In recent years, the landscape of political protests and protests in general in Azerbaijan has changed significantly. The last large-scale protest in the country took place at the “Mehsul” Stadium (part of the Yasamal Sports and Health Complex) in January 2019. Since then, for six years, not a single major protest action has taken place. This is not a random process: political leaders,lawyers, and civil society representatives argue that it stems from both changes in legal mechanisms and a long-term political strategy by the government. Their perspectives, alongside international legal standards and historical context, are explored in this article.
The January 2019 rally – A point of no return
Ali Karimli, the chairman of the Azerbaijani Popular Front Party (APFP), has long been one of the leading figures in organizing political protests. He has initiated more than a hundred rallies, marches, pickets, and other types of demonstrations in opposition to the Azerbaijani government. He recalls the last rally at Mahsul Stadium in January 2019, which demanded the release of political prisoners:
“At the time, a second criminal case had been launched against Mehman Huseynov [a well-known Azerbaijani blogger]. Our rally was held to demand freedom for Mehman and all other political prisoners. Once the protest became massive, the authorities got scared and shut down Mehsul Stadium without offering alternative venues. This eliminated even the minimal freedom of assembly in Azerbaijan.”
This rally was one of the largest in Azerbaijan in recent years, drawing around 30,000 people by various estimates. Its success was largely due to Huseynov’s popularity. Karimli says that ever since then, all protest applications have been denied.
Unlike previous protests, the aftermath of the January 19 rally was marked by mass detentions and police interrogations. Major mobile operators handed over data on individuals present near the protest. As a result, both participants and random bystanders were called in for “preventive talks” at local police stations.
Mahsul Stadium closed
The Mahsul Stadium (meaning “harvest” in Azerbaijani), a traditional venue for opposition rallies, was shut down for “renovation.” While Baku has other designated protest areas, when the opposition requests permits to hold events in central locations like the squares near the “May 28” or “Narimanov” metro stations, where crowds are usually large, Baku City Executive Authority always replies:
“Due to heavy pedestrian and traffic flow in these areas, holding protests there would cause congestion and infringe on the free movement rights of citizens.”
Instead, protesters are directed to a stadium in Lokbatan, 24 kilometers from Baku. Ali Karimli analyzes the six years of de facto protest bans:
“During these six years, hundreds of people have been arrested: opposition activists, civil society activists, journalists. Almost all independent journalists have ended up behind bars, as have NGO activists. An atmosphere of fear has been created in society. Freedom of assembly is completely banned. I myself spent five out of those six years under an internet blockade.”
The APFP and the National Council of Democratic Forces (a major opposition alliance) last requested permission for a rally on April 18, 2025, demanding the release of political prisoners, anti-poverty measures, and child benefits. The city authorities denied the request, citing the same reasons as before.
Karimli explains the real motivation behind the government’s stance:
“They fear peaceful protests because they know the people are dissatisfied. Yes, they managed to weaken the opposition. But the opposition isn’t made of steel — under repression, with no resources or funding, it’s no surprise the opposition ranks have also shrunk. But the people shift to an invisible opposition. By destroying formal political institutions, they create a more powerful invisible resistance.”
Post-War crackdown: Intensified control
Political activist Araz Aliyev, co-founder of the “Third Republic” platform and a political activist, believes the situation worsened after the 44-day war in 2020, when Azerbaijan regained control over its territories. He argues that while sovereignty was restored, democracy and human rights, including freedom of assembly, deteriorated.
“Over the last five years, protest activity has nearly vanished. Before and immediately after the war, there were numerous rallies involving the opposition and civil society. People could gather at Fountain Square or other public spaces. But that changed after the war. Global trends played a role too, such as the war in Ukraine, possible foreign influences, and even the potential return of Trump to power. Today, the protest environment is nearly crushed. Holding a sign or wearing a sticker in public now almost guarantees arrest.”
Changes in the legal environment: From notification to permission
In many democratic countries, holding a protest only requires notifying the authorities. Azerbaijan’s 1998 Law “On Freedom of Assembly” also followed this model. The purpose of notification was to ensure participant safety and prevent clashes. But according to lawyer Samed Rahimli, although freedom of assembly is formally guaranteed by the Constitution, legislative amendments have effectively restricted it:
“Initially, the law was general and in line with the Constitution. But over time, many amendments were added that tightened regulations. In 2005, the Constitutional Court clarified that the ‘notification’ mentioned in the Constitution essentially meant permission. Then came issues with designated protest sites, which were approved by the Baku Executive Authority, often in remote and inconvenient locations. Freedom of assembly isn’t just about gathering with like-minded people. It’s about drawing public attention, including from those who disagree. But the authorities started systematically rejecting requests to protest in central areas, suppressing protests through both legal changes and arrests.”
Rahimli also notes that 2011 amendments increased penalties for unauthorized protests. Fines were raised, and participants began receiving up to 30 days of administrative detention, often in worse conditions than regular prisons.: “By the mid-2010s, protest activity had nearly stopped due to harsh penalties. Organizers were accused of ‘petty hooliganism’ or ‘disobeying police’ and faced criminal charges.”
Protests by ordinary citizens
Although opposition parties cannot hold sanctioned protests, ordinary citizens continue to demonstrate on issues like ecology and labor exploitation.
A notable example is the Soyudlu village protests (Gadabay District), where residents opposed the dumping of toxic waste from a gold mining facility into a local lake. Police harshly cracked down on the protest. Later, President Ilham Aliyev criticized the demonstrators for allegedly throwing stones at police.
Other examples include a boycott by Baku taxi drivers demanding shorter working hours and better conditions, or delivery workers protesting reduced pay.
One protester from Soyudlu initially said:
“Let them come and see! Let them stand here for 10 minutes — they’ll get dizzy. What’s happening to our children?”
But later, he posted an apology on TikTok:
“They sent journalists who write lies about our country, our people, our president. Don’t believe those articles!”
Similarly, the taxi boycott organizer released a remorseful video after police detention:
“We launched the ‘Stay at Home!’ campaign, but that was a mistake.”
“Trade unions are an extension of the regime”
Labor rights activist Nilufer Mammadrzayev says that intimidation or false promises are common tactics used by the Azerbaijani authorities:
“The cancellation of the taxi boycott after promises of help and the suppression of protests across the country after the case of a pregnant underage girl all show how intolerant the state apparatus is to mass protest. They use both force and manipulation, including hollow promises, to maintain control.”
These promises are usually symbolic. The systemic problems remain. This is how real public influence is neutralized. There are no independent unions; they have been incorporated into the regime. The absence of civil society and the pressure on activists are hallmarks of authoritarianism. Whether it’s boycotts or youth protests, the crackdown reveals how deeply rooted state control is.”
Mammadrzayev emphasizes that although political rallies are banned, social protests continue. Online campaigns, petitions, and hashtags on social media reach large audiences and are relatively safer. Since authorities can’t fully control them yet, protests are moving into new forms:
“Social media is the main platform for protest. After the news about a pregnant minor, young people across the country launched a campaign via WhatsApp, Instagram, and other platforms. They coordinated actions and shared tasks — and many joined. I think digital activism will only grow stronger.”
Politician Araz Aliyev also believes that the authorities are not interested in solving the problems of the population, so spontaneous protests will continue:
“Most activists are either in prison, abroad, or unable to write openly due to pressure. But that doesn’t mean resistance has disappeared. The problems haven’t gone away – people want to react. In 2025, everyone has access to Internet, and when people see a 13-year-old girl being raped and then forced to give birth, they can’t remain silent. In the 21st century, it’s very difficult to control people with medieval methods.”
International obligations vs. reality
Azerbaijan is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 11) and OSCE documents guaranteeing freedom of assembly. However, as Freedom House stated in its February 29, 2024 report “Freedom in the World: Growing Damage from Illegitimate Elections and Armed Conflicts”, and Amnesty International noted on January 23, 2025, this right is “systematically and persistently violated” in Azerbaijan.
The shrinking space for freedom of assembly raises concerns not only for this particular right but also for the future of political culture in the country.
With the support of MediaSet.
