When the notorious Case 173 ended in Egypt last year, local human rights defenders (HRDs) hoped it might mean the end of more than a decade targeting human rights organisations.

The case, opened in 2011 and known as the “foreign funding” case, targeted NGOs with foreign links, and a range of HRDs had their assets frozen and were prevented from leaving the country. The psychological impact on local HRDs was severe too, a clear signal that despite the revolution of 2011 which ended the dictatorship of president Hosni Mubarak, the repression of human rights NGOs was to continue.

The Executive Director and Founder of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), Hossam Bahgat (photo above), was one of those originally targeted in Case 173, when he was prevented from travel and had his assets frozen. But in January of this year he was summoned for questioning again, and charged with terrorism-related offences. Bahgat is out on bail, but threats against him and those who do human rights work remain.

On a research visit to Egypt in March 2025, human rights expert Brian Dooley, a member of the Advisory Board of the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR), met a series of HRDs. They complained that the European Union has largely abandoned them, that senior EU officials no longer meet them on visits to Cairo, and that the EU should and could use its influence with President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s government much more, not least over the issue of financial loans to Egypt.

They have long given up hope of any useful support from the United States, but expect more from EU countries which still claim to support human rights.

Several HRDs said that the sudden fall of Syrian dictator Bahar Al-Assad in December had scared President Al-Sisi’s government, which is nervous that such a popular uprising could happen in Egypt, and everyone remembers the contagion of the popular pro-democracy protests in late 2010 and early 2011 across the region which brought down Mubarak.

While President Al-Sisi continues to repress voices calling for reform, parts of the Egyptian government still care about Cairo’s international reputation.

In January this year, Egypt faced the United Nations United Nations Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in Geneva, where – like other UN member states, its human rights record is scrutinised by the other states every four and a half years.

The Egyptian government went to great lengths to counter the reports submitted by local and international human rights NGOs detailing years of abuse.

Local HRDs told GCHR they’re frustrated that other governments don’t use this sensitivity about image and reputation to press for reforms in Egypt, including for the release of activists from prison, and an end to executions and torture.

Instead, the EU appears to be telling itself that President Al-Sisi offers a kind of stability compared with Syria. But the EU need look no further than Egypt’s neighbour Libya to see what happens when a supposedly-stable government falls suddenly and without warning, bringing exactly the sort of chaos the EU wants to avoid.

President Al-Sisi’s stability might be much more fragile than it looks, especially with mounting food prices. The cost of food in Egypt increased 6.60 percent in March of 2025 over the same month last year. High food prices were a key driver of the 2011 revolution, and Food Inflation is today up another 18.60 percent from then.

Another potential trigger for street protests is the situation of jailed activist Alaa Abd El-Fattah, who remains in prison despite having completed his sentence in September 2024. His mother, Dr Laila Soueif, has been protesting in London outside 10 Downing Street for over six months and her health is very fragile. Were she to die on hunger strike some HRDs suggest it could spark demonstrations in Cairo.

HRDs in Egypt also complain that the EU and others have been too gullible about Egypt’s fake reforms, and have been unwisely dragged into supporting a largely cosmetic process. “Momentum for change has been lost,” said one HRD, “and the energy drained out of international pressure by all this talk of a national dialogue and a human rights strategy, which are essentially useless.”

This government plan – to pretend it’s on the path to reforms and needs encouragement, not criticism, from the international community – echoes what the Bahraini government did after the country’s mass pro-democracy protests of early 2011. In the following few years, Bahrain’s ruling family largely took the focus away from its from violent crackdown against HRDs by pretending it had embarked on wholescale human rights reforms, and much international attention moved elsewhere.

Egypt’s HRDs can’t afford fading international scrutiny to completely disappear. What they need for EU and other governments is much more public support, and much more open criticism of President Al-Sisi’s government.