I. BAHRAIN GENERAL PRESENTATION

With a population of over 1.5 million in 2023, Bahrain is a constitutional monarchy that calls itself “reformist”. Inaugurated in 1973, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain was amended on 14 February 2002 following a referendum (98.4% approval, according to the Bahraini government) and then amended again in 2012. Article 1(d) states that the Bahraini system of government is “democratic”. However, surveys conducted by various NGOs clearly contradict this statement: the CIVICUS Monitor gives Bahrain a score of 18/100, describing it as a country with a “closed” civic space. The NGO Freedom House gives Bahrain a score of 12/100 for “overall freedom”, including only 2/40 for “political rights” and 10/60 for “civil liberties”.

A member of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Bahrain is also a member of the United Nations, which it joined in 1971. As such, it is included as a member of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), initially regarded by the UN General Assembly as a human rights charter with a degree of binding force.

However, even though some of the UN’s recommendations – made every four and half years through the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process – have been officially adopted by the Bahraini government, most of them have never been implemented, according to the Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR), the Bahrain Center for Human Rights (BCHR) and CIVICUS, among other NGOS.^[1]

On 06 July 2012, members and observers of the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) submitted 176 recommendations to the Bahraini government.^[2] In October 2012, the latter partially or fully accepted 158 of these recommendations. In particular, it rejected the abolition of the death penalty, the release of human rights defenders and other activists (specifically Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, one of the founding directors of GCHR and co-founder and former President of BCHR) and the strengthening of cooperation with the UN Human Rights Mechanisms.

Four years later, at the beginning of 2017, only 2 of the 158 UPR recommendations accepted had seen any progress towards “genuine implementation”. A number of organisations – BCHR, Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) and the Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) – noted a lack of substantial progress on 133 recommendations, with 23 recommendations being very poorly implemented in a technical sense, with little or no impact.[3]

Then in submissions to Bahrain’s UPR in 2022, human rights organisations – including GCHR, BCHR, ADHRB and the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), noted a troubling lack of progress on key elements to promote civic space, including freedom of expression and association, and reported on violations against human rights defenders, including women, and lack of fair trials and the use of torture in detention.^[4]

Since 2014, the Kingdom has also banned access to its territory for human rights observers including GCHR, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and UN human rights bodies (such as the Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights).

II. BUYING INTERNATIONAL SILENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS? BAHRAIN’S CONNECTION WITH CERTAIN WESTERN COUNTRIES

Bahrain’s flagrant violations of fundamental freedoms appear to be covered up and protected by the Kingdom’s relations with certain Western countries. In addition, Bahrain hosted the Formula 1 World Championship event for the 22nd consecutive time during the 22nd edition of the Bahrain Grand Prix, which took place from 11 to 13 April 2025.

These events underline the Kingdom’s influence on the international stage, even though some activists, such as Najah Ahmed Yusuf called on the championship directors to take action for years.^[5] During the Grand Prix in April 2017, tear gas was used against protesters. Yusuf was arrested following her online criticism of Bahrain’s Grand Prix, and has been subjected to arbitrary detention and torture. She was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment in June 2018. In 2012 and 2016, protesters were killed during demonstrations against the F1.^[6]

• For the UK, Bahrain is an important trading partner for arms exports and other products. The potential trade deficits the UK faces with Brexit support this kind of political relationship.

In addition, the UK police have won millions of pounds by training officers from several Middle East countries that maintain the legal death penalty. In 2017, Bahrain provided around £0.5 million of the £1.3 million provided to the Anglo-Welsh College of Policing since 2012 by the combined governments of Bahrain, the UAE, Oman and Kuwait. The UK Home Office justified its decision by stressing that this training could only facilitate judicial reform and respect for human rights in countries that have not abolished the death penalty: 89% of the money earned by the college came from countries where the death penalty still exists.^[7]

• In the United States, in September 2017, the Pentagon announced that the US State Department had given its approval to a contract for the sale of arms to Bahrain worth more than $3.8 billion. In October 2017, the Bahraini authorities announced the signing with the American Lockheed Martin for the delivery of 16 F-16 fighter jets.

III. INTERNAL STATUS OF THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS

The government is interested in human rights, but it does so in order to fabricate a false civil society within the state, and it goes so far as to praise its own human rights record. This democratic façade is a smokescreen that thwarts the efforts of genuine local and international human rights organisations.^[8]

– Ala’a Shehabi and Luke Bhatia, Bahrain’s Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf (2015)

The Arab Spring was severely repressed in Bahrain. Since 2014, human rights observers and UN human rights organisations have been denied access to Bahraini territory. The “political isolation laws” introduced in 2018 prevent former members of opposition groups from joining parliament or joining the ranks of governors of civil society organisations. “Good Conduct Certificates” are now required for Bahraini citizens and residents in order to access university, employment or – among other things – join a sports club.^[9] Subsequently, the Covid-19 health crisis led to a significant increase in the control and oppression of Bahraini civil society.^[10]

Although in 2024 King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa granted amnesty to more than 2,500 prisoners, including 800 arbitrarily detained for their political participation and peaceful freedom of expression, prominent human rights defenders and political leaders (Sheikh Ali Salman, Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja, Dr. Abduljalil Al-Singace, Hassan Mushaima) remained arbitrarily detained:

• SheikhAli Salman (political activist), initially acquitted following his second trial on spurious charges of sharing intelligence in 2011 with Qatar’s prime minister and foreign minister, he was sentenced to life imprisonment in 2018. He is also charged with “inciting the overthrow of the government by force.”^[11
• Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja (prominent human rights defender and one of the founding directors of GCHR), sentenced in June 2011 to life imprisonment after a military trial, notably for his participation in peaceful demonstrations during the 2011 “Arab Spring”, where he called for democratic reforms across the MENA region. He went on hunger strike after hunger strike.^[12]
• Dr. Abduljalil Al-Singace (prominent human rights defender), sentenced in 2011 to life imprisonment on charges of plotting to overthrow the government because of his participation in pro-democracy demonstrations in March 2011.
• Hassan Mushaima (political activist), sentenced to life imprisonment in 2011 for “attempting to overthrow the government” through his participation in pro-democracy demonstrations. He is suffering ill-treatment and medical negligence in prison.^[13]

For the most part, the various forms of freedom discussed in this report (right to life, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association and peaceful assembly) are well covered and theoretically guaranteed by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain as well as by legislation and decrees. However, the many limits placed on these supposed guarantees, both textually and in practice, reduce them to a mirage. Unprotected, the exercise of these freedoms is severely repressed and condemned by the Bahraini government. The aim here is to confront the texts with their practices.

Certain aspects, such as conditions of detention and trial and Internet surveillance, are not covered here but have already been mentioned in various GCHR reports.^{[14] [15]} On internet surveillance, see in particular “Freedom of expression on the Internet at risk from anti-cybercrime laws in the MENA region” (10 July 2025).^[16]

1. Death penalty

The Bahraini government has refused to abolish the death penalty, a suggestion made by the UN HRC (Universal Periodic Review) on 06 July 2012. The Kingdom of Bahrain submits its fourth national report to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on 24 August 2022.^[17] It states that the death penalty is applicable only in certain cases, and “with due respect for the safeguards set forth in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, including crimes punishable by life imprisonment when committed for terrorist purposes and offences covered by Act No. 15 of 2007 on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

The ICCPR provides in Article 6. 2 of its third part that “In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court.”

However, Bahraini law does not limit the death penalty to the most serious crimes. The European Union recognised in a 2015 resolution that Bahrain has expanded its use of the death penalty to politically motivated cases.^[18] It has used the pretext of terrorism to violate the civil rights of government critics, as the death penalty also includes “vaguely defined terrorism-related offences (under the Penal Code and the Law of Protecting Society from Terrorist Acts (No. 58/2006), opening the door for pretextual targeting of government opponents.”^[19] Consequently, capital trials do not adhere to fair trial standards.

In addition, Article 6.6 of the ICCPR provides that “Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present Covenant.” It appears that the Bahraini authorities are hiding behind the ICCPR in order to further oppress the country’s civil society.

For instance, on 15 January 2015, three Bahrainis (Ali Al-Singace, 21 years; Abbas Al-Samea, 27 years; Sami Mushaima, 42 years) were executed for their alleged role in a bomb attack in Manama in 2014, which killed 3 police officers. These executions are considered extrajudicial by Agnès Callamard, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions.^[20]

B. Freedom of opinion and expression

Articles 22, 23, 27 and 28 (b) of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain guarantee the right to freedom of opinion and expression, provided that “fundamental beliefs of Islamic doctrine are not infringed, the unity of the people is not prejudiced, and discord or sectarianism is not aroused.” (Article 23). Nonetheless, the government took steps in 2022 against what it considered acts of civil disobedience, which included critical speech. The penal code allows penalties of no less than one year and no more than seven years of imprisonment, plus a fine, for anyone who “offends the monarch of the Kingdom of Bahrain, the flag, or the national emblem.”^[21]

At the same time, some human rights defenders have reported intimidation by government officials while at UN headquarters in Geneva. At a side event organised by Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB) in 2015, Abdulnabi Al-Ekri, president of the Bahrain Transparency Society, and Hussain Abdulla, executive director of ADHRB, reported being threatened by a Bahraini MP and the chairman of the country’s human rights committee, Khalid Al-Chaer, who allegedly told Abdulla: “I know that you still have a family living in Bahrain, and you can imagine what would have happened to them by now if the government was really bad”. Al-Ekry and Abdulla also said that the delegation was taking photos of them.^[22]

Other examples illustrate the repression perpetrated by the Bahraini authorities:

• In 2018, prominent human rights defender Nabeel Rajab (one of the founding directors of GCHR and founder and President of BCHR) was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for tweets criticising Saudi interventions in Yemen.

• In 2019, after posting tweets between 2017 and 2019 about documented government corruption and other political problems in the kingdom, lawyer Abdullah Hashim was convicted of spreading “fake news”.
• Incarcerated since 31 December 2019, high school student Kameel Juma Hasan, then aged around 17 and son of former prisoner Najah Ahmed Yusuf, has been convicted in between 15 and 20 different cases. He is now serving a total sentence of 28 years in prison as part of reprisals against his family.

C. Freedom of the press

Article 24 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain provides that “Subject to the provisions of the preceding article, freedom of the press, printing and publication shall be guaranteed in accordance with the rules and conditions laid down by law.” Legislative Decree No. 14 of 2002 on the press, printing and publishing specifies that “journalists have the right to gather or obtain information, statistics and data, provided that their publication is authorised by law.”

However, there has been no independent media in the country since the closure of the Al- Wasat newspaper in June 2017. As the international NGO Reporters sans frontières states, “Bahrain therefore only has television and radio channels controlled by the Ministry of Information. There are four national daily newspapers in Arabic and two in English, all semi-governmental and owned by a member of the royal family. Media outlets owned by the government or by members of the royal family are allowed to work for influential politicians, members of parliament or businessmen and women. Since 2016, Bahraini journalists working for international media have had difficulty renewing their accreditation.”^[23]

D. Freedom of association

Freedom of association, including trade union freedom, is theoretically permitted under Article 27 of the Bahraini Constitution if it is based “on national principles, for legitimate purposes and by peaceful means” and “provided that the foundations of religion and public order are not violated”. Legislative Decree No. 18 of 1972 stipulates that, “Public security and the sanctity of homes and places of worship must not be violated.” Concerning trade unions, any dismissal is officially considered́ to be unfair if the worker is dismissed because he or she belongs to a trade union or legitimately participates in one of its activities, as authorised by the laws and regulations in force (according to Law No. 36 of 2012 on the Labour Code in the private sector). Decree no. 7 of 2020 sets out the rules and procedures to be followed at each stage of collective bargaining. In its 2022 report, the Bahraini government states that “political associations can only be dissolved by court order.”

These texts give the illusion of a form of protection for freedom of association. This is not the case, as the government has the power to interfere in the various forms of association: it uses its authority first and foremost within political associations.

In fact, the government decides whether a group is social or political in nature, based on the statutes proposed by the group. The law prohibits any activity by an unauthorised society or group, as well as any political activity by an authorised civil society group. NGOs and civil society activists have claimed that the ministry regularly uses its oversight role to restrict the activities of these organisations. Local NGOs reported that officials actively sought to undermine the activities of some groups, including by interfering in board elections or imposing burdensome bureaucratic procedures on board members and NGO volunteers. In 2022, the government also required CSOs to submit board candidates for approval before holding elections. The government has repeatedly disqualified members of banned political societies from running for positions in CSOs, sports clubs and other non- political organisations, without explanation or an appeal process.^[24]

All so-called opposition political associations have been dissolved. Members of the political opposition are still in prison for their role in the pro-democracy demonstrations of 2011, as well as for their more recent political activism.^[25]

E. Peaceful assembly

In theory, Article 28.2 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bahrain provides that “public meetings, parades and assemblies” are permitted “if the ends and means of the meeting are peaceful and do not offend public morals”. That said, several laws and actions by authorities restrict the exercise of this right in practice. The anti-terrorism law prohibits unlicensed gatherings of more than five persons, and the Ministry of Interior maintained a prohibition on public demonstrations to “maintain public order”. According to the government, no applications were submitted to hold a demonstration or protest during the 2022 year. The authorities have also banned the use of vehicles for any demonstration, protest or rally, unless the organisers have obtained special written permission from the head of public security.

However, even the most peaceful demonstrations are violently curbed. On 05 April 2021, for instance, the government repressed a peaceful sit-in organised at Jau prison following the death of prisoner of conscience Abbas Malallah, who had been unable to obtain a necessary medical treatment.

F. An official policy that conceals the repression of Bahraini NGOs: national institutions and mechanisms for the protection and promotion of human rights

Bahrain officially has a National Institute for Human Rights (NIHR). Between 2016 and 2022, it had the “B” accreditation status, as the Bahraini government points out in its national report submitted to the UNHRC in 2022. This accreditation is awarded by GANHRI (Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions). The process is handled by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)^[26], the UN human rights body whose mission is to support the creation and strengthening of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs). At its second session (2024), the GANHRI Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) recommended that this status be renewed. In this sense, “B” status denotes partial compliance by the Bahraini National Institution (“in practice and in law”) with the Paris Principles, whose main pillars are pluralism, independence and effectiveness.

Yet, in its 2024 report, the SCA confirms that it has received information indicating that the NIHRB has not strengthened measures to address serious human rights violations, third party communications and UN Special Procedures reports indicating, inter alia, continuing arbitrary arrests and detentions. The SCA also affirms that the NIHRB has not provided sufficient evidence of effective and substantive cooperation with civil society organisations, including human rights defenders.

At the same time, NGOs working to defend human rights have very limited room for manoeuvre. For example, Nabeel Rajab, was convicted in 2016 of “insulting a statutory body” (Article 216 of the Bahraini Criminal Code) for referring to the Ministry of Interior in tweets he posted denouncing the torture of detainees at Jau Prison and “disseminating false rumours in time of war” (Article 133 of the Bahraini Criminal Code) in relation to tweets he published about the Saudi-Arabia led coalition air strikes in Yemen.^[27] He was only conditionally released on 09 June 2020; since then, he has been unable to speak publicly on matters of human rights in Bahrain.

IV. Recommendations

For the international community:

1. Take action against atrocities committed by the government of the Kingdom of Bahrain during events such as the Formula 1 championships.
2. Stop trade agreements that legitimise and strengthen the repressive role of the Bahraini police (in particular with the United Kingdom) and the Bahrain government through the supply of arms (United States and Europe).

For Bahrain:

1. Immediately and unconditionally release all arbitrarily detained human rights defenders and activists.
2. As already recommended by the GCHR in its 2022 report on prison conditions in Bahrain, urgently improve the conditions of detention of prisoners while they are detained. This includes:

• Guaranteeing prisoners the protection of their fundamental rights, in accordance with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Mandela Rules);
• Providing urgent medical care for prisoners (particularly Dr Abduljalil Al-Singace, Abdulhadi Al-Khawaja and Hassan Mushaima) suffering from health problems and left without any appropriate care.

3. Hold accountable and condemn the perpetrators of violence against human rights defenders (detainees and non-detainees), in particular the perpetrators of torture, sexual abuse and other forms of abuse.

4. Halt all ongoing proceedings against human rights defenders in Bahrain. Also, protect the activities of human rights defenders, who are simply exercising their fundamental rights, which are protected by the international community through international institutions or intergovernmental organisations.

5. Repeal the punitive legislation (Constitution, laws, decrees and other texts), both officially and in practice, which allows the criminalisation and prosecution of human rights defenders. In particular, revoke all “anti-terrorist” laws and texts referring to them, which are used to prosecute individuals who use or defend the use of their fundamental freedoms.

6. Reform the conditions of criminal trials and detention to ensure that fair trial guarantees are respected at all stages of the proceedings and that the fundamental rights of the accused are guaranteed.

7. Authorise the entry into the country of NGOs committed to human rights and UN bodies, in order to draw up reliable reports on the current situation suffered by Bahraini civil society.

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^[1] GCHR, BCHR, CIVICUS “Bahrain Joint Submission to the UN Universal Periodic Review 27th Session of the UPR Working Group”, 16 February 2017, /bahrain-joint-submission-to-the-un-universal-periodic-review-27th-session-of-the-upr-working-group/

^[2] United Nations Human Rights Council – 2^nd Cycle, 13th session Universal Periodic Review – Bahrain, Matrix of recommendations, 2012, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/upr/bh-index

[3] ADHRB, BCHR and BIRD, Bahrain’s Third Cycle UPR: A Record of Repression, 17 March 2017, https://www.adhrb.org/2017/03/11848/

^[4] ADHRB, BCHR, GCHR, FIDH, “Joint Submission to the United Nations, Universal Periodic Review, 41st Session of the UPR Working Group – Kingdom of Bahrain”, March 2022, /wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Bahrain_UPR_Joint_Submission_ADHRB_BCHR_FIDH_GCHR_March_2022_ENGLISH.pdf

^[5] Bahrain Institute for Rights & Democracy (BIRD), “Sexually Assaulted Bahraini Female Activist Sentenced to Three Years in Prison over Facebook Comments Criticizing Formula One Race in Bahrain”, 25 June 2018, https://birdbh.org/2018/06/breaking-sexually-assaulted-bahraini-female-activist-sentenced-to-three-years-in-prison-over-facebook-comments-criticizing-formula-one-race-in-/qurium/www.gc4hr.org/bahrain.html

^[6] GCHR and 24 others, “Formula One Group should support the safeguarding of human rights in Bahrain”, 28 March 2019, /formula-one-group-should-support-the-safeguarding-of-human-rights-in-bahrain

^[7] AMIN, Lucas, “UK police earned millions training officers in repressive regimes”, The Guardian, 15 September 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/sep/15/uk-police-earned-millions-training-officers-in-repressive-regimes

^[8] SHEHABI, Alaa and OWEN, Marc, “Bahrain’s Uprising: Resistance and Repression in the Gulf”, 2015.

^[9] Human Rights Watch, Bahrain Events of 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/bahrain

^[10] LUSZEZ, Léa, “Bahrain Takes Advantage of the Sanitary Crisis to Step Up its Repression of the Opposition”,18 August 2021, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/bahrain-takes-advantage-of-the-sanitary-crisis-to-step-up-its-repression-of-the,4971

^[11] Amnesty International, 4 November 2018, “Bahrain: Opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman unlawfully convicted”, http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2018/11/bahrain-opposition-leader-sheikh-ali-salman-unlawfully-convicted/

^[12] Martin Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders, website page dedicated to 2022 laureate Abdul-Hadi Al-Khawaja, https://www.martinennalsaward.org/hrd/abdul-hadi-al-khawaja/

^[13] Americans For Democracy & Human Rights in Bahrain (ADHRB), “Profile in Persecution: Hasan Mushaima”, 26 September 2024, https://www.adhrb.org/2024/09/updated-profile-in-persecution-hassan-mushaima

^[14] GCHR, ADHRB, BCHR, “A Report on Prison Conditions in Bahrain – July 2022”, 07 August 2022, /prison-conditions-in-/qurium/www.gc4hr.org/bahrain.html

^[15] Gulf Centre for Human Rights (GCHR), “Women human rights defenders at risk in detention”, 02 November 2014, /women-human-rights-defenders-at-risk-in-detention/

^[16] GCHR, “Freedom of expression on the Internet at risk from anti-cybercrime laws in the MENA region”, 10 July 2025, /wp-content/uploads/2025/07/GCHR-Freedom-of-Expression-on-the-INTERNET-Cybercrime-Laws-in-MENA-En-July-2025.pdf

^[17] UNHCR, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – National report submitted in accordance with resolutions 5/1 and 16/21 of the Human Rights Council * Bahrain. P.4. Report A/HRC/WG.6/41/BHR/1. 2022, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g22/468/31/pdf/g2246831.pdf

^[18] FIDH, “Rights groups condemn death penalty sentence of Mohammed Ramadan and Husain Ali Moosa”, 16 December 2015, https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_-_death_penalty_compilation_of_fidh_and_leagues_press_releases_from_2013_to_2016-2.pdf (p.10).

^[19] The Advocates for Human Rights – Bahrain’s Compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Alternative Report about the Death Penalty. Submitted in June 2018, https://www.theadvocatesforhumanrights.org/Res/bahrain_human_rights_committee_death_penalty_2%202.pdf

^[20] WINTOUR, Patrick, “Bahrain executes three Shia men in first death sentences since 2010”, 17 January 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/15/bahrain-three-men-death-sentence-shia-muslims-gulf?CMP=share_btn_url

^[21] United States Department of State – 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain, 2022, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/qurium/www.gc4hr.org/bahrain.html

^[22] OWEN JONES, Marc, “From Geneva to London: How Bahrain Tries to Game Human Rights Accountability in the International Area”, 20 September 2017, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/from-geneva-to-london-how-bahrain-tries-to-game-human-rights-accountability-in,2010

^[23] Reporters sans frontières (RSF), Freedom of the press in Bahrain, https://rsf.org/en/country/bahrain

^[24] US Department of State – 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain, 2022, https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/qurium/www.gc4hr.org/bahrain.html

^[25] Human Rights Watch, Bahrain Events of 2024, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2025/country-chapters/bahrain

^[26] United Nations – Human Rights Office of the High Commission, Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) – National human rights institutions (NHRIs) Accreditation Process by GANHRI, https://ganhri.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Accreditation-flyer_EN.pdf

^[27] Global Freedom of Expression, University of Columbia, “The Case of Nabeel Rajab”, https://globalfreedomofexpression.columbia.edu/cases/nabeel-rajab-case/