On 28 July 2023, President William Ruto declared the Pemba community to be an “ethnic community of Kenya”. At a citizenship award ceremony in Kilifi County he read aloud from a proclamation issued in January, which states:

“I, William Samoei Ruto, President and the commander-in-Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces, having considered the said petition and the consequent Parliamentary Report in light of the Constitution of Kenya, our National Values, and the Principles of Governance, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution, do recognise, proclaim and order:
1. That Kenyans of Pemba heritage constitute a community that is one of the ethnic communities of Kenya.”

This is the second group which a president has formally proclaimed to be a tribe or ethnic community of Kenya in recent years. Uhuru Kenyatta did the same for Kenyan Asians in 2017, and gave less formal forms of recognition to other groups in speeches and statements. In 2016, registration of the Makonde people was declared to be compulsory following a cabinet decision, and Uhuru handed out certificates of citizenship to community members at a function in 2017. Uhuru also supported citizenship for Shona people and in 2020, issued certificates and ID cards to them at a public ceremony on Jamhuri Day.

But citizenship is not granted to groups. Indeed, there is much that is not well understood about how citizenship functions in Kenya.

Citizenship is the relationship between an individual and the state. It is a social contract and a symbiotic relationship where the state recognizes the rights and entitlements of an individual while at the same time the individual recognizes their responsibilities to the state. It also expresses the relationship of an individual to a national community. It is the legal recognition of belonging. When presidents talk of granting citizenship to communities, they are affirming that belonging in order to right some historical injustices. But they are also (perhaps unintentionally) giving a misleading interpretation of the way that citizenship law works in Kenya – or indeed in most other countries.

In this article we examine the use of presidential decrees of nationality, and their relationship not just to a politics of belonging, but to the laws of Kenya. 

How citizenship status really works: by birth vs by registration

Citizenship status derives from the Constitution of Kenya 2010, the Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011, and the regulations that define the procedures to apply for recognition or grant of citizenship. It is important to distinguish between citizenship by birth and citizenship by registration.

Citizenship by birth means citizenship that is automatically attributed to a child at birth. It does not require an application but is acquired simply by operation of the law. Of course, a person who is attributed citizenship by birth will in practice later have to apply for a national ID card to be able to prove the status when needed, but if the relevant facts are established, the person cannot in law be denied the documents. According to the constitution, a person is a citizen by birth if either their mother or father is a Kenyan citizen. Birth on Kenyan territory does not give any rights to Kenyan citizenship.

The next step, of course, is to prove that either the mother or father is Kenyan, and this is where it may become complicated for those whose parents do not have identity documents. The burden of proof of the relevant facts is on the individual who claims to be a citizen. This is not always obvious. On the one hand, there are real challenges in interpreting the law on automatic or voluntary acquisition of Kenyan citizenship upon independence in 1963, and up until an amendment to the constitution in 1985 that removed rights to citizenship based on birth in Kenya. This amendment was stated to be retroactive to the date of independence – against the general principles of the rule of law. On the other hand, very many people who are undoubtedly Kenyan citizens in law have historically held no identity documents.

Citizenship by registration, as opposed to by birth, is citizenship that a person who is not already a citizen has to apply for. It depends on an administrative process. For some people, citizenship by registration is available (in principle) on simple application, for example if they have been married to a Kenyan for seven years.

However, for others the process is much more discretionary and can be refused on a wide range of grounds. For example, someone who is a legal resident of Kenya for seven years can apply for citizenship, but must satisfy a list of conditions including being “capable of making a substantive contribution to the progress or advancement in any area of national development within Kenya” (section 13 of the Citizenship and Immigration Act). Again, the burden of proof that the conditions are fulfilled lies with the individual.

Very many people who are undoubtedly Kenyan citizens in law have historically held no identity documents.

As we know, members of some communities who have been living in Kenya for a very long time were not previously recognised as Kenyan. In recognition of this, the Citizenship and Immigration Act 2011 created special temporary procedures to enable such a person to apply to register as a citizen. These procedures were for people who have been living in Kenya continuously since independence in 1963 and who did not have a claim to citizenship in Kenya or any other state, or who did not hold an identity document recognising citizenship in any country. Descendants of people fulfilling these conditions were also eligible. The term “stateless” is commonly used to refer to such people in Kenya (although the law is more complicated). Just as with a normal application for registration, the process is an individual application, the burden of proof of the relevant facts is with the individual, and no membership of a community is mentioned.

There was a legal window of five years for this process, and in that time practically no use was made of it – a few people tried to apply, but there was no procedure in place to treat the applications. Diana Gichengo of the Kenya Human Rights Commission at the time was quoted in the Daily Nation (4 October 2016) saying, “It is unfortunate that the deadline has elapsed without a single person being registered.” It was thanks to the efforts of the Makonde community and their famous march, and the civil society groups that supported them, including the KHRC, that the interior secretary agreed to take action and to extend the registration deadline, using the additional three-year extension available in the law. This extension expired in 2019.

What has been the procedure applied in recent cases?

In none of the cases of the Makonde, the Shona, or the Pemba – or Kenyan Asians – did the president “grant” citizenship to all members of those communities. Instead, the presidential declarations, preceded by a parliamentary committee report in the Pemba case, and lobbying from civil society (as well as the UNHCR), generated the political will to find the legal means to resolve their statelessness. It is still the case that every individual had or will have to go through their own process, and provide proof of their own birth, parentage and so on.

The nature of these registrations was different in each case. The Makonde and Shona people were registered as citizens during the special window provided in law for the registration of stateless people (although the ceremony for the Shona took place after it had expired). They had to first apply for citizenship and swear an oath of allegiance. Only once citizenship was granted for each individual were they issued with ID cards.

For Pemba people, the proclamation by President Ruto took place after the expiry of that special window. This meant that they would not be able to apply for citizenship in the same way. Instead, it seems that the government is taking the approach that they were citizens by birth and simply lacked recognition of that fact – despite the previous statement by the cabinet secretary that this was not the case. Accordingly, it seems they will simply be issued with ID cards without swearing an oath – if they can fulfil whatever evidential requirements are put in place. By issuing ID cards to members of a community on the basis that they are citizens by birth, the government admits that they have been legitimate Kenyans all along but have been denied citizenship for all these years.

It is still the case that every individual had or will have to go through their own process, and provide proof of their own birth, parentage and so on.

The government could have introduced a bill in parliament to amend the Citizenship and Immigration Act (Section 15(2)) to further extend the window for registration of stateless people, but this has not yet happened. The reasons for this are not transparent. If this window can be extended, there are other communities who could also benefit from targeted registration processes – including people of Rwandan and Burundian descent (with the exception of a handful of Rwandans who have been issued with ID documents).

What is the relevance of “communities” or “tribes” of Kenya for citizenship?

Kenya’s citizenship law does not contain any mention of “tribes” or “ethnic communities”. What, therefore, is the relevance of the recent proclamations and declarations?

They are important because, despite the lack of relevance of ethnicity for citizenship law, membership of an “ethnic community” has historically had official and unofficial significance in the processes of acquiring identity documentation.

The Registration of Persons Act 1947 is still in effect, and until a 2018 amendment, required a person to declare their “race or tribe” to acquire a national ID. This is, of course, a hangover from colonial administrative practices, including for the infamous kipande system to ensure that men did not move from their Native Reserves without the permission of the settler authorities.

Though there is, since 2018, no longer any legal or regulatory requirement to include ethnicity on application forms or in a population or citizenship register, it continues to happen. The National Registration Bureau is not transparent about why it collects this data, or what impact it has on an individual’s application. But we know from the experiences of several marginalised communities that members of some ethnic communities continue to face “vetting”, requiring additional forms of proof of identity and parentage that can be impossible fulfil. When they can’t meet these sometimes unduly onerous requirements, they can find themselves stateless.

In practice, the communities most affected by these unofficial and discriminatory practices are ethnic groups that are vaguely perceived, en masse, as not belonging to Kenya either now or at the time of independence: Nubians, Makonde, Shona and Pemba are the most well known but not the only examples. This leads to a situation in which public debates take place about an entire community’s belonging and history in Kenya. These debates then shape public perceptions of whether these people “deserve” citizenship or not, even though this should really be a question of each individual’s biography.

Members of some ethnic communities continue to face “vetting”, requiring additional forms of proof of identity and parentage that can be impossible fulfil.

Take Shona people, for example. They tell their history as having come from Zimbabwe before independence, as missionaries of the Gospel Church of God. Pemba peoples have sought to present themselves as long-term inhabitants of the coast, not of Pemba Island, and therefore indigenous to what is now Kenya for centuries. They use their fishing prowess to further support this point. Nubian people point to having been settled in Kenya long before independence, and to their support for Tom Mboya and the Kenyan nationalists.

In all these cases, these communities – as communities – have been in Kenya for generations, they have made it their home, and they have strong ties and allegiances here. This is in the spirit of what citizenship is meant to be, even though the law is actually about individuals. In this sense, ethnic community is something of a vehicle to a generalised sense of belonging and a widespread political acceptance thereof, and this can be useful. But it does not, and should not, supplant the notion that citizenship is individual.

The president has no powers to grant citizenship

While it is welcome that the president took an inclusive tone in his address to the Pemba community, he overstated his powers. The Constitution of Kenya 2010 sets up the backbone of citizenship acquisition in Kenya and it doesn’t give the president any powers to confer citizenship or declare “ethnic communities of Kenya” in any official way. Nor did the drafters ever dream of giving such power to the president, as it could reduce nationality to a political tool. This is not to discredit the president’s roles in advancing the political will to help end statelessness in Kenya, but rather to examine the sustainability and fairness of such initiatives, and to clarify the limits of the executive in this area.

As described above, entitlements to citizenship are outlined in the constitution and in laws. If it appears that citizenship by birth can be granted to groups on the basis of discretion and not as a legal right, that can undermine the perceived authority of the constitution and the rule of law more generally. Such powers were not given to the president because they are not meant to be discretionary, and there are meant to be safeguards in place to ensure all those entitled to citizenship can get it. If we were to centre these powers in the presidency, what would the procedure be for application? What would the appeals mechanisms be if you have been denied the opportunity due to your political inclination or other discriminatory grounds?

While it is welcome that the president took an inclusive tone in his address to the Pemba community, he overstated his powers.

So why have both Uhuru and Ruto acted as if they have more powers than they do? The answer is, of course, political. It is a way for presidents to continue to gather political support. The “launch” or “citizenship declaration” events become like rallies. This is especially so since devolution. The blow to Kenya’s executive delivered by devolution has perhaps been removing opportunities for the president’s “benevolent” flights every other week from one corner of the country to the other, launching “development”: schools, hospitals, water projects, agriculture projects. The executive has been forced to be creative in the ways that they connect to the wananchi on the ground. Such a proclamation as made by Ruto on the Pemba or the directives issued by Uhuru in favour of the Makonde and Shona gives the illusion of the president as still a dispenser of state goodies in a decentralised system of patronage.

For the local politicians involved, their role in lobbying the parliament and the executive is also, at least in part, for political benefit. Where the executive used to play the biggest role in handing out political favours, this has now shifted to the county-level political class like members of parliament, senators and governors. The Makonde trek was flagged off by Kwale governor Salim Mvurya who said at the time, “My government fully supports this registration and we are going to fight tooth and nail until you get your rights.” Later, a kicker in the local daily on Makonde’s recognition read, “Nkaissery, Mvurya ask community to return the favour by voting Jubilee in next year’s elections”

There are two take-home messages here.

One is that in making our judgments about the presidential citizenship declarations, we must take into account that although they have been inclusive for some, they also reproduce ethnic patronage politics more generally, and that is not always such a good thing.

The second is that Kenyans must remember there are checks and balances in place to ensure the proper conferral of citizenship in line with the law, and it is not up to the president. This is especially important for those whose citizenship is still denied.

Citizenship and IDs are given to individuals, not to groups

The practice of conferring citizenship looks – on the surface – as if it has been conducted on a community by community basis. This is how the president, the media, civil society groups and the UNHCR have presented the process for the Pemba people.

However, citizenship is an individual status. Despite appearances – the big ceremonies and targeted registration drives – every Makonde, Shona and Pemba individual had to go through their own process to either prove their right to citizenship by birth, or by registration.

Importantly, this means there are people in all these communities who, because of the inability to acquire sufficient proof, still do not have any citizenship. Civil society groups and bureaucrats must be careful to ensure nobody falls through the cracks, and that these individuals receive assistance in building their case to get their Kenyan documents when they are entitled to them.

There is no such thing as a register of Kenya’s ethnic groups

It is also important to recognise that, despite the presidential proclamations and other gazette notices of “tribes of Kenya”, there is actually no single, authoritative register of Kenya’s ethnic groups. When people refer to “the 42 tribes” and add 43 (Makonde) and 44 (Asian), this draws on the number of ethnic groups counted in the 1969 census, but that is usually not acknowledged. And the census is not a singular, fixed and definitive list of the ethnic groups in Kenya. It changes every decade, in fact, and now counts well over 100 if you include “sub-tribes” (and even if you don’t, the number is still not 42, or 44).

The idea, then, of giving a “tribe” a “code” is something of a fiction. It is a political stunt.

There are other lists of ethnic groups in use, including by the National Registration Bureau (though they are not transparent about this) and the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission to keep track of ethnic representation in political parties, and by the Public Service Commission to keep track of ethnic diversity in public service employment. But none of these are the same as each other, and some groups find themselves on one and not on the other. Being “recognised” with a code does not guarantee access to jobs or electoral constituencies.

Most importantly for this article, there is absolutely no list of ethnic groups that would mean that if your group were on it, you automatically get citizenship.

Where to from here?

The approach of the government and politicians has painted a misleading picture of citizenship, enabling its politicisation. It is our hope that there can be a more sensitive and informed discussion of citizenship and inclusion in Kenya that might adhere to the following principles:

Stop promoting the idea that the president grants citizenship to groups.

While it is great that presidents talk in inclusive terms, and they can continue to drum up political support for registration drives, they and others need to be more careful and clear that they are only implementing the law.

The executive’s “granting” of citizenship through declarations and orders for stateless communities without clarifying their legal basis makes citizenship acquisition look like a game of musical chairs.

Push the bureaucracy to do its job on citizenship

The National Registration Bureau and associated bodies have learnt a lot in these processes. Although they have targeted particular communities based on the political will generated by the presidential declarations, that does not mean these same capabilities cannot be put to wider use. Civil society must continue its important work of pushing NRB in this direction.

Individuals who believe they are Kenyan citizens by birth should have access to the same processes that seem to be proposed for Pemba people. The NRB has shown that there are ways of dealing with difficult situations where individuals may lack all the formal documents necessary, and it should make more use of them.

Being “recognised” with a code does not guarantee access to jobs, or electoral constituencies.

In some cases, an individual’s right to citizenship by birth is reasonably contested, and the NRB may deem they require “vetting”. However, vetting should only be directed at establishing if a person is a citizen by birth under the law. It should never be used because of an individual’s membership of an ethnic group. Vetting procedures should also be reviewed to be more transparent and less discriminatory, as recommended by the parliamentary committee considering the issue of ID cards for Nubian people.

In cases where individuals are applying for citizenship by registration, these processes could also be made more accessible, learning from these recent experiences, including by extending the timeline for the registration of stateless persons indefinitely. While the law unfortunately provides for discretion in some cases, this does not mean procedural improvements would not help in many of them.

Problematic as the misleading “mass grant” narrative is, can some of the gains of these processes be put to work for those who have previously faced mass exclusion? We hope so.

The general picture that emerged on the 23rd of August 2023 was very simple: in urban areas that have traditionally voted for the opposition, polling stations delayed in opening, voters had to sleep in queues, ward borders had been tortured to accommodate gerrymandering, and ballot papers were missing. In the rural areas, the story was different. Voting materials arrived on time, voting went on “smoothly”, but not without the menacing presence of a ruling party-deployed semi-militia group called Forever Associates of Zimbabwe (FAZ) outside polling stations and an alarming number of voters who claimed “illiteracy”. It is this organisation – that were claiming to do “polling surveys” – that the SADC Observer Mission identified as the “shadowy organisation” outside polling stations.

This trajectory of coercion and irregularities had been afoot in the pre-election season. For the past five consecutive elections, and more (2005, 2008, 2012, 2018), and now the August 2023 general election, the opposition has struggled to get an updated voters roll that they can audit or use for planning voter mobilisation. In each of these elections, the opposition has had to seek the intervention of the courts, and this has been described by some as “lawfare”, a scenario where justice institutions are deliberately captured to obfuscate the electoral process and keep the opposition lawyers busy.

The current military-backed party-state elite have gone further to make democracy very expensive, the cost of being a candidate has gone up (US$20,000 for president and US$1,000 for members of parliament). The political landscape in Zimbabwe has barely changed and the ruling party is back to its default settings – combining law and coercion to try and subdue the opposition. The SADC Observer Mission made some scathing remarks just after the election:

In conclusion, the Mission observed that the pre-election and voting phases, on 23–24 August 2023 Harmonised Elections were peaceful and calm. However, for reasons outlined above, the Mission noted that some aspects of the Harmonised Elections, fell short of the requirements of the Constitution of Zimbabwe, the Electoral Act, and the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (emphasis mine).

Before making this bold conclusion, the Observer Mission noted a litany of irregularities ranging from access to the voters roll, delimitation, freedom of assembly and expression, independence of the judiciary, nomination fees, biased state media coverage, voter materials and participation of women. In an interview on Newzroom Afrika, Dr Nevers Mumba, the head of the Observer Mission, went further to say, “Our goal is to authenticate the process and if the process is flawed the result cannot be legitimate.”

But even long before the election, the region had mandated the former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, to be in Zimbabwe as an “elder”, most likely to cool down the polarisation. President Chissano visited Zimbabwe as part of “debt negotiations” but when one looks closer, there was some shuttling going on beyond the “debt”. This is to be found in Dr Adesina’s statement on Zimbabwe, saying, “We have institutionalised a platform for regular, constructive, and open dialogue that is key for trust and confidence building among all stakeholders,” adding that the issues to be addressed included “governance, rule of law, human rights, freedom of speech, political level playing field, electoral reforms that will assure free and fair elections”.

Currency Fluctuations, Hyperinflation, and ‘Gold Mafia’ 

Somewhere, in history, a writer intelligently warned that “history does not repeat, but rhymes” and nowhere is this more evident than in the incessant economic and currency meltdowns in Zimbabwe. In the twilight of the collapse of the Zimbabwe dollar under Robert Mugabe, the central bank, was printing money to fund government and hyperinflation became the stuff of legend. On Amazon and other platforms, the $ZW is still an object of ridicule and a collector’s item, one can still buy a $ZW 1 trillion note. That hyperinflation is back again and wreaking havoc, and true to form, the military-nationalists are blaming “sanctions” and “saboteurs” in equal measure and their solution has been a raft of Bills and Acts to legislate “patriotism”. Professor Steve Hanke, who tracks Zimbabwe’s hyperinflation, has estimated it as the highest in the world, at a whopping 685 per cent, having topped 1332 per cent in March 2023.

On the 24th of May 2023, former Finance Minister and opposition stalwart Tendai Biti had this to say about the currency collapse:

Only 2 weeks ago the rate was US$1 to ZW$1,000. US$1,000 was a flat ZW$1 million. Now the rate is at US$1 to ZW$4,000. This means in a mere ten days working people and pensioners have lost 400% of their wages and pensions. Truth is the kakistocracy has failed and failed in absolute terms –.

These currency fluctuations are bad news for business, but worse news keeps rolling in. The Minister of Finance has had to use presidential powers to issue statutory instruments forcing business and service providers to only use the “foreign exchange rate that is prevailing at the RBA-controlled auction rate”. This rate is an artificial rate, not linked to the market demand for foreign currency. Zimbabwe becomes a puzzle; for example, it has one of the biggest sources of remittances – US$1.8 billion plus and rising per year – and yet the currency continues to collapse. Part of the explanation is to be found in the collapse of trust in the local currency and the unwillingness of citizens to trust banks in Zimbabwe. This explains the billions of US$ circulating informally outside the finance system and being kept securely “mattress and pillow” bank.

Somewhere, in history, a writer intelligently warned that “history does not repeat, but rhymes”.

While the central bank and the ministry of finance continue to deny the collapse of the local currency and to push it as “legal tender”, the effect of the income collapse is especially bad for government employees. In a video circulating on social media, nurses and nurse educators say that they are receiving their pay in the $ZW equivalent yet most shops are now demanding to be paid in US$. One member of parliament has taken a private school to court to force it to accept payment in $ZW; the consequences would be dire. If schools accept the collapsed $ZW, then they cannot pay services providers. Boarding schools would have to shut down. Some elites are somehow insulated; in the now infamous Gold Mafia scandal, it became clear that political elites are transacting in US$ and only switch to the local currency when there is advantage.

But it gets worse – some of the businesspeople that have access to the auction system can get foreign currency from the Central Bank at heavily discounted rates and still sell their goods, fuel for example, in US$. The flamboyance and arrogance of the well connected are plain to see; first-class flights, holidays in exotic locations, and imported luxury cars (Rolls Royces, Lamborghinis, and the latest Mercedes Benz models). They live in a parallel universe.

Under the late president Robert Mugabe, patronage networks started flourishing in exchange for supporting his presidency and the level of grand-scale looting of Zimbabwe’s natural resources accelerated. Here a tender worth millions for a solar farm is funded and undelivered, another tender to supply medicines is overinflated into millions; there a tender for cars is overinflated and on and on it goes. The state has become a willing and easy fishing pool for the party-state elites. Recent divorce proceedings involving the former president’s daughter exposed the level of elite privilege, with more than 21 farms becoming part of the proceedings (over 21,000 ha – the size of Monaco). Other ministers and members of parliament and connected elites have amassed prime land holdings by simply writing letters to the city council and grabbing land then subdividing it and selling it.

Post-Election, Future Trajectories and Extractive Party-Army Elite 

The ruling party elite pull influential strings within the political economy. They control a large swathe of potential voters through land even threatening to dispossess land from land reform beneficiaries. In small-scale mining they have cemented control of sometimes violent “small-scale miners” but the “comrades” are also in business in the diamond, gold, coal, iron ore sectors and have extensive land holdings in urban areas. Lawyer and long-time activist, Siphosami Malunga commented that:

There’s a political economy to authoritarianism. There’s nothing like seeking power for power’s sake. Authoritarianism is not just about accumulating ALL power. It is about accumulating ALL power so you can unaccountably use it to enrich yourself endlessly. It’s always the money (Twitter, 29/08/2023).

The “comrades in business” are now fighting back because a political transition will make them orphans of the state and its apparatus of patronage and racketeering. The liberation generation, older and sometimes fractured, has started fighting back calling, the observer reports ‘advisory’ and ‘non-binding’ and the ZANU PF spokesperson accusing Zambia, of being a “neo-colonial” front posing a threat to all liberation movements in Southern Africa (especially South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and even Tanzania). For its part, the opposition has heightened its demands, announcing that they “reject the election in toto” meaning that even the parliamentary, senatorial and council opposition will potentially not take up the positions.

The diplomatic shuttles to Zimbabwe’s capital have already ensued, with the announcement that the former president of Tanzania, Jakayo Kikwete, will lead a mission to cool down the tempers. The opposition will have to contend with a regional leadership of liberation movements that are easily swayed by ZANU PF and within the region it is an open secret that Harare’s leaders have actively supported and funded networks of leaders in the region making them beholden to their patronage. The ruling elite propaganda has borrowed the Mugabe rhetoric and the deputy secretary to the president has already started playing back the clips of Robert Mugabe threatening the whole region and telling them to go hang. Whether the region will buy this bravado and allow the “comrades” in Harare to entrench illegitimacy remains to be seen.

The flamboyance and arrogance of the well-connected is plain to see.

Zimbabwe has entered another cycle of contested electoral outcomes and a herculean polarised political contest between the ruling party and the opposition is in the offing. The trajectory is not looking good for the liberation generation. As they get older, lose regional allies, and become fractured, a demographic shift is eroding their hold on power, but their dispatch from state power, long started by Morgan Tsvangirai, will be convulsive and torturous and it seems the only way out is a negotiated political settlement to ease them into retirement. Within these murky waters opposition leader Nelson Chamisa finds himself in at the deep end.

One of the most confounding aspects of Kenyan foreign policy is the fact that there is generally no official doctrine guiding the conduct of the country’s external relations or its decision making. Kenyan international relations aficionados are left to speculate on the actions of the leadership with regards to questions of economics, peace, migration, climate, and culture.

As for the citizens, there is increasing disappointment with the conduct of the country’s foreign affairs due to numerous faux pas, an unresponsive officialdom, minimal camaraderie with fellow African countries on issues, and significant dalliance with the West on issues of global concern.

Remarkably, this could be because Kenya’s current foreign policy document published in 2014 makes no mention of the word “doctrine” despite it being the guiding framework for the country’s diplomatic engagements.

Foreign policy doctrine is the overarching justification grounding the rules upon which political leadership handles situations or explains the actions of one country towards another.

Subsequently, the justifications provided, or the activities carried out in the diplomatic community, tend to confound many observers, be they local or international. For example, there are numerous interpretations of what “pragmatism” means in Kenyan foreign policy. For some, it is “a cunning and ruthless pursuit of her national goals irrespective of ideals” while for others it is mainly an “emphasis on economic considerations when tackling national challenges”, among other interpretations.

In November 2022, President William Ruto’s international relations dealings were reported in the news as both “Look East” and “Look West”, and also as the “Here and There Diplomacy” characterized by conflicting signals, questionable or controversial conduct, and poor communication.

Kenyan foreign policy proclamations and practice, therefore, contradict the country’s projection of consistency in pursuit of stability within its national, regional, continental, and global engagements even while possessing a very realist understanding of threat in its traditionalist diplomatic conduct.

This is despite attaining a “pluralist dividend” following promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya 2010. It is therefore important to recognize that an understanding of opportunities from a post-modernist context can increase the benefits of including non-state actors in Kenya’s foreign policy.

In a sense, their inclusion would infuse new ways of thinking about global power relations, increase the country’s understanding of its potential sphere of influence, encourage consideration of entities outside of officialdom, and the possibility of novel ideas in the country’s external relations.

Kenyan diplomacy in a multipolar world

Shifts in polarity within global developments seem to be a new feature of the post-COVID and post-truth world.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict, the rise of China, disruptive technology, inflationary shocks, continued troubles in the Middle East, energy challenges, inadequate growth, an unexceptional America, demographic pressures, and a strain on natural resources seem to have ushered in a multipolar world by means of force; force, in this instance, being both natural and man-made events resulting in crisis in which one disaster builds into another, making situations worse. This context of polycrisis is particularly affecting power distribution within the international system.

Shifts in polarity within global developments seem to be a new feature of the post-COVID and post-truth world.

A modernization of Kenyan foreign policy is, therefore, required to establish a transformative diplomacy that can consider new nuances, increase sophistication in negotiation, and actualize greater responsiveness in the country’s conduct of its external relations.

Kenya must begin imagining itself on its own terms instead of based on Western “exceptionalist” predetermination illustrated by, for example, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) description of the country as an “anchor state” that provides stability.

This categorization is on account of the strategic confidence Kenya offers the US based on its financial services and infrastructural connectedness that make it a “hub of its subregion”. Further, this is due to Kenya’s promotion of regional peace and security among its neighbours in tandem with US/Western interests.

However, this perspective limits Kenya’s ability to become an African exemplar state; the appropriate democratic model within its immediate sphere of influence which is primarily the East African Community (EAC) and the greater Horn of Africa region.

As such, developing a doctrine would help pursue international peace and prosperity as championed by Kenya in response to an increasingly multipolar world through a multilateralism that focuses on building profitable relations as a means to building alliances within the savanna climate countries.

Peace in the savanna equals peace in the world

Generally, Kenya’s diplomatic pillars (peace diplomacy, economic diplomacy, diaspora diplomacy, environmental diplomacy, cultural diplomacy) are captured as a list of priorities, that is, a shared common purpose with the international community as opposed to being a defined,  inherent framework for the country’s global ambitions.

In this sense, Kenya identifies issues of concern, spaces for action, institutions to influence, and opportunities for collaboration without giving a clear picture or viewpoint of what a harmonious world looks like according to its national interests.

Considering its history, Kenya must, therefore, develop a doctrine that offers guidance on domestic linkages to its foreign affairs, foundations in regional integration, prospects for new diplomatic constituencies, efforts towards modernization, and responses to emerging threats – essentially, explaining the centrality of Kenyan external relations logic in building profitable relations as a means of acquiring positive and sustainable alliances that benefit the world.

Kenya’s understanding of redistributed power requires a geostrategic reorganization of its motivations for cultural, economic, military, or political distinctiveness towards making an impression on the Savanna Climate Countries.

By distinguishing The Savanna as the space within which to optimize its global footprint, Kenya will be able to deploy an “Africa plus World” strategy that will harness the maritime advantages of the Indian Ocean Rim as a portal to increased economic collaboration in trade, investment, and the development of the country.

A Pax Savanna doctrine offers the language and reasoning of a “looking worldwide” foreign policy position that searches for partnership from all corners of the globe while ending the ambiguity of historical non-alignment that makes Kenya “Look East” today and “Look West” tomorrow.

Such a construct of objectives – a policy imagination of Kenya’s place in the world – must consider the geopolitical ways and means to become a part of either the current global economic system, the emerging alternative world order or, better still, a continental renaissance architecture.

While it interacts with the Bretton Woods system, the country should consider whether it will be a part of BRICKS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, Kenya, South Africa) or BRICSEA (Brazil, Russia, India, China, Southern and Eastern Africa).

This can only be achieved if the country works in tandem with the EAC to become a fast-growing economy that can, together with the BRICS countries, participate in dominating the world by 2050. EAC members’ engagement would be on equal terms with the BRICS member countries based on their combined advantage in terms of land mass, population, and GDP.

Ultimately, through whatever promising form or formation of international politics, Kenya should seek to take up the mantle of championing African prosperity, legitimacy, and welfare both for its own benefit and for the benefit of its continental compatriots.

A Pax Savanna doctrine offers the language and reasoning of a “looking worldwide” foreign policy position.

In doing so, Kenya would provide clarity concerning its participation in the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), its intervention in Haiti, and justifications for Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs) or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), among other actions.

Projection of influence in intergovernmental forums such as the Group of 20 (G20), the principal organisations of the United Nations (the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice, the UN Secretariat, and the Trusteeship Council) and coalitions such as the Group of 77 (G77), among others, must then be channelled towards achieving a Pax Savanna, an “Africa plus World” strategy that focuses on the Indian Ocean Rim as a theatre of specific transformational interest for Kenya.

Transformative diplomacy initiatives as rejuvenation

Non-state actors tend to be viewed or engaged with from a significant distance in Kenyan foreign policy. For instance, in and of their own right, professionals are only mentioned or acknowledged once in the entire 2014 foreign policy document.

This may be a consequence of previous clashes on questions concerning human rights as seen on issues regarding the Kenyan cases at the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the handling of suspects in the ongoing global war on terror.

Regrettably, these lenses of contestation are similarly applied to non-state actors in a whole range of other global spaces such institutional reforms, tax governance, debt sustainability, regional integration, climate change, trade advocacy, consumer rights, gender responsiveness, non-communicable diseases, and civil protection, i.e. emergency response.

Unlike the diaspora whose geolocational and financial influence are well captured (to the point of a ministerial evolution that has seen the creation of a state department for diaspora affairs), the vast human resource experience(s) and occupational positioning outside officialdom are yet to be truly harnessed for purposes of informing the national development agenda. Experts, scholars, practitioners, and students in spaces outside established diplomatic bureaucracy are peripheral entities in Kenyan foreign affairs policymaking.

Non-state actors tend to be viewed or engaged with from a significant distance in Kenyan foreign policy.

Adopting transformation as restorative diplomatic force of interactions will therefore champion more inclusion of non-state actors or professionals in decision-making, thereby helping to move current foreign policy away from its exclusive traditions, practices, and its policymaking roots to a more productive working relationship despite the differences that may emerge from time to time.

Such an approach would encourage the Kenyan government to embrace various platforms that expand access to expertise from the wider diplomatic professional community and from among its citizens. It would offer the government the opportunity to support the inclusion of new foreign policy ideas, and avenues for contribution by non-state actors thereby ending their marginalisation.

Deliberate mapping of Kenyan citizens in academia, non-governmental organisations (international and local), staffers within various diplomatic offices in Kenya, including the United Nations, the private sector, and faith-based organisations, among others, is critical in building support and partnerships in the national interest.

Moreover, such an initiative would infuse new ideas on improving Kenya’s foreign policy through emerging institutions such as the Foreign Service Institute (FSI), National Defence University (NDU) of Kenya, and the International Relations Society of Kenya (IRSK) to build bridges across existing tensions to prevent reversals and orchestrate diplomatic transformation for the modern age.

This would serve as a means of moving beyond the simple recognition and inclusion of multiple actors in decision-making to the establishment of an “Emergence Doctrine” of “The Exemplar State” to become a force for good in Africa and the world.