1. Executive Summary

This report by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) documents how legal, regulatory and informal measures in Jordan restrict the work of human rights defenders (HRDs), and identifies the safeguards required to restore an enabling environment. It is based on research of cases documented by GCHR and many human rights partners, as well as analysis of laws such as the Cybercrimes Law by GCHR and partners. It applies Jordan’s obligations under international law, and its own laws.

It focuses particularly on restrictions that impact the ability of civil society to enjoy Freedom of Expression, Media Freedom and Access to Information, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association; Civil Society Organisations and Access to Resources; Digital Surveillance and Privacy; and Administrative and Court Restrictions.

2. Background

Jordan’s civic space is anchored in constitutional guarantees yet governed by an interlocking regulatory environment that sets the conditions under which human rights defenders (HRDs) operate. The Constitution recognises freedom of opinion and the press (Article 15), peaceful assembly and association (Article 16), and the confidentiality of communications (Article 18), each subject to regulation “within the limits of the law.” As a State party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), these guarantees are read in light of obligations on privacy, expression, peaceful assembly and association (Articles 17, 19, 21 and 22).

Operationally, civic participation in Jordan reflects not only the wording of individual laws but also how regulatory and criminal law provisions operate in tandem. Online, broadly worded offences and provider-facing compliance duties in Cybercrimes Law No. 17 of 2023 may be applied alongside Penal Code No. 16 of 1960 provisions, allowing peaceful expression to be treated as a matter of public order or national security. Such layering may increase exposure to arrest and prosecution and may induce self-censorship in digital and community spaces. A parallel dynamic operates offline: administrative powers, licensing requirements and pressure on venues collectively narrow the space for assemblies and civic organising.

Visibility and information flows are shaped by media licensing and network regulation. The press and publications framework are administered by the Media Commission (MC) which covers website licensing/registration in addition to blocking powers, influencing who may publish and how quickly content can be restricted.

In parallel, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (TRC) licenses networks and online services and enforces provider-facing compliance duties, providing the interface for orders to restrict content, obtain subscriber data, or implement technical measures. For HRDs, these arrangements affect the continuity of independent outlets and the reach of documentation and public-interest reporting.

Beyond visibility and networks, offline participation is structured by the frameworks governing assemblies and associations. The public assemblies framework sets notification and conduct conditions for gatherings; in practice, discretion invoked on public order grounds is at times used to restrict or disperse assemblies, while exposure to administrative liability for organisers and host venues encourages risk-averse decisions, reducing the feasibility of spontaneous or rapid-response gatherings.

Organisational life is channelled through the associations framework, covering registration, internal governance and access to resources. Approvals for foreign funding and related reporting requirements concentrate decision-making within the executive, creating opaque, delay-prone procedures that can constrain programme delivery and protection work. Where activities linked to assembly or organisational capacity are framed as implicating state security, a different set of powers is engaged.

Building on this, a parallel security and preventive track further shapes the operating environment. In contexts where assembly or organisational activity is treated as a security matter, crime prevention and counter-terrorism frameworks may introduce preventive powers – including the possibility of administrative detention by governors – and may involve recourse to exceptional jurisdictions, notably the State Security Court (SSC). When applied expansively, these powers can shift oversight from routine regulation towards coercive control, with practical effects on how defenders plan activities, engage publicly and assess litigation risk.

3. Freedom of Expression, Media Freedom and Access to Information

Jordan’s Constitution guarantees freedom of opinion and expression. Article 15 provides that “the State shall guarantee freedom of opinion” and that every Jordanian may freely express views “by speech, writing, photography and the other means of expression,” within the limits of the law. Jordan is also party to the ICCPR; under Article 19, as interpreted in General Comment No. 34, any restriction must be provided by clear law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society.

Authorities have increasingly relied on Jordan’s Cybercrimes Law, alongside Penal Code provisions, to police online expression. Taken together, these features have a chilling effect on journalists and HRDs.

A coalition of groups including GCHR along with Access Now, Amnesty International, ARTICLE 19, INSM, SMEX and Human Rights Watch (HRW) declared in a joint statement that the Cybercrimes Law: “It uses overly broad, vaguely defined terms,” including “fake news,” “provoking strife,” “undermining national unity,” “immorality,” and “contempt for religion” and authorises wide-ranging enforcement that chills journalists and human rights defenders.

The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) likewise highlights the criminalisation of such categories and the associated penalties; for example, Article 15 provides imprisonment of at least three months and/or fines of JOD 5,000–20,000 (6,025-24,100 EUR). In addition, Article 24 penalises publishing the names, images or information of law-enforcement personnel; Article 33 authorises takedown orders, blocking and temporary user bans, with fines of JOD 15,000–30,000 for non-compliance; and Article 37 obliges social-media platforms with over 100,000 subscribers in the Kingdom to maintain a local office, with possible advertising bans and bandwidth throttling for non-compliance.

The impact is visible in emblematic prosecutions. On 11 June 2024, a court in Amman sentenced journalist and human rights defender Hiba Abu Taha to one year’s imprisonment under Articles 15 and 17 of the 2023 Cybercrime Law over articles criticising Jordan’s role during the war in Gaza. She was convicted of “inciting strife” and “threatening societal peace,” and was released on 13 February 2025 after serving the custodial term and paying a JOD 5,000 fine. The case illustrates how broadly worded offences have been used against reporting on matters of clear public interest. 

Another emblematic case is that of the journalist and satirist Ahmed Hassan Al-Zoubi. He was taken into custody on 02 July 2024 to serve a previously imposed one-year sentence tied to a 2022 Facebook post criticising officials’ handling of truck drivers’ strikes. As documented by the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR), he was convicted under Penal Code Article 150 (inciting sectarian/communal strife) together with Article 15 of the previous Cybercrime Law. On 16 January 2025, the court commuted the remainder of his sentence to community service and he was released, underscoring the criminalisation of non-violent political commentary.

Use of the cybercrime framework has extended to publishers. On 17 March 2025, authorities arrested Omar Al-Zayood, publisher of Al-Hashmiyah News, following a complaint by former Prime Minister Bisher Al-Khasawneh; prosecutors questioned him under the 2023 law over alleged “inaccuracy” and “insulting the dignity of individuals.”  This case shows an example of using the law to silence the press.

Activists documenting policing have also faced prosecution. On 5 November 2023, activist Anas Al-Jamal was detained in Irbid and transferred to Amman in connection with three X posts, including a video showing law-enforcement blocking protesters in the Jordan Valley. A Jordanian court convicted him under Article (24) of the Cybercrime Law No. (17) of 2023 for posting the video and sentenced him to three months’ imprisonment and a JOD 5,000 fine. He was released on 13 January 2024 after a crowdfunding effort covered the fine.

Courts have continued to rely on exceptional or severe charges for speech. On 07 January 2025, the State Security Court (SSC) sentenced mathematics professor and activist Ayman Sanduka to five years’ imprisonment for “incitement to oppose the political regime” according to Article (149) of the  Penal Code, over a Facebook post criticising Jordan’s relations with Israel. On 21 July 2025, the Court of Cassation annulled the conviction and re-characterised the conduct as the misdemeanour of “insulting the King” based on Article (195) of the Penal Code, returning the case for re-sentencing. The case raised persistent concerns about resort to exceptional jurisdictions and overbroad offences in expression-related cases. 

In a related context, the case of academic and community activist Ibrahim Al-Mansi arose from social-media posts defending the Association for the Preservation of the Holy Quran and criticising the Ministry of Awqaf’s closure of its branches. On 10 August 2023, the Court of Appeal convicted him of “defaming an official body” according to Article )191) of the Penal Code and imposed four months’ imprisonment. On 20 March 2025, an Amman appellate circuit revoked a community-service substitution and ordered execution of the custodial term. Subsequently, security forces detained him on 22 May 2025, and he was released on 21 August 2025 after roughly 91 days in custody. This sequence illustrates the continued use of criminal defamation to sanction protected public-interest speech.

Beyond individual prosecutions, authorities imposed a systemic restriction on online media. On 14 May 2025, the Jordanian Media Commission (MS) ordered Internet Service providers (ISPs) to block at least 12 news websites which are mostly independent, following investigative reporting alleging profiteering from aid deliveries to Gaza. No detailed legal decision was published and there was no prompt route to judicial review; instead, officials advanced vague justifications in the press such as “spreading media poison” and “attacking national symbols”.

Independent network measurements by Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI) corroborated the blocking across multiple Jordanian networks. A coalition of 24 rights and press-freedom organisations, including GCHR, urged the authorities to reverse the order, stressing that such blocking is incompatible with Article 15 of the Constitution and Article 19 of the ICCPR.

Taken together, the overall pattern indicates a narrowing of the digital civic space through overlapping criminal and administrative tools. Vaguely drafted speech offences and severe sanctions in the Cybercrime Law No. (17) of 2023 —particularly Articles (24), (33) and (37)—combined with recourse to exceptional jurisdictions for speech-related cases and the wholesale blocking of news websites, raise serious concerns. Under ICCPR Article )19 – 3 (—which sets the legal test for restrictions on expression as being “provided by law” and “necessary” for the limited aims in sub-paragraphs (a)–(b)— and as elaborated in General Comment No. 34 on strict necessity and proportionality, however these measures do not appear to satisfy that test. Enforcement should protect—rather than penalise—the digital civic space.

4. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Jordan’s tightening restrictions on peaceful assembly and association form part of a broader, systemic narrowing of civic space. While Article (16) of the Constitution protects freedom of assembly and association, and Jordan is party to the ICCPR which guarantees the right of peaceful assembly as stated in Article (21) and freedom of association in Article (22), the authorities continue to apply overbroad legal and administrative tools including administrative detention, pre-event restrictions, dissolution of independent bodies, and stringent foreign-funding controls that undermine these guarantees.

Under ICCPR Article 21, as clarified in General Comment No. 37, restrictions on peaceful assemblies must be provided by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be strictly necessary and proportionate. Assessed against that test, the measures described here do not appear to comply. Comparable requirements —prescribed by law, legitimate aim, and necessity (including proportionality as clarified by the Committee)— also govern restrictions on freedom of association under Article (22-2).

4.1 Freedom of Peaceful Assembly

Against this legal backdrop, Article (16) of Jordan’s Constitution guarantees the right of assembly “within the limits of the law”. The 2011 amendments to the Public Meetings Law No. 7 of 2004 replaced prior authorisation with a 48-hour notification regime, while the 2011 Instructions on Organising Public Gatherings and Demonstrations set additional operational constraints on routes, timing, flags and slogans. Read together with ICCPR Article 21 (GC 37), any restriction must be clearly prescribed by law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate in a democratic society. In practice since 2023, however, authorities have treated assemblies as contingent on de facto permission and imposed ad hoc limits including, in late March 2024 near the Israeli Embassy in Amman, bans on certain Palestinian flags and slogans and a post-midnight cut-off, none of which appears to meet the test of legality, legitimate aim and necessity/proportionality.

Beyond the assemblies framework, governors have relied extensively on the Crime Prevention Law No. 7 of 1954 to order administrative detention on vague preventive grounds and without charge, including re-detention after prosecutorial or court-ordered release during the March 2024 protests or others. While governor orders can be challenged before the Administrative Court within statutory time limits under the Administrative Judiciary Law, practical obstacles and the preventive nature of these measures have limited the effectiveness of review in practice. The National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) recorded 37,395 administrative detentions in 2023, up from 34,411 in 2022, indicating the normalisation of a tool that should be exceptional, including in cases affecting human rights defenders.

In a separate case, union activist Maysara Malas was held for 47 days in administrative detention over peaceful, pro-Gaza activities and only released on 16 May 2024. As applied to journalists documenting and organisers facilitating assemblies, such preventive detention fails the test of legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality required by ICCPR Articles (21 & 9).

Building on this pattern, the same approach has also targeted women human rights defenders (WHRDs). Engineer and WHRD Bushra Al-Absi was placed under governor-ordered administrative detention on 16 July 2025 and transferred to Jweideh Women’s Prison. According to family statements carried by independent media outlets, her detention was linked to Gaza-solidarity protests and, during her open-ended hunger strike, she was reportedly held in solitary confinement with restrictions on access to water. She was released on bail of (50,000) JOD on 28 July 2025.

Documented practice shows that authorities have used coercive “no-protest” undertakings as a condition for release from administrative detention. During the 2020 teachers’ protests, GCHR and HRW have documented detainees being pressed to sign pledges not to protest, backed by financial guarantees ranging from  (20,000 to 50,000 JOD). In the Gaza-related protest cycle, monitors reported similar coercion in 2024, including a case of a 27-year-old activist compelled to sign such an undertaking.

Authorities have likewise targeted mobilisation linked to assemblies. On 25 March 2025, Chemistry teacher and activist Hamza Bani Issa was arrested in Irbid while distributing Gaza-solidarity leaflets. He was taken to the East Irbid Security Centre, severely beaten, resulting in permanent blindness in his left eye, and subsequently referred to the State Security Court, remaining in pre-trial detention months later. Read against ICCPR Articles (21 & 19, GC 37 & GC 34), such pre-emptive repression of mobilisation linked to peaceful assembly and expression does not meet the tripartite test.

In parallel, authorities continue to rely on Penal Code provisions on unlawful assembly and rioting based on Articles (64 &168) and where expression is linked using Article (149) linked to “undermining the political regime” and Article (150) on “sectarian incitement”, which have been repeatedly criticised as vague and prone to misuse against peaceful critics and protesters.

Taken together, overbroad criminal offences, open-ended administrative detention under the Crime Prevention Law 1954, and coercive “no-protest” undertakings have produced a sustained chilling effect on peaceful assembly, particularly for human rights defenders, journalists, union organisers and student leaders. Read against Articles (21 & 9) of ICCPR, as clarified by GC 37 and GC 35, this framework does not satisfy the cumulative requirements of legality, legitimate aim and necessity/proportionality.

4.2 Freedom of Association: Professional Unions

This subsection focuses on independent professional unions as key spaces where HRDs organise and advocate for their causes. Article (16) of Jordan’s Constitution protects freedom of association, and as Jordan is a State party to the ICCPR, under Article 22, any restriction must be prescribed by clear law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate. Jordan has not ratified ILO Convention No. 87 on freedom of association, while it has ratified Convention No. 98 on the right to organise and collective bargaining, which leaves a gap with core international standards that directly affects HRDs working within unions.

The Jordan Teachers’ Syndicate (JTS), also referred to in official sources as the Jordan Teachers Association (JTA), has been a central focus of restrictive action by authorities. Established under the Teachers’ Syndicate Law No. 14 of 2011, the union was raided and shut down on 25 July 2020, with all 13 board members arrested, including Deputy Head Nasser Al-Nawasrah, while the Amman Magistrates Court imposed a sweeping gag order following peaceful mobilisation over pay and implementation of prior agreements.

On 26 June 2022, the Amman Court of First Instance, sitting as an appellate court, halted the prosecution of the union as a legal person but upheld the 2020 dissolution of its elected bodies. Most recently, on 17 July 2025, the Constitutional Court struck down Law No. 14 of 2011 in its entirety, rendering it null and void with immediate effect; the Ministry of Education then announced refunds of salary deductions previously withheld for union dues. Absent a rights-compatible replacement framework, more than 100,000 state-school teachers risk losing independent representation and directly shrinking associational space for HRDs active within the union.

On 11 July 2021, Amman’s Criminal Court acquitted Deputy Head of the JTS Nasser Al-Nawasrah of charges under Article (132 Part 1) on broadcasting false or exaggerated news undermining the state’s prestige), Article (354) on threatening unlawful harm, and Article (15) of the then-applicable Cybercrime Law, in a case arising from short video clips circulated online at the height of the JTS dispute. On 27 September 2021, the acquittal was upheld. As noted above, on 26 June 2022 the Amman Court of First Instance halted prosecution of the union as a legal person but upheld the 2020 dissolution, leaving operations effectively suspended. Read against Article (22) of ICCPR, this combination of criminal prosecution and administrative measures against union leaders and the union as a legal entity does not appear to satisfy the test of legality, legitimate aim, and necessity/proportionality.

The pattern is not confined to the JTS. On 08 June 2020, the Cabinet approved the dissolution of the Jordan Medical Association (JMA) board and appointed an interim committee chaired by the Minister of Health to exercise the board’s powers, pursuant to Article (75) of the JMA Law No. 13 of 1972. Such executive substitution of an elected professional body is an intrusive administrative intervention that departs from international standards requiring any interference with freedom of association to be lawful, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate.

Taken together, the dissolution or disabling of elected union bodies through executive fiat, the voiding of a union’s legal basis by constitutional ruling without safeguards to preserve independent representation, and the broader use of preventive detention against union leaders and allied defenders (documented elsewhere in this report) do not meet the test of legality, legitimate aim, and necessity in addition to proportionality under Article (22) of ICCPR. They also diverge from ILO freedom-of-association principles.

4.3. Civil Society Organisations and Access to Resources

CSO registration, operations and dissolution are governed by the Law on Societies No. 51 of 2008, as amended in 2009. Observers have long flagged vague grounds such as “public order” and intrusive oversight as enabling disproportionate suspension or dissolution and interference in internal governance.

In December 2023, the government centralised foreign-funding approvals under the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MoPIC) and removed the previous “30-day deemed-approval” rule, and instead introducing a multi-layered, discretionary vetting mechanism that increases administrative control over access to resources for independent civic work. Recent reports describe continuing opacity, unpredictable document demands, and delays, which, as applied, function as de facto constraints on independent civic work. 

The Community Media Network (CMN) case illustrates the chilling effect of opaque approvals: in September 2022, CMN filed a complaint with the National Centre for Human Rights (NCHR) after a (25,000 JOD) grant for a recycling-awareness programme was rejected beyond the statutory window, citing vague reasons and with communications reaching the donor prematurely.

These are not isolated incidents but a cumulative pattern that hollows out civic independence layered approvals, vague dissolution powers and opaque funding denials tether CSOs to discretionary decisions-making. Access to resources is integral to freedom of association and expressly recognised in the Article (13) of UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders. As applied, the current framework does not satisfy Article (22) of ICCPR. These dynamics intersect with digital surveillance and privacy concerns assessed in Section 4.

5. Digital Surveillance and Privacy

Jordan’s Constitution protects the confidentiality of communications and permits interference only by judicial order as stated in Article (18). Read against the ICCPR, particularly Article (17) on privacy and Article (19) on freedom of expression, and the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 16 and No. 34, that any interference must be lawful, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary and proportionate. In practice, however, a web of laws and regulatory measures has expanded authorities’ access to data and communications in ways that risk normalising surveillance of HRDs and chilling civic speech.

The Cybercrime Law illustrates this shift. Article (12) criminalises “circumventing the IP address … by any means” with intent to commit a crime or prevent its discovery, a formulation that can sweep in commonly used privacy tools such as VPNs, proxies, and Tor, where mens rea is alleged. Meanwhile, Article (37) requires social-media platforms with more than 100,000 users in Jordan to establish a local office to process official requests, with non-compliance exposing them to measures such as advertising bans and bandwidth throttling. Taken together, these provisions facilitate identification, content control and pressure on intermediaries, raising concerns under ICCPR Articles (17 & 19).

Beyond the Cybercrime Law, broad surveillance powers persist. Under the Anti-Terrorism Law (No. 55/2006), prosecutors may place a suspect’s residence, movements and communications under surveillance based on undefined “reliable information” as stated in Article (4). The Criminal Procedure Code permits interception of communications “where necessary to reveal the truth” based on Article (88), which is a standard applied in practice to electronic communications.

Licensing and regulatory duties under the Telecommunication Law No. 13 of 1995 framework require operators to provide facilities to execute judicial/administrative/ national security orders 

based on Article (29/g). Since 2019, TRC regulations and practice have embedded data-retention obligations and enabled disclosure on broad public-interest grounds, further entrenching expansive access to metadata with limited oversight.

Jordan has also adopted a Personal Data Protection Law (No. 24/2023) recognising core data-subject rights and establishing a Personal Data Protection Council and implementation unit within the Ministry of Digital Economy and Entrepreneurship. However, the Council is chaired by the Minister and includes government and security representatives, an institutional design that raises independence and conflict-of-interest concerns when overseeing state processing of HRDs’ data. To align with international standards, the supervisory body should be structurally independent of government ministries and security agencies, with transparent appointment and removal safeguards.

Independent forensic investigations confirm the use of commercial spyware against civic actors in Jordan. A joint probe led by Access Now, with the Citizen Lab and partners, identified at least 35 Jordan-based targets, including journalists, lawyers, activists and civil society figures, who were compromised or targeted with NSO Group’s Pegasus between 2019 and September 2023. Publicly-named victims include journalists Daoud Kuttab and Hosam Gharaibeh, lawyer and WHRD Hala Ahed and lawyer Loay Obeidat. HRW reported that two of its Jordan-based staff were repeatedly targeted, with one device briefly infected and several attempts blocked by Apple’s Lockdown Mode. Taken together, these findings depict invasive surveillance of civic actors – irrespective of formal attribution – that chills sources and advocacy.

While regional reporting has documented the proliferation of other commercial intrusion tools, such as Hacking Team, FinFisher, there is no verified public evidence of their deployment in Jordan. Freedom House also notes a January 2023 investigation reporting UK-provided digital surveillance training to Jordanian services, raising risks of capability misuse without robust safeguards.

Taken together, Jordan’s surveillance environment no longer functions as an exception constrained by strict safeguards, but as a composite regime coupling vague statutory powers and expansive regulatory practice with documented deployment of commercial spyware against civil society. As applied to HRDs and journalists, criminalising protective anonymity tools, pressuring platforms to localise compliance infrastructure, and maintaining broad interception authorities without independent oversight fails to satisfy the cumulative legality, legitimate-aim, and necessity/proportionality requirements under Articles (17 & 19), and (GC 16 & GC 34) of ICCPR. These digital measures interact with restrictions on assembly and association analysed elsewhere in this report.

6. Administrative and Court Restrictions

Beyond the legal restrictions described above, Jordanian authorities, particularly the General Intelligence Directorate (GID), employ administrative and informal practices that constrain the work and lives of HRDs outside independent judicial oversight. These include repeated summons coupled with standing instructions to “remain in touch,” sudden travel bans or the effective denial of travel documents without a disclosed court order, obstacles to certificates of good conduct and professional licensing, and pressure on employers and family members. In field research with 42 activists, HRW found that 31 were told to “remain in touch” after questioning, while 19 reported losing their jobs following security interference, and 17 faced difficulties obtaining a certificate of good conduct. This targeting illustrates how administrative levers discipline peaceful civic actors outside the courtroom.

These measures intensified during and after the Gaza-related protest cycle. Amnesty International reported the use of arrests and administrative detention alongside coerced “no-protest” undertakings as a condition of release. It also documented, in April 2024, a three-month suspended sentence and a travel ban imposed solely for social-media posts critical of security forces and for sharing calls for protests. The CIVICUS Monitor likewise noted a pattern of court-ordered releases being followed by renewed administrative detention and the imposition of travel bans on protesters, including activist Anas Al-Jamal, who remained under a travel ban after his January 2024 release.

Earlier incidents show the pattern is not transient. Front Line Defenders reported multiple instances in 2022 in which HRDs Ahmed Al-Neimat and Abdulrahman Shdeifat were prevented from travelling abroad without publicly disclosed judicial orders, illustrative of opaque movement restrictions imposed via security channels. Al-Naemat has also faced administrative obstacles in his professional life, including the denial of a certificate of good conduct in 2019 needed for job visas and earlier difficulties renewing a taxi driver’s licence in 2017, with no clear avenue of redress. Such measures, imposed outside transparent judicial control, directly implicate Article (12) of the ICCPR.

Restrictions have also operated extraterritorially via consular levers. On 08 July 2024, DAWN reported that political activist Muin Al-Harasis, residing in Türkiye, was refused passport renewal after months of inquiries, as consular staff cited an adverse GID decision without providing a legal basis or an avenue of appeal. The refusal effectively deprived him of a valid travel document and constrained his right to return, raising serious concerns under Article (12/4) of the ICCPR.

Smear campaigns and coordinated online harassment further compound these pressures and can have gendered impacts on women human rights defenders. In June 2023, prominent lawyer Hala Ahed faced a virulent social-media campaign after announcing a training on feminism and related public-interest topics, just days after she was named a 2023 Front Line Defenders Award laureate. Such campaigns seek to discredit legitimate human-rights work, deter participation in civic life, and heighten safety risks.

Read against international standards, restrictions on movement, such as travel bans, refusals to renew passports, or effective denial of travel documents, violate Article (12) of ICCPR and require clear legal basis, legitimate aim, and strict necessity and proportionality. The UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. (27) underscores these safeguards. Coercive undertakings and informal pressures that chill lawful civic participation violate Article (19) of ICCPR on freedom expression, while collection or disclosure of personal data and monitoring absent robust necessity and proportionality safeguards engage Article (17) of ICCPR on privacy, as elaborated by General Comment No. (16).

7. Conclusions

This report finds that Jordan’s civic space is constrained by an interlocking set of laws, regulatory authorities and informal practices that, in combination, narrow the room in which HRDs can organise, document and speak. Criminal provisions are applied to online and offline expression; access to information is constrained; the organisation of assemblies and associations is channelled through discretionary licensing and funding controls; interception and data-access powers are broad; and informal administrative pressures extend beyond the courtroom. Measured against Jordan’s Constitution and its obligations under the ICCPR, particularly Articles (17, 19, 21 & 22), the framework shows recurring shortfalls in legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality, with concrete impacts on the safety, participation and access to remedy available to journalists, lawyers, union and student organisers, and women human rights defenders (WHRDs).

Recommendations

Accordingly, GCHR makes the following recommendations:

1.We call on the Government and Parliament to align the legal framework with constitutional guarantees and the ICCPR. This includes revising speech-related offences in the Cybercrime Law No. 17 of 2023 and the Jordanian Penal Code to meet the tests of legality, legitimate aim and necessity/proportionality; ensuring that any order to remove or block content is subject to prior and independent judicial authorisation and prompt, time-bound review, in addition to ensure that association and public-gathering rules operate as facilitation rather than de facto prior authorisation; and reforming access-to-information provisions and practice to enable timely disclosure. The personal-data regime should be overseen by a structurally and functionally independent authority with clear limits on security-agency access and robust appointment and removal safeguards.

2. We call on the Ministry of Interior and governorates to end the use of administrative detention against peaceful actors under public-order frameworks, and to cease coercive “no-protest” undertakings as a condition of release. Travel bans, passport denials and other movement restrictions should not be imposed absent a clear and individualised legal basis and prior judicial order, and must be promptly reviewable with an effective right of appeal. Consular functions should not be used to indirectly curtail civic participation or the right to return, including passport issuance and renewal.

3. We call on prosecutors and courts to refrain from pursuing expression and assembly cases that fall within protected activity, and to ensure that any restriction demonstrably meets necessity and proportionality in a democratic society. Jurisdiction over peaceful-speech cases should not rest with exceptional bodiesو prompt, reasoned decisions should be published; and judicial review must be available for blocking, surveillance and detention measures, as well as administrative travel restrictions. Where cases proceed, defendants must have timely access to counsel and to case files and evidence.

4. We call on the Media Commission, the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission and online platforms to embed due-process safeguards in content and data requests. Blocking and takedown measures should be exceptional, transparent and subject to prior judicial control. Also, telecom operators and online platforms should not penalise users for the use of privacy-enhancing or anonymity tools; and operators should publish regular transparency reports on government demands and their handling, with disaggregated data on requests and outcomes, with notice and remedy for affected users wherever possible.

5. We call on international partners to centre safeguards in any technical or security cooperation, avoiding support that expands surveillance or enforcement capabilities absent robust legal controls and independent oversight. Support should prioritise independent regulation, the protection of encryption and privacy, legal aid and digital-security assistance for HRDs, and the implementation of relevant UN recommendations, including those of the UN Human Rights Committee and Special Procedures, to restore an enabling environment for human rights work.