Since the recent military coup in the Niger Republic, there has been an intensification of sabre-rattling between some Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member states and the new junta in Niamey. 

Recall that on July 26, 2023, the presidential guard commander Abdourahamane Tchiani detained and ousted Mohamed Bazoum, the democratically elected president of the Niger Republic. 

In an unprecedented move, ECOWAS, under the presidency of Nigeria, in consultation with the United States, France, and the EU, all of which have substantial mineral, political, economic, and military interests in the uranium-rich country-imposed sanctions and threatened military action. It gave the putschists an ultimatum to return Bouzum to power or face military action. That ultimatum ended on Sunday, August 6. 

In addition, in a move likely to violate the terms of the River Niger convention signed by nine riparian states-Guinea, Mali, Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Benin, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroun, and Chad on February 16, 1963, Nigeria unilaterally cut off electricity supply to Niger, as part of its sanctions.   

Niamey reacted by refusing to see the high-powered delegation that the ECOWAS chairman, President Ahmed Tinubu of Nigeria, sent to Niger. It closed its airspace on Monday, August 7, further hardening the divide and engendering the diversion of the flight paths of many European and American airlines, adding in some cases as much as 1,000 kilometres to their paths and additional costs in aviation fuel. 

Mali and Burkina Faso, two West African countries led by military strong-men, broke ranks with ECOWAS by throwing their weight behind the coup plotters. They indicated that any military action against Niger was tantamount to a declaration of war against them too. This not only indicates cracks in the ECOWAS alliance but raises the spectre of the first All-West-African war in the history of the continent.

The coup attracted wide condemnation from the United States, EU, France, and Germany, which called for a restoration of the status quo. In addition to imposing sanctions, they threatened further actions, including the military option, to show their seriousness.

There is a rationale and realpolitik behind America`s interest in restoring the status quo. Niger Republic hosts one of the largest operational US Drone bases, where she and her allies conduct operations against Islamic terrorism. For its part, France sources 32 per cent of the Uranium powering the 59 nuclear reactors, which produce 80 per cent of her electricity needs, from Niger.  

For the EU, a friendly Niger is the last bulwark between Europe and a recurring wave of illegal migrants from sub-Saharan Africa bent on crossing the Mediterranean. These substantial military assets, geostrategic interests, and the new fear of Russia’s incursion into Africa explain the reaction of these states.

On the other hand, ECOWAS, led by a Nigerian president, whose election was contentious and who is viewed by many as being in a hurry to show some muscle in Niger, not only to distract from mountains of domestic problems facing his government, including questions of his legitimacy but also to gain some legitimacy in the West. 

An article in the French newspaper of record, Le Monde of  August 3, 2023, declared in its headline: “Bola Tinubu´s credibility will depend on what he can do in Niger”. Also of disturbing import are investigative reports claiming Tinubu was an asset run by US intelligence, which has caches of kompromat on him due to his drug-running past, and for which a US court forced him to forfeit hundreds of thousands of dollars.

The ultimatum to the coup plotters in Niamey expired on Sunday, August 6. As the world waits for the next move in this political chess game that may have consequences for the region, there is increasing evidence to conclude that any rush to invade Niger will be a wrongheaded move.  

Some in Bola Tinubu´s political circles view Nigeria as a great African power and believe that such an operation, supported by American logistics and hardware, may succeed in taking Niamey in a matter of days. But they may be over-optimistic. As Declan Walsh noted in the New York Times of August 7, “Niger is twice the size of France, and its battle-tested army has been trained by American and European special forces”. Anecdotal evidence, on the other hand, shows that the coup has gained popular support in Niger and across the region. 

Many prominent voices in Africa and in Nigeria are becoming more insistent in rejecting military action. In Nigeria, which is expected to contribute troops to a military operation, one notes an aversion to the government taking the country to war. This was reflected in the Nigerian Senate refusing to grant President Tinubu the powers he needed to embark on military action in Niger. 

Many people in northern Nigeria have ancient links to Niger and are averse to any military action against their kith and kin in the Niger Republic. The caucus of northern Nigeria came out strongly against the military operation in Niger in a strongly worded letter read on the floor of the Senate. 

It is interesting that some proponents of military action in Niger, especially in the ECOWAS bloc, have not ratified the Malabo Protocol on ending unconstitutional change of governments in Africa, a fact that hampers effective action in Niger. This African Union instrument, resulting from a protracted and complex process, was adopted in 2014 but is not yet in force because only 15 out of 55 AU member states have submitted ratification instruments.   Nigeria is one of the 40 states yet to ratify what could have been one of the most potent instruments for fighting unconstitutional change of governments in Africa. 

Despite democracy being touted as the best system of government, actions like the non-ratification of this protocol betray democracy as a cover, which the African political class uses just to retain power.  And this is one of the factors that lead to military coups, which end up endangering the stability of countries and entire continents. 

Africa cannot afford any military operation that may lead to a break-out of war. In fact, any war in the Sahel at this time will have devastating consequences not only for Africa but also for Europe and the United States.  It will lead to a destabilisation of the Sahel, and a massive displacement of people, which has the potential of unsettling the region.  

Most of the countries in the Sahel, where Niger is located, are ranked high in the Fragile States Index and are already under intense domestic and external pressure from lingering crises, low-density conflicts, and terrorist insurgencies.   Africa south of the Sahara is host to more than 35 out of the 110 armed conflicts going on in the world today. This is second only to the Middle East and North Africa, with 45 active armed conflicts. And most of these countries are around or surround the Sahel.

The countries in this region are among the poorest economies in the world and are plagued by a host of domestic problems. The World Food Programme considers the Sahel an area of concern due to “rising armed conflict, deteriorating security, widespread poverty, and the impact of climate change”. 

The effect of Islamic terrorism is already being felt across the region. Niger hosts 300,000 Nigerian refugees who fled Boko Haram terror. These refugees run the risk of being caught in the crossfire in the event of any armed confrontation between the two countries. 

Other countries in or around the region are not stable either. Libya is a failed state, torn by internal wranglings and civil war, consequent on the NATO overthrow of its former leader Muammar Gaddafi under circumstances many Africans consider questionable.  

NATO´s intervention there in 2011 and the killing of Gadaffi created a power vacuum, which destabilised the Sahel. Many Tuaregs, and returning combatants aligned with Gaddafi, returned to their respective countries in the Sahel with an arsenal of weapons from Libya. This opened the way for an influx of Jihadist fighters and the proliferation of weapons across the region, contributing to sectarian conflicts, anarchy, violence, and the increased fragility of the region.    

Sudan is in the grips of a civil war between two generals. Algeria, Benin, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Mali, Central Africa Republic, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d Ivoire, Mauritania, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Togo are all fighting terrorist insurgencies, exacerbating the fragility of the entire region. 

Nigeria, the leading country in ECOWAS, has her army deployed in 30 out of her 36 states, conducting military operations against Islamic Jihadists like Boko Haram, ISWAP, Fulani militants, and secessionist agitations like the Pro-Biafra and Yoruba Nation movements in the southeast and southwest. 

On the economic front, Nigeria is hit by runaway inflation consequent on years of mismanagement, accentuated by the recent subsidy removal on petroleum products, which has worsened the country’s and its citizens’ economic situation. Such a country riven by these domestic issues cannot afford a war, even though she may be depending on France, the EU, and the United States to supply the financing and hardware while ECOWAS supplies the troops. 

All this points to the fact that any military intervention that risks further destabilisation of this fragile region is ill-advised. The Sahel, as it is now, is one huge tinderbox, waiting for the next mismanaged conflict to explode into a full-blown war, with dimensions that no one can accurately predict at this time.