Politics
Does The EAC Regional Force Still Justify Its Presence in DRC?
7 min read.The operations of the EACRF are bogged down by a poor interpretation of its mandate and the unrealistic expectations of the host country.
June marks six months since the East African Community Heads of State Summit agreed to send an East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) to the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo to help quell the fighting sparked by the re-emergence of the M23 rebel group.
After months of uncertainty and fears over the deployment of the regional force, Kenya was the first country to send troops, followed by Uganda, Burundi and South Sudan. The EACRF was granted a peace enforcement mandate giving them permission to attack and neutralise, in particular, the M23 rebel group and push it out of the territory it had occupied. As the EACRF’s initial mandate period comes to an end, there remain some valid concerns about what exactly has been the impact of the force.
Formed as a trading bloc, this is the first time the EAC is deploying its troops to a member state since its reformation in 1999. There was therefore a lot of pessimism as to whether the EACRF mission would achieve its goals. In addition, as history shows, African Union and United Nations military intervention missions tend to get embroiled in interminable internal conflicts. MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and missions in South Sudan, Central African Republic, Somalia, and Mali are powerful reminders of the pitfalls of such endeavours. No matter how precise and effective the interventions have been, they are never the magic wand to resolve the underlying internal political challenges. In short, these missions tend to prolong their stay, a perfect case being MONUSCO, which was first deployed in 1999 and is still in the DRC.
The M23 rebel group was formed in 2012 as an offspring of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP). Its reason for waging war against the DRC government was to protect the Congolese Tutsi and other ethnic communities in North and South Kivu from persecution and discrimination. Despite being inactive for a period of almost 10 years following the 2012 peace agreement, the M23 group has continued to be viewed as a security threat to the DRC government, especially in the province of North Kivu. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, over 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons have been forced to flee since March 2022.
A lot has been heard about the EACRF, which has been deployed in the eastern part of DRC for the last six months. What has it been doing? As the initial six months draw to a close, several formidable challenges have confronted the EACRF which seriously impinge on its ability to achieve its objectives.
The success of the EACRF was always going to be highly dependent on the effectiveness of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC). This is because at the end of the mission the EACRF is expected to hand over its responsibilities to the DRC security agencies. At the time of writing, DRC security sector reforms remain declarations of intent. It is quite evident that, as constituted today, the FARDC is ineffective. Considering this reality, and with an election in the horizon, an improvement seems unlikely in the short term while the EAC regional force is in place. Already, the EAC secretariat has requested that the mission be granted a three-month extension. The reality is that at the moment there are legitimate doubts as to whether the FARDC has the capacity to hold territory and protect civilians, not just from the M23 but also from other armed groups operating in the eastern DRC.
Furthermore, the proliferation of armed groups in the region makes it difficult to achieve the desired goals as the M23 group is not the only armed group that is fighting in the region. The Kivu Security Tracker Report of 2021, reported that there exist more than 120 armed groups operating in areas of North Kivu, South Kivu, Ituri and Tanganyika. Many of these groups do not have the capacity to hold territory or cause havoc like the M23. As such, they have been left out of the mandate of the EACRF yet they have the capacity to create instability. Therefore, the EACRF was always going to face an uphill task in dealing with not just the M23 but also the other groups. The proliferation of armed groups in the eastern DRC remains a hindrance to any realisation of long-term peace.
The reality is that at the moment there are legitimate doubts as to whether the FARDC has the capacity to hold territory and protect civilians.
The EAC prides itself as being people-centred and built on good neighbourliness. However, the internal politics within the EAC have jolted the operations of the EACRF. The quick admission of the DRC to the EAC has brought with it the perennial bad blood with neighbouring Rwanda. For the longest time, Kinshasa has pointed an accusing finger at Kigali for the chaos that have engulfed the eastern part of the country, a charge Kigali has consistently denied. The continued bitter exchange of words between President Felix Tshisekedi and President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has not helped matters.
The EAC is built on the personal friendships between the presidents of the member states and on the spirit of good neighbourliness. Indeed, Tshisekedi lost a key ally in former president Uhuru Kenyatta who handed over power to a candidate that he did not support. It was widely suspected that Tshisekedi had a soft spot for Raila Odinga in the 2022 Kenyan presidential election. William Ruto having won the presidency, it is evident that Tshisekedi has been forced to navigate the relationship with much caution and frustration. Personal friendship among leaders is the sine qua non for the success of EAC regional integration, and thus the continued bad blood between Kagame and Tshisekedi impacts negatively on the mutual trust that is essential in the EAC decision-making processes. From recent events, it is evident that Tshisekedi is pulling in a different direction away from his peers in the bloc.
Tshisekedi has since embarked on forum shopping within the SADC community, hoping to convince the bloc to send troops to fight the M23 rebel group. Tshisekedi believes that his EAC counterparts are too soft on Kigali and this explains why the EACRF has not bloodied Rwanda’s nose as many politicians in Kinshasa would have wished. Instead, the EACRF has chosen to negotiate with the M23 to have them withdraw from the occupied territory without firing a single bullet. Some analysts believe the current push to regionalise the conflict fits into the argument that, by whipping up nationalist sentiment, Tshisekedi aims to score political goals and gain enough legitimacy across the country.
The multiple interests and goals of the troop-contributing countries are not aligned. This is bearing in mind that a number of EAC member states have a history of intervention within the DRC; at least each member state of the EAC has at one time or another deployed troops in the DRC. The Uganda People’s Defence Forces has been operating in Ituri and North Kivu since 2021 in pursuit of the Allied Democratic Forces. Burundi has in the past deployed a contingent to go after the RED-Tabara rebel group. Kenya recently deployed around 200 soldiers to join MONUSCO under the Quick Reaction Force while Tanzania has its troops present under the Force Intervention Brigade which is also part of the MONUSCO peacekeeping force. Therefore, the competing interests among the member states inside the DRC remain a huge risk for the mission. It is highly plausible that the EACRF is just a Trojan Horse for the troop-contributing countries to further their interests in the DRC.
In addition, the EAC member states contributing troops to the regional force will need to harmonise their various interests if the EACRF is to achieve its goals. The initial agreement to have Kenya assume the command is increasingly questioned. The DRC is unhappy with the way the EACRF under Kenyan command has been undertaking its mission; the EACRF has opted for diplomacy instead of waging war and shelling the M23. In a video that circulated online after a Heads of State summit in Bujumbura, a visibly angry President Tshisekedi was seen lecturing the force Commander Gen. Jeff Nyagah who has since resigned from his post. In a quick rejoinder, Kinshasa went ahead and rejected the replacement that Kenya had appointed. The DRC wants the force commander to rotate among the member states or be placed under FARDC command. There is a need to address some of these problems if the regional force is to achieve its mandate.
Funding of the EACRF remains a challenge. At the moment, each troop-contributing country is catering for its own troops. The EAC has for a long time been plagued by late payment of contributions by the member states. There was expected additional support from partners like the EU and the US but so far none has been committal in footing the bill. There is a high possibility that some troop-contributing countries may struggle to fund their troops in the long run as the EACRF mission is enormously expensive.
The initial agreement to have Kenya assume the command is increasingly questioned.
Lastly, a military victory over the M23 is not sufficient to bring peace to the restive eastern part of the DRC. There is a need for a parallel political process to accompany the military operation. So far Kinshasa has refused to speak to the M23 whom they have declared as terrorists. Previous peace agreements signed in 2013 between M23 and the DRC authorities continue to gather dust as none has been honoured by either of the parties. Despite there being the Nairobi Process led by former president Uhuru Kenyatta, the continued isolation of the M23 from the talks is proving to be counterproductive.
In the eyes of many observers and the citizens of the DRC, the EACRF has proven to be ineffective since its deployment. This is because the M23 seems to have taken more territory while the EACRF has been place. Moreover, despite the failure by the M23 to respect multiple ceasefires, the EACRF remains cautious, unwilling to engage in an offensive.
According to one analyst, the reason why the EACRF has been cautious is because several governments that have contributed troops to EACRF have given their troops strict instructions not to put themselves at any risk; they will therefore not defend territory. The danger with this directive is that the EACRF has been caught in the crosshairs of a restive population that wants action and tangible results and a leadership that wants to use the force as a private army. The goodwill that the EACRF initially enjoyed has quickly dissipated as the constant attacks on the mission by Tshisekedi and his allies have to a large extent incited the locals to protest against it.
With a looming election, attacks against the mission will go a notch higher as the EACRF forms the perfect bogeyman for the ineffective FARDC and the DRC government.
The deployment of the EACRF was never going to address the security situation in the eastern DRC in a flash. Six months down the line, the mission is still bogged down by a poor interpretation of its mandate and the sometimes unrealistic expectations of the host country. Already, the DRC has embarked on a shopping spree for new troops from the SADC bloc to come to the rescue of the fledgling EACRF mission. As the relationship between Tshisekedi and Kagame deteriorates further, the big task for the EAC remains to try and rescue the mission from total collapse and spare the bloc some embarrassment.
It is clear that whatever the positions of the troop-contributing countries might be, there is increasing frustration within the DRC that the EAC has in its possession a potent weapon with which to confront M23 that is not being properly utilised. This potentially effective EACRF is being hamstrung by EAC politics and its inability to use force in its peace operations.
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Politics
Death of a Hero and the Coronation of a Parasite
This year marks sixty years since Kenya’s independence in 1963. Gathanga Ndung’u is scathing of the cabal of wealthy turncoats who have led Kenya’s independence. Ndung’u celebrates a real hero of liberation, Mukami Kimathi, who died in Kenya as the coronation of a royal parasite was being marked in the UK.
Amid the chaos and randomness of life, sometimes we are served with stark synchronicities that must not be ignored. These windows of opportunities, give us a moment to pause, reflect and see the connection between two seemingly unrelated events.
A case in mind is the recent passing on of Mukami Kimathi, the wife to Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) Field Marshal Dedan Kimathi who was largely the face of the anti-colonial war in Kenya which culminated with the fall of the Union Jack on 12 December, 1963. Kimathi’s death coincided with the coronation of King Charles III who is inherited the scepter of power from Queen Elizabeth II. While pomp and glamour rocked Westminster Abbey earlier last month, gloom and somber reflection filled the small town of Njabini as Kenya mourned one of its independence heroines.
The hoisting of the Kenyan Flag in Uhuru Gardens ushered in a new era of self-rule in 1963. Finally, the fruits of the protracted struggle that had started in the early 20th century by warriors such as Samoei Arap Koitalel, Muthoni Nyanjiru, and Mekatili wa Menza, finally paid off. The air was pregnant with expectations from the new Kenyan-led government with the promise of a democratic state, of the people, for the people, and by the people. The land and freedom that was at the center of the struggle was now controlled by one of our own. This meant that we could now chart a path to prosperity determined by the people. Tragically, as we know, the dream was quickly broken by a cabal of rapacious political turn-coats.
As history would later unfold, the first prime minister and president of Kenya, Johnson Kamau Ngegi (Jomo Kenyatta), and his clique turned against the dream at the expense of the newly formed nation. Impoverished by over-exploitation by the British Government, Kenya was in dire need of visionary and pragmatic leadership to steer the country from agriculture to a more diversified economy that would ensure the growth of a non-agricultural sectors such as manufacturing and public services.
The dream to eradicate diseases, ignorance, and poverty was shelved to allow the elite to buttress and consolidate wealth for their families and friends. The political and economic elite embarked on a looting spree of whatever was relinquished by the colonialists: white highland farms and other properties across the country through the infamous One Million Acre Scheme in which Kenya received a milti-million pound loan to buy land from white settlers living the country. This was a tactic to diffuse the danger of a radical land redistribution movement.
The power had been transferred from a foreign oppressor to a homegrown oppressor who was hellbent on using state machinery to maintain the newly acquired wealth and status. Together with their close allies and family, they formed a comprador class which continued to rule on behalf of the former colonial master.
Fake independence and resistance
Kenya’s independence sixty years ago this year was reduced to a mere flag which had to a large extent, no socio-economic impact on the majority of Kenyans. With a meagre 12% high potential farming land, most Kenyans worked as casual labourers on white owned-farms. These farms grew cotton, coffee, tea, pyrethrum and horticultural produce for exports.
Fully conscious of the betrayal, some KLFA warriors led by Musa Mwariama and General Baimunge, went back to the forest to continue fighting for land. The president did not lift the ban on KLFA and proscribed and labelled it as terrorist. What ensued was a crackdown of our independence heroes who felt cheated by the independence settlement. This marked the beginning of the assassination and exile of some of the leaders and fighters. To fortify the new power, dissidents were silenced too through imprisonment and assassination such as the shooting of the fiercest critics, Pio Gama Pinto in 1965. Having established the foundation of the newborn state on the rubble of cronyism, nepotism, betrayal, and corruption, Kenya’s second president perpetuated this grubby legacy.
After the fall of the apartheid government in South Africa, Nelson Mandela – who claimed to have been inspired by the leader of the armed struggle in Kenya – visited Kenya hoping to meet Dedan Kimathi’s Mausoleum or grave site. To his dismay, the two governments which had ruled for more than thirty years had not bothered to locate Kimathi’s remains from Kamiti Maximum Prison which is believed to hold his remains although in an unknown location.
Just as Kimathi was forgotten, other heroes still alive were forgotten and continued to wallow in abject poverty with only a few former fighters being given small parcels of land. Despite their active campaigning to secure the state’s recognition and support, they never felt the warmth of an independent state as the dream was hijacked and individualized by a few.
Mukami Kimathi – a freedom warrior
During the KLFA war, Mukami organized the women battalion, helped in administering oaths, coordinated spies in the Mount Kenya Forest and also ensured mobilization of resources for fighters and other logistical issues. Her contribution in the struggle spanned both the pre and post-independence period.
All these sacrifices were ignored too, by the different independence governments until Mwai Kibaki recognized the KLFA movement and offered a small amount of land to her but which still was not a recognition befitting the role she played in the country’s independence. Most freedom fighters continue to die without any recognition from the government or compensation.
Yet the government failed to fulfill her only dream of being able to bury the remains of her late husband. Every year 20 October when we celebrate Mashujaa Day (Heroes Day), it is always an opportunity for the government to pay lip service to war heroes. This continues as the elite continues to acquire illicit wealth while consolidating political power to propagate their vast and unquenchable interests in various sectors of the economy. Through this, the country has become what J.M. Kariuki foresaw as a country of ten millionaires and ten million beggars.
Royal rituals, visits and reparations
On the other hand, the British Government has been reluctant to compensate war heroes in Kenya despite many calls for reparations. Instead there are only a few instances with only a handful benefitting from ‘reparations’.
An example was the £19.9 million payout to three KLFA veterans granted by the British High Court. Despite this unwillingness, the British Government has continued with its grandiose coronations, royal weddings and burial rituals. It has also continued to participate in invasions, wars and conquest, whose cost would have otherwise helped to compensate the KLFA and other victims of Britain’s atrocities around the world.
The state rushed to give Mukami Kimathi a state burial ‘befitting’ her status, yet she lived a spartan life. Her burial was an attempt by the Kenyan government to redeem itself and avoid any backlash from the public. Unsurprisingly, the Kenyan Flag was not hoisted half-mast even for an hour to honor her courage, sacrifice, and commitment to the country’s independence, yet it was hoisted half-mast for three days following Queen Elizabeth’s death last year. Kenya continues to betray the collective dream by not recognizing our history while also erasing significant parts of our history.
Mukami’s burial ceremony, which was attended by political honchos, was turned into another elite parade where the leaders in both government and opposition exchanged insults without taking time to let the family and other mourners reflect on the rich legacy which she was leaving behind. Outrageously, the cost of her state burial would have been enough to provide for her and her family when she was alive.
King Charles III has announced, his plans to visit Kenya later in the year to deepen ties that date to the colonial era. For activists we should use this visit to push for reparations for the many victims of atrocities committed by the colonial government in the concentration camps that were set-up across the country. His visit should only be permitted if his agenda is to provide a way for restoration, compensation, and healing to the broken families and individuals who were incarcerated, tortured, maimed, and killed.
The UK King’s visit should be largely centered on ‘undoing’ the dispossession which his family and country orchestrated. The government cannot claim to be putting the interest of its citizens first when it is clearly not interested in fighting for the justice of its people. Before we embark on trade deals, military cooperation, and knowledge exchange, let us first heal our historical wounds rather than covering them up.
As we celebrate 60 years since independence this year, Oginga Odinga’s – Kenya’s first vice-president – autobiography,Not Yet Uhuru, reverberates strongly to the current state of the nation which was sadly foreseen.
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This article was first published by ROAPE.
Politics
Low Budget Support is the Maritime Sector’s Biggest Challenge
The blue economy holds immense promise for Kenya but a lack of training capacity denies the country access to a properly trained workforce that could unlock the maritime sector’s potential.
The place of the maritime industry in accelerating economic growth in Kenya has been increasingly debated in recent years. However, not much has been done to create new jobs due to a lack of deliberate and sound policies that are matched with the necessary budgetary allocation to train a workforce in order to tap into what could arguably be the next frontier of economic development.
Even the Kenya Kwanza manifesto—which is detailed in other areas of the economy—is silent on how to awaken this sleeping giant. Moreover, the budget estimates for 2023/2024 only mention the blue economy in passing, giving it a paltry allocation. Two critical areas, which are closely related, have sealed the fate of this industry: failure to exploit the full commercial potential of the sector due to a lack of a properly trained workforce that is itself due to a lack of training capacity.
The weaknesses bedevilling the industry were identified when the State Department for Shipping and Maritime Affairs signed an agreement with the Higher Education Loans Board (HELB) to establish a Maritime Education and Training (MET) Financial Support Scheme in 2021 to support capacity building in the maritime and blue economy sector.
Amb. Nancy Karigithu, a former Director General of the Kenya Maritime Authority (KMA) and former Principal Secretary in the State Department for Shipping and Maritime, pointed out that there was a need for training funds to be made available in a more structured way in order for such opportunities to be more accessible for Kenyan Youth. Undertaking training abroad—as most skilled people working in the industry have done in the past years—is highly prohibitive in terms of cost.
Moreover, although a huge chunk of the country’s budget goes to the education sector, very little of it is absorbed by the maritime training institutions where huge infrastructural investments need to be made in order to train a competitive workforce. Such training institutions also require adequate space in which to install the equipment needed for the trainees, which must be adapted to the work environment to which they will eventually be deployed.
In a bid to address the issue of training, a policy decision was taken to establish Bandari College under the tutelage of the Kenya Ports Authority. It was later renamed Bandari Maritime Academy (BMA), gaining an independent status. Due to the slow pace at which maritime training has grown in the country, one of the biggest challenges facing BMA and other Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions that have rolled out maritime training courses is a lack of training personnel.
This is not just a Kenyan problem but a regional one. A stakeholders’ forum that convened on 7 October 2021 in Nairobi under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Standing Committee on Shipping (ISCOS—a regional maritime organisation for Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia) to address the challenges in Maritime Education and Training (MET), returned a harsh verdict of a sector in dire need of reforms and significant government and regional support.
Industry stakeholders from ISCOS member states noted that the lack of qualified training staff and maritime professionals was a huge challenge that was holding back the growth of a critical sector of the economy. Inadequate and expensive training facilities, tools and equipment were also cited as a huge challenge that was hampering progress in the industry.
There is a global workforce shortage in seafaring, a key area that Kenya could tap into and create jobs in just a few years if deliberate efforts are made towards that end. This is low-hanging fruit for the Mombasa economy, which has witnessed dwindling economic opportunities since the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) moved logistics to Nairobi. The proposed Special Economic Zone (SEZ) that could have offered alternative employment has been challenged and is facing litigation in the courts after environmentalists questioned its ability to deal with sea pollution.
Kenya’s success in the hospitality industry has seen shipping lines such as Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) recruit locals to work on their liners. But this is not the case on container, bulk and tanker ships because most Kenyan-trained seafarers lack the skills needed by crew working on these vessels.
The International Maritime Organisation (IMO)—where Amb. Karigithu is one of the candidates for election to the position of Secretary-General slated for 18 July this year—has developed a series of model courses that provide suggested syllabi, course timetables and learning objectives to assist the instructors to develop training programmes that meet the Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (SCTW) convention.
Of the more than 30 courses offered in maritime training, as recommended by the IMO, BMA was only able to offer six in 2021. In addition, the country lacks onboard training opportunities as Kenya does not have a training ship of its own. This has caused delays in the completion of training courses given that onboard training is compulsory to obtain certification. This is a problem facing other institutions providing maritime training such as Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) which offers marine engineering courses. Training programmes must ensure that students acquire practical knowledge through actual work experience; trainees must learn by doing while at sea and in port.
Lack of training has also affected the exploitation of marine fishing since the country does not have the seafarers and equipment necessary to fully exploit the immense fish volume in the high seas. The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel, 1995 (STCW-F 1995), which came into force in 2012, sets certification and minimum training requirements for crews of seagoing fishing vessels of 24 metres and above in length.
Training programmes must ensure that students acquire practical knowledge through actual work experience.
Last year, the government drafted a set of regulations to empower industry players, which it said would double the fish catch to 300,000 metric tonnes. According to the Draft Marine Fisheries (Access and Development) Regulations 2022 and the Lake Turkana Fisheries Management Plan, Kenya has the potential to earn at least KSh100 billion and create 240,000 jobs annually once the new regulations are fully implemented.
Former Agriculture Cabinet Secretary Peter Munya last year said billions of people globally, especially the world’s poorest, rely on healthy oceans as a source of jobs and food nutrition. About 60 million people globally are employed in fishing and the oceans contribute about US$1.5 trillion annually to the overall global economy according to a 2022 World Bank report.
In Kenya, marine fisheries account for less than 10 per cent of the national fish landings and sustain the jobs of more than 1 million individuals whose income depends directly or indirectly on fishing, according to Munya. The number of fishers employed directly in Kenya’s marine sector is 13,426.
Kenya has an abundance of untapped potential in maritime resources along its marine coastline that extends over 650 kilometres, translating to a total area of 9,700 square kilometres of territorial waters and an Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ) constituting a further 142, 400 square kilometres.
About 60 million people globally are employed in fishing and the oceans contribute about US$1.5 trillion annually to the overall global economy.
Optimal exploitation of marine fishing in Kenya is hindered by infrastructural limitations, inappropriate fishing craft and gear and a lack of properly trained seafarers. Artisanal fishers restrict their operations mainly to the continental shelf because they are ill-equipped in terms of craft and equipment to fish in the deep sea.
Despite its huge potential, the sector is underfunded. In this year’s budget, KSh3.5 billion went to the Kenya Marine Fisheries and Socio-Economic Development Project; KSh1.2 billion to Marine Fish Stock Assessment; KSh580 million to Capacity Building in Deep Sea Fishing; KSh142 million to rehabilitation of Fish Landing Sites in Lake Victoria; KSh141.5 million to Aquaculture Technology Development and Innovation Transfers; KSh500.7 million to Liwatoni Ultra-Modern Fish Hub and KSh88 million to the Development of Blue Economy Initiatives.
The deep-sea waters are left to the Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) that mainly fish tuna species; Kenya lies within the rich tuna belt of the West Indian Ocean where 25 per cent of the world’s tuna is caught.
Foreign fishing fleets can operate in Kenya’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) through the regional and international agreement and cooperation provision of the National Oceans and Fisheries Policy, which allows governments to continue granting fishing rights in their EEZs based on the state of the stock and the economic returns.
Another critical area in which Kenya can exploit the blue economy is through the ownership of ships in partnership with already existing shipping lines. Former president Uhuru Kenyatta signed a controversial deal between the Kenya National Shipping Line Ltd (KSNL) and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) with this objective in mind but the deal has not been actualized.
A recent promise by the Shipping and Maritime Affairs Permanent Secretary Shadrack Mwadime that the government would invoke the cabotage laws under the Merchant Shipping Act to allow and facilitate sea-borne transshipment is a good proposal that needs government support.
Kenya does not have a national shipping carrier. Transshipment, which involves the transfer of goods from one vessel to another for shipping to the final destination, is an opportunity that Kenyan ship owners could exploit. However, the country must remove the bottlenecks cited by shipping lines as a hindrance to using Mombasa port, particularly the customs procedures that make Mombasa unattractive as a transshipment hub.
In supporting the deal signed between KNSL and MSC, the government estimated that its cargo imports cost an average of KSh14 billion in freight per year, while local destination charges by shipping lines comprise another KSh34 billion. With local shipping capacity and the application of “Buy Kenya, Build Kenya” policies, the amount of freight charges of KSh14 billion could be retained in Kenya.
In the absence of a pricing framework or a competitive environment, the Mombasa port tariff for shipping lines has proliferated to 36 charge items. The revived KNSL, the government observed, could be used by the government to influence and leverage the reduction or elimination of components of destination charges thus reducing the national burden in the maritime transport of government cargo. The charges include delivery order fees, amendment to the bill of lading fees, supervision fees, manifest correction fees, currency exchange rates, container repair charges, and equipment management fees, among others.
In running the liner service, KNSL had the option of chartering or acquiring its own vessels over time. It was anticipated that income arising from transferring MSC transshipment cargo from Mombasa to other ports around Africa would yield sufficient funds to make vessel acquisition a reality in the long run.
Kenya can draw vital lessons from the Ethiopian Shipping and Logistics Service Enterprise (ESLSE). By 2020, when ESLSE was planning to acquire two more vessels, it had 11 ships with a total loading capacity of 400,000 tons of cargo.
Transshipment, which involves the transfer of goods from one vessel to another for shipping to the final destination, is an opportunity that Kenyan ship owners could exploit.
Marine Cargo Insurance (MCI) also has huge potential, if the government puts in place strong measures to enforce it. Its overall performance has significantly improved since the National Treasury’s directive to enforce Section 20 of the Insurance Act came into effect on 1 January 2017, which requires compulsory purchase of MCI from local underwriters.
However, importing cargo on Cost Insurance Freight (CIF) and the lack of proper coordination between the various agencies has made enforcing this requirement a huge challenge.
Claims of undercutting have been cited in the MCI insurance business as a record number of players have entered the segment. The Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) had in the past raised concerns over unsustainable premiums.
Following the directive, however, the MCI has performed considerably well compared to the years before 2017. The gross written premiums were KSh2.3 billion compared to KSh1.45 billion in 2016, representing an increase of 59 per cent. Based on the value of the imports, MCI premiums can generate up to KSh20 billion annually, according to ISCOS.
However, there is a silver lining on the horizon. Insurance companies are being brought onto the online cargo clearing system that is operated by KenTrade, which is being integrated with the Kenya Revenue Authority’s (KRA) Integrated Custom Management System (iCMS). This could help in enforcing section 20 of the Insurance Act.
If the government rhymes its rhetoric with policy and budgetary support, harmonizes the activities of the 22 agencies running the industry that have conflicting roles, and focuses on maritime training and education, the blue economy has tremendous potential to propel Kenya to great economic heights.
Politics
War Has Arrived
Writer and feminist activist Reem Abbas on the personal costs of the war between Sudan’s military and the Rapid Support Forces.
Why should I be surprised?
After all, I did see this war coming. I saw it a few days beforehand, right after the RSF took over a military airport in Meroe in Northern Sudan. I had seen this war coming since 2019, when the revolution attempted to thwart the security committee of former president and general, Al-Bashir (Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir). However, politicians made a deal to split power and share it between the army and the RSF. I saw it coming after the 2021 military coup was launched against the flawed transitional government, and after I saw how politicians worked to empower the RSF in the aftermath of that coup d’état. They dwarfed the national army (the Sudanese Armed Forces) and furthered the concept of having two armies. I saw it coming because no country has two armies unless the two are at war with each other and they are controlling different territories.
I panicked momentarily. We don’t have enough food. I need to pay my phone bill. Do we have diesel for the generator in case the power goes out for days? I ran to the kitchen to fill up every pot and pan with water. Water could be turned off at any moment. My mind was racing; I went through a war-essentials checklist. It was never a tried and tested checklist, but I was hoping for the best. Two days later, I found myself in my sister’s home office, trying to finish an orientation for work. We had to stop it mid-way, as the fighter jets were looming too close to home. I could not focus.
My nights were sleepless, I didn’t know where to place my daughter so that she would be covered. I never realized that our beds weren’t raised high enough to fit her underneath, which, according to friends on Facebook, is the safest place to be. I felt like my room was the safest because it had one window that was blocked by another building. I forced my whole family to switch their rooms. My sister slept on a mattress on the floor, and my mother slept on a bed next to my daughter and I.
I wasn’t able to learn how to sleep at night again, because the fighter jets would come after 12 am. Their sound actually comforted me. Sound as a phenomenon is described as a wave of compressed air. The high compression of sound reduces its loud volume so if you hear the jet, it means that it is far away and not going to hit you with bombshells. There is always silence before your house is shelled. A few days into the war, my sister and I left the house to buy food. I told her, if anything happens to me, pretend you don’t know me. Walk away. One of us has to return, we can’t leave our parents alone. A small grocery shop was open. We bought basic non-perishable goods. I bought Oreos for my daughter. She likes them and I wanted to give her a sense of normality.
Another shop opened a few days later. Its metal door was still locked, but the shopkeepers would open it just a little bit, just enough to allow us to crawl inside. We used the last cash we had to buy more food. I bought fresh bread that day and felt better after binging on it. A few days into the war, my mother told us to enjoy the salad, as it was the last tomato that we had in our fridge.
The war began taking a toll on my family. We began bickering on a daily basis. My daughter’s father asked me if he could take her with him to another city. I was under pressure, I felt that choosing to resist him would undermine her safety. She began to ask me about the day this would end and said that she missed her school and her friends. She wanted to go to the restaurant we had gone to a week before the war, where she played on the trampoline while I had a latte, and where she loved eating the pizza. My father and I wanted the family to stay. We began to hear that the RSF was occupying houses. They would kick people out of their houses, loot those houses and then move in. They were not just occupying houses, they were occupying the city. As inhabitants, we were being erased from Khartoum. Our life was cheap, it was only worth as much as a phone or some cash that they could loot. The RSF would take your property, live in your house and drive your car.
Our street, which was close to a highway, became a bus station overnight. Buses that were heading out of Khartoum into other states or even into Egypt, were just a few steps away from our house. There was an exodus happening, but we felt the need to stay.“Staying in our house is in itself resistance,” wrote my father on his Facebook page. But three weeks into the war, we were packing our bags.
We felt suffocated in our own home. We were too terrified to leave the house and we also felt a bit defeated. My stomach was upset and I had my period twice in three weeks. I was completely nerve-wracked as I packed my bags. I looked at my books, collected over fifteen years. I looked at the beautiful painting by Essam AbdelHafiz that I bought to hang in my new apartment. Just a few weeks before the war, I had gone to his exhibition with my colleagues and we talked about art and resistance. I had no idea why I packed the way I did. With me came a few non-fiction books and the book by George Packer that I was reading, as well as two dresses and two pants, and some skincare to save my face which has aged non-stop since the war arrived in my city.
When we left Khartoum and drove three hours to Medani, I felt strange. I had come to Medani many times for work and to visit friends. But, I was now a stranger in my own country. I was learning how to walk on the streets again. I was learning how to sit at a cafe, and I was learning how to live without the constant sounds of gunshots and fighter jets.
The supermarket shelves were becoming emptier and emptier. Stocks were low because most factories in Khartoum were burned down or looted or both. Carnage was the new normal in Khartoum, led by the RSF as they broke into banks, factories, companies, and houses.
We have all worked very hard to build the little infrastructure we had, and now it is gone. I was joking with a friend that there was no Coca-Cola in Medani. No Coca-Cola in the country that produces one of the most vital ingredients in this drink, gum-arabic. If the war continues, the world may actually start caring because of the Coca-Cola shortage. A war-torn country in the horn of Africa could be relevant after all, for international business.
Hemedti captured the revolution
When I joined the protests in 2019, one of the main slogans was: “The military to the barracks, the RSF to its dismantling.” This slogan continued until the sit-in that brought an end to Al-Bashir in April 2019. The RSF could read the street, they knew that Al-Bashir’s rule was coming to an end. They began marketing themselves as supporting the will of the people. Its leader Hemedti (Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo), emerged as a separate political force. Sudan emerged as a country with two armies. No entity has reaped the fruits of the revolution as has the RSF.
The transitional period (2019-2021), failed to fix the most critical problem: the problem of how to merge the two forces and reform the problematic military institution. In the period after the coup, the international community began working with political actors to reach an agreement that would once again realize a new partnership between the political forces and the military institution. Once they carried out security sector reform talks, the military dragged their feet, because it became clear that the agreement would largely disempower the military. It would take away their key economic interests and also empower the RSF by giving them space to continue growing their economic power. Not only that, it would take almost a decade to integrate RSF forces into the army. Much to the dismay of the international community who kept pushing for an agreement to be signed, the government postponed signing the agreement. For civilians, the agreement still meant that for at least a decade, the country would continue to have two armies.
The war was inevitable, but one can never prepare for a war. In Medani, I tried to withdraw money from my account. I had about two dollars in my pocket, just enough to buy coffee from the tea lady on the side of the road, as I sat on a stool awaiting my turn at the bank. I was client number 101, and the bank had set up a massive tent to shield the clients from the sun. They said the system was down and there was no hope. After three hours, I left defeated.
My whole life is (was?) in Khartoum. Our home has books and paintings and the many spices I buy when I travel. My mother is a plant mom. She always claims that her plants smile when she walks into the garden to water them and that they move when she speaks to them lovingly. When we left, we kept our refrigerator and freezer running. We were only supposed to be gone for a few days. I told my mother’s plants that we would spend two days and then return. Two days before the war, I had an appointment at the Spanish embassy. I was excited about going to France to meet my colleagues and to travel with them to Granada and Barcelona. Now my passport was stuck at the embassy and all the diplomats had been evacuated.
Khartoum is no longer ours. Our building, a building we spent 10 years building with my father’s retirement money, is now controlled by RSF. They live in the rooms and they park their car in our garage. Our house remains safe, but we are waiting for the news that we don’t want to hear. RSF is close to our house and they began looting our neighbors. The war got close to our doorsteps, but we are no longer there.
A few days after we left, I read the news online. RSF had looted the bank at Omdurman Ahlia University, and the looting of the university itself began. A research center inside the university was burned to the ground. Ten years ago, my family celebrated at this very same center. We donated thousands of books from the library of my great-grandfather, a politician, public servant, and author, to this center. It was full of books, resources, and manuscripts. It was part of our cultural infrastructure. This war was coming for us, it was coming for our history and our very existence.
I saw the news on Twitter. The Spanish embassy was broken into and everything was looted. But some young men went there and picked up some passports. After hearing this, I was now trying to trace my passport. At that point, I was ready to pay any price. I ended up retrieving my passport from one of these young men through a friend over a month later after the war broke out. By that time, I had crossed the border to Egypt using an old passport that I renewed at a border town. I now have a valid passport, but no home to go back to.
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This post is from a partnership between Africa Is a Country and The Elephant. We will be publishing a series of posts from their site every week.
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