Introduction

Digital repression has achieved unparalleled spatial outreach in recent years.[1] The proliferation of intrusive surveillance technologies combined with advancements in network connectivity have enabled authoritarian governments to extend their surveillance and scrutiny of freedom of expression and assembly to online spaces. Compared to traditional intelligence methods, using surveillance technologies and social media for spying on human rights defenders (HRDs) requires less resources and is more cost-effective, which has significantly aided in the expansion of government repression.[2] Tracking HRDs has therefore become more ubiquitous than ever before. In the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, the hacking of HRDs is especially pervasive and widespread.[3]

Ahmed Mansoor, an Emirati human rights activist and member of the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR) Advisory Board, was one of the first targets of Pegasus spyware, deployed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) government to hack into his devices prior to his arrest on 20 March 2017.[4] He is currently being held in solitary confinement at Al-Sadr prison in Abu Dhabi, serving a combined 25-year sentence while suffering from chronic health conditions and being denied basic rights.[5]

Aside from physical risks, including arrest and imprisonment, digital repression has other serious consequences. Previous research has documented how digital repression might help erode social ties; for example, HRDs may feel compelled to minimise contact with their families due to fear of reprisals, as authoritarian governments often target relatives as a means of coercion.[6] Furthermore, HRDs may feel the need to stay vigilant about whom they stay in contact with, as government agents often use people within HRDs’ networks to gain access to their devices and social media accounts.[7] These examples capture cases of self-isolation, alluding to the psychosocial effects that may result from digital repression. However, there is limited research on the psychological consequences of this phenomenon, which is essential to fully understanding the harms of digital repression and solidifying claims for addressing it.

This piece describes the psychological and emotional impact of digital repression, drawing on existing research and incorporating qualitative insights from informal conversations with HRDs in the MENA region. The following outlines an overview of digital repression practices and how they are undertaken, followed by documentation of the resulting numerous psychological effects. It concludes with recommendations to address digital repression. 

Practices of digital repression

Digital repression encompasses a range of digital tactics used by governments to monitor, intimidate, and silence HRDs. These tactics include online surveillance and online harassment. To track HRDs and gather information about them, government agents use Spyware technologies and phishing techniques. Spyware technologies provide complete access to targeted devices, including their cameras and microphones, thereby offering an all-encompassing view into the private lives of HRDs without them even realising it. Similarly, phishing attempts involve sending malicious links that, if clicked, can give perpetrators access to social media accounts, computers, or other sensitive information. These attempts are often engineered through invitations for seminars and interviews that can be sent via email or social media accounts.[8]

Using information obtained through surveillance, authoritarian governments often engage in online harassment by sending threats to targets, spreading false information about them to undermine their credibility, launching smear campaigns, and coordinating trolls against their social media content using fake accounts. Additionally, they can publish private and intimate details about their targets, known as doxxing.[9] These violations and threats create pressure that often leads to significant psychological impacts on the mental health and well-being of human rights activists.

Psychological toll

HRDs report different psychological responses to digital repression. These range from feelings of insecurity, anxiety, and paranoia to mental stress, and burnout.[10] One of the participants in a recent study, for instance, described online targeting as “emotional and psychological war”.[11] In particular, digital repression creates feelings of uncertainty regarding the extent of the monitoring and its potential uses, thereby making those subjected to surveillance feel powerless.[12] 

In reporting to GCHR, for example, a woman human rights defender (WHRD) from the MENA region describes the deep psychological pain she felt upon discovering that her devices had been compromised for over a year, giving full access to her camera and private details to those monitoring her. Losing her right to privacy and learning that strangers with harmful intentions possessed her private photos made her live in fear of their potential leak and lose her sense of safety, especially because she did not feel supported by her family. The fact that those who hacked her phone enjoyed impunity and were backed by her country’s government further fuelled her sense of powerlessness and eroded her faith in the possibility of seeking justice. Traumatised by the experience and lack of protection, she decided to minimise her involvement in human rights work to mitigate the vulnerabilities that came from it.

Another WHRD also reported psychological distress that she faced from having her devices hacked. However, unlike the previous case, this did not disrupt her activism. The support of her family was crucial in helping her manage these stressors and allowed her to continue her activism uninterrupted. This element of support is especially crucial for women engaged in activism in hostile contexts, as it provides them with a sense of support and security against attacks designed to defame and isolate them from their families who might feel ashamed of their activism.

Gendered effects

These cases remind us of the heightened risks that women involved in human rights face due to their work, as well as the gendered nature of digital repression when it targets women. The attacks that women endure often focus on their identity as women, their sexuality, and their bodies for the intention of shaming them and tarnishing their reputation.[13]

For example, one woman activist in a study reported that attacks against women often involve sexual elements, such as accusations about having a boyfriend or engaging in extramarital relationships. As a result, for women originating from regions in which patriarchal norms are well-entrenched and where gender-based violence is normalised, the threat of online surveillance is a nightmarish scenario. The public sharing of private photos and intimate details can be used to provoke threats of sexual violence, including harassment and rape.[14] Even more dangerous, these photos may be used to fabricate images of activists in compromising situations and circulating them as explicit content. GCHR has previously warned against the dangers of deepfake technology and its potential misuse against WHRDs in the region.[15] Because of these costs, some women activists may fall into depression and experience suicidal thoughts,[16] particularly when psychological support is scarce and their families hold their activism responsible for these attacks.

Conclusion and recommendations

This research brief highlights how digital repression has a profound impact on the psychological well-being of human rights activists, often leading to mental health issues such as depression, anxiety, and social isolation. Women are particularly severely impacted by digital repression as the digital attacks they endure have a sexualised dimension. Civil society groups and tech companies have a responsibility to mitigate these effects by supporting affected activists across various arenas. Accordingly, recommendations in this regard include:

For civil society

Provide psychological support for victims of digital repression. While technical and forensic assistance is crucial for detecting device hacks and applying digital hygiene, it should not be the sole form of support expected in digital emergencies. As this brief shows, victims of online surveillance often face severe mental health consequences, including anxiety and depression, due to digital attacks. Civil society groups should strive to provide specialised programs to address those challenges, including counselling and support groups. The responsibility for providing such support should not fall on civil society workers through personal relationships, but rather be ensured through formal mental health services.

Ensure access to legal support. Seeking justice can empower affected individuals, helping them regain their sense of security, which is crucial for their rehabilitation. It is also an important mechanism for keeping the proliferation and normalisation of surveillance tools in check. Civil society organisations should provide legal guidance for those interested in prosecution and building teams of lawyers that are trained in litigating such cases.

Invest in research to explore and establish avenues for accountability. Documenting abuse and cases of digital repression is essential for leveraging data in advocacy. Even more crucial, however, is identifying new legal opportunities that can be harnessed to pursue accountability. For example, one such opportunity is exploring the extent to which international humanitarian and criminal law can be applied to prosecute tech actors involved in selling surveillance technologies to authoritarian governments.

For tech companies

Digital repression should not fall on deaf ears. Social media companies are aware of the extent that their platforms are being used in exercising digital repression. Consider investing in tools and features that ensure the protection and safety of users. Prioritise and respond to reports of digital attacks, especially those reported by victims. 

Engage with civil society groups. Open a channel of communication with local NGOs and trusted flaggers of online violations who have knowledge about the extent of mental health consequences that digital repression and harassment can cause.

Photo credit: Udey Ismail

[1]     Michaelsen, M. (11 June 2022). Digital repression: Transnational reach, psychosocial Effects, and political consequences. Mobilizing Ideas. https://mobilizingideas.wordpress.com/2022/06/01/digital-repression-transnational-reach-psychosocial-effects-and-political-consequences/  

[2]     Al-Jiwazi, N., & Antsis, S. (27 May 2022). The effects of digital transnational repression and the responsibility of host states. Lawfare. https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/effects-digital-transnational-repression-and-responsibility-host-states

[3]     Access Now, (1 February 2024). Between a hack and a hard place: how Pegasus spyware crushes civic space in Jordan. https://www.accessnow.org/publication/between-a-hack-and-a-hard-place-how-pegasus-spyware-crushes-civic- space-in-/qurium/www.gc4hr.org/jordan.html

[4]     GCHR, (24 September 2021). EU calls for release of Ahmed Mansoor and the end to sales of surveillance tools. /eu-calls-for-release-of-ahmed-mansoor-and-the-end-to-sales-of-surveillance-tools/

[5]     GCHR, (22 September 2022). Human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor remains held in solitary confinement five and half years on. /human-rights-defender-ahmed-mansoor-remains-held-in-solitary-confinement-five-and-half-years-on/; and GCHR, (02 August 2024) UAE84 trial is a mockery of justice. /uae84-trial-is-a-mockery-of-justice/

[6]     Moss, D. (2016). The ties that bind: Internet communication technologies, networked authoritarianism, and ‘voice’ in the Syrian Diaspora. Globalizations, 15(2), 265–282.

[7]     Michaelsen, M. (2020). The digital transnational repression toolkit, and its silencing effects. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/special-report/2020/digital-transnational-repression-toolkit-and-its-silencing-effects

[8]     Michaelsen, M. (2020). The digital transnational repression toolkit, and its silencing effects.

[9]     Al-Jiwazi, N., & Antsis, S. (2022). The effects of digital transnational repression and the responsibility of host states.

[10]  Ibid; Al-Jiwazi, N., al. (2022). Emotional and psychological war: Digital transnational repression in Canada. Citizen Lab Research. https://citizenlab.ca/2022/03/psychological-emotional-war-digital-transnational-repression-canada/

[11]  Ibid.

[12]  Michaelsen, M. (2020). Silencing across borders: Transnational repression and digital threats against exiled dissidents from Egypt, Syria and Iran. HIVOS. https://www.hivos.org/assets/2020/02/SILENCING-ACROSS-BORDERS-Marcus-Michaelsen-Hivos-Report.pdf

[13]  Al-Jiwazi, N., al. (Summer/Fall 2023). Transnational repression against exiled women activists. Middle East Report. https://merip.org/2023/09/exiled-women/

[14]  Ibid.

[15]  GCHR, (2019, October 2019). Deepfake poses a threat to human rights defenders in the Middle East. /deepfake-poses-a-threat-to-human-rights-defenders-in-the-middle-east/

[16]  Al-Jiwazi, N., al. Transnational repression against exiled women activists.