provoked outrage in the West and in other parts of the world. Last week US President Joe Biden called what was happening in Ukraine a “war crime” —invoking language from the lexicon of human rights that is a unique contribution of “the West” as an idea, and the world order since the end of WWII, an essentially Western rights and rules-based order in the management of human affairs. It has meant a period of unprecedented peace, especially in Europe where, in the past few hundred years, some of the most devastating wars have been fought. Indeed, one of the exceptional attributes of European cities that Africans observe when they visit them are the impressive monuments to war and to the men who fought them.

The war crimes of Putin and his regime in Ukraine are ongoing. At the United Nations General Assembly of 2 March, 28 out of 54 African countries (51 per cent of African countries) voted in favour of a resolution condemning Russia’s aggression. In contrast, 81 per cent of non-African countries voted in favour of the resolution. Thirty-five African countries (48.6 per cent) abstained. Eight African countries did not vote and Eritrea voted against the resolution. Kenya’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Amb. Martin Kimani, was widely lauded in the West for an outstanding speech criticising the disproportionate and unprovoked Russian action.

Events since this grim renewal of large-scale European hostilities have served to demonstrate a number of profound new realities. First, I was struck that Putin so brazenly embarked on the operation. But the world has changed. I was also struck that US President Joe Biden”—perhaps the US president most experienced in foreign affairs in a long while”—consulted with Chinese President Xi Jinping rather than rushing into action that would be too drastic even for the US in the current context. There was a time, not so long ago, when the US could do more or less what it wanted anywhere on the globe. Its presence in Asia, and in the Pacific generally, has been dominant since 1945. This era has ended and the world senses it. For African leaders, China is today their most significant investment partner. Russia is one of their biggest suppliers of wheat and by far their biggest supplier of weapons, and both countries combined were steadfast supporters—in real terms—of decolonisation and the anti-apartheid struggle on the continent. They have lots of chips to call in.

***

American might—political, military, economic and soft power—has implicitly and explicitly underwritten the global liberal order. This seemed set to become the norm with the fall of the Soviet Union; it was as if we all wanted to become like America. In many countries, we copied its constitution, adopted its position on individual rights, capitalism, etc.

In the US itself some right wingers were even more robust and sought to export the model of governance and rights through war—changing regimes that did not fit into the new world order. This latter hubristic project fell apart in the Middle East and most dramatically in Afghanistan last year. But a hegemon also maintains power via the mythology and values it imbues and imparts; what other peoples believe it can do and believes in; the sense that it is the source of most things great and good—inventions, health, education, happiness and joyful life. But the events of the last decade have shattered this myth, especially for the youth in the world’s poorest countries. New types of media have demonstrated that for all the talk of “rights”, geopolitics is in actual fact often the highest and most delicate form of hypocrisy and, more often than not, trumps rights.

Events since this grim renewal of large-scale European hostilities have served to demonstrate a number of profound new realities.

In the meantime, a host of nations have risen economically, politically and militarily, and importantly, in confidence when it comes to projecting their geopolitical interests via both soft and hard power. Russia is one such country but the dragon in the room is China, which is using its superpower status to systematically and unapologetically evict the US from Asia. China’s trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative is so vast in scale and ambition it reaches across the planet. (I write this article sitting in the lobby of a spanking new airport terminal in Lusaka still under construction by a Chinese contractor.) And then there is India, another rapidly growing behemoth. On the global stage, Turkey and a host of other countries in the Middle East now punch way above their apparent geopolitical weight.

Clearly, a new world order is emerging and it does not conform to the ostensibly liberal values that have underpinned the Western-dominated post-1945 world order. It is partly because of this that so many African countries were cautious about criticising Russia when it invaded Ukraine. Africa has been caught in the middle of big power competition before—from the 1950s to the 1990s—and our politics has never been the same.

***

As the Western hegemon ends, authoritarians are flourishing. What academics called a global democratic recession has become a depression. But despite a spate of dramatic reversals in Africa over the past two years, with a return to coups and attempted coups and the capture of elections by elites, research shows that two-thirds of Africans still support democracy. We have tried Big Man rule and the trauma lingers. What is clear is that the West—and America in particular – is diminishing as a guarantor of this system of governance.

A new world order is emerging and it does not conform to the ostensibly liberal values that have underpinned the Western-dominated post-1945 world order.

As Africans, we are going to have to come up with our own mechanisms for dealing with the accountability of our leaders and managing conflicts when they take place. The reality is that some of our most solid partners in delivering public goods—like education, health, infrastructure, security, etc.—will no longer be predominantly the colonials and former colonials of the West but will hail from a cross-section of countries with an assortment of governance systems, some of them inimical to African aspirations.

My grandfather’s story of the man roasting on the roof was searing and, to this day, I regret not having asked what happened to him at the end of it all. Still, the settler farmer who was meting out his own form of arbitrary justice did in the end leave—they all do, even the local pretenders who take over from them and build their own blackface oligarchy eventually fall under the weight of the contradictions upon which they thrive. A story for another day. . .

I have been engaged by The Elephant to provide its readers with a series of pieces about surveys related to the forthcoming election. They will both review and comment on such surveys published during the weeks since the previous piece, and highlight events that are deemed likely to influence the results of subsequent polls that will be likewise interrogated over the coming months. In doing so, the pieces aim to provide readers with several analytical tools to better enable them to make their own assessments of such surveys in terms of their credibility and potential impact — an issue that will also be considered, based mainly on the expressed reactions to them by key political actors and analysts. Given such ambitious aims, the author welcomes readers’ comments and suggestions.

More broadly — though not always explicitly — the series also seeks to address the question as to the contribution — positive or otherwise — such surveys make to Kenya’s still very much in-progress “democracy”, though largely leaving aside the profound and never-ending debate among scholars as to just what “democracy” means, and how its criteria can be empirically measured. Such an evaluation must unfortunately include both scientifically sound and bias-free polls, as well as those that fail to conform to such standards, whether or not such failure is obvious to those who consume them.

For transparency, let me begin with a brief personal note. As is widely known, I have been associated with several market research firms in Kenya as a research analyst, beginning with The Steadman Group in 2005. While we conducted a number of surveys on a variety of governance topics for individual and in some cases, confidential, clients, most of my work was in connection with the periodic surveys conducted on various public issues. This includes, in the “early years”, the 2005 constitutional referendum for which we conducted two polls, and the 2007 election, both of which attracted considerable attention from both the general public and the political class, and quite prominent, if not always accurate, media coverage.

I continued in this capacity after Steadman was sold to Synovate, a UK firm, in 2008, and then from 2012, when Ipsos, a French company, bought Synovate.  In March 2019, the management in Paris made a decision (for reasons that remain unclear – to me, at least) that the Kenya office would no longer conduct and release survey results “of a political nature” and therefore had no further need for a political scientist/analyst like me. Reverting to my earlier role as an independent consultant, I began part-time work with Ms. Maggie Ireri, who after resigning as Ipsos CEO in 2015 had launched her own market research firm, Trends and Insights for Africa (TIFA). In the last two years, we have conducted six national surveys on public issues (among other work) and are planning to continue to do so, with an increasing focus on the 2022 elections.

In brief, therefore, whereas I shall seek to be objective in my assessments of the current polling environment in Kenya in general and of the survey products of particular firms, including TIFA’s, I cannot guarantee my analyses will be completely free of unconscious bias, which shall be for my readers to judge. At the same time, I am confident that I now know much more about survey research than I did twenty years ago and recognize that I, along with my colleagues, could have done and still could do certain things better.

In subsequent articles, I will address the technical requirements of methodologically sound surveys, but for now, let us assume that all such requirements are met and that their results are accurate, within the limitations of survey science. Adopting this assumption, we can ask: of what use are election-related surveys?

In the last two years, we have conducted six national surveys on public issues (among other topics) and are planning to continue to do so, with an increasing focus on the forthcoming election.

Consumers of such surveys can be roughly divided into several overlapping categories, reflecting their needs and interests: candidates for elective office together with their strategists; the public at large and especially voters; the media; actual and potential campaign donor-supporters and investors; and regional and more distant governments.

While perhaps obvious, the specific ways in which such information may be put to use vary, largely depending on the user. Political parties and coalitions, for example, need to establish the popularity of potential candidates ahead of nominations. Subsequently, nominated (and independent) candidates may want to know how viable their campaigns are, and the potential impact of particular campaign strategies.

For their part, the media may use polls to decide how much coverage to give particular candidates and issues based on their popular appeal, in order to focus scrutiny on those deemed more likely to occupy important public offices, while at the same time aiming to attract a wider audience for purely commercial purposes.

Similarly, those prepared to invest in campaigns would want an accurate measure of the popularity of parties and candidates in order to more accurately calculate their potential for success, especially if their primary motivation is to benefit from the eventual victors, whether directly in terms of contracts, for example, or indirectly in terms of policies that support their material and/or ideological interests.

Yet another category of potential poll consumers are conflict prevention and mitigation actors who could use them to assess the likelihood of violence based (at least in part) on an assumption that the closer the result, the more likely there will be post-election contestation (especially if the official results are less than universally acknowledged as “true”). In addition, having a more accurate understanding of the issues that divide the country and the intensity of such divisions can also inform the development of strategies early enough to at least mitigate more serious conflict outcomes.

Such pre-election assessment benefits also apply to Investors whose decisions may depend on the likely future policy environment based on which parties and candidates, with what agendas, will be in power. Similar concerns also apply to foreign governments and NGOs whose operations and interests in the country are also likely to be affected by the make-up and orientation of the next government (in some cases, at both the county and the national level).

Three additional categories of poll-users can be identified.  First, there are academics and other researchers seeking to test hypotheses about campaign activity, political party processes, voter motivation, turnout levels, and the salience of particular political parties’ or candidates’ policies and identities in terms of attracting votes. Such analyses can be country-specific or part of wider, cross-national studies.  Second are the survey firms themselves.  They may use elections to test various methods of data collection and analysis both for internal purposes and to publicly demonstrate their ability to gather reliable information as a way to attract future business.

Finally, we have the voters – at least those whose votes are not “set in stone” due to embedded patronage relations or any of the various forms of automatic “demographic support” including but not limited to common ethnic identity or religious affiliation. They may wish to know the viability of particular political parties and candidates to ensure they don’t “waste” their votes, especially if the race(s) in question appear close.  (One challenging area of post-election research is to discover whether any voters actually changed their ballot choices based on an awareness of polls, since many respondents are not prepared to admit this.)

The obvious focus for all of these various entities is on the election’s outcome. However, beyond the “horse races”, such surveys can be used to reveal just how deeply divided any political community is, as well as the levels of confidence in election integrity among particular sections of the electorate, and how much faith they have in the utility of elections in terms of actually making a difference in their lives. The latter would be partly reflected in the level of participation in various aspects of the electoral process such as registering to vote, attending campaign rallies and other meetings and engaging in party nominations — in addition to turning out to vote on election day.

But all of these uses of election-related polls depend on one crucial factor: their credibility.   Unless poll consumers can be sure that the results are reasonably accurate, it would be folly to rely upon them for anything more than “entertainment”.  Here, a key factor inspiring such confidence is having results from a number of reputable firms that are largely similar.

Beginning with the first factor, we can speak of “safety in numbers” — the “numbers” here being not the survey results themselves, but the number of firms undertaking such election-related polls.  That is, the more firms that undertake such surveys, the easier it is to spot “outliers”, while also allowing for the calculation of average results in order to minimize inevitable, but hopefully minor, variations in methodology.

Unfortunately, with less than six months to the election, far fewer “political” polls have been released/published than was the case in connection with any of the last three general elections. This is mainly a consequence of the reduced number of firms engaged in such survey work for public release. Over that period, the most prominent among them was Ipsos, but which has been largely silent since late 2018, with its few releases on public issues completely avoiding “politics”.  In this regard, it has joined Strategic Africa (formerly Strategic Public Relations) and Consumer Insight, both of which undertook/released voting-intention polls prior to the 2007 and 2013 elections but have been “silent” since prior to the 2017 election. Their “disappearance” has only been partly compensated for by the arrival of TIFA, which has undertaken several national and county-level polls, and more recently RealField, a British firm that released the results of its first Kenya survey last January. On the other hand, most visible throughout this period have been Radio Africa with its now monthly polls (and which broadcasts results on its various radio stations while publishing them in its newspaper, The Star), and Infotrak, even if, over the years, the latter’s results — as will be shown in subsequent pieces — have often been somewhat at odds with those of other “established” firms.

The “disappearance” of these firms has only been partly compensated for by the arrival of Trends and Insights for Africa.

Before reviewing their results – and setting aside any insinuations of deliberate falsification – it is important to note the main factors that could explain different results that fall outside standard margins-of-error among two or more surveys. Most relevant are the following: the samples are of considerably different sizes and/or do not match in terms of relevant demographics (and which any post-survey data-weighting has failed to rectify); the data collection dates are different so that at least some respondents in more recent surveys have been influenced by relevant events; questions even on the same topics are worded differently (in whatever interview languages are used), or are placed in a different sequence-order, so that the subject matter of what has been asked previously differentially influences responses to the question-data being compared; the interviewers are not equally qualified and/or fastidious in terms of accurately recording responses, coupled with different levels of quality control in data-capture and analysis among the firms involved.

Keeping the above factors in mind, we may conclude this first election poll piece by trying to answer the question: how congruent have the presidential contest poll results released by the currently active firms been? Based on the figures, several points can be made.

Recent Survey Presidential Contest Results (Rounded Figures in Percent)

First, what might explain the significant reversal of position between Deputy President William Ruto and Raila Odinga as shown in Radio Africa’s most recent survey: an increase of 20 per cent by the latter with the former gaining just 5 per cent, even as the proportion who declined to name any candidate decreased by 24 per cent (thus largely accounting for combined gains of the two main candidates)? Such a major change awaits confirmation by future polls.

Second, in comparing Radio Africa’s previous poll with TIFA’s most recent one, even if Ruto’s lead over Odinga was nearly identical (just over 10 per cent) why is it that the combined figures for “undecided” and “no response” about respondents’ preferred presidential candidate were so different (i.e., 30 per cent for TIFA vs. only 13 per cent for Radio Africa)? Also, and in large part based on the results of these two firms, how, according to Infotrak’s poll of late December (thus conducted a few weeks before the Radio Africa and TIFA polls) could these two main candidates be in a statistical tie? Further, even if the gap between Ruto and Raila (5 per cent) reported by RealField is at a mid-point between those of Radio Africa/TIFA and Infotrak, how could its combined figure of those who declined to mention any preferred candidate (7 per cent) be so much lower than that of any of the other three firms?

Reported differences in methodology do not provide a sufficient basis for answering such questions, even if, for example, Infotrak indicated that its 1,600 respondents represented only 26 counties – which seems strange, given that TIFA’s slightly smaller sample included respondents from all 47. Regarding RealField, among its methodological details was the declaration that interviews were conducted by 500 “fielders”, who were somehow able to complete nearly 22,000 interviews in just four days — meaning an average of eleven interviews per day by each of them, a very ambitious “completion rate” for a household-based survey, even for interviews of shorter duration.

One thing is clear, however: the variation in sample sizes cannot explain the variations in findings. An additional note about the RealField survey: based on its abundant sample size, data-collection alone would likely cost at least US$10,000, and with professional costs and company profit, at least twice that.  Further, several questions were raised by The Star, the only mainstream media outlet that gave the survey any coverage. Among these was the source of funding for the survey, which a representative of the firm identified (as required by Kenyan law for all voter-intention surveys conducted during the twelve months preceding an election) as the Kenya National Muslim Advisory Council. This largely unknown entity was described to me by a senior official of another, much better known, Muslim organization as a “one-man show”, with the “one man” in question not known for his personal wealth and thus not in a position to afford such a massive survey. He was also a quite vocal supporter of the BBI amendment bill last year, according to several media sources.

Finally, something should be said about the confusion, or deliberate “spinning”, of the issue as to whether Ruto’s lead, as reported by Radio Africa and TIFA in their February polls, is sufficient to achieve an outright victory in the first round of the presidential election. When both Radio Africa and TIFA released the results of their November surveys (as shown above), the Deputy President and several of his political associates attacked them (without naming either company) during one or more campaign rallies in western Kenya. According to the Deputy President, as reported in several TV newscasts, these polls were false “because we’ve done our own survey that shows us at 56 per cent”.

It is hard to determine how the Ruto “campaign” figure was arrived at. Yet if the figures for the Radio Africa and TIFA polls are re-calculated having removed those stating they were “undecided” as well as any other respondents who failed to identify a preferred candidate (i.e., “will not vote”; “no response”), the results are both nearly identical and mirror the DP’s claim as shown in the chart below:

In both cases, they suggest a first-round win for Ruto, even if claiming this so far in advance of the election, with so many uncertainties remaining, including choice of running mates, would be highly misleading.  Moreover, it cannot be assumed that all, or even a significant proportion, of those who failed to mention a preferred candidate will not, in fact, vote, suggesting that one analytical challenge is to try to discern from the data which way such respondents are “leaning”, and thus how they are likely to vote — among those who will do so.

Just how such an analysis can be undertaken, and how reliably the media report such findings, are subjects to be considered in the next piece in this series.

With matchmaking almost complete, the Kenyan political dance now takes on a more structured character as we head into election season proper between April and August 2022.

With the collapse of the One Kenya Alliance, we now know that, nationwide, it is a two-horse presidential race between William Ruto and Raila Odinga, each backed by supporting alliances, but with Raila’s Azimio la Umoja also backed by President Uhuru Kenyatta and the state apparatus. The contortions required for an incumbent president to support his strongest opponent to succeed him destroyed the ruling Jubilee party during 2020-21. This leaves a rump Jubilee allied with ODM and 20+ other “Azimio-friendly” parties facing the recently formed Kenya Kwanza alliance, centred on Deputy President Ruto’s UDA.

The two alliances are now neck and neck overall, with most models giving both candidates between 7.5 million and 8.5 million votes each, leaving the result open and subject to influence from other factors, including the financial resources of the two alliances, state support and simple luck.

With the onboarding of Luhya leaders Musalia Mudavadi and Moses Wetangula to his new coalition during February, Ruto has strengthened his national credentials and gained a strong base in the Western region, but benefited less than he had hoped nationwide, as a substantial element in FORD-Kenya and the ANC defected to Azimio. Raila’s Azimio alliance has lost most of the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru, but elsewhere has strengthened its position in the last six months, picking up support in northern Kenya and the coast and recently winning over a very reluctant Kalonzo Musyoka. He was the last big player left in the now collapsed OKA alliance.

Whether Raila can keep Musyoka—who now controls maybe 50 per cent of the Kamba vote—is less certain, as Musyoka is openly angry and prepared for trouble. But this last-minute shotgun marriage gives the ramshackle Jubilee-ODM-Wiper-KANU alliance a narrow majority (52-53 per cent) in the National Assembly once more (which the government had lost for a few weeks in February).

The diagram below shows the political allegiances of the elected MPs in the national assembly as of early March 2022, after Musyoka finally declared for Azimio. Orange indicates Azimio (for now, as they have not decided on a colour as a brand) and Yellow for Kenya Kwanza (the colour of the UDA, its largest component).

A square represents one elected MP. There are also 47 elected women representatives and 12 party-nominated MPs (not shown). They follow a similar pattern but with a slightly greater leaning towards Azimio as a result of the vulnerability of nominated MPs to party recall.

My calculations show that Azimio has the backing of 150 elected MPs while Kenya Kwanza has 134, with six having refused to declare their stand or flip-flopping so fast their position cannot be determined.

Both presidential candidates have failed to nominate a running mate as deputy president, holding back from making that choice for as long as possible, until defection from their alliances by spurned partners becomes impossible. Both have onboarded very senior allies (Luhya Mudavadi, Kamba Musyoka) without formally naming them as deputy, leaving the Kikuyu, Embu and Meru vote still potentially swingable by a strong choice of DP by one or both alliances.

This last-minute shotgun marriage gives the ramshackle Jubilee-ODM-Wiper-KANU alliance a narrow majority.

In truth though, there are few senior Kikuyu, Meru, Embu or Mbeere with the mettle to become Deputy President to either candidate. Martha Karua is, in my view, the best Kikuyu candidate for Raila, but they have a difficult history together and she commands respect more than she does votes. Peter Munya might work for the Meru but not elsewhere. Peter Kenneth is a safe pair of hands but he is more of technocrat than a rabble-rouser. For Ruto, none of the floated names (Wahome, Gachagua) makes real sense. They are not national-level players, and many have skeletons bursting out of their closets. Susan Kihika in Nakuru might be my pick (a female DP is a distinct possibility) but she is still new and the Nakuru governorship is hers for the taking so a 50-50 chance at DP might be less attractive than a definite governorship. Anne Waiguru would be another option, but again, she has a solid chance of re-election and she does not have the common touch. Justin Muturi would do, but he doesn’t set hearts alight. Mudavadi would motivate the Luhya more than Muturi would sustain the Kikuyu.

At the county level, the model below shows my prediction as to which alliance and presidential candidate will (based on multiple factors) win the presidential election in that county. Where opinion polls have been (properly) conducted, those numbers have been incorporated.

As we can see, the two alliances are again neck and neck, with a fractional advantage for Kenya Kwanza. In most counties, the leading alliance is now pretty clear to all but diehard supporters. The final result will be determined by the size of the winner’s majority, so turnout will play a huge role in the outcome.

Another huge influence on constituency and county elections (but not the presidential election) will be “friendly fire”, i.e. split votes between different candidates from the same alliance. Both alliances have decided not to hold cross-alliance primaries, leaving multiple candidates from the same alliance competing for the seat in different parties. This was the bane of the pro-Kibaki parties in 2007 and is likely to have the same effect on Azimio. Real three- and four-horse races will result across at least a fifth of the country (with Jubilee candidates standing against ODM and DAP-K candidates for example, or UDA, ANC and FORD-Kenya competing against each other), making the result in a first-past-the post system hard to predict. But assuming no upsets, we can predict that UDA and ODM will be the largest parties in the next parliament, and UDA will be the largest, as it is the dominant player in the Kenya Kwanza coalition everywhere except among the Luhya, while support for Azimio is more evenly spread between constituent parties.

Regional models do not tell the whole story, however, for in presidential elections some counties are more equal than others. At the extremes, Nairobi has 2.5 million voters, while tiny Lamu has 80,000. Presidentially, therefore, Nairobi’s dominance is worth 30 times the dominance of Lamu. Historically, Kenyan elections have been about many things, including real issues (corruption, economic reform, ethnic clashes, multi-party democracy), personal loyalties and alliances and loyalty to party (although the parties change every five years), but underlying those have been consistent ethnic community preferences. To use a pithy phrase coined in 1992, that election was about “bribe and tribe”, and while the situation has changed in the last 30 years, that characterisation is still familiar to many.

In truth though, there are few senior Kikuyu with the mettle to become Deputy President to either candidate.

In the last two general elections, an ethnically-based predictive model—looking at the population of each ethnic group, registration, predicted turnout and estimated voting intention for each community—proved extremely accurate in predicting overall results. Whether the turnout and voting preference predictions will be accurate this time cannot be confirmed until the day, and outcomes can change with events, such as unexpected selections of Deputy Presidents, wars, disease, sudden deaths, major defections, blatant election rigging or catastrophic faux pas by leading candidates. But it did well in 2013 and 2017.

Overall, my current national presidential model is based on the input that there are between 51 and 52 million Kenyans today, of which roughly 30 million are aged 18 and over. We know the ethnicity of these people in 2019. Of the 30 million, we know that 22 million have registered to vote, 13 per cent more than in 2017. But we also know that voting registration rates have historically differed between communities and have varied depending on whether they have ethnic “skin in the game”.

Looking at historical registration rates and turnout, and current registration by constituency, gives us an estimate of the number of actual voters in 2022—I predict between 16 and 17 million. We do not know the ethnicity of those registered voters, above all because the government has failed to release the census results regarding ethnicity at the district or county level since 1989. But we have 1989 and can make a good guess at the changes since. Adding to the mix the predicted voting preferences of each community, one can then estimate the votes for each candidate.

There are four important notes to this model though. First, for this election, William Ruto has run an effective grassroots, economy-based campaign, the first true national populist campaign since Matiba in 1992, openly critical of the wealthy elites and appealing to the poor and marginalised of every ethnicity (most Kenyans). While senior politicians and most elites have turned against him, the poor have not; his “hustler versus dynasties” campaign has given them hope. I therefore predict that in this election we shall see some cross-ethnic economic voting. I think that Ruto will poll 25 per cent and above in places like Ukambani (if Musyoka does not become Raila’s running mate), Kisii and at the (Christian) Coast even when much of the political establishment is with Azimio.

The two alliances are again neck and neck, with a fractional advantage for Kenya Kwanza.

Religion is another cross-ethnic political theme, stronger than in most previous polls, with Ruto explicitly branding himself as a Christian leader and receiving the support of grassroots religious groups in Christian areas but correspondingly finding it heavy going in Muslim areas of northern Kenya and the Coast.

Thirdly, this model does not take material election rigging into account. Top-up voting in the homelands of the two candidates is common (whether you like it or not) and is to some extent factored in. Material rigging (entirely faked results) is different—it can produce totally unpredictable results. But the Kenyan courts have become increasingly assertive on such matters and the risks of rigging were made evident with the annulment of the 2017 presidential result (even though no rigging was proven). Whoever wins, I’m sure the other will petition.

Finally, this assumes both alliances have the financial resources to finish the campaign. Both have big donors, and both are seeking funds from home and abroad. But Azimio has the dubious honour of having close connections to the state apparatus and its opportunities to free up funds. On the other hand, Ruto has personally bankrolled an insurgent campaign for two years, and even his deep pockets must one day run dry.

Putting all this together, the result of my current model (all other things staying equal) is a narrow Ruto victory of 8.3 million to Raila’s 8 million (51 per cent-49 per cent). But this is not cast in stone. A 5 per cent error in my prediction of the Kikuyu vote (estimated at 71 per cent Ruto to 29 per cent Raila in my model) changes that result to a narrow Azimio win. In one sense, it is all to play for. However, in another, given the country’s violent political history and the endless disputes over election rigging, such a narrow victory for either alliance is unlikely to be a comfortable outcome for Kenya.